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Chapter 1
Introduction
Anyone can tell that conversations and texts have meanings. They come with some
content which is conveyed from the speaker or writer to the hearer or reader of
the discourse. Moreover, it does not take long to see that texts and conversations
are built up from smaller units, such as sentences, phrases, and words, and that
there is some sort of systematic relation between the composition of a text or
conversation from smaller units and its meaning. Clearly, the text in (1.1a) does
not mean the same thing as the one in (1.1b).
(1.1) a. Jack opened the door. He turned on the light.
b. Jack turned on the light. He opened the door.
The order of the sentences matters. From (1.1a) we conclude that Jack turned on
the light after he opened the door. Furthermore, we tend to assume that the light
he turns on is a light in the room he just opened a door of. This presupposes that
before Jack opened the door and turned on the light, the light was off. In fact, in
order to turn on the light, he must partly or completely have entered the room,
so it is likely that just after he turned on the light he is in the room. From (1.1b)
we conclude that Jack turned on the light before he opened the door. The light
he turns on must be a light in the corridor or location outside the room of which
he opens a door. This light must have been off, before Jack turned it on. It is
not clear whether Jack enters the room. If we think of the discourse in (1.1b) as
a short narrative, or a description of what happened, that description ends just
after Jack opens the door.
The example illustrates, in a nutshell, what are the main concerns of discourse
theory . If a language user reads a text, or takes part in a conversation, he con-
structs a meaning or interpretation of it in his mind. Conversely, if he wants to
write a text, or contribute to a conversation, he translates what he has in mind
into words and sentences. Discourse theory investigates the systematic relation
between linguistic form and meaning, in particular where the construction and
interpretation of larger discourse units is concerned.
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It tries to explain how language users handle implicitness in discourse, that is,
how they fill in what is not explictly said and obtain cohesive interpretations. It
offers an analysis of the context dependence of sentences in their discourse context.
It addresses, for instance, the particular contribution to discourse meaning of
words and phrases that link up to events or individuals previously mentioned
in the discourse. These are called anaphors. The pronoun ‘he’ in (1.1a-b) is an
examples of this. Definite noun phrases, such as ‘the light’ and ‘the door’, are
sometimes called anaphors as well. They refer to entities which are ‘given’, or
can presumed to be present in the context of interpretation. Because they tell us
something about what the speaker or writer presupposes to be the case they are
also often categorised as presupposition triggers. Sometimes an anaphor has an
explicit antecedent , that is, a word or phrase that precedes it in the discourse,
and which introduces the entity it refers to. For example, in (1.1a-b) ‘Jack’ is the
antecedent of ‘he’.
Discourse grammar is a branch of discourse theory which most rigorously im-
plements the idea that discourse is composed of clauses and larger discourse units
just like sentences are composed of words and phrases. Discourse, like sentences,
has syntactic structure, and the construction of discourse is rule-based. While
the meaning of a sentence is composed of the meanings of the words it consists
of, the meaning of a discourse is composed of the meanings of sentences and so-
called discourse relations. In (1.1), for example, it is assumed that each discourse
is composed of two sentences that are linked by a narration relation. Although
a discourse relation is not expressed by a visible lexeme, it has a syntactic and
semantic contribution of its own, just like a word. The main semantic contribu-
tion of a narration relation is to establish a temporal relation between the events
described by the two sentences in the discourse. The event described by the first
sentence precedes the event expressed by the second sentence in time.
In this work we present a framework of discourse interpretation that includes
a discourse grammar. The purpose of our enterprise is to put forward what might
be called a common language for the specification of discourse theory. Much of
current research in linguistics and discourse interpretation focuses on highly spe-
cialised issues. Moreover, it employs a number of different formal representation
systems, so that the analyses provided are sometimes hard to compare. Though
it is unavoidable that alternative treatments of one and the same topic arise in a
field of research where we meet with uncertainties of various kinds, such a disper-
sion of our findings need not be accepted. Even when we concentrate on details
or isolated phenomena, linguistic theory is essentially a theory of the whole of
a language user’s linguistic capabilities. Analyses of different topics should be
combined so that they may help to evaluate and strengthen each other.
We think it worthwile to strive for unity in formal treatment, and to develop
a shared discourse theoretical perspective. The framework of discourse interpre-
tation that we put forward is a flexible system which allows much freedom in
setting the parameters of discourse theory. We hope that it may help to integrate
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and compare findings that are now spread over different approaches or spelled
out in different formal theories. To show the possibilities of the framework it is
applied in the domain of anaphoricity and presupposition theory in this work.
The framework is a reasoning system which includes a discourse grammar. The
grammar represents the syntactic and semantic ‘rules’ in the mind of a language
user. It models his linguistic knowledge. As may be gathered from our brief dis-
cussion of (1.1), however, linguistic knowledge on its own is not enough to obtain
the meaning of a discourse. A language user employs his world knowledge and
his knowledge of what is normally the case as well. He is able to infer a most
plausible interpretation of a discourse, given his linguistic and his nonlinguistic
knowledge. Therefore, our framework of discourse interpretation also includes a
reservoir of world knowledge, and a so-called default reasoning component and
preference system.
Another salient characteristic of the discourse model is that the grammar is
a Logical Description Grammar. A standard discourse grammar generates lin-
guistic representations or discourse representations for a given discourse. Usually,
linguistic representations are tree structures,1 decorated with syntactic labels and
features, and semantic values. If a single sentence or discourse has more than one
possible analysis or interpretation, the grammar generates a different represen-
tation for each of them. We say, in that case, that the discourse is ambiguous
or underspecified . The following sentence is a example of what is usually called
structural ambiguity.
(1.3) Alan filmed a cat sitting on the roof.
Depending on how we link the phrase ‘sitting on the roof’ to the other parts of
the sentence we get different meanings. If it modifies the object ‘a cat’ it indicates
a property of the animal: the cat that Alan filmed was sitting on the roof. On the
other hand, if it attaches to the verb phrase ‘filmed a cat’ it specifies the manner in
which Alan filmed a cat, namely while he (Alan) was sitting on the roof. Another
example is given in (1.4); this is a common case of underspecification.
1A tree structure is a graph with certain special characteristics. A graph is a finite set of
nodes with a relation on it. A tree structure is a graph with a single root, or topnode. If there is
more than one node, the root is connected to one or more ‘daughter nodes’, which themselves
can be the topnode of a subtree. Subtrees are disjunct. Here is an example; the nodes are
indicated by letters.
(1.2) a
b
c d e
f
g h
i j
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(1.4) John fell. Bill pushed him.
We may fill in the implicit relation between the two events differently. Either
John fell, and subsequently, Bill pushed him. Or we infer that John fell because
Bill pushed him, so the pushing took place before the falling.
Ambiguity and underspecification may come in various forms and guises in a
given language, and discourse abounds with it. A grammar formalism can capture
the interpretation of an ambiguous sentence or discourse by producing all possi-
ble linguistic representations and corresponding meanings. However, it can also
produce a single representation, which underspecifies the syntactic or semantic
properties that are variable and differ across the possible representations. De-
scription grammars are of the latter kind.2 For any given sentence or discourse
they generate a single description, which specifies all that is invariable about the
input, and leaves open the options when there is a choice. In the case of (1.3), the
description will say that ‘sitting on the roof’ is a constituent within the sentence
but it will not determine its exact syntactic position. In (1.4), it will say that
there is a relation between the events expressed by the two sentences, but it will
not specify which one.
In a description grammar there are two levels of linguistic analysis, namely
that of the description, which can be partial, and that of the linguistic structures
or representations it describes. For any given input, the possible representations
can be obtained by reasoning about the tree structures that ‘fit’ the description
and the semantic content that may possibly fill the gaps. In particular, we will
speak of a Logical Description Grammar or LDG. This serves to emphasize that
the grammar formalism in our framework is in fact a logical theory, that is, a
set of statements, or constraints in a logical language. Sentence and discourse
descriptions are likewise sets of statements in a logical language. The combined
theory of the grammar and a discourse description describes the syntax and se-
mantics of a given discourse. The linguistic representations of a discourse can be
obtained by reasoning about the models that verify the combined theory.
There are various reasons why the use of descriptions in linguistics is attrac-
tive. One is the very simple one of having compact representations of what must
otherwise be summed up in a list. Another is the computational advantage of
not having to backtrack too soon in practical implementations of natural lan-
guage processing. From a theoretical point of view, an important reason is that
with partial descriptions we can state most directly and precisely what we know
about the words and sentences they represent, and what can assumed to be their
contribution to the syntax and semantics of the larger whole of a discourse. We
can abstract over what is variable in their behaviour. This, in principle, leads to
conceptual accurateness and transparancy in our grammar and discourse descrip-
tions. Finally, since the description method applies not just to individual words
2See for instance Vijay-Shanker (1992), Rogers and Vijay-Shanker (1992), Muskens (1995),
Gardent and Webber (1998), and Kallmeyer (1999).
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or particular discourses, but to linguistic theory as such, there is a great flexibility
and generality in the approach.
It is the last point we take as a lead in our discourse model. While the compo-
nents of the framework we have on offer are not different from what is present in
other approaches, we present a meta-theoretical perspective which is new. The de-
scription method allows us to talk about discourse theory as such, and to consider
different ways of implementing it. The framework may be seen as a test-bed for
discourse theory, and a tool for comparing and integrating different approaches
towards the same linguistic topic. We think this is particularly useful in a field
like discourse semantics, where, we would claim, the theories that are developed
are open ended in two ways. First, it is not very clear how to delineate the object
of research and determine what a discourse theory should account for. Second,
there is the issue of what power or complexity the theory itself might or might
not have.
As for the first point, we will try to stay on safe ground by concentrating on
the observable linguistic facts, that is, words, sentences, and texts in English, and
the possible readings that sentences can get in a given discourse context, accord-
ing to our own intuitive judgement and that of other language users. The latter is
already slippery ground, though. Beyond this is the vista of the communication
process as whole, and all the aspects of human language behaviour. We will stay
away from that, but it cannot be denied that the things that people say or write
are part of their communicative behaviour. We will sometimes refer to rules of
communication and language users’ purposes, in order to explain our ‘observable
facts’. Furthermore, as is common nowadays, we adopt a cognitive linguistic per-
spective. We will talk about the language user’s grammatical knowledge, and will
consider his language capacity as a cognitive capability.
As for the technical properties of the formalism, we allow ourselves a dis-
course theory that is highly powerful. The description grammar is in the class of
context-sensitive grammar formalisms. The grammar is a set of hard constraints:
a discourse must satisfy these constraints, if not, it is predicted to be ungram-
matical. The grammar is complemented with a so-called preference system and
a common sense reasoning component. Preferences and common sense inferences
generate gradient predictions, and these predictions are cancellable in the presence
of new information. The preference system raises the complexity of the discourse
theory, but it seems necessary to accept this if one aims at a linguistic coverage
that is anywhere near complete. At the same time, it is good practice to explain
the phenomena we are looking at in the simplest possible way, so in general we
will try to formulate our account in terms of plain grammatical constraints first,
and only if that does not work resort to preferences.
Existing discourse theories vary greatly in what they cover or intend to explain,
and in the formal tools they employ. They range from those that provide a logic
to account for relatively few aspects of the semantics of discourse, for instance
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Discourse Representation Theory,3 File Change Semantics,4 Dynamic Montague
Grammar,5 Dynamic Predicate Logic,6 and Update Semantics,7 to those that have
a broad linguistic coverage and are meant to account for the macro-structure of
discourse, such as the Linguistic Discourse Model,8 Rhetorical Structure Theory,9
Segmented Discourse Representation Theory,10 and (Lexicalised) Tree Adjoining
Grammar for Discourse.11 They may also build on theories of planning and goal
satisfaction, like Centering Theory,12 or focus on dialogue interpretation.13
The description grammar framework is powerful enough to implement the
greater part of the linguistic phenomena that these theories cover. Due to the
description method, the parameters of the discourse theory can be varied, and
the constraints can be set exactly as one wants. Thus, for any given linguistic
topic, a particular account may be tested by implementing it, and trying out
alternative accounts. On the basis of such comparisons we can hopefully make
some motivated choices, not just with respect to the topic under consideration,
but also with respect to the discourse theory in which it is embedded.
In chapter 2, 3, and 4 of this book the LDG framework of discourse interpretation
is developed. In chapter 5 and 6 the model is applied in the domain of anaphoric-
ity and presupposition theory. In the second of these chapters we take up two
competing theories of presupposition interpretation in discourse, and show that
they can fruitfully be combined in a single treatment.
Chapter 2 introduces the concept of description grammars and presents the
Logical Description Grammar formalism that we will employ. In chapter 3, the
LDG formalism is tuned to the treatment of discourse, and the framework of dis-
course interpretation is put forward. The emphasis in this chapter is on discourse
syntax. We discuss the place of discourse relations in the grammar formalism,
and their relation with underspecification. We zoom in on the relation between
discourse and sentence grammar. Finally, we discuss the ins and outs of the frame-
work as an incremental model for discourse interpretation. We assume that lan-
guage users process discourse step by step. The grammar generates a discourse
description for the discourse processed so far, and each newly processed contri-
bution to the discourse induces an incrementation of the discourse description.
3Kamp (1981)
4Heim (1982)
5Groenendijk and Stokhof (1990)
6Groenendijk and Stokhof (1991)
7Dekker (1993)
8(Polanyi 1988; Scha and Polanyi 1988)
9Mann and Thompson (1988)
10Asher (1993)
11Webber et al. (1999)
12Grosz and Sidner (1986)
13like for instance Hamblin (1971), Carlson (1983), Ginzburg (1994), Walker (1996a), and
Hulstijn (2000).
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After each incrementation step, the language user may reason about the discourse
description, and obtain the possible interpretations of the discourse. Chapter 3
spells out the basic properties of the grammar formalism and technicalities of the
reasoning process.
Chapter 4 unfolds the semantics of the formalism. It defines the notion of dis-
course meaning dynamically, as the update of what is implicitly taken for granted
by the participants in the discourse with what is being said in it. After each dis-
course contribution a newly updated discourse meaning can be inferred from the
discourse description. Discourse descriptions describe discourse tree structures.
Each node in a discourse tree comes with a semantic value, and the semantic
value of the topnode is constructed compositionally from the semantic values of
the nodes it dominates. The semantic representation language—which is a sub-
language of the description language—is a variant of Compositional Discourse
Representation Theory, put forward in Van Leusen and Muskens (2003). Fine-
grained CDRT, as we call it, is informally introduced in the chapter and defined
in detail in appendix A.
The main issue in chapter 4 is the treatment of context dependence, or context
sensitivity in discourse, and how to account for this compositionally. With a view
to the analysis of anaphors, presupposition triggers, and context-sensitive words
and phrases in general, we assign not only semantic values, but also local contexts
to the nodes in a discourse tree. Local contexts represent precisely the contextual
information that is relevant for the interpretation of the discourse constituent
represented by the node to which they are assigned. Anaphors, presupposition
triggers, and discourse relations are characterised in the lexicon of the grammar
in terms of, among others, conditions on their local contexts. Furthermore, general
constraints on the informativity and consistency of discourse constituents in their
local contexts can be included in the grammar.
In all of this, the description method and the overall architecture of the frame-
work lead to a smooth integration of grammatical levels, and of sentence and
discourse theory. Lexical descriptions describe the syntactic and semantic contri-
bution of words in parallel, and this carries over to discourse descriptions. The
grammar is simply a set of constraints which grammatical discourse must satisfy.
Syntactic and semantic constraints naturally interact in delimiting grammatical
discourse. Although we have not specified phonological and morphological con-
straints, it seems reasonable to expect that these components can be incorporated
in the grammar as well.
As for the place of pragmatics in our framework, matters are somewhat differ-
ent. Meaning effects that are cancellable, or which result in acceptability judge-
ments that are gradient, are to be explained in terms of the language user’s
preferences, and we decided to call parameters of the discourse theory that are
captured by means of preferences pragmatic. Since the whole of our framework
is a reasoning system in which grammatical constraints and preferences interact
freely, pragmatics, in our sense of the term, is a fully integrated component of
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discourse theory. It is a question for future investigation, however, how much
of what is commonly called pragmatics is covered by our notion. It remains to
be seen, for instance, exactly how a characterisation of discourse contributions
in terms of their appropriate use in communication, and the intentions, commit-
ments and beliefs of the participants could be given in our framework of discourse
interpretation.
Chapter 4 completes the presentation of our description grammar framework.
The basic parameters of the discourse theory are specified and the general ap-
proach to discourse analysis should be clear at this point. The framework is an
open work environment, in which some aspects of discourse theory are formally
spelled out, and others await further elaboration. It is flexible in the sense that
even in the case of basic parameters, which determine, for instance, the type of
structures that discourse descriptions can describe, or the semantic representation
language, different choices could be made. For easy reference, the basic axioms
and definitions of the LDG formalism are summed up in appendix B.
In chapter 5 the analysis of context sensitive elements introduced in chapter
4 is taken up, and a treatment of anaphoricity as an independent parameter in
the discourse theory is put forward. Anaphors introduce underspecified discourse
markers. Anaphora resolution is an inference task, in which the language user
must find out what discourse marker present in the local context of the anaphor
potentially binds it, and determine which of the potential binders results in a most
preferred reading of the discourse. The inference task is constrained by general
semantic conditions on binding, as well as constraints that are particular to the
class of anaphors under consideration. For instance, for personal pronouns, we
assume that their binders must be entities that are salient, and in a domain of
elements determined by the local discourse topic. We touch upon the analysis of
so-called bridging anaphors, and discuss the possibility of accommodating binders.
This means that the presence of a suitable binder in the local context of the
pronoun is presumed, even though there is no explicit antecedent in the discourse
context which introduces it.
In chapter 6 we zoom in on presupposition theory. We combine the approach
to presupposition theory proposed in Karttunen (1974) and others, with the ap-
proach put forward in Van der Sandt (1992) and Geurts (1999). The first is
sometimes called the satisfaction theory of presupposition. It treats presupposi-
tions as tests on the context of interpretation. For a sentence to be felicitous or
interpretable, the context of interpretation must entail or satisfy its presuppo-
sitions. Sometimes a presupposition can only be satisfied by strengthening the
context of interpretation; this is accommodation. The second approach may be
called the anaphoric theory of presupposition. Its central idea is that presupposi-
tional material must be bound in the discourse context of the trigger. If it cannot
be bound, it must be inserted at some semantically accessible location in the
discourse context; this is accommodation in the sense of the anaphoric approach.
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Starting out from Karttunen (1974), we view presuppositions as conditions on
local contexts, and implement the relation of satisfaction as a relation of entail-
ment. On the other hand, we analyse presupposition triggers as anaphors, in line
with the anaphoric approach. Anaphoric aspects of presupposition interpretation
can then be explained in terms of the interaction with independent constraints on
binding in the discourse theory. Presuppositional conditions can only be satisfied
given the binding of the trigger.
Fusing the two approaches, we find that each comes with its own notion of ac-
commodation. In the satisfaction approach, this is the strengthening of the initial
context of interpretation of a conversation with general background knowledge,
as induced by the satisfaction of presuppositions or arbitrary other constraints.
In the anaphoric approach, it is the insertion of precisely the presuppositional
material in accessible locations in the semantic representation of the discourse.
Though these are qualitatively different forms of accommodation, both are the ef-
fect of the language user’s effort to obtain a possible and most preferred discourse
meaning, and we shall argue that if the interpretation task calls for it, they may
co-occur. They will be implemented in our discourse semantics accordingly.
Presupposition theory is an integrated part of discourse theory. When a sen-
tence contains a presupposition trigger, the satisfaction of the presuppositional
condition is only one factor in its interpretation. The hearer may use the total
of his grammatical knowledge to infer the possible grammatical readings of the
sentence. Reasoning on the basis of his preferences and world knowledge, he will
determine the most preferred readings among these. Thus, what comes out as
a most preferred reading is the result of the interaction of all grammatical con-
straints and preferences involved. This explains that sentences that may be said
to evoke weak presuppositions can get strongly presupposing interpretations.
Generally speaking, the predictions of our combined treatment conform to
those of the anaphoric approach, if the constraints on informativity and consis-
tency and the preferences in the discourse grammar are set in the manner of
the anaphoric account. The explanatory force of the satisfaction approach is pre-
served in the assumption that presupposition triggers introduce context sensitive
conditions. As such, they incite the reasoning process that eventually results in
the binding of presuppositional material, either by an explicit antecedent, or by
accommodated material. Overall, the two approaches are overlapping, and can be
seen to complement, rather than rival each other.
As spin-off of our implementation, we will see that various aspects of presup-
position theory that received a procedural treatment in the anaphoric approach
to presupposition can be treated declaratively in our underspecification frame-
work. Furthermore, given the flexibility of the account, a unified treatment of the
diverse class of presupposition triggers may be provided, while still doing justice
to their individual differences. Finally, along the way, we offer an interesting, if
not conclusive evaluation of the role of informativity conditions in our discourse
theory. Informativity is a typical example of a discourse parameter of which it
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is not quite clear whether it belongs to discourse semantics or to pragmatics.
We lean towards the latter point of view but the reader is invited to join in the
discussion.
We wrap up in chapter 7.
We would like to end with a note on coverage, and the usefulness (or unusefulness)
of formal theory in discourse analysis. In any theory of discourse interpretation,
there is a trade-off between formal precision and empirical coverage. To put it
strongly, only a crumb of what one would like to say about the linguistic data
and their interpretation can be specified in a formal theory by spending a reason-
ably acceptable amount of time on it. Still, the analysis must be as precise and
explicit as possible. That is why, in general, linguists use formal theories, or log-
ics, or representation formalisms. At the same time, we want to stay close to the
empirical data and give a relatively extensive analysis. In practice we will walk
the middle road between formal rigour and broad linguistic coverage by being for-
mally precise about what we consider to be basic parameters of discourse theory,
while also leaving much of what the discourse theory as a whole is intended to
cover unspecified.
It follows from this that we will sometimes have more to say about the lin-
guistic data than is reflected in the formal theory. The conceptual analysis can
be richer than the formal treatment, and there is no sense in which the latter
is more important than the former. We may add that to capture the facts that
one does understand in a formal theory can be difficult, but to avoid formalising
inadvertently what one does not fully understand can be just as hard. This is
where plain, informal discussion wins over formalisation and must certainly be
given its due.
Chapter 2
Logical Description Grammar
2.1 Introduction
The discourse model which is developed in this dissertation consists of a Logical
Description Grammar or LDG for discourse analysis, a reservoir of world knowl-
edge, and a reasoning component. In this chapter we explain what LDGs are and
how they work, and set some pointers to the relevant literature.
Description grammars for sentence analysis have been proposed in Vijay-
Shanker (1992), Rogers and Vijay-Shanker (1992), Muskens (1995), Pinkal (1996)
and Kallmeyer (1999), among others. Description grammars for discourse analy-
sis have been proposed in Gardent and Webber (1998) and Duchier and Gardent
(1999). Whereas most natural language grammars generate tree structures as
linguistic representations, LDGs generate logical descriptions of tree structures.
Since these descriptions can be partial, in the sense that more than one tree
may satisfy a given description, aspects of the described tree structure may be
underspecified. Due to this feature, LDGs have certain attractive properties.
For one, the derivation or incrementation of descriptions is a monotonic, non-
destructive process. That is, no information is removed from a description when
it is incremented. This is different in a related formalism such as Tree Adjoin-
ing Grammar, where the adjunction operation changes structural relations in the
input tree. Furthermore, underspecification or ambiguity occurring in linguistic
expressions can be represented in an intuitively plausible manner through under-
specified representations. Finally, in description grammar any type of linguistic
feature which may be relevant for the analysis of a sentence or discourse can be
described in one and the same representation language. Thus, the grammar for-
malism allows for a smooth integration of constraints coming from different gram-
matical levels, such as syntax, semantics and—in the case of discourse analysis—
pragmatics. It also supports a unified account of sentence and discourse analysis.
The structure of this chapter is as follows.
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As a preliminary, in section 2.2 the main features of Tree Adjoining Grammar
(TAG) are discussed. Description grammar can be viewed as an extension or
modification of TAG. Next, in section 2.3, the basic idea underlying description
grammars is explained: description theory can be used to underspecify features
of linguistic representations. In section 2.4, the central part of this chapter, we
zoom in on the specific variant of description grammar that will be employed in
our discourse model in later chapters. This is the LDG formalism proposed in
Muskens (2001). The section starts with an introduction to the various levels of
analysis of the grammar and discusses the components of the grammar and their
working in detail. The chapter is summed up in section 2.5.
2.2 Tree Adjoining Grammar
Logical Description Grammar can be viewed as a variant of Tree Adjoining Gram-
mar (TAG). In TAG, linguistic representations are composed from ‘elementary
trees’ which are provided by the lexicon. Parsing a sentence comes down to putting
together the elementary trees triggered by the lexemes occurring in the sentence.
This is the same in description grammar, be it that in description grammar there
is an additional level of representation, namely the level of descriptions of tree
structures.
TAG was first introduced in Joshi et al. (1975), as a grammar formalism
whose generative capacity is adequate for the treatment of natural language. As
was argued in, among others, Shieber (1985), the generative capacity of context-
free grammars is not sufficient for natural language. TAGs are ‘mildly context-
sensitive’, that is, slightly more powerful than context-free grammars. TAG has
been applied to various kinds of long distance dependencies in linguistic descrip-
tion. Since TAG was put forward, its claim to adequacy for natural language
analysis has been put to the test, and this has led to the formulation of additional
constraints and various extensions, one of which is LDG. Description grammars
are at least as powerful as TAGs.1
For in-depth introductions to TAG, we refer to Joshi et al. (1975), Joshi (1987),
Abeille´ (1993), or Kallmeyer (1999). Here, we only present some necessary back-
ground information for our explanation of description grammar. The discussion
is not meant as an overview of the TAG-literature, but it should give the reader
an easy access to it.
Whereas standard phrase structure grammars are defined in terms of rewriting
rules on strings, TAGs are defined in terms of operations on tree structures. TAGs
generate tree structures rather than strings. In a TAG, a syntactic structure for a
1Exactly how much more powerful they are depends on the specific type of the grammar for-
malism under consideration; this is a matter for further investigation, see for instance Kallmeyer
(1999).
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natural language sentence is derived by ‘putting together’ elementary trees, each
of which carries a lexical item at one of its leaves. For example, the syntactic
structure for the sentence ‘John sneezed’2—
(2.1) S2
DP1
John
VP4
V5
sneezed
—can be constructed, or derived, from the elementary trees for ‘John’ and ‘sneezed’:
(2.2) DP1
John
(2.3) S2
DP3 ↓ VP4
V5
sneezed
We will say more about the derivation process in a moment. Formally, a TAG
consists of a set of initial elementary trees, a set of auxiliary elementary trees, a set
of terminal symbols, and a set of nonterminal symbols. In the context of natural
language processing, the elementary trees represent the syntactic structure and
other grammatical features which a lexeme of a particular word class contributes
to the syntactic representation of a sentence. Lexemes are terminal symbols and
syntactic categories are nonterminal ones. For expository purposes the nodes in
the trees in our examples are numbered as well; the numbers do not form part of
the elementary trees, however.
Initial elementary trees, such as the two featuring in (2.2) and (2.3), often
contain substitution nodes . Substitution nodes are nodes on the frontier of the
elementary tree labelled by a nonterminal symbol. They are marked by ↓. Lin-
guistically, a substitution node represents a constituent which the lexemes that
select the elementary structure subcategorise for. Auxiliary trees—see the exam-
ple in (2.4) further on—differ from initial trees in that one of the nodes on their
frontier, labelled by a nonterminal, is a so-called foot-node. This node is anno-
tated with an asterisk (*). The label of the foot-node must be identical to the
label of the root node of the elementary tree. Auxiliary trees introduce recursion
in a linguistic structure.
2The internal syntactic structure of the DP is suppressed in these representations. The same
goes for the AP further on.
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Derived trees are produced by combining elementary trees, or previously de-
rived trees. The yield of a derived tree is the string of terminal and nonterminal
symbols we find at its leaves when going through the tree from left to right. The
language generated by a TAG is the set of terminal strings yielded by the trees
that can be derived by the TAG. A TAG is adequate for a given natural lan-
guage if it generates the set of all grammatical expressions of the language and
no others, and if the tree structures generated are syntactically correct, given the
linguistic theory that is adopted.
Tree structures are derived through the operations ‘adjunction’ and ‘substitu-
tion’. For example, the syntactic tree for ‘John sneezed’ in (2.1) is derived from
the two initial trees in (2.2) and (2.3) by substituting the tree headed by the
node numbered 1 for the node numbered 3. Substitution is the replacement of a
substitution node in a tree by another tree. The substitution node and the root
of the tree to be substituted must carry the same syntactic label. Substitution is
typically used to link a predicate to the arguments or complements it subcate-
gorises for.3 Adjunction4 is typically used to model the (recursive) application of
modifiers. The operation makes use of auxiliary trees. As stated above auxiliary
trees contain a unique node which is marked as a foot-node and which carries the
same nonterminal label as the root. Here’s an example:
(2.4) VP6
AP7
suddenly
VP∗8
Adjunction is an insertion operation on trees which replaces a subtree rooted at a
node called the adjunction site. Adjunction replaces the subtree by an auxiliary
tree, while attaching the subtree at the foot node of the auxiliary tree. Adjunc-
tion may only take place when the labels of the root node of the subtree and
the foot node of the auxiliary tree are identical. For example, the syntactic tree
for the predicate ‘suddenly sneezed’ is derived by adjunction of the auxiliary tree
for ‘suddenly’ in (2.4) to the elementary tree for ‘sneezed’ in (2.3) at node 4, the
adjunction site. This results in the structure shown in (2.5). Subsequent substi-
tution of the elementary tree for ‘John’ in (2.2) at the substitution site in (2.5)
will derive a complete syntactic structure for ‘John suddenly sneezed’.
3However, as is shown in Kroch (1987) and Abeille´ (1988a), Abeille´ (1988b), this correspon-
dence breaks down for complement clauses when the interaction with long-distance dependencies
is considered. The matrix sentence which subcategorises for a complement clause should feature
a substitution node, but the interaction with long distance dependencies forces it to be a foot
node. In Kallmeyer (1999) it is argued that this is one of the problems of TAGs solved in LDGs.
4Adjunction is referred to as ‘insertion’ in Schilder (1997). It appears in the form of ‘con-
struction rules’ in Pru¨st (1992) and Pru¨st et al. (1994), and as ‘topic-based updating’ in Asher
(1993).
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(2.5) S2
DP3 ↓ VP6
AP7
suddenly
VP8
V5
sneezed
TAGs are not just employed for sentence analysis but also for discourse analy-
sis. Both in (L)TAG for Discourse(Webber 1991; Schilder 1997; Gardent 1997a;
Webber and Joshi 1998; Gardent and Webber 1998; Webber et al. 1999; Webber
et al. 1999; Webber 2004)5 and the Linguistic Discourse Model (Scha and Polanyi
1988; Pru¨st 1992; Pru¨st et al. 1994; Polanyi and van den Berg 1996; Polanyi et al.
2004) the adjunction operation plays a central role in modelling the incrementa-
tion process in the analysis of ongoing discourse, and in accounting for discourse
syntactic constraints on interpretation.
In some variants of TAG, notably within Polanyi’s Linguistic Discourse Model,
another derivation operation is used beside adjunction, namely ‘attachment’ or
‘extension’. Extension comes down to adding a subtree as a new daughter to a
node in a tree which already has at least two daughters. The picture in (2.6)
below illustrates this. In the Linguistic Discourse Model, extension is used when
the conjugated discourse units are connected by a single relation of semantic
parallelism, and thus, in the words of the authors,6 are semantically strongly
connected.
(2.6)
k1
k2 . . . k3 k4 =⇒
k1
k2 . . . k3 k4
Much of the work on TAG for natural language concerns so-called Lexicalised
TAG, see for example Schabes (1990), Joshi and Schabes (1991), and Abeille´
(1993), Abeille´ (1994). A lexicalised TAG , or LTAG , is a TAG in which each
elementary tree structure is systematically associated with an overt lexical item
called ‘the anchor’. More precisely, a structure, elementary or derived, is lexi-
calised if there is at least one overt lexical item that appears in it. If more than
5Webber (2004) is a useful survey paper, setting pointers to other papers and approaches,
and clarifying Webber’s point of view on the sentence-discourse interface.
6Pru¨st et al. (1994), pp. 299, 300.
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one lexical item appears, either one lexical item is designated as the anchor, or
a subset of the lexical items local to the structure are designated as a ‘multi-
component anchor’. A grammar is lexicalised if it consists of a finite set of lexi-
calised structures and an operation or operations for composing the structures.
Usually, the anchor of an elementary tree instantiates its syntactic head. It
determines what nodes and syntactic labels are present in the elementary tree in
which it figures; these nodes can be said to be anchored to it. An elementary tree
represents the domain of locality of its anchor, a domain over which syntactic
and semantic constraints can naturally be stated. Because of the potential use of
adjunction, this domain may be stretched or extended. Thus, LTAGs are char-
acterised by an ‘extended domain of locality’ as compared to context-free phrase
structure grammars.
2.3 Description Grammars
Although TAG is more powerful than context-free grammar, it has been argued
that it still cannot handle some natural language phenomena very well. This is
claimed, for example, with respect to certain aspects of scrambling in German
(Rambow 1994a; Rambow 1994b), aspects of extraposition (Weir 1988; Kroch
and Joshi 1987), and a uniform treatment of complements (Kroch 1987; Abeille´
1988a; Abeille´ 1988b; Rambow et al. 1995a). In response to the last problem a
variant of TAG called ‘D-Tree Grammar’ is developed in Rambow et al. (1995a),
building on Vijay-Shanker (1992).
Both in Rambow’s ‘D-Tree Grammar’ and Vijay-Shanker’s rephrasing of TAG
in terms of ‘quasi-trees’ (see below), tree descriptions or constraints on trees are
used instead of trees, and the relation of immediate dominance connecting the
nodes of a tree is relaxed. We shall call grammar formalisms which in one way
or another share these two features description grammars. Beside D-Tree Gram-
mar and TAG with quasi-trees, the term covers, among more, Logical Description
Grammars (Muskens 1995; Muskens and Krahmer 1998; Muskens 2001), Radical
Underspecification (Pinkal 1996), Constraint Language for Lambda-Structures
(Egg et al. 1998; Egg et al. 2001), Tree Description Grammars (Kallmeyer 1999),
and description grammar for discourse as proposed in Gardent andWebber (1998),
Duchier and Gardent (1999), and Van Leusen and Muskens (2003).
The central characteristic of these grammar formalisms is that they generate
descriptions of linguistic tree structures rather than the structures themselves.
Either implicitly or explicitly there are two levels of analysis: the level of con-
straints or descriptions, and the level of the described linguistic structures. Since
descriptions can be partial, they can serve to underspecify aspects of the struc-
tures they describe. In principle, any feature of the linguistic structure can be
underspecified. Like TAGs, description grammars offer an extended domain of
locality, but they have a greater generative capacity than TAGs.
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The idea to use descriptions of trees in natural language processing can be traced
back to Marcus et al. (1983). Marcus et al. are concerned with deterministic
natural language parsing. They adopt the hypothesis that natural language can
be analysed by a parsing process which builds a syntactic analysis indelibly , that
is, any structure built by the parser is part of the correct analysis of the input.
They observe, however, that when the indelible syntactic analysis takes the form
of a tree, there are certain linguistic constructs which terminally confuse the
parser, although they are interpretable to a human agent.
In order to solve this problem, they propose to use ‘D-Theory’, as they call
it. Instead of trees, the parser should manipulate descriptions of syntactic struc-
tures or trees. The two characterising features of ‘D-theory’ are that it specifies
‘dominance’ rather than ‘immediate dominance’ between nodes, and that it uses
names to refer to nodes. These node names function like variables: they can re-
fer to any node that fits the description in as far as it is specified. They do
not name a particular entity, as personal names do. Immediate dominance is a
primitive relation between nodes (irreflexive, intransitive, asymmetric). A node i
dominates a node j iff i = j or there is a node k such that i dominates k and k
immediately dominates j. By stating only dominance in a description, relations of
immediate dominance existing in the tree described can be underspecified. This
allows for deterministic parsing where otherwise some form of backtracing would
be required.
Marcus et al. formulate a cognitive requirement for their approach: for D-
theory to be psychologically valid, it must be the case that just those constructions
which garden-path a D-theory parser garden-path people as well. This require-
ment is later referred to as the deterministic hypothesis in Duchier and Gardent
(1999): cases of attachment ambiguity that require no conscious reanalysis from
the language user must be processed deterministically.
The idea to use description theory for parsing is taken up in Vijay-Shanker
(1992). In that paper a reinterpretation of TAGs as grammars which manipulate
descriptions of trees, called ‘quasi-trees’, is proposed. Quasi-trees feature pairs of
quasi-nodes which carry the same syntactic label and which are related through
dominance: ‘top’ dominates ‘bottom’. In building up a quasi-tree for a sentence, a
pair of quasi-nodes may be identified, or it may be ‘pushed apart’ by intervening
nodes.
Quasi-trees can be visualised by means of pictures that are similar to trees, but
which should not be confused with them. In these pictures, immediate dominance
is indicated by uninterrupted lines and dominance by dashed lines. For example,
the quasi-trees describing the elementary trees from which the sentence ‘John
suddenly sneezed’ is built up can be pictured as follows.
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(2.7)
DP1
John
VP7
AP8
suddenly
VP9
S2
DP3 VP4
VP4′
V5
sneezed
Elementary quasi-trees are put together through subsertion and sister-adjunction.
Subsertion generalises over the substitution and the adjunction operation in TAG.
Sister-adjunction has the same effect as extension in TAG.7 Both these operations
basically consist of the addition of dominance links between nodes. In our exam-
ple, subserting the quasi-trees for ‘John’ and ‘suddenly’ into the quasi-tree for
‘sneezed’ results in the following quasi-tree.
(2.8) S2
DP3
DP1
John
VP4
VP7
AP8
suddenly
VP9
VP4′
V5
sneezed
The set of structures derived by the quasi-tree grammar can be obtained by
taking the ‘circumscriptive reading’ of the domination relation indicated in the
quasi-trees composed with subsertion and sister-adjunction. This is done by iden-
tifying top and bottom nodes that are linked by dominance edges. For example,
the circumscriptive reading of the quasi-tree in (2.8) is obtained by identifying
node 1 and node 3, node 4 and node 7, and node 9 and node 4′. Notice that a
dominance relation may stretch over an arbitrary number of nodes linked by im-
mediate dominance. In principle a quasi-tree describes an infinite number of tree
structures. The tree structure obtained by taking the ‘circumscriptive reading’ of
the domination relation in a quasi-tree is the minimal tree compatible with it.
7Actually these two operations do not feature yet in Vijay-Shanker (1992). We are grouping
together here some follow up of Vijay-Shanker (1992), such as Rogers and Vijay-Shanker (1992),
Rogers and Vijay-Shanker (1994), Rogers (1994), and Vijay-Shanker and Weir (1994), and
closely related work on D-Tree Grammar, such as Rambow et al. (1995a) and Rambow et al.
(1995b).
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Vijay-Shanker’s motivation for using descriptions is that it supports a straight-
forward embedding of (feature based) TAG in a unification framework. With
standard TAG such an embedding is hindered by the fact that derivation is non-
monotonic: the adjunction operation does not preserve the structural relations
holding in the trees that are combined. In the quasi-trees approach, however, the
derivation process is monotonic. Subsertion and sister-adjunction only add dom-
inance links to elementary descriptions, and the circumscription operation only
strengthens statements about dominance to identity statements.
This is not only computationally attractive but also linguistically interesting.
Through the use of partial descriptions the syntax and semantics of the linguistic
tree structures can be underspecified. Since natural language abounds in am-
biguous phrases and constructs which underspecify the syntax and semantics of
sentences, such as gapping and VP-ellipsis, it is desirable to have a grammar in
which this can be expressed directly—a grammar which generates representations
that underspecify the syntax or semantics of a sentence whenever it is in fact un-
derspecified or ambiguous.8 A grammar which produces partial descriptions of
trees naturally does this.
The work by Marcus, Hindle and Fleck, and by Vijay-Shanker has been taken
up by other authors, who propose their own variant of description grammar. They
all use descriptions as underspecified representations of linguistic structures, but
the grammars sometimes differ in their formal characteristics.
For example, the tree descriptions may be (sets of) quantified first order formu-
lae as in Muskens and Krahmer (1998) and Muskens (2001) or nonquantified ones
as in Kallmeyer (1999), Egg et al. (1998) and Duchier and Gardent (1999). The
described tree structures may provide both syntactic and semantic information
as in Muskens and Krahmer (1998), or they may be just semantic representations
as in Egg et al. (1998). Description grammar is combined with compositional
DRT as a semantic representation language in Van Leusen and Muskens (2003),
and with (U)DRT in Cimiano and Reyle (2005). Blackburn and Bos (1999) and
Bos (2004) combine λ-DRT with Hole Semantics, an underspecification formalism
closely related to UDRT.
Furthermore, in most papers the described structures are regular tree struc-
tures, but in Blackburn and Gardent (1998) and Duchier and Gardent (1999)
they are proposed to be ‘re-entrant’ trees (Directed Acyclic Graphs). Kallmeyer
defines ‘synchronous local TDGs’ and employs them in the syntax-semantics inter-
face of her grammar (1999). The manner in which the minimal trees or ‘solutions’
or ‘models’ of a description are computed may vary: in Muskens and Krahmer
(1998) and Muskens (2001) built-in properties of the grammar and the descrip-
tion of a sentence ensure that only minimal trees fit the description, in other
approaches, for instance Duchier and Gardent (1999), sentence descriptions allow
8Such representations are commonly, perhaps confusingly, called ‘underspecified representa-
tions’. The representations themselves are not underspecified, of course.
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nonminimal verifying trees but only the minimal ones are computed.
There is also some variation with respect to the issues addressed, and the
perspective from which they are viewed. The emphasis may be on computational,
linguistic, or cognitive issues. In Marcus et al. (1983), tree descriptions are pro-
posed to be used for computational purposes, notably, to allow for deterministic
parsing of natural language. In Vijay-Shanker (1992), a description grammar, ma-
nipulating quasi-trees, is developed in order to define derivation as a monotonic
process. In Erk et al. (2002) the computational properties of processing CLLS are
investigated. Duchier and Gardent (1999) zooms in on the efficient computation
of minimal models for description grammar allowing re-entrant trees. Blackburn
and Bos (1999, 2005) and Bos (2004) provide an extended computational imple-
mentation and integrate automated inference techniques.
Taking up the deterministic hypothesis of Marcus et al. (1983), Gardent and
colleagues address cognitive issues in the treatment of garden-path sentences and
incremental discourse processing (Gardent and Webber 1998; Duchier and Gar-
dent 1999). Interestingly, they argue that for a proper treatment of garden-path
sentences more is needed than just description theory: underspecification must be
combined with a preference system that highlights a specific reading correspond-
ing to the hearer’s currently preferred interpretation. Without this additional
bias, description grammar would be too tolerant, and would not predict that in
these cases some form of backtracking or revision of previous analysis takes place.
Finally, different authors concentrate on different linguistic constructs. Among
others, Rambow et al. (1995a) discuss the treatment of complement clauses, and
wh-movement. The treatment of quantifier-scope ambiguities, ellipsis and an-
aphora at sentence level is in focus in what might be called the Saarbru¨cken
branch of description grammar, that is Pinkal (1996), Egg et al. (2001), and oth-
ers. Scope ambiguities and lexical ambiguity are also addressed in Muskens and
Krahmer (1998), Muskens (2001), and Cimiano and Reyle (2005). VP-ellipsis is
in focus in Thompson (2002), who combines description theory with higher order
unification. The constraining effect of ontological information on syntactic and
semantic ambiguity is addressed in Cimiano and Reyle (2005). Various forms of
structural and semantic ambiguity occurring at discourse level are treated in Gar-
dent and Webber (1998) and Duchier and Gardent (1999). Garden-path sentences
are discussed in both Marcus et al. (1983) and Gardent and Webber (1998). In
Van Leusen and Muskens (2003) the interaction of anaphora and presupposition
resolution with general background information at discourse level is addressed.
Egg and Redeker (2006) focus on discourse structure per se.
2.4 LDG in Detail
The particular version of description grammar that will be employed in our frame-
work of discourse interpretation is the one proposed in Muskens and Krahmer
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(1998) and Muskens (2001). Following Muskens, we call the grammar a Logical
Description Grammar or LDG . The name highlights the fact that the descrip-
tions generated by the grammar are statements or sets of statements in a logical
language, in this case classical type logic. The grammar is purely declarative. It
models parsing as a deduction process; a parse results from the language user’s
reasoning about linguistic descriptions. The formalism is nonincremental, that is,
all relevant linguistic information for the analysis of a sentence must be given
at the outset of the reasoning process. In the next chapter, where we apply the
formalism to the description of discourse structure, an incremental version of the
grammar will be proposed.
In the following sections the LDG formalism will be discussed in detail. Sec-
tion 2.4.1 explains the overall working of the grammar. In section 2.4.2, we go
through an example which illustrates the parsing process and which shows how
structural ambiguity is dealt with in an LDG. This introduces some further as-
pects of Muskens’ approach in an informal way. Subsequently, we zoom in on
the various components of the grammar formalism. Section 2.4.3 introduces the
axioms or general descriptions of the grammar, section 2.4.4 is about the positive
and negative polarities of nodes, in section 2.4.5 input descriptions are discussed,
and section 2.4.6 is about lexical descriptions.
2.4.1 Overall Working of the Grammar
An LDG system G = 〈G, I〉 consists of the following components.
• A Logical Description Grammar G=〈A,W〉, where
– A is a set of axioms or general descriptions and
– W a set of lexical descriptions (classifying and elementary)
• I, an infinite set of input descriptions δ, generated per processed utterance
Lexical descriptions describe the syntax and semantics associated with the lex-
emes of the language. They are comparable to the elementary trees in a TAG.
Lexical descriptions come in two kinds: classifying descriptions and elementary
tree descriptions. The first link a lexeme to its word class and a semantic value,
the second associate a tree structure with a basic word class. Differing slightly
from Muskens (2001) we will use the term lexical description only to indicate
the combination of a classifying description and the appropriate elementary tree
description. The axioms or general descriptions determine the structures that are
described by the grammar, namely tree structures.
A full-fledged LDG can be expected to contain additional descriptions repre-
senting aspects of the specific linguistic theory incorporated in the grammar. As
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opposed to the axioms, these descriptions would cover the ‘variable’, or theory-
dependent part of the grammar formalism. The linguistic theory might be pre-
sented as a separate component of the grammar, called T . As we will see, however,
constraints of the linguistic theory can very often be incorporated in the lexicon
W, or else formulated in a few additional general descriptions, so that there is no
necessity to adopt an new component T .
In what we shall often call the grammar system or grammar formalism the
grammar G is combined with an infinite set of input descriptions I, which are gen-
erated per sentence. Input descriptions sum up the lexical items in a sentence and
specify the order in which they occur. Beside the grammar and the input descrip-
tions an LDG system may be assumed to contain so-called integrity constraints:
constraints of a logical or linguistic nature on the form of input descriptions and
lexical descriptions. Being meta-level constraints, we have not represented them
in the system.
All descriptions in the grammar system, whether input, lexical, or general
descriptions, are stated as quantified formulae in first order predicate logic. The
grammar is a set of logical statements, a logical theory representing the linguistic
knowledge of the language user. This facilitates reasoning with descriptions. In
particular, parsing can be modeled as logical deduction given G. A description
grammar G is adequate for a given language if, for any grammatical sentence u in
the language and for no ungrammatical one, the input description of the sentence
δu is consistent with G. Sentence interpretation is modeled as follows in LDG.
sentence
u
?
input or sentence description
(underspecified representation) + G
δu
?
set of verifying tree structures
M(δu)
...
set of possible semantic interpretations
Figure 2.1: Sentence interpretation in LDG
First, the language user constructs an input description of the sentence and selects
the relevant lexical descriptions fromW. Though the term is not used in Muskens
(2001), we will refer to the whole of this as the sentence description. It represents
the language user’s linguistic knowledge of the sentence and the words occurring
in it. Sentence descriptions can be partial, and so, syntactic or semantic features
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of the sentence may be underspecified. Sentence descriptions instantiate what
might be called the level of underspecified representation in the grammar system.
Next, the language user may reason about the tree structures that ‘fit’ the
sentence description given G, thereby parsing the sentence. Parsing is a deduction
process in which the minimal trees or models that verify a sentence description
are determined.9 The resulting set of trees instantiates a second level of analysis
in the grammar, the level of fully specified linguistic structures.
Reasoning about the alternative sets of node identifications which the sen-
tence description allows for given the axioms in G, the language user may arrive
at a set of alternative, more specific descriptions. Each of these alternatives is
validated by a particular tree structure.10 The respective tree structures are pre-
cisely those that validate the original description. Each of them corresponds to a
particular disambiguation of the sentence. When the description of a sentence is
not validated by any tree structure, the sentence does not belong to the language
generated by the grammar.
Finally, to obtain the semantic interpretation of the sentence, the language
user may collect the semantic values at the root nodes of the tree structures val-
idating the sentence description. The interpretation of these values produces the
possible interpretations or readings of the sentence. In fact, semantic interpreta-
tion is an integrated part of the parsing process: reasoning about the sentence
description involves both reasoning about the tree structures that satisfy it and
reasoning about the potential meaning of the sentence, as represented at the roots
of the tree structures. Like syntactic features, semantic values can be underspec-
ified.
In the following section the parsing process is illustrated with an example.
After that, we zoom in on the different components of the grammar and the
parsing-as-deduction method. Section 2.4.3 discusses the axioms of the grammar,
section 2.4.4 is about the pairing of ‘positively’ and ‘negatively marked’ nodes in
the parsing process—not discussed so far—, in section 2.4.5 input descriptions
are examined, and section 2.4.6 is about lexical descriptions.
2.4.2 Parsing an Ambiguous Sentence: An Example
Consider the sentence
(2.9) John saw a man with a telescope.
9The tree structures are indeed the models which validate the descriptions according to
classical model-theory. In order to avoid confusion between the models of descriptions, and the
models commonly featuring in semantic interpretation (also represented in the schema in 2.1)
we prefer to use the terms ‘trees’ or ‘tree structures’.
10To be precise, each alternative description is validated by the tree structures in a single
equivalence class of structures.
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This is a classic case of syntactic ambiguity: the modifying PP ‘with a telescope’
may be attached to the NP, as in the syntactic tree in (2.10) below, or to the
VP, as in tree structure (2.11). This results in, respectively, the reading of the
sentence in which there was a man with a telescope whom John saw, or the
reading in which John saw a man by means of a telescope.
(2.10) S
DP
John
VP
V
saw
DP
D
a
NP
NP
man
PP
P
with
DP
D
a
NP
telescope
(2.11) S
DP
John
VP
VP
V
saw
DP
D
a
NP
man
PP
P
with
DP
D
a
NP
telescope
In a standard TAG, it is not possible to generate a single syntactic representa-
tion which underspecifies the ambiguity, thus reflecting that the sentence may
be interpreted either way. This is different with description grammars. In LDG,
the two trees in (2.10) and (2.11) feature only at the second level of analysis in
figure 2.1, the level of fully specified linguistic structures. Processing the sentence
results in a possibly partial logical description of the sentence, the first level of
analysis in figure 2.1. The ambiguity of the sentence is captured in the sentence
description through underspecification of the syntactic structure.
As in section 2.3, the sentence description of (2.9) can be represented in the
form of a picture; see (2.12) below. As before, uninterrupted lines represent the
relation of immediate dominance and dashed lines represent dominance over an
arbitrary, underspecified length. The left-right ordering between sister nodes and
between lexical nodes in the picture reflects the precedence relation between these
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nodes. Furthermore, the picture now figures a root node r and a variable category
label XP, which can match either NP or VP.11
(2.12) r−
DP+1
John
S+8
DP−9 VP
−
10
VP+11
V2
saw
DP−12
DP+13
D3
a
NP−14 NP
+
4
man
XP+15
XP−16 PP
−
17
PP+18
P5
with
DP−19
DP+20
D6
a
NP−21 NP
+
7
telescope
The picture in (2.12) shows an important new feature, namely the decoration of
certain nodes with + and − polarities. The trees or models that verify a sentence
description can be obtained by pairing off positively and negatively marked nodes
in a one-to-one fashion and identifying the nodes thus paired. The axioms and
integrity constraints of the grammar ensure that this is so, see section 2.4.4 below.
They also enforce that the resulting structure is a linguistic tree, that the order
of the lexical elements in the structure reflects their order in the sentence, and
that category information linked to the nodes is respected that is nodes can only
be identified when they carry the same syntactic label.
Given the sentence description, the sentence can be parsed. Remember that
parsing is a deduction process. Using his grammatical knowledge, the language
user may deduce an output description which is more explicit about the models
or tree structures that satisfy it. In particular, he will reason about the mapping
of positively and negatively marked nodes and the resulting node identifications.
In the case of the description in (2.12) he might reason as follows. Consider
the negatively marked node named 21. It can be seen that 21=7 can be derived:
21 must match with a positively marked node. All nodes named other than 4, 15
and 7, are excluded on the basis of clashing category information; but of these
three 4 and 15 are out because they precede 6 while 21 is preceded by 6. Now
only one candidate is left, namely 7, so 21 must be identified with 7. In much the
same way 19=20, 12=13, 9=1, 17=18 and 8=r is derived. This produces the
following description as a possible intermediate result.
11The labeling ‘XP’ on nodes 15 and 16 in (2.12) is just a way of representing the fact that
the syntactic label of these nodes is underspecified, though they must carry the same label.
On the assumption that a modifier headed by the preposition ‘with’ may attach to either an
NP or a VP, XP may be either an NP or a VP. This cannot be expressed very well by means
of a picture, but in the lexical description of the preposition it can be spelled out. It should
contain the following statement, in which ℓ is a function which assigns syntactic labels to nodes:
(ℓ(15) = vp ∨ ℓ(15) = np) ∧ ℓ(16) = ℓ(15)
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(2.13) S8
DP9,1
John
VP−10
VP+11
V2
saw DP12,13
D3
a
NP−14 NP
+
4
man
XP+15
XP−16 PP17,18
P5
with DP19,20
D6
a
NP21,7
telescope
At this point there is a choice between the identification of node 16 with node
11 or with node 4. Now it cannot be deduced which identification must be made.
This reflects the ambiguity in the sentence which is being parsed. However, when
each of the two possibilities is pursued we find the two tree structures which
validate the description, and which represent the two possible interpretations of
the sentence.
If node 16 is identified with node 11 then given the general descriptions it
logically follows that 10 = 15, and 14 = 4. This produces one of the possible
models of the description, namely the tree-structure introduced earlier in (2.11).
Alternatively, if node 16 is identified with node 4, it can be deduced that 14=15,
and 10=11. This results in the other possible model, namely the tree structure in
(2.10). Through the combined force of the lexical, input and general descriptions
these two are ensured to be the only models of (2.13). The sentence description
captures the ambiguity of the sentence in a single representation through the
underspecification of dominance relations.
2.4.3 General Descriptions
As stated in section 2.4.1 an LDG consists of a set of axioms or general descrip-
tions, a set of lexical descriptions, and input descriptions, generated per sentence.
The general descriptions of the grammar characterise the basic properties of the
structures described. They ensure that the structures are always tree-like. Given
the additional constraining force of the lexical descriptions and the input descrip-
tions the structures described by the grammar must be linguistic trees.
The set of general descriptions proposed in (Muskens 2001) comprises four-
teen axioms, the first ten of which concern dominance and precedence in tree
structures. In the description language of the grammar nodes are indicated by
k, k1, k2, . . .. Furthermore ≺ denotes linear precedence,  denotes immediate dom-
inance, ∗ denotes dominance, and + proper dominance. A node k1 dominates
a node k2 if k1 properly dominates k2, or if k1 is identical to k2.
A1 ∀k r∗k
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A2 ∀k ¬ k+k
A3 ∀k1k2k3 [[k1
+k2 ∧ k2
+k3] → k1
+k3]
A4 ∀k ¬ k≺k
A5 ∀k1k2k3 [[k1≺k2 ∧ k2≺k3]→ k1≺k3]
A6 ∀k1k2 [k1≺k2 ∨ k2≺k1 ∨ k1
+k2 ∨ k2
+k1 ∨ k1=k2]
A7 ∀k1k2k3 [[k1
+k2 ∧ k1≺k3]→ k2≺k3]
A8 ∀k1k2k3 [[k1
+k2 ∧ k3≺k1]→ k3≺k2]
A9 ∀k1k2 [k1k2 → k1
+k2]
A10 ∀k1k2k3¬[k1k3 ∧ k1
+k2 ∧ k2
+k3]
AxiomA1 states that the root r dominates all other nodes.A2–A5 ensure that+
and ≺ are strict partial orderings. The Exhaustivity property, A6, says that any
two nodes stand either in a precedence relation or in a relation of dominance.12
The Inheritance property, laid down in A7 and A8, says that precedence relations
are inherited from ancestor nodes. Finally, A9 and A10 constrain the relation
between immediate dominance () and proper dominance (+).
The description language further contains the labeling function ℓ. The labeling
function assigns syntactic category labels to nodes, as for example in ℓ(n) = vp.
To ensure that nodes are labeled uniquely, it must be prevented that category
label names corefer. This is what the following axiom does.
A11 c1 6= c2, if c1 and c2 are distinct label names
Three further axioms will be discussed in the next section.
2.4.4 Positive and Negative Anchoring
It is a specific property of the description grammar formalism as it is formulated
in Muskens (2001) that nodes in descriptions are either positively or negatively
marked, or not marked at all, in which case they are called saturated . Saturated
nodes are of both + and − polarity; they are unmarked in order to keep the
pictures of descriptions transparent. To illustrate, in the following description of
the sentence ‘John sneezed’, the nodes 1, 3, and 6 are positively marked, the
nodes 4 and 5 and the root are negatively marked, and 2 and 7 are saturated.13
12Furthermore, it follows from A1–A8 that every pair of distinct nodes that is not related
through dominance is related through precedence. This is known as the Exclusivity property,
see for instance Partee et al. (1990), ch. 16 p. 442.
13Negatively marked nodes correspond to what are sometimes called ‘open nodes’ in other
description grammar formalisms, compare for example Duchier and Gardent (1999). Positively
marked, and saturated nodes correspond to ‘closed nodes’.
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(2.14) r−
DP+1
D2
John
S+3
DP−4 VP
−
5
VP+6
V7
sneezed
The positive and negative marking of nodes plays a central role in obtaining the
tree structures that satisfy a given description. The verifying trees are obtained by
mapping positively and negatively marked nodes one-to-one. Negatively marked
nodes may attach to material below them, positively marked nodes may attach to
material above them, and saturated nodes are not required to be identified with
any other node.
All of this is regulated by the axioms A12–A14, which will be listed below.
Rather than talk about the positive or negative marking of nodes in descriptions
of trees, however, these axioms talk about the positive or negative anchoring of
nodes to their lexical anchor. The notion ‘lexical anchor’ already popped up in our
discussion of the lexicalisation constraint in TAG in section 2.2. The constraint
requires that each elementary tree in a TAG is associated with (at least) one
lexical item, called its anchor . The anchor determines what syntactic constituents
feature in the elementary tree. All nodes in the elementary tree are anchored to
the designated lexical item or to the node at which it sits.
In LDG the lexicalisation constraint is implemented as follows. For every lexi-
cal description inW it holds that all the nodes in the description are anchored to
the lexical head of the described tree. If a constituent in the described elementary
tree is, in the sense of X-bar theory, a projection of the lexical head, the corre-
sponding node is positively anchored to it. The intuitive idea behind this is that
a positively anchored node in an elementary tree is introduced, or contributed
by the anchor. On the other hand, if a constituent is subcategorised for by the
lexical head, the corresponding node is negatively anchored to it. A negatively
anchored node in an elementary tree represents a constituent which is required or
‘consumed’ by the lexical head. It must be produced by other elementary trees.
To clarify the above, consider the following representation of the sentence
description in (2.14), in which the anchoring relations expressed by the positive
and negative marking in (2.14) are visualised by arrows, and the anchors are
indicated by ⋄.
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(2.15)
− +
−
−
+ +
+/− +/−
r
DP1
D⋄2
John
S3
DP4 VP5
VP6
V⋄7
sneezed
Almost all of the anchoring relations in this description are introduced by the lexi-
cal descriptions of John and sneezed, the only exception is the negative anchoring
of the root. The anchoring relations play an essential role in deducing node identi-
fications in a given sentence description. The deduction process is constrained by
the following three general descriptions, which we shall call the anchoring axioms
of the grammar. The predicate lex says that a node is lexical, and the functions
α+ and α− produce, respectively, the positive and negative anchor of a node. For
example α+(k1) = k2 says that k1 is positively anchored to k2.
A12 ∀k lex(α+(k))
A13 ∀k [k = r ∨ lex(α−(k))]
A14 α−(r) = r
Axiom A12 requires that the positive anchor of a node is lexical and A13 requires
the same for negative anchoring, except for the root. The root is negatively an-
chored to itself (A14). Intuitively, this means that the root creates the open slot
it fills itself: there is no element which subcategorises for the root.
Together, the axioms A12–A14 require that each node in a tree structure is
both positively anchored to a lexical node, and negatively anchored to a lexical
node or the root. The positive and the negative anchor can but need not be
identical. If the anchoring axioms are to be satisfied, nodes which in a given
lexical or derived description are only specified to be positively anchored must
be identifical to nodes that are only specified to be negatively anchored, and
vice versa. Thus positively marked nodes are mapped one-to-one to negatively
marked ones. The anchoring axioms help to ensure that the trees verifying a
sentence description are the minimal ones verifying it. The distinction between
positive and negative anchoring relations is essential for this.
In the case of example (2.15), the anchoring axioms enforce the identification
of node 1 and 4, node 5 and 6, and node 3 and the root. Note that in the resulting
tree, see (2.16) below, node 1 (or 4) is positively anchored to node 2 but negatively
anchored to node 7. This reflects that the DP is contributed or produced by the
proper name John and at the same time functions as an argument of the predicate
headed by sneezed.
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(2.16)
−
+
+ − +/−
+/− +/−
S3,r
DP4,1
D⋄2
John
VP5,6
V⋄7
sneezed
To end this discussion of positive and negative anchoring, notice that the an-
choring axioms cannot be satisfied relative to individual lexical descriptions. The
axioms regulate the manner in which lexical description may combine to form a
sentence description, hence they can only be sensibly applied at sentence level.
Even then, it must be so that the input description of a sentence triggers ‘enough’
lexical tree descriptions. If not, either A12 or A13 is violated and inconsistency
can be deduced. It would follow that the sentence is ungrammatical.
2.4.5 Input Descriptions
The description grammar outlined above is a sentence grammar. For any given
sentence, it produces an input description which covers the complete sentence.
Input descriptions sum up the lexical nodes appearing in the sentence, and specify
the linear order of these nodes and the lexical items attached to them. Further-
more, input descriptions contain what we shall call a circumscription clause. The
clause says that there are no other lexical nodes than the ones named in the input
description. To illustrate, in (2.18) we give the input description of the sentence
(2.17). The circumscription clause is underlined.
(2.17) John suddenly sneezed.
(2.18) ∃k1k2k3(k1 ≺ k2 ≺ k3
∧ john(k1) ∧ suddenly(k2) ∧ sneezed(k3)
∧ ∀k(lex(k)↔ (k = k1 ∨ k = k2 ∨ k = k3)))
It is one of the integrity constraints of the grammar framework that the order
of the lexical nodes in an input description reflects the order of the words in the
sentence it represents. Presumably, another integrity constraint—though not one
stated in Muskens (2001)—is that there is a one-to-one correspondence between
the words in a sentence and the lexical nodes occurring in its input description.
This ensures that the input description of a sentence triggers ‘enough’ lexical
tree descriptions, so that, in principle, the anchoring axioms can be satisfied.
Finally, the presence of a circumscription clause in the input description is another
integrity constraint.
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The circumscription clause plays a central role in ensuring that the described
trees are finite, and more specifically, that they are the minimal ones that may
satisfy the description. The clause requires the lexical nodes in any tree that
may satisfy the input description to be one of a particular finite set, namely
those that are named in the input description. Similarly, the lexical descriptions
triggered by the lexical nodes in the input description specify and circumscribe
the nonterminal nodes that are positively or negatively anchored to each of the
lexical nodes, and this is a finite set too. In this manner, the maximal number
of nodes (both terminal and nonterminal) in a tree is determined: there can be
no more nodes in a verifying tree than the ones that are explicitly named in the
input description and the relevant lexical descriptions.
The LDG formalism presentend here is purely declarative and nonincremental:
input descriptions are not built up word by word but generated at once for the
whole sentence. Logical deduction is applied to complete input descriptions. The
circumscription clause, formulated as it is, would cause problems in an incremen-
tal set-up of the grammar. This can easily be seen by considering what would
happen if the grammar formalism would be used to process discourse incremen-
tally. Suppose a discourse is a sequence of sentences. We would then process the
sentences one after another, with each incrementation step adding a new input
description to the ones already generated. Each individual input description in
the resulting set or discourse description would contain its own circumscription
clause, saying that there are no other lexical nodes than the ones described in
it. This would cause the discourse description to be inconsistent. Thus, in an
incremental version of the formalism, circumscription must be implemented in
a different way. We will return to this issue in the next chapter, in which an
incremental variant of LDG will be proposed.
2.4.6 Lexical Descriptions
So far we have been talking about the lexicon of the description grammar as if it
consists of a single type of descriptions, namely lexical descriptions. In fact, the
lexicon, as it is defined in (Muskens 2001), contains two kinds of descriptions,
namely classifying descriptions and elementary tree descriptions.
Classifying descriptions specify, for every lexical item, its semantic value and
the word class it belongs to. In the case of example (2.17) the following descrip-
tions apply. They classify ‘John’ as a proper noun (pn), ‘suddenly’ as an adverb
(adv), and ‘sneezed’ as an intransitive verb (iv). The function σ gives the seman-
tic value of a node. More precisely, σ stands for a family of functions σα, which
associate nodes with semantic values of type α. For simplicity, the superscripts
are suppressed in our descriptions.
(2.19) a. ∀k[john(k)→ (pn(k) ∧ σ(k) = john)]
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b. ∀k[suddenly(k)→ (adv(k) ∧ σ(k) = suddenly)]
c. ∀k[sneezed(k)→ (iv(k) ∧ σ(k) = sneezed)]
Elementary tree descriptions associate a tree structure, including syntactic and
semantic labels, with each basic word class. An elementary tree description de-
scribes the syntax and semantics contributed by an arbitrary lexical item in the
relevant word class. While classifying descriptions provide the basic semantic val-
ues of lexical nodes, elementary descriptions provide ‘recipes’ for the composition
of the complex semantic values of nonterminal nodes. The semantic representation
language used in Muskens (2001) is classical type logic.14 In principle, however,
the description grammar formalism does not enforce the use of a particular se-
mantic representation language, and a different representation language could
be chosen. In our LDG for discourse compositional DRT will be employed, see
chapter Four.
The grammar might associate the following elementary tree desciptions with
the word classes pn, adv and iv. In the descriptions △(k, k′, k′′) abbreviates the
conjunction kk′ ∧ kk′′ ∧ k′ ≺ k′′. Furthermore, t
+
←֓ {t1, . . . , tn} and t
−
←֓
{t1, . . . , tn} abbreviate the information that t1, . . . , tn are exactly the elements
that are, respectively, positively and negatively anchored to t.
(2.20) ∀k[pn(k)→ (ℓ(k) = dp ∧ k
+
←֓ {k} ∧ k
−
←֓ ∅)]
(2.21) ∀k[adv(k)→ ∃k2k3[ℓ(k) = ap ∧ ℓ(k2) = vp ∧ ℓ(k3) = vp ∧
△(k2, k, k3) ∧ σ(k2) = σ(k)(σ(k3)) ∧ k
+
←֓ {k, k2} ∧ k
−
←֓ {k, k3}]]
(2.22) ∀k[iv(k)→ ∃k2k3k4k5[ℓ(k) = v ∧ ℓ(k2) = s ∧ ℓ(k3) = dp ∧
ℓ(k4) = vp ∧ ℓ(k5) = vp ∧△(k2, k3, k4) ∧ k4 
∗ k5 ∧
k5  k ∧ σ(k5) = σ(k) ∧ σ(k2) = σ(k4)(σ(k3)) ∧
k
+
←֓ {k, k2, k5} ∧ k
−
←֓ {k, k3, k4}]]
Notice that the elementary tree descriptions for proper names (2.20) and adverbs
(2.21) have been simplified, for purely expository reasons. They do not contain a
node which is labeled by the syntactic category label corresponding to the basic
word class. The nodes labeled ‘DP’ and ‘AP’ act as lexical anchors.
We shall continue to use the term lexical description for the combination
of the classifying description of a particular lexical item with the elementary
tree description of the appropriate word class. To illustrate, for the lexical item
14It is type logic with an extension. Muskens embeds predicate logic (PL) in classical type
logic in order to be able to model variable binding in quantificational contexts after the binding
machinery used in the Tarski truth definition of PL. The resulting language contains formulae
of type ‘register’ (comparable to discourse referents) and of type ‘state’. A more extended
explanation of the embedding of PL in classical type logic than the one provided in Muskens
(2001) can be found in Muskens (1996).
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‘suddenly’, the lexical description resulting from conjoining (2.19b) and (2.21)
can be graphically represented as follows.
(2.23) VP+k2
suddenly(σ(k3))
AP⋄k
suddenly
suddenly
VP−k3
σ(k3)
In this picture node names appear as subscripts. Semantic representations are
represented in italics; note that σ(k)σ(k3), occurring in the elementary tree de-
scription for adverbs, has been instantiated to suddenly(σ(k3)). Lexical descrip-
tions for the other lexical items in ‘John suddenly sneezed’ can be constructed in
the same way.
As was explained in the preceding sections, parsing is a deduction process
in LDG. Parsing the sentence ‘John suddenly sneezed’ consists in collecting the
input description of the sentence (2.18) and the classifying- and elementary tree
descriptions describing the lexical elements in it, and reasoning about the tree
structures that verify them given the axioms of the grammar. As a preliminary,
witnesses are chosen for the nodes described in the input description. Intuitively,
this implements the idea that the language user is parsing a particular occurrence
of the sentence and the lexical items it contains. Whenever he comes across new
nodes in the reasoning process fresh witnesses are taken. To illustrate, he may
take witnesses 1, 2, 3, and 4 for the nodes in (2.18), which produces
(2.24) 1 ≺ 2 ≺ 3 ∧ john(1) ∧ suddenly(2) ∧ sneezed(3)
∧ ∀k(lex(k)↔ (k = 1 ∨ k = 2 ∨ k = 3))
In the other descriptions, node names can subsequently be substituted by the
appropriate witnesses. Taking input and lexical descriptions together this results
in
(2.25)
DP+1
John
John
VP+4
AP2
suddenly
suddenly
VP−5
S+6
DP−7 VP
−
8
VP+9
V3
sneezed
sneezed
Using this description (or set of descriptions) as a premise to his grammar, the
language user can now deduce the node name identifications 7=1, 5=9, and 8=4.
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See Muskens (2001) for a detailed discussion of the reasoning process involved,
made relative to a similar example. The node name identifications result in a
description which is verified by a single tree structure, namely
(2.26) S
suddenly(sneezed(john))
DP
John
John
VP
AP
suddenly
suddenly
VP
V
sneezed
sneezed
The axioms of the grammar do not allow for the deduction of any alternative set
of node identifications. Thus, the sentence is predicted to be unambiguous.
In case a sentence is ambiguous (as is, for example, (2.9) that was discussed
in section 2.4.2) there will be more than one model or tree structure that satisfies
its description. Notice, however, that although the alternative models that satisfy
a description in case of ambiguity can be determined by means of logical de-
duction, a partial description cannot be made more specific by logical deduction
alone. Ambiguity and underspecification can only be resolved by adding more
information, that is, by increasing the premises in the deduction process. This
is in accordance with our intuitive understanding of the matter: an ambiguous
statement can only be disambiguated by taking into consideration additional in-
formation or ‘context’.
2.5 Conclusion
LDG combines grammar with reasoning and underspecification theory. The gram-
mar is a logical theory, representing the language user’s grammatical knowledge.
Parsing, or more in general, linguistic interpretation, is a reasoning process: on
perceiving a sentence the language user constructs a logical description of the
words occurring in it and the order in which they occur. Given his grammatical
knowledge, the language user can add descriptions of the lexemes in the sentence,
and reason about the linguistic tree structures that fit or verify the sentence de-
scription. Different verifying tree structures represent different potential readings
of the sentence.
Logical descriptions function as so-called underspecified representations. Since
descriptions can be partial, syntactic and semantic features of sentences may be
underspecified. A consequence of this is that various forms of underspecification
and ambiguity occurring in natural language expressions can be modeled directly.
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From a cognitive linguistic point of view there is a strong intuitive appeal in this:
descriptions never contain more information than can be justified on linguistic
grounds. On the basis of his grammatical knowledge the language user may reason
about a description and find out more about the linguistic structures that satisfy
it. He will only disambiguate an ambiguous sentence or construction when through
background or world knowledge, or through subsequent conversation, he obtains
more information about it, so that it can be deduced that there is only a single
linguistic structure satisfying the description.
In a computational setting, it is an advantage that the derivation or incre-
mental parsing of linguistic expressions can be modeled as a monotonic, nonde-
structive process. During the parsing process no information is retracted from
the sentence description. An interesting cognitive claim relating to this feature
is the deterministic hypothesis, which says that cases of attachment ambiguity
that require no conscious reanalysis from the language user must be processed
deterministically. As is argued in Marcus et al. (1983) and Gardent and Web-
ber (1998), however, to account for sentences which garden-path the hearer and
require conscious reanalysis, description grammar must be combined with a pref-
erence system that comes up with a specific reading corresponding to the hearer’s
currently preferred interpretation.
LDG presupposes an embedding of linguistic analysis in a model of human rea-
soning in general. This seems to be appropriate, since in determining the meaning
of a sentence in its context of utterance, a language user employs sources of in-
formation other than just his grammatical knowledge and the linguistic input. To
disambiguate a sentence, or to determine how a sentence relates to its discourse
context, he makes use of his world knowledge and reasons about the nonlinguistic
context of utterance as well. Since parsing is modeled as reasoning in LDG, the
language user’s access to common knowledge and other sources of information in
the interpretation process can naturally be integrated in the model of sentence
interpretation.
Finally, as a constraint-based system LDG is an open, flexible model of lin-
guistic analysis. The grammar is nothing but a set of constraints formulated in
one and the same logical language, simultaneously constraining the properties of
linguistic structures. As such, the interaction of constraints coming from different
grammatical levels (such as syntax and semantics) is modeled straightforwardly,
and in principle new constraints, instantiating other grammatical levels, can sim-
ply be added. It also means that LDG is very useful as a logical toolkit for
linguists. No particular linguistic theory is hard-wired in the description gram-
mar: the formalism provides the means for the specification of a linguistic theory,
rather than that it implements a particular linguistic theory itself. Thus, the for-
malism can very well be employed to implement and test alternative constraints
and to compare different linguistic theories.
Chapter 3
LDG for Discourse Analysis
3.1 Introduction
The LDG presented in the preceding chapter is a sentence grammar, but the
formalism can be employed for the analysis of discourse as well. In this chapter,
we put forward a framework of discourse interpretation which incorporates an
incremental variant of LDG. Beside the grammar system, the framework includes
a reservoir of general or world knowledge, and a default inference component. As
before, the grammar system generates logical descriptions of linguistic structures.
The descriptions represent the language user’s knowledge of the ongoing discourse.
Given his grammar and his world knowledge, the language user may reason about
the tree models verifying the description of a discourse. The tree models figure as
discourse representations. Each different tree model stands for a possible linguistic
analysis, and correspondingly, a reading, of the discourse.
The integration of LDG in a model of discourse interpretation is interesting for
various reasons. Firstly, due to its formulation in terms of description theory, LDG
provides an elegant and powerful treatment of underspecification and ambiguity
at discourse level. As can be seen from the work available on the application of
underspecifiation theory to linguistic phenomena exceeding sentence level this is
a wide and fruitful field of research indeed.
To name just some of this work, building on Reyle’s UDRT (1993), Asher and
Lascarides (2003) propose underspecified logical forms in SDRT for the treat-
ment of various forms of ambiguity, such as scope ambiguity of quantifiers, lexical
ambiguity, anaphora resolution, VP-ellipsis, presupposition binding or accommo-
dation, structural ambiguity (attachment ambiguity) of discourse connectives and
relations of coherence, and semantic underspecification of the latter. Furthermore,
the Saarbru¨cken school of description grammar (Pinkal 1996; Niehren et al. 1997;
Egg et al. 1998) focuses on the treatment of quantifier scope, VP-ellipsis, paral-
lellism phenomena and anaphora resolution. Blackburn and Bos (1999) provide a
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computational treatment of anaphora and presupposition resolution. Finally, in
Gardent and Webber (1998), Blackburn and Gardent (1998), Duchier and Gar-
dent (1999), Duchier and Gardent (2001), and most recently Egg and Redeker
(2006) various forms of ambiguity and underspecification of coherence or discourse
relations are investigated. A less well investigated, but similarly interesting topic
of research would be the treatment of focus articulation in English in an under-
specifiation formalism. We build on all of the above work in developing our own
model of discourse interpretation.
Another benefit of using LDG in a model of discourse interpretation is that
the resulting model is open to the testing of cognitive claims. LDG models parsing
as reasoning. Employing grammatical knowledge, world knowledge, and specific
knowledge of the sentence or discourse under consideration, a language user rea-
sons about the linguistic analysis and meaning of a sentence or discourse. As part
of a general model of human knowledge and reasoning, our framework of dis-
course interpretation naturally provides a cognitive theory of discourse analysis.
Thus, predictions of the framework can be tested on their cognitive tenability and
attractiveness.
Finally, again due to its formulation in terms of description theory, LDG
functions as a specification language for discourse theory. LDG allows us to ‘talk’
about the properties of a discourse theory in a logical language. Of course, in
what follows we will make certain choices and fill in the specifics of some con-
straints of the discourse theory. However, for the particular choices one can make
in discourse theory there are often viable alternatives. In our view it is a step for-
ward to be able to implement and consider alternative treatments in one and the
same formalism. Different approaches to a given issue can then be compared, and
maybe in some points a synthesis can be obtained. Our framework of discourse
interpretation provides a platform for this.
In this chapter the basic formal characteristics of the LDG framework of discourse
interpretation are presented. The focus is on discourse syntax and the effects of
incrementality in reasoning about discourse descriptions. An explanation of the
semantic representation language employed in the framework and the semantics
of discourse contributions will be given in the next chapter. The same goes for
central notions such as discourse meaning, felicity or appropriateness conditions,
and the integration of local contexts in LDG.
In section 3.2 the framework of discourse interpretation is introduced and its
overall working is explained. In section 3.3 we zoom in on the relation between
sentence grammar and discourse grammar. It is argued that sentence theory is
a fully integrated part of discourse theory in our model. In section 3.4 we talk
about discourse structure. The grammar is extended to cover syntactic structure
above clause and sentence level. Our use of the terms ‘discourse constituent’,
‘discourse relation’ and ‘discourse operators’ is explained, and a simple treatment
of discourse operators and discourse relations in the lexicon of the grammar is
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provided.
In section 3.5 we present an incremental version of the LDG formalism of
Muskens (2001), which was discussed in the preceding chapter. The implications of
incrementality for the relation between input descriptions, discourse descriptions
and the tree structure models that verify them are discussed (section 3.5.1). Input
descriptions are adapted to the incremental set-up of the grammar (section 3.5.2),
and the incrementation operation is defined (section 3.5.3). The resulting LDG
formalism is applied to an example (section 3.5.4). The example features two
sentences linked by an implicit discourse relation. Given the properties of the
grammar, it can be deduced that there is a discourse relation linking the tree
representations of the two sentences. The relation is semantically underspecified.
The hearer is predicted to infer an appropriate semantics, however, employing his
world knowledge and default reasoning.
In two subsequent sections, some further properties of incrementation as it is
modeled in our framework are discussed. Section 3.5.5 defines structural accessi-
bility of the nodes named in a discourse description, and it explains what it means
for an input description to attach at the right frontier of a described discourse
tree. Section 3.5.6 discusses the deterministic hypothesis, a central cognitive claim
which applies to the attachment of new input descriptions in incremental LDG.
The hypothesis says that cases of attachment ambiguity which require no con-
scious reanalysis of the hearer are processed deterministically. The implications of
the hypothesis for the framework of discourse interpretation are briefly discussed.
In section 3.6 the chapter is summarized and some loose ends are indicated.
3.2 A Framework of Discourse Interpretation
We propose a framework of discourse interpretation that incorporates an LDG
system which is adapted to cover incremental discourse processing. In doing so
we implement what might be called the central idea of discourse grammar theory,
namely that discourse, like sentences, is subject to rules of syntactic and semantic
composition—that, in other words, the notion of a grammatical discourse makes
sense.
Discourse grammaticality is a more encompassing notion than sentence gram-
maticality, however. The object of study is not the syntax and semantics of sen-
tences in isolation, but rather the relation of sentences (or utterances, or discourse
contributions) to their context of interpretation. For a discourse to be grammat-
ical, the sentences uttered in it must not only be syntactically correct but also
semantically well-formed in their context of interpretation, so that the discourse
as a whole is coherent.
The framework of discourse interpretation that we propose takes the interac-
tion of the various factors that make a discourse into a coherent whole as its point
of departure. The grammar is a set of constraints on the syntactic and semantic
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properties of discourse. A grammatical discourse satisfies all these constraints.
Different types of discourse contributions, such as assertions, denials, confirma-
tions, objections, etc., can be characterised in terms of the particular constraints
which make them felicitous in their context of interpretation as contributions of
that type.1 In actual discourses, it may occasionally be unclear what the type of a
given discourse contribution is. The grammar formalism predicts this, as it allows
the relation of a discourse contribution relative to its context of interpretation to
be underspecified.
There is more to discourse interpretation than just the application of gram-
matical knowledge, however. It is commonly assumed that hearers employ world
knowledge in, for instance, testing presuppositions, resolving bridging anaphora,
and inferring implicit coherence relations. Furthermore, in interpreting ambigu-
ous or underspecified discourse they often have preferences for certains readings
over others. Hence we include both world knowledge and a default reasoning
component generating preferences in the framework of discourse interpretation.
A discourse model or framework of discourse interpretation of a language user a,
Fa = 〈G
+,K, 〉, consists of an incremental grammar system G+ = 〈G,∆0, I,+〉,
a reservoir of general background information or world knowledge K, and a de-
fault reasoning component . The incremental grammar system combines a dis-
course grammar G with discourse descriptions that are build up incrementally
from the initial discourse description ∆0 and input descriptions in I by means of
the operation +. As before, G represents a’s grammatical knowledge of a given
natural language. K represents his nonlinguistic knowledge. This includes world
knowledge, common sense knowledge, and knowledge about the actual utterance
situation. The inference engine stands for his default reasoning capacity and
his capacity to assign ‘preferences’. As in the preceding chapter, standard logical
deduction is available to the language user as well, of course.
G is a Logical Description Grammar. As before, it is a set of descriptions, or
statements in classical type logic. For any given stretch of discourse the gram-
mar system produces a discourse description. This is a set of logical statements
describing the syntactic and semantic relations characterising the discourse pro-
cessed so far. Discourse descriptions represent the language user’s knowledge of
the discourse. As before, discourse descriptions can be partial; they figure as un-
derspecified discourse representations in the discourse model.
A language user may reason about the models of a discourse description given
G and K, employing logical deduction and . As before, the verifying models of
1Discourse contributions can be characterised in our discourse model to the extent that the
parameters made available in it can be set for each type of discourse contribution. Parameters
that are currently not covered in the discourse model, for example the plans and intentions of
the participants in making a particular kind of discourse contribution, or their attitudes and
commitments, do not feature in our formal treatment of discourse contributions. In this respect,
the model offers only a partial characterisation. For some discussion of integrating participants’
commitments in the discourse model, see section 3.2 of the next chapter.
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a description are tree structures. They are comparable to the ‘discourse parse
tree’ in the Linguistic Discourse Model (Polanyi 1988; Scha and Polanyi 1988)
and (L)TAG for discourse (Webber and Joshi 1998; Webber et al. 1999). The
tree structures figure as fully specified representations of the discourse processed
so far. As before, aspects of the syntax or semantics of the discourse can be
underspecified, in which case there will be more than one verifying tree model.
The default reasoning component stands for the language user’s capacity to
reason about world knowledge in interpreting discourse, and to make choices in
the face of uncertain or incomplete information. We assume the language user is
able to weigh the available information and to decide whether some options are
for instance most likely to be true, or most uncontroversial, or most desirable.
On the basis of this weighing he is able to order alternative verifying models
according to preference, and to opt for the most preferred ones. Crucially, con-
clusions drawn by means of are defeasible, and can be retracted when more
information becomes available to the language user. Unlike the constraints in G
the preferences generated by are ‘weak constraints’.
Although we will not say anything about the internal working of , its presence
will help to delineate the tasks within the framework of discourse interpretation,
and clarify the impact of default reasoning on the disambiguation of discourse.
As a component in the framework, is comparable to what used to be called
DICE, and is now part of the logic of information packaging in SDRT (Asher
and Lascarides 2003), to the general inference mechanism for defausible aspects
of discourse semantics proposed in Webber et al. (1999), and to the system of
preferences or biases presupposed in Gardent and Webber (1998). As we envisage
its function and working in Fa, however, it most closely reflects the type of rea-
soning and the weighing of alternatives proposed in theories of plausible reasoning
(Rescher 1976) and belief change (Ga¨rdenfors 1988).
Abstracting over individual language users, a logical description grammar for
discourse analysis G may be taken to characterize a natural language. It provides
an analysis of all possible ‘grammatical discourses’ in a language. As we said
before, we are using the term grammatical in a wide sense. For a discourse to
be grammatical , the sentences uttered in it must be syntactically and semanti-
cally well-formed in their context of interpretation. A description grammar for
discourse G is adequate for a given language if, for any grammatical discourse
in that language and for no ungrammatical one, the description of the discourse
is consistent with G. A discourse model Fa is adequate if it generates the (cog-
nitively) correct preferences over the verifying models of discourse descriptions
given G, and G is adequate.
We define a discourse as a sequence of utterances u1 . . . un, where the linguistic
expressions uttered are sentences. Utterances may be either written or spoken. In
the case of spoken discourse, we make the simplifying assumption that the utter-
ances are strictly ordered according to onset time. Furthermore, we assume that
each utterance is the vehicle of a single discourse contribution. A discourse contri-
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bution is a ‘dialogue move’ or ‘language act’ made by a particular participant at
a certain point in a given discourse, with a particular rhetorical function relative
to the discourse context, for example an assertion, a denial, a confirmation, or a
question.
Unlike the LDG formalism presented in the preceding chapter, G+ processes
discourse incrementally . Every discourse contribution induces an incrementation
of the discourse description built up so far. Incrementations are always mono-
tonic, even when the discourse contribution causing it is a correction or a denial.
An incrementation step never leads to the retraction of a statement from the
discourse description, it only leads to a further specification of the tree model of
the discourse under consideration. Only when the language user, confronted with
new information, is forced to cancel default conclusions drawn earlier by means
of , real backtracking takes place.
The following schema shows a model of incremental processing in our discourse
model. In principle, ui may stand for any relevant processing unit, but since we
are focusing on discourse level we assume they stand for utterances of sentences.
u1 . . . un =⇒ u1 . . . unun+1
? ?
∆n =⇒ ∆n + δn+1
? ?
M(∆n) M(∆n + δn+1)
...
...
semantic interpretations semantic interpretations
Figure 3.1: An incrementation step in LDG for discourse
For any utterance ui, δi is the input description resulting from analysing or parsing
the sentence uttered. u1 . . . un is an initial stretch of discourse, ∆n the discourse
description resulting from processing it, and ∆n + δn+1 denotes the result of
incrementing ∆n with δn+1. Discourse descriptions are basically sets of input
descriptions (but see section 3.5.3). An incrementation step (=⇒) consists in
processing a new utterance un+1; the grammar then produces an input description
δn+1 of un+1 and combines this with the current discourse description ∆n, so that
a new discourse description ∆n + δn+1 = ∆n+1 is formed. Furthermore, M is
a function which produces the set of models or trees which satisfy a discourse
description, given G. Each verifying model in M(∆n) or M(∆n + δn+1) comes
with a semantic interpretation, representing a possible reading of the discourse.
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We will use the term update to refer to the result of incrementing a discourse
description by an input or sentence description at a particular moment in pro-
cessing the discourse; this is represented by ∆n + δn+1 in the schema. At the
level of the verifying tree models, updates are characterised not just in terms
of the tree structures described by, respectively, a given input description and a
given discourse description, but also by the attachment possibilities of the two.
Hence, an update is essentially more than just an input description. While input
descriptions represent the sentences uttered in a discourse, updates represent the
discourse contributions made through these utterances.
3.3 Sentence and Discourse Theory Integrated
An incremental LDG system or LDG for discourse analysis G+ = 〈G,∆0, I,+〉
consists of the following components.
• A grammar G = 〈A,W〉, where A is a set of axioms or general descriptions
and W a set of lexical descriptions (classifying and elementary),
• I, an infinite set of input descriptions δ, generated per processed utterance,
• ∆0, the initial discourse description, and
• +, the incrementation operation.
Apart from the last two, these components are familiar from the grammar system
presented in the preceding chapter. As before, G is a Logical Description Gram-
mar. The general descriptions or axioms A regulate the types of structures that
can be described by a discourse description generated by the grammar. Though
some of the axioms will be modified with a view to the treatment of implicit
discourse relations and the change to an incremental set-up, and some general
descriptions will be added, their general purpose and effect is the same as be-
fore. The lexical descriptions in W characterise the elementary tree structures
contributed by lexemes of the different word classes; together they constitute the
lexicon of the grammar. As before, input descriptions name the lexemes occurring
in the linguistic expression uttered and state the linear order of these lexemes. Un-
like the input descriptions in the original proposal, however, they do not contain
a circumscription clause.2 The new components in the list embodies the change
from a nonincremental to an incremental grammar formalism: + constructs a
new discourse description from a given discourse description plus a new input
description, ∆0 is the start element of this.
In the preceding chapter, the term linguistic theory was used to refer to any
particular theory of sentence analysis laid down in G. In this chapter, we prefer
2See section 2.4.5 of the preceding chapter.
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to use the term discourse theory instead, and this then refers to any particular
theory of discourse analysis laid down in the framework, or discourse model Fa
as a whole. There is no specific component within the discourse model which
represents the discourse theory as such. Different components of the grammar
cover different aspects of the discourse theory. For example, the assumption that
discourse structures are tree structures is laid down in the axioms A, and the
syntax and semantics of discourse connectives is laid down in the lexiconW. As we
shall see in subsequent chapters, the resolution of anaphora and the satisfaction of
presuppositions is governed by constraints in bothW and A. The incrementation
operation + captures another property of the discourse theory. Finally, the impact
of default reasoning and preferences on the disambiguation of discourse in general
is given by .
The discourse theory laid down in the discourse model comprises both sentence
analysis and discourse analysis. As with LDG for sentence analysis, the lexicon is
the motor of the syntactic and semantic analysis of the linguistic input. Indeed,
if we consider an LDG for sentence analysis and an LDG for discourse analysis
characterising one and the same natural language, the lexicon of the second is
a strict extension of the lexicon of the first. Thus, sentence theory is a fully
integrated part of discourse theory.
Notice that this is not in any way prohibiting the implementation of a no-
tion of ‘sentencehood’ in the grammar, as a particular syntactic domain over
which constraints can be stated. In fact, we believe sentencehood is important in
controlling unwanted ambiguity and the attachment possibilities of subsequent
discourse. Even when a notion of sentencehood is not explicitly implemented in
the formalism, however, the term sentence theory can sensibly be employed to re-
fer to sentence internal relations, or to linguistic constraints in the grammar that
are specifically operative at, or below the level of sentences. There are, however,
many constraints in the grammar, for instance on anaphora resolution, which ap-
ply across the board, so that it is sometimes a matter of perspective rather than
strict delineation that makes us talk about sentence theory rather than discourse
theory.
In computational approaches to discourse analysis it is common to distinguish
between sentence parsing and discourse parsing, see for example Polanyi et al.
(2004), or Webber (2004) and Forbes et al. (2001). In talking about discourse
processing, we find it practical to make this distinction as well. We adopt an
idealised picture of discourse processing, in which the utterances in the discourse
are processed one after another and there is a component in G which delivers the
appropriate input descriptions for each utterance, independently of the discourse
processed sofar. Utterances of sentences are the standard processing units of the
discourse grammar. This can be changed whenever it is desirable, however. There
is no principled reason why we should not enter the domain of sentence analysis
and, for example, in the processing of a complex sentence treat clauses or simple
sentences as processing units.
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In general we expect that there are subtle interactions between sentence anal-
ysis and discourse analysis. For example, the topical structure of a discourse raises
expectations about the form and content of the next utterance to be processed.
Given the fact that the sentence grammar and the discourse grammar are inte-
grated in a single formalism we are hopeful that such interactions can succesfully
be modeled in the discourse model.
3.4 Discourse Structure and Discourse Relations
All theories of discourse interpretation claim that discourse is structured , and
that the structure of the discourse processed so far constrains the form and inter-
pretation of incoming utterances. Discourse structure results from the sequential
order of the utterances in a conversation and the rhetorical links between them.
The type of hierarchical structure proposed varies per theory. The most influ-
ential approaches are, on the one hand, Mann and Thompson (1988)’s Rhetorical
Structure Theory (RST), and on the other, strict tree structure models such as
Polanyi’s Linguistic Discourse Model and Webber’s LTAG for discourse. RST as-
sumes a hierarchical structure which is built up from rhetorical relations linking
pairs of nonoverlapping text spans; one of the pair is the nucleus and the other
the satellite. A single nucleus can be associated with several satellites, each via
their own rhetorical relation. Hence RST structures are more flexible than strict
tree structures. In our model we opt for the simplest type of structure. Follow-
ing Polanyi’s Linguistic Discourse Model and LTAG for discourse, we will assume
that unambiguous discourse can be represented by single tree structures, discourse
(parse) trees composed of discourse constituents linked by discourse relations.
Various arguments in favour of the idea that discourse is hierarchically struc-
tured through rhetorical links are given in Asher and Lascarides (2003), chapter
1. Most of this concerns the resolution of anaphoric and presuppositional expres-
sions. Generally speaking, if an incoming utterance refers to individuals, events
or concepts introduced earlier in the discourse, it depends, among other things,
on the structural position of the antecedent whether the link can be expressed
through personal pronouns, definite descriptions or other types of anaphors.
Let us take a quick look at one of these arguments. Consider the following
discourse, discussed in Asher and Lascarides (2003) pp. 8–10.
(3.1)a. Max had a great evening last night.
b. He had a great meal.
c. He ate salmon.
d. He devoured lots of cheese.
e. He then won a dancing competition.
f. # It was a beautiful pink.
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The last utterance in the discourse is a statement about the salmon Max ate,
introduced earlier in (3.1c). Intuitively speaking, (3.1f) elaborates on (3.1c), but
the proposition expressed by (3.1c) is somehow out of reach. In particular, we
have trouble resolving the pronoun ‘it’ to the salmon Max ate. In discourse gram-
matical approaches, this can be explained on the assumption that the discourse
unit containing the antecedent of a personal pronoun in the discourse represen-
tation must be in a particular structural position relative to the discourse unit
representing the clause containing the pronoun: it must be at the ‘right frontier’
of the discourse tree. To see this, consider the following picture, which is a tree
representation of the part of this discourse consisting of the utterances (3.1a–e).
The labels elaboration and narration denote coherence, or discourse relations.3
(3.2) 1
2
(3.1a)
3
4
elaboration
5
6
7
(3.1b)
8
9
elaboration
10
11
(3.1c)
12
narration
13
(3.1d)
14
narration
15
(3.1e)
The right frontier of a discourse parse tree in LTAG for discourse and the Lin-
guistic Discourse Model is roughly the set of nodes in the tree representing the
3The tree structure in (3.2) uses the discourse relations occurring in the SDRT representation
of this example in Asher and Lascarides (2003) on page 140, but it presupposes the discourse
syntax of our own grammar. We constructed the tree structure in (3.2) by projecting the π-
labels in the SDRT representation into nodes or discourse units and translating the SDRT
subordination structure as syntactic dominance. (π-labels are discourse referents for speech
acts in SDRT.) The hierarchical structure of SDRSs, however, conforms to Rhetorical Structure
Theory, and differs essentially from our discourse syntactic structures in that it permits a single
π-label to serve as an argument in more than one discourse relation. To allow this in our
grammar too, we would need graphs or tree structures of a more flexible kind, in which a node
can have more than one mother node. See Blackburn and Gardent (1998) and Duchier and
Gardent (1999) for some discussion of these so-called re-entrant trees. (In fact, as noted in
Sporleder and Lascarides (2007), SDRT goes a step further than RST in that it allows for the
possibility of more than one relation holding simultaneously between two discourse units.) On
the ‘treeness’ of discourse structure, see also Egg and Redeker (2006). While adopting strict
tree structures, they discuss some constructs in discourse that are often claimed to require
more flexible structures, namely ‘crossed dependencies’, discontinuous (that is, interrupted)
constituents, and discourse units that enter into more than one coherence relation with other
discourse units. Especially the last type of construct poses a challenge to plain tree structure
in their view.
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smallest rightmost discourse unit and the discourse units dominating it. In (3.2)
it consists of the nodes 1, 3, 5, and 15. As an effect of the incrementality of the
discourse parsing process, tree structures representing incoming utterances attach
only at the right frontier of the discourse tree. The antecedent of the pronoun in
(3.1f) is introduced at node 11, but this is not a discourse unit at the right frontier
of the discourse tree. Consequently, the pronoun cannot refer to it. Whatever the
attachment position of the tree representation of (3.1f) in (3.2) is going to be, the
use of a pronoun is predicted to be infelicitous.
Observe that, although the use of a pronoun at this point in the discourse is
inappropriate, it is not impossible to refer to the salmon Max ate by other means.
The speaker might say something like, ‘By the way, the salmon Max ate was a
beautiful pink.’ Discourse grammatical theories will say that the definite descrip-
tion, unlike the pronoun, is sufficiently informative to re-establish the salmon as
a topical element and to resolve or accommodate the presupposition that there
is some salmon eaten by Max, given the attachment of the tree representation of
the incoming utterance at a suitable node on the right frontier of the discourse
tree structure.4 Presumably, this is node 5, where Max’s having a great evening
last night is the topic under discussion.
We will come back to this example in chapter 5 when we discuss the implemen-
tation of discourse structural constraints on anaphora resolution in LDG. In the
rest of this section we will talk about the building blocks of discourse structure,
namely discourse units, discourse relations and discourse operators. We want to
make clear what these notions stand for in the context of our LDG for discourse.
We will also discuss how implicit, or inferred discourse relations contribute to
discourse syntax in LDG. For definitions of attachment, structural accessibility
and the right frontier in LDG we refer to section 3.5.5.
Discourse units and discourse operators As we said, we presuppose that an
unambiguous discourse can be represented by a single tree structure, a discourse
tree composed of discourse constituents linked by discourse relations. Thus, as
in LDG for sentence analysis, the discourse grammar generates descriptions of
tree structures. The notion of a discourse unit is somewhat fluid, due to the fact
that the ‘discourse unitness’ of clauses is established a posteriori. That is, if in
a subsequent update a discourse relation attaches to a clause, we know it is a
discourse unit. Syntactically, discourse units may loosely be defined as clauses, or
constituents composed of clauses and discourse operators. We leave open whether
every clause can serve as a discourse unit.5 All clauses and discourse units in
4The discourse cue phrase ‘By the way’ plays a role in this too. It signals a change from the
latest local topic, namely ‘Max won a dancing competition’.
5But see Polanyi et al. (2004) on this issue. Compare also Marcu (2000) on the problem of
rhetorical grounding, that is, the task of automatically determining the elementary units of text
in discourse parsing. Marcu speaks of ‘clause-like units’.
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our grammar are of the syntactic category S.6 Semantically, discourse units are
composed of clause meanings, and meanings of discourse operators and discourse
relations.
We use the term discourse operator to refer indiscriminately to coordinating
and subordinating connectives (‘and’, ‘but’, ‘or’, ‘if’,‘because’, ‘unless’ etc.), sen-
tence adverbials or modifiers (‘furthermore’, ‘however’, ‘then’, ‘in addition’, ‘on
the other hand’, etc.), discourse cues (‘OK’, ‘well’, ‘so’ and ‘anyway’, etc.) and
the discourse particles ‘Yes’ and ‘No’. The lexicon of the grammar contains lexical
descriptions for lexemes of these word classes. Like all other lexemes, discourse
operators come with a particular truth-conditional contribution to the semantics
of the discourse. As such they constrain the discourse relations which make a
discourse into a coherent whole. They do not necessarily fully determine them,
however.7
Here are graphical representations of the lexical descriptions of a few of them.
For the time being, we suppress the semantic values in these pictures; they will
come in a variant of compositional DRT which will only be explained in the next
chapter. The same goes for the felicity conditions or context-sensitive constraints
that are often attached to individual discourse operators.
(3.3) S+k1
S−k2 Conk
or
S−k4
The coordinating connective ‘or’ takes a clause or discourse unit as an argument
to its left and another one as an argument to its right. We will sometimes refer to
Sk2 as its contextual argument and to Sk4 as its internal argument . Semantically,
‘or’ results in a disjunction of the semantic values of its arguments.
6Alternatively, a distinction between S-nodes, for clauses, and T or Dc nodes for ‘texts’ or
‘discourse units’ could be introduced. This is the approach taken in, among others, Webber
(2004)—and which, incidentally, was followed in Van Leusen and Muskens (2003). Webber
allows clauses or sentences, which can function as minimal discourse units, to anchor Dc nodes.
A sentence level LTAG parser delivers the input structures for a discourse level D-LTAG parser.
Since many discourse operators function both below and above sentence level, this set-up of the
grammar implies that there is a systematic ambiguity between ‘sentence’ and ‘discourse’ uses
of these operators. This is perfectly acceptable, but it does raise the question whether in all
these cases there is indeed a corresponding difference between the semantic-pragmatic impact
of the operator at discourse level and its impact at or below sentence level.
7Many discourse operators are known to be ambiguous, or compatible with more than a
single discourse relation or coherence relation. See for instance Hirschberg and Litman (1993)
or Knott and Mellish (1996).
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(3.4) S+k1
S−k2 Sk3
Subk
if
S−k4
S+k1
Sk3
Subk
if
S−k4
S−k2
The subordinating connective ‘if’ takes an argument to its left, this is the subor-
dinated clause Sk4, and an argument which may either precede or succeed it, the
main clause Sk2 . The lexical description of ‘if’ underspecifies the precedence order
of the main and the subordinated clause; in (3.4) this is expressed by showing
both options. Semantically, ‘if’ results in a conditional statement.
(3.5) S+k1
Advk
however
S−k2
S+k1
S−k2 Advk
however
The lexeme ‘however’ is an adverbial, which may either preceed or succeed its
internal argument, that is, the clause or discourse unit it modifies. Again, the
lexical description underspecifies this. Semantically, ‘however’ reproduces the se-
mantic value of its internal argument, and triggers a requirement of contrastivity
or denial of expectation relative to its context of interpretation.8
8Alternatively, discourse adverbials like ‘however’ could be analysed as two-place operators,
as in
(3.6) S+k1
S−k2 Sk3
Advk
however
S−k4
S+k1
S−k2 Sk3
S−k4 Advk
however
This would imply that the relation to the discourse context expressed by the adverbial is a
structural one, rather than a presuppositional or anaphoric one, as it will be in our account.
An advantage of the simpler structure in (3.5) is that potential problems in the syntactic
composition of sentences containing sequences of sentence or clause operators (as in, for example,
“John promised to come. If, however, against all expectations, he doesn’t, one of us will have to
give the talk.”) can be avoided. Some further reasons for preferring the structure in (3.5) over
the one in (3.6) are given in Webber et al. (2003). Webber c.s. argue that discourse adverbials
behave anaphorically in that they admit the crossing of structural dependencies, and have
a wider range of options with respect to their external argument than do coordinating and
subordinating connectives.
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(3.7)
S+k1
S−k2 Partk
yes
S+k1
S−k2 Sk3
Partk
yes
S−k4
Finally, ‘yes’ is a discourse particle. It may occur on its own, operating on a
single argument to its left, its contextual argument. It may also come with an
additional argument to its right, as in ‘John is a nice guy. Yes, he certainly is’.
Semantically, it produces the semantic value of its contextual argument, or the
combination of this with the semantic value of its internal argument. In both
cases the particle serves to express the confirmation of its contextual argument.
Additional constraints on the context of interpretation regulate this.
The lexical descriptions just presented merely serve to show a possible treat-
ment in LDG of these discourse operators. Different choices could be made, and
further research into the meaning and use of these operators in their discourse
context will certainly lead to the exploration of alternative treatments.
Discourse relations and implicit anchors Literature on discourse analysis
abounds in names and classifications of rhetorical relations, coherence relations,
and discourse relations, compare for instance Hobbs (1985), Polanyi (1985), Mann
and Thompson (1987), Grosz and Sidner (1986), Webber (1991), Knott and Mel-
lish (1996), Marcu (1997), and Asher and Lascarides (2003). The distinctions
between these three kinds of relations are not always drawn very sharply. Some-
times the terms are interchangeable, and sometimes they overlap. We shall use
the term ‘rhetorical relation’ only when talking about speech acts or discourse
contributions, and the particular semantic-pragmatic relations to the conversa-
tional context that characterise them as contributions of a certain type. We shall
use the term ‘coherence relation’ in a more general sense, to refer to the semantic-
pragmatic relations that glue together the utterances in a discourse. This covers
relations of a rather ‘rhetoric’ flavour such as ‘correction’ and ‘confirmation’ as
well as what might be called content linking relations, such as ‘contrast’ and
‘parallel’. Finally, we will employ the term ‘discourse relations’ to refer to the
elements in our discourse grammar that denote coherence relations.9
We will employ the same names for discourse relations as Asher and Lascarides
(2003) do, and in our syntactic-semantic characterisation of them try to keep as
close to theirs as we can, given the possibilities of our grammar formalism. We
will freely use terms like ‘correction’, ‘counterevidence’, ‘elaboration’, ‘narration’,
‘contrast’, ‘explanation’, and ‘result’, trusting that in the context in which we are
9This use of the term ‘discourse relation’ is specific to our approach. In most approaches, it
refers simultaneously to the element in the grammar or discourse theory and the (discourse /
coherence / rhetorical) relation it represents.
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using these terms it is intuitively clear what they refer to. In the next chapter we
will spell out the semantics of some of these relations in LDG.
Discourse relations, in our grammar, are implicit elements denoting coherence
relations. Syntactically, they link clauses to their discourse context. Semanti-
cally, they characterise coherence relations through the particular combination of
their compositional semantics and a (possibly empty) set of context sensitive con-
straints or felicity conditions . Felicity conditions constrain the relation between
the semantic values of the arguments of a discourse relation in the relevant con-
text of interpretation or local context. As an integrity constraint of the grammar
we require that it describes only a finite number of discourse relations, that is,
discourse relations are a closed class. With a view to a classification of discourse
relations, additional integrity constraints on the relation between the defining
properties of discourse relations and the semantics of discourse operators might
be added.
Coherence relations may be completely determined through the presence of
explicit discourse operators and the tense, mood and modality of their internal
argument. They are often underspecified, however. Notably, this is the case when
no overt discourse operator is present, and the relation of coherence must be in-
ferred by the hearer on the basis of his grammatical knowledge, world knowledge,
and information about the utterance situation. The following example illustrates
this.
(3.8) John left early.
He was ill.
In interpreting the discourse, the hearer infers that there is some relation between
the fact that John was ill and the fact that he left early. In all probability the
hearer assumes that John left early because he was ill, that is, the second sentence
provides an explanation of the proposition expressed by the first. The relation of
explanation is what makes the discourse into a coherent whole. In this situation
we assume that there is an implicit linguistic element representing the coherence
relation: a discourse relation.
Like many other authors, for example Lascarides and Asher (1991), Lascarides
et al. (1992), Webber and Joshi (1998), we assume that discourse relations, like
overt discourse operators, contribute to the syntactic structure of discourse. Thus,
for the discourse in (3.8), given the interpretation suggested, our LDG will gen-
erate a description of the following tree structure.10
10Other interpretations or readings of this discourse are possible. The tree structure in (3.9)
corresponds to the most preferred reading or interpretation of the discourse. In section 3.5.4 we
say more about this.
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(3.9) S17
S18
John left early
S19
Rel4
explanation
S20
he was ill
In line with Webber and Joshi (1998) and Webber et al. (1999), we assume that
discourse relations can anchor elementary structures. The lexicon of the grammar
contains two elementary descriptions for elements of word class rel : one for coor-
dinating discourse relations, such as narration and contrast, and one for subordi-
nating discourse relations, such as elaboration, explanation, result and correction.
The following pictures of descriptions feature these two elementary forms. Again,
for the semantics, see chapter 4.
(3.10) rel:
S+k1
S−k2 Rel
⋄
k
narration
S−k3
S+k1
S−k2 Sk3
Rel⋄k
explanation
S−k4
As in the preceding chapter, the sign ⋄ marks the anchor of the elementary struc-
ture. In the case of coordinating elementary structures, k negatively anchors itself,
k2 and k3. It positively anchors itself and k1. Coordinating discourse relations re-
quire a discourse unit Sk2 to their left (the contextual argument) and a discourse
unit Sk3 to their right (the internal argument). In the case of subordinating ele-
mentary structures, k negatively anchors itself, k2, k3, and k4. It positively anchors
itself, k3, and k1. Subordinating discourse relations require a discourse unit Sk2
to their left (the contextual argument) and a discourse unit Sk4 to their right
(the internal argument).11 In the discourse tree in (3.9) the nodes 17, 18, 19, 20
and 4 instantiate the elementary description of subordinating discourse relations,
selected by the discourse relation explanation.
11Various alternative treatments might be considered. For instance, one might opt for a single
elementary structure for all discourse relations, and treat the distinction between coordinating
and subordinating relations as an independent syntactic-semantic property. This is more in
line with for example the approach of Asher and Lascarides (2003), where the ‘subordination
relation’ functions as a defining property of certain discourse relations, constraining their impact
on the discourse topical structure. Another alternative one might consider is to adopt a more
flexible elementary structure for subordinating relations, or possibly for all discourse relations,
of the following form:
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In order to allow for nodes and structure in a discourse tree that are not
anchored to the lexemes occurring in the discourse, but to discourse relations,
some slight modifications of the axioms which regulate lexicalisation in LDG are
necessary. Remember that LDG adheres to the lexicalisation principle adapted
from LTAG: all nodes in a verifying tree model of a description must be positively
and negatively anchored to a lexical node in the tree. In the case of discourse
relations, however, there is no lexeme which anchors the nodes and structure
introduced in the discourse description. We account for this by introducing a
distinction between implicit anchors and lexically expressed ones in the grammar.
Discourse relations come with the first type of anchor, and lexemes with the
second type of anchor.
In the LDG formalism presented in the preceding chapter, nodes which serve
as an anchor are lexical nodes (and vice versa), and all lexical nodes carry an
explicitly expressed lexeme. Moreover, terminal nodes and lexical nodes coincide.
In order to cope with implicit anchors we differentiate between lexically expressed
nodes and terminal nodes. Terminal nodes are nodes which do not dominate any
other node:
A15 ∀k[ term(k) ↔ ¬∃k′ : k+k′]
Anchors are now required to be terminal, rather than lexical. We adjust the
anchoring axioms A12 and A13, replacing ‘lex ’ with ‘term’.
A12′ ∀k : term(α+(k))
A13′ ∀k[ k = r ∨ term(α−(k))]
Anchors can be either lexical or not, and in the latter case we call them implicit
anchors. ‘Lexical’ now means lexically expressed, or not phonologically empty. We
introduce the predicate imp to indicate that a node is terminal but not lexical.
This makes the node into an implicit anchor :
(3.11) S+k1
S−k2
S−k3
S+k4
Rel⋄k S
−
k5
In comparison with the structure in (3.10), the structure in (3.11) has an additional attachment
point. A discourse grammar based on this type of elementary structure will predict more possible
readings and might be useful in accounting for subtle differences between readings of a given
discourse.
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A16 ∀k[imp(k) ↔ term(k) ∧ ¬lex(k)]
We make sure that all terminal nodes are marked as such in the elementary
tree descriptions in W, and that lexemes occurring in sentences introduce lexical
nodes in the input descriptions that represent them. As in nonincremental LDG,
it is an integrity constraint of the grammar that lexical nodes are identified with
the anchors in the lexical descriptions they select. Thus, all lexical nodes are
terminals, but not every terminal needs to be lexical.
The lexicalisation principle now applies to terminal nodes, as it applied to
lexical nodes before: all nodes in a verifying tree model of a discourse description
must be positively and negatively anchored to a terminal node in the tree. At the
same time, the discourse grammar shall be sufficiently relaxed to allow for implicit
anchors occuring in between lexically consecutive constituents in the described
discourse structure (see section 3.5.3 and 3.5.4).
Whenever constraints in LDG are relaxed for some reason, there is a danger
that the resulting formalism is too tolerant, in other words, that it allows for
unwanted verifying models or interpretations of discourse. Indeed, the occurrence
of implicit anchors in the described discourse tree structure must be restricted
to cases which can be linguistically motivated. Even though we want to allow
for implicit anchors, we do not want implicit nodes and structure to appear just
anywhere in the models of discourse descriptions. Further research is needed to
find out if there are other linguistic constructs for which an analysis in terms of
implicit anchors, or deduced nodes and structure, might be appropriate. For the
time being we assume that implicit anchors occur only with discourse relations,
that is, all implicit anchors are of word class ‘rel’:
A17 ∀k[imp(k) → rel(k)]
3.5 Incremental LDG
While for sentence analysis both incremental and nonincremental models can be
used, for a model of discourse processing only an incremental formalism comes into
question. Discourses do not come as finished wholes. They are built up utterance
by utterance, and each utterance is interpretable to the language user, given the
discourse processed so far. The discourse model should reflect this. As we saw
in the preceding chapter, however, the LDG proposed in Muskens (2001) is not
incremental: input descriptions sum up all the lexemes that are relevant for the
parsing of a sentence, and sentences are parsed as a whole.
As can be seen from Kallmeyer (1999), Egg et al. (1998), Gardent and Webber
(1998), and Duchier and Gardent (1999) there are some incremental formulations
of description grammar on the market. While in terms of expressive power the de-
scription grammar for discourse of Gardent and Webber (1998) would do equally
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well, we prefer to provide an incremental variant of Muskens’ LDG here. The ben-
efit in this is that the incremental grammar formalism will inherit the fine-tuned
anchoring system of nonincremental LDG, which makes parsing into a simple pair-
ing off of positively and negatively marked nodes. Thus, parsing results directly
in the set of linguistically relevant verifying tree structures. There is no need for
an additional computation on the basis of which only the minimal models among
those verifying the descriptions are selected, as is the case with the description
grammars of Vijay-Shanker (1992), Kallmeyer (1999) and Duchier and Gardent
(1999).
The structure of this section is as follows. In section 3.5.1 it is argued that
the manner in which lexical nodes are circumscribed in Muskens’ LDG leads to
problems in an incremental grammar. We then propose an alternative way of cir-
cumscribing the lexical nodes in the models. This results in some adjustments in
the form of the input descriptions (section 3.5.2), and in the formulation of what
we shall call the left- and right-closure properties of discourse descriptions, (sec-
tion 3.5.4). All this interacts in a certain way with the incrementation operation,
which is defined in section 3.5.3.
As before, parsing is deduction, or rather, parsing is reasoning about discourse
descriptions and the tree models that verify them. We go through an example of
this in section 3.5.4. The example features an implicit discourse relation. Given
his grammatical knowledge, the hearer is predicted to deduce that there is a dis-
course relation linking the tree representations of the two sentences. Furthermore,
employing world knowledge and default reasoning, he is able to infer a specific,
semantically appropriate discourse relation. Thus, the discourse is predicted to be
structurally and semantically coherent. In two subsequent sections, some further
properties of incrementation as it is modeled in our framework are discussed.
3.5.1 Circumscription of Lexical Nodes
As we just said, an attractive feature of the LDG formalism discussed in the pre-
ceding chapter is that the tree structures which verify a description are precisely
those that represent an intuitively plausible linguistic analysis of a given sentence,
i.e. they are the minimal models of the description. One factor among the prop-
erties of the grammar formalism which cause this effect is the circumscription
of lexical nodes in the input descriptions and the circumscription of nonterminal
nodes anchored to the lexical ones in the elementary descriptions. Circumscrip-
tion ensures that there are no other nodes in the described tree structure or model
than the ones that are explicitly named in the description.
It is not difficult to see that circumscription, as it is implemented in LDG,
leads to problems in an incremental version of the theory. Consider the input
description of the sentence ‘John left early’.
(3.12) ∃k1k2k3(k1 ≺ k2 ≺ k3 ∧ john(k1) ∧ left(k2) ∧ early(k3)
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∧ ∀k(lex(k)↔ (k = k1 ∨ k = k2 ∨ k = k3)))
The circumscription clause ∀k(lex(k)↔ (k=k1 ∨ k=k2 ∨ k=k3)) says that there
are no other lexical nodes in the tree described than the ones summed up in the
input description. This is unproblematic as long as we consider just single input
descriptions. In the discourse model, however, the grammar builds up a discourse
description from a sequence of input descriptions, adding an input description
per processed utterance. Obviously, with more than one input description, each
one stating that there are no other lexical nodes than the ones it sums up, the
combination of these descriptions is inconsistent given the axioms of the grammar.
So having the circumscription clause in each of the input descriptions of the
utterances in a discourse is too strong. Intuitively, we only want to say that
there are no other nodes in a discourse tree than the ones that are named in
the discourse description in total, or in the input descriptions gathered so far
collectively . How to maintain the constraining effect of the circumscription of
lexical nodes, while dropping the circumscription clause in each of the input
descriptions?
The essential observation is that a discourse, or more precisely, an initial
stretch of discourse, can be viewed as a string of contiguous lexical elements with
a first and a last element.12 It is perfectly reasonable to assume that after each
incrementation step, there are no lexical elements in between the ones that were
parsed so far, and that there is no lexical element which precedes the leftmost
one. Furthermore, as the language user is able to obtain an interpretation of the
discourse as if it were now finished, we take it that he may temporarily assume
that there is no lexical element which succeeds the rightmost lexeme parsed so
far. When another utterance follows, this assumption must of course be dropped,
but after each incrementation step it can be added again.
What we have just formulated is a method to dynamically circumscribe the
lexical nodes in the described discourse tree. This is an alternative to circum-
scription per input description which does not hamper the stepwise incrementa-
tion of discourse descriptions. In the following sections we will implement this
in the grammar formalism. We shall adjust the input descriptions, define the in-
crementation operation, characterize the first and the last element in a discourse
description, and go through an example of discourse parsing or reasoning about
discourse descriptions given the resulting, incremental LDG.
3.5.2 Input Descriptions
To begin, we make sure that the lexical elements that are listed in input descrip-
tions are immediate successors. For this, we introduce the relation of immediate
precedence, denoted by the symbol ≺l.
12This presupposes strict linearisation of the utterances in a discourse.
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Immediate Precedence ∀k1, k2[k1≺l k2 ↔ k1≺k2 ∧ ¬∃k3(k1≺k3≺k2)]
Modifying an integrity constraint of the grammar on the form of input descrip-
tions, we now assume that in any input description, the lexical nodes are ordered
by≺l rather than≺. At the same time the circumscription clause is dropped. Since
it was a side-effect of the circumscription clause to identify the lexical nodes as
such, we add independent statements to that effect. So instead of (3.12) we now
have
(3.13) ∃k1k2k3(k1 ≺l k2 ≺l k3 ∧ lex(k1) ∧ lex(k2) ∧ lex(k3) ∧
john(k1) ∧ left(k2) ∧ early(k3))
This is weaker than the original circumscription clause, but it still excludes nodes
in the model occurring in between the ones representing parsed lexical elements.
Furthermore, we assume that when a discourse description is incremented
with an input description, witnesses are chosen for the variables in the input
description. Moreover, for every input description or update new witnesses are
chosen, that is, witnesses which have not been used earlier in the ongoing parsing
process. Intuitively this is not an implausible move, since each input description
represents a particular occurrence of a sentence uttered in the discourse under
consideration. As in the preceding chapter we use numerals as constants of type
ν (tree node) for witnesses.13 For example, we would have
(3.14) 0≺l 1≺l 2 ∧ lex(0) ∧ lex(1) ∧ lex(2) ∧ john(0) ∧ left(1) ∧ early(2)
The advantage of using witnesses is that at the time when incrementation takes
place, input descriptions feature constants rather than existentially bound vari-
ables as node names. Consequently, the incrementation operation can refer to
lexical nodes introduced in input descriptions that were processed earlier. This
would not be possible if the corresponding node names were bound in their input
description by an existential quantifier.14
13By convention we start counting at 0 and choose the next natural number (i + 1) for the
next node we encounter. The order of the numbers is not relevant, however. What matters is
that for new nodes new witnesses are chosen, that is, numbers that are not in use yet.
14In this, and the following sections we provide a simple set-theoretic formulation of incre-
mentation in LDG. The treatment is a bit sloppy, however, in that it involves some reasoning
about witnesses at metalevel. This can be avoided by employing the following dynamic alter-
native. We distinguish between dynamic descriptions and static ones. Dynamic descriptions
are of type ν(νt) while static ones are of type t. In input descriptions of the form λkinλkout.δ,
λkin is the leftmost lexical node and λkout the rightmost lexical node. For example, we have
(3.15) λk1λk3∃k2(k1 ≺l k2 ≺l k3 ∧ lex(k1) ∧ lex(k2) ∧ lex(k3) ∧
john(k1) ∧ left(k2) ∧ early(k3))
The initial discourse description is simply the first input description processed. Generally
speaking, discourse descriptions are ‘left-closed’, that is, the discourse they describe starts with
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3.5.3 The Incrementation Operation +
Discourse descriptions are sets of input descriptions, extended by means of an
incrementation operation. The incrementation operation + does two things in
particular. Firstly, it adds a new input description δi+1 to the discourse description
built up so far, ∆i:
Addition ∆i ∪ {δi+1} ⊆ ∆i + δi+1.
Secondly, for all utterances in a discourse except the first one, it makes the most
recently processed utterance into the right neighbour or successor of the sequence
of utterances that were processed before. More precisely, it makes the leftmost
lexical node named in the new input description into the immediate lexical suc-
cessor of the rightmost lexical node named in the discourse description. We define
the relation of immediate lexical succession (ILS), denoted by the symbol ≺ι as
follows.
ILS ∀k1, k2[k1≺ι k2 ↔ (k1≺l k2 ∨ ∃k3(k1≺l k3≺l k2 ∧ imp(k3)))]
In other words, a node k2 immediately lexically succeeds a node k1, or k2 is a
immediate lexical successor of k1 if and only if k1 immediately precedes k2, or
there is a single implicit anchor which immediately succeeds k1 and immediately
precedes k2. The effect is that when a pair of nodes is immediately lexically
succeeding, the lexical yields of these nodes are consecutive. The lexical yield of
a node k is the sequence of lexemes attached to the terminal nodes dominated
by k. Only invisible implicit anchors can be in between. This is desirable with a
view to the treatment of discourse relations that we envisage.
a particular leftmost lexical element, and there is a node in the described discourse tree which
represents this leftmost lexeme throughout the processing of the discourse. We employ 0 as a
name for the node representing this element in discourse trees. No verifying tree contains a
node k which precedes 0. Left-closure consists in applying type ν(νt) discourse descriptions
to 0: ∆(0). The incrementation operation + links dynamic input description to left-closed
discourse descriptions. So for a left-closed dynamic discourse description ∆ of type (νt) and a
dynamic input description δ of type ν(νt) we have
∆ + δ = λk.∃k1 k2[k1 ≺ι k2 ∧∆(k1) ∧ δ(k2)(k)]
The output discourse description is a conjunction of the input discourse description and
the new input description. Furthermore, the rightmost lexical node named in the input
discourse description is made into the immediate left neighbour of the leftmost lexical node
named in the input sentence description. (See the main text for the precise definition of the ≺ι
relation.) Temporary right-closure of discourse descriptions consists in applying the discourse
description to the node currently representing the rightmost lexeme in the discourse: ∆(nfin),
where nfin designates the node name or witness of the node representing the last lexeme.
Left-closed discourse descriptions can also be turned static by existentially binding the output
element: ∃k∆(k). For static discourse descriptions, verifying tree modes can be obtained in the
usual way.
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As we said, the incrementation operation makes the leftmost lexical node
named in the new input description into the immediate lexical successor of the
rightmost lexical node named in the discourse description. We call this property
of incrementation Lexical Contiguity . Using nRML∆i to denote the witness of the
node name in ∆i representing the rightmost lexeme in the discourse, and nLMLδi+1
to denote the witness of the node name in δi+1 representing the leftmost lexeme
of the input sentence, we define it as follows.
Lexical Contiguity {nRML∆i ≺ι nLMLδi+1} ⊂ ∆i + δi+1, where i > 0.
For obvious reasons Lexical Contiguity does not apply to the input description
representing the first utterance of a discourse. That description updates the initial
discourse description ∆0, where ∆0 is defined as the empty set:
Initial Discourse Description ∆0 = ∅
Interestingly, the initial discourse description is verified by an infinite number of
different tree structures, namely all the tree structures allowed for by G. So, in
fact, the initial discourse description is a totally underspecified representation of
any possible discourse which is grammatical according to G. Every update of ∆0
eliminates some of the possible tree structures or models allowed for by ∆0 given
G. Subsequent updates eliminate further models.
Together, Addition and Lexical Contiguity characterize the incrementation
operation +. Given the distinction between the first update and all subsequent
ones, we define it as follows.
Incrementation
1. ∆0 + δ1 = ∆0 ∪ {δ1}
2. ∆i + δi+1 = ∆i ∪ {δi+1} ∪ {kRML∆i ≺ι kLMLδi+1}, where i > 0.
To illustrate the above, consider the following discourse.
(3.16) John left early.
He was ill.
Processing the first utterance results in the following input description. Witnesses
have been chosen for the node names.
(3.17) 0≺l 1≺l 2 ∧ lex(0) ∧ lex(1) ∧ lex(2) ∧ john(0) ∧ left(1) ∧ early(2)
Updating the initial discourse description ∆0 with (3.17) results in ∆1:
(3.18) {0≺l 1≺l 2 ∧ lex(0) ∧ lex(1) ∧ lex(2) ∧ john(0) ∧ left(1) ∧ early(2)}
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Processing the next utterance of the discourse results in the following input de-
scription. Notice that new witnesses have been chosen.15
(3.19) 9≺l 10≺l 11 ∧ lex(9) ∧ lex(10) ∧ lex(11) ∧ he(9) ∧was(10) ∧ ill(11)
Updating ∆1 with (3.19) produces the discourse description ∆2:
(3.20) {0≺l 1≺l 2 ∧ lex(0) ∧ lex(1) ∧ lex(2) ∧ john(0) ∧ left(1) ∧ early(2)}
∪ { 9≺l 10≺l 11∧ lex(9) ∧ lex(10) ∧ lex(11) ∧ he(9) ∧was(10)∧ ill(11)}
∪ {2 ≺ι 9}
Since 2 ≺ι 9 reduces to either 2 ≺l 9, or 2 ≺l n ≺l 9 for some implicit node n, all
terminal nodes named in ∆2 are strictly ordered by immediate precedence. Veri-
fying tree structures of ∆2 cannot contain unwanted additional nodes in between
the terminal ones named in the discourse description. This holds for all discourse
descriptions.
Given Lexical Contiguity of input descriptions in general, it is ensured that
if a newly processed sentence is not linked to its discourse context through an
overt discourse operator incorporated in the sentence, it is related to the discourse
context through (an implicit) discourse relation. There are no other options. Fur-
thermore, it is a property of the grammar that discourse relations cannot be
stacked, that is, if a sentence is linked to the discourse context through a dis-
course relation, there is only one of them. This will be illustrated in the next
section. On the whole, every newly processed sentence is predicted to be struc-
turally linked to its discourse context, either via an explicit discourse operator
or via a discourse relation. We will refer to this property of incremental LDG as
structural coherence.
3.5.4 Reasoning about Discourse Descriptions
So far, we have made sure that there are no lexical nodes intervening between the
lexical nodes that are explicitly named in the discourse decription. However, as
yet it is still possible that a verifying model contains lexical nodes preceding or
succeeding the string of nodes representing the lexical elements actually occurring
in the discourse. To prevent this, we introduce the following two axioms or general
descriptions in G. We assume that the language user is able to recognise the first
and the last lexical element in a discourse, and we reserve the special node names
0 and nfin for the representation of these elements. The axioms are called ‘left-
closure’ (LC) and ‘right-closure’ (RC) respectively.
15In chosing the witnesses for the lexical nodes in (3.19) some numbers have been skipped.
This is because, in fact, the missing numbers are employed as witnesses for the node names of
nonterminal nodes named in the sentence description of the preceding sentence, see the more
extended discussion of this example in the next section.
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LC ¬∃k(k ≺ 0)
RC ¬∃k(nfin ≺ k)
For any well-formed discourse description, axiom LC tells the language user that
there is no verifying tree model which contains nodes preceding the node named 0.
That node is the left-most lexical one in the described tree structure. Discourse
descriptions which contain a leftmost lexical node named 0 will be called left-
closed .16 Similarly, axiom RC implies that there is no verifying model which
contains nodes succeeding the node named nfin, which is the rightmost lexical one
in the described tree structure. Discourse representations containing a statement
which identifies the rightmost lexical node named in the discourse description
with nfin will be called right-closed .
When a discourse description is both left- and right-closed, the lexical nodes
in a verifying discourse tree must be precisely those specified in the description.
Thus, with the help of Lexical Contiguity, left-closure and right-closure, the effect
of the circumscription clause in nonincremental LDG is obtained: the lexical nodes
in the verifying tree structures are circumscribed. Verifying trees of the discourse
description can be obtained in the same manner as in nonincremental LDG, by
pairing off positively and negatively marked nodes.
What is different now is that discourse descriptions are built up incrementally.
Crucially, only discourse descriptions that are not right-closed can be incremented
without becoming inconsistent. At the same time, after each incrementation step
the language user is able to deduce the semantic content of the discourse processed
so far, and reason about its possible disambiguations. In order to obtain the
verifying tree models of the discourse processed so far, however, the update effect
of possible continuations of the discourse must be ignored, that is, the discourse
description must temporarily be right-closed.17
Thus we propose that after each incrementation step, the language user may
assume that the discourse is finished and reason under the assumption that
the discourse description is right-closed. Adding the hypothetical end statement
nRML∆=nfin to his premises, he can deduce node identifications and obtain the
verifying trees of the current discourse description. When the discourse continues
he drops the right-closure hypothesis. In general, when considering the interpre-
tation of the discourse processed so far, we are interested in statements φ such
16In Van Leusen and Muskens (2003) a slightly different approach is followed. It is assumed
that the root node in a discourse description is anchored to a special lexical element, the
start element, and the start element is characterised by the left closure property. A pleasant
consequence of this is that the root node comes with a lexical anchor, like all other nodes in
a tree description. Furthermore, the first incrementation step need no longer be treated as an
exception to Lexical Contiguity. Apart from this, the effect of the two approaches is exactly the
same.
17Note that anything stated in the processed part of a discourse might be retracted later
on through corrective discourse contributions, so nothing can be concluded from a discourse
description if we take into account its possible continuations.
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that G,∆ |= (nRML∆ = nfin) → φ, where ∆ is the current discourse description
and nRML∆ is the rightmost lexical node named in ∆.
To illustrate this, consider again the discourse description ∆1, resulting from
the language user’s processing of the utterance ‘John left early.’
(3.21) {0≺l 1≺l 2 ∧ lex(0) ∧ lex(1) ∧ lex(2) ∧ john(0) ∧ left(1) ∧ early(2)}
Given LC the language user knows that ∆1 is left-closed. Using his lexical knowl-
edge he will deduce the appropriate lexical descriptions for the lexemes in the
input description.
(3.22) ∆1: r
−
DP+0
John
S+3
DP−4 VP
−
5
VP+6
V1
left
VP+7
VP−8 AP2
early
On the temporary assumption that the discourse is currently finished, the lan-
guage user identifies the right-most lexical element named in the description with
nfin, adding the hypothetical end-statement
(3.23) 2 = nfin
to the discourse description. ∆1 is now right-closed. We indicate this by means of
a superscript rcl at the description label.
(3.24) ∆rcl1 : r
−
DP+0
John
S+3
DP−4 VP
−
5
VP+6
V1
left
VP+7
VP−8 AP2
early
The hearer may now reason about the verifying models of the discourse descrip-
tion, mapping positively to negatively marked nodes. This results in
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(3.25) ∆rcl1 : Sr,3
DP4,0
John
VP5,7
VP8,6
V1
left
AP2
early
For ∆rcl1 there is only verifying tree model; there is no ambiguity in the discourse
parsed so far. When next ‘He was ill.’ is uttered, the hearer finds out that the
discourse was not finished yet and drops the hypothetical end-statement. ∆1 is in-
cremented with the new input description and the appropriate lexical descriptions
are selected, resulting in ∆2.
(3.26) ∆2: r−
S+3
DP4,0
John
VP5,7
VP8,6
V1
left
AP2
early
DP+9
He
S+12
DP−13 VP
−
14
VP+15
V10
was
AP−16 AP
+
11
ill
Notice that the completed parse of the sentence ‘John left early.’ as represented
in (3.25) is transferred to (3.26), while this parse resulted from reasoning under
the right-closure assumption. The question becomes important how much of a
hearer’s reasoning is independent from hypothetical end statements such as (3.23).
This independent part can monotonically be transferred to the next phase of
the reasoning process. The matter depends essentially on the basic structural
properties of elementary tree descriptions, and the ‘attachment potential’ allowed
them by the axioms or general descriptions in the grammar formalism. Though
the issue is important it is currently still open.
As for conclusions which depend crucially on the right-closure assumption,
we would suggest that the transfer of those can be thought of as the result of a
bias or preference of the language user to preserve conclusions once drawn, or to
minimize information loss. Unlike conclusions that are drawn independently from
right-closure, they are cancellable.
Consider (3.26) again. The newly added input description now represents the
last utterance in the discourse. The language user wants to parse it and find
out what it means relative to its discourse context. The last word of the newly
processed utterance is now the final word of the discourse, so he assumes
74 CHAPTER 3. LDG FOR DISCOURSE ANALYSIS
(3.27) 11 = nfin
and he reasons about the verifying tree models of the discourse description. First,
reasoning about node identifications, he may parse the new sentence.
(3.28) ∆rcl2 : r−
S+3
DP4,0
John
VP5,7
VP8,6
V1
left
AP2
early
S+12
DP13,9
He
VP14,15
V10
was
AP16,11
ill
But then, what about the discourse as a whole? The description of the new
sentence does not come with some overt discourse operator which introduces a
negatively marked node to the left of the sentence. And no verifying trees can be
obtained by identifying r with 3, or r with 12. In the absence of additional nodes
and structure no verifying models for the discourse description can be found.
There must be some—currently underspecified—additional nodes and structure,
linking the nodes named 3 and 12.
In the reasoning process that leads up to this conclusion, there are two options
to consider. Given Lexical Contiguity of the incrementation operation 2 ≺ι 9, so
either 2 ≺l 9, or 2 ≺l n ≺l 9 and n is an implicit anchor. First, suppose 2 ≺l 9.
Given left and right closure of the discourse description, the presence of any
additional nodes in between the terminal ones named in the discourse description
is excluded. As all terminal nodes in a tree structure are ordered by precedence,
this excludes any additional terminal nodes. Given the anchoring axioms of the
grammar, there can be no additional nonterminal nodes in the described tree
structures either. But then, it is not possible to pair off positively and negatively
marked nodes in ∆rcl2 in such a way that all nodes become satisfied. So no verifying
tree model is obtained.
The other option is that 2 ≺l n ≺l 9 and n is an implicit anchor. According
to axiom A17, specified in section 3.4, implicit anchors occur only with discourse
relations. Discourse relations, like lexemes, come with an elementary tree structure
of the appropriate type. The lexicon W contains two elementary descriptions for
elements of type discourse relation: one for coordinating and one for subordinating
discourse relations. There are no other options. The language user may conclude
that either the one or the other applies, and that the left and right argument of
the discourse relation dominate the nodes representing the two sentences in the
discourse, respectively. The following pictures show the two possibilities.
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(3.29) ∆rcl2 (a): r−
S+17
S−18
S+3
DP4,0
John
VP5,7
VP8,6
V1
left
AP2
early
Rel20 S
−
19
S+12
DP13,9
He
VP14,15
V10
was
AP16,11
ill
(3.30) ∆rcl2 (b): r−
S+17
S−18
S+3
DP4,0
John
VP5,7
VP8,6
V1
left
AP2
early
S19
Rel20 S
−
21
S+12
DP13,9
He
VP14,15
V10
was
AP16,11
ill
The inferred implicit anchor is the node named 20. Since in both ∆rcl2 (a) and
∆rcl2 (b), 2 ≺l 20 ≺l 9, it can immediately be seen that no further implicit discourse
relations can be deduced in between 2 and 9: the immediate precedence of 2 and
20, or 20 and 9, would be violated. For each of the possibilities in (3.29) and (3.30)
a verifying model can be obtained by mapping positively to negatively marked
nodes in the obvious way. Thus, the discourse is predicted to be structurally
coherent.
At this point in the reasoning process, however, the discourse relation link-
ing the second sentence to its discourse context is still both structurally and
semantically underspecified. The grammar G enforces some measure of semantic
nontriviality in the sense that, whichever the underspecified discourse relation is,
it must be one of the finite collection described in the lexicon of the grammar.
Employing his world knowledge K and default reasoning component , the hearer
may determine a most preferred one among these. As in all other discourse theo-
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ries, the selection of a semantically most coherent interpretation builds essentially
on interaction with the hearer’s preference system.
In the case of ∆rcl2 , he may infer that the reason why John left early was
that he was ill, that is ‘He was ill’ is linked to ‘John left early’ by a relation
of explanation. There may be other possible readings, for example one in which
John left early and he was ill, but there is no causal link. In that case, the two
propositions might be related by a relation of contination or one of background .
We assume that the hearer’s default reasoning and preference system generates
a preference for the explanatory reading. Because explanation is a subordinating
discourse relation, the preference induces not just semantic, but also structural
disambiguation. Option ∆rcl2 (a) is now excluded, and we have
(3.31) ∆rcl2 : r−
S+17
S−18
S+3
DP4,0
John
VP5,7
VP8,6
V1
left
AP2
early
S19
Rel20
explanation
S−21
S+12
DP13,9
He
VP14,15
V10
was
AP16,11
ill
The default inference that the coherence relation is a relation of explanation is a
prototypical example of a conclusion which will be transferred to the next phase
of the reasoning process, but which might be cancelled when more information is
available to the hearer, for instance through the analysis of subsequent discourse.
Notice that if it would be cancelled, the two structural alternatives in (3.30)
and (3.29) would be available again. The conclusion that there is some implicit
discourse relation linking the sentence represented by the node named 12 to its
discourse context would be preserved, however.
There is a single most preferred verifying tree structure for ∆rcl2 , namely
3.5. INCREMENTAL LDG 77
(3.32) Sr,17
S18,3
DP4,0
John
VP5,7
VP8,6
V1
left
AP2
early
S19
Rel20
explanation
S21,12
DP13,9
He
VP14,15
V10
was
AP16,11
ill
After each incrementation step, the language user may reason about the semantic
contents of utterances and about the meaning of the discourse processed so far.
As in the nonincremental LDG, each lexeme in the input comes with a semantic
value and each nonterminal comes with a recipe for the composition of its seman-
tics. Application of the recipe to the basic values produces the semantic value of
the node under consideration. For any right-closed discourse description ∆rcli , the
discourse meaning will be defined as an update of the relevant context of inter-
pretation with σr, the semantic value of the root. This will be explained in full in
the next chapter, which zooms in on the semantic interpretation of discourse and
the integration of felicity, or appropriateness conditions in the discourse theory.
3.5.5 Attachment at the Right Frontier
It is easy to see that the incrementation process influences the accessibility of the
nodes named in discourse descriptions. We call a node named in a discourse de-
scription structurally accessible if it is a potential attachment site for a subsequent
update of the discourse description.18 A node named in a discourse description is
a potential attachment site if it can be anchored consistently to a terminal node
named in the input description resulting from a potential subsequent update. If
the node is positively marked, it will find its negative anchor in the part of the
tree structure representing subsequent discourse. If it is negatively marked, it will
find its positive anchor in the part of the tree structure representing subsequent
discourse. If it is unmarked, or ‘satisfied’ it cannot be an attachment site for
subsequent updates.19
18In TAG for discourse and LDM structurally accessible nodes are often called ‘open nodes’
and structurally inaccessible ones ‘closed nodes’. In description grammar approaches the term
‘open node’ is sometimes used to denote what we call negatively marked node names, and the
term ‘closed node’ to denote both what we call positively marked node names’ and ‘satisfied
node names’. We will avoid these terms or use them only in the first sense here, that is, ‘open
nodes’ are structurally accessible ones and ‘closed nodes’ are structurally inaccessible ones.
19Though notice that unmarked nodes can be redescribed by subsequent updates in principle.
There is no single constraint in the grammar which says that overlapping descriptions are
prohibited. In practice, however, it is excluded through the interaction of the axioms of the
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To illustrate, consider the following discourse description. It is the description
which results when, after parsing and interpreting the discourse ‘John left early.
He was ill.’, the hearer drops the right-closure assumption in expectation of the
next discourse contribution.
(3.33) ∆2: r−
S+17
S18,4
John left early
S19
Rel20
explanation
S−21
S+12
He was ill
Given our definition of incrementation, subsequent updates place the tree de-
scribed by the new input description immediately to the right of the structure
already described by the input discourse description. Hence, the potential attach-
ment sites of the discourse description in (3.33) are the nodes named r, 17, 21
and 12. All other nodes named in ∆2 are structurally inaccessible or closed off
for attachments of subsequent updates.
For example, in the updated discourse description represented in (3.34) below,
it is impossible to identify the node named 18 with the node named 23 in the
input description resulting from the update without violating the axioms of the
grammar or the properties of the discourse description. Suppose 18 = 23. Since
nodes in a tree can only have a single mother node, it would follow that 17 = 22,
19 = 24, 20 = 25, and 21 = 26. However, 20 cannot be identified with 25 because
the first strictly precedes the second. Hence, 18 cannot be identified with 23; it is
structurally inaccessible to the update.
(3.34) ∆3: r−
S+17
S18,4
John left early
S19
Rel20
explanation
S−21
S+12
He was ill
S+22
S−23 S24
Rel25
explanation
S−26
S+27
He had eaten a shrimp roll
grammar and the properties of input descriptions of the incrementation operation.
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For the new input description represented in (3.34) there are two possible attach-
ments: either (r∗ 22 and) 23∗ 17, or 21∗ 22 and 23∗ 12. Under the assump-
tion that the discourse description is right-closed, this comes down to r = 22 and
23 = 17, or 21 = 22 and 23 = 12. The two attachments result in discourse de-
scriptions representing different interpretations of the discourse. There is a form
of ambiguity here, similar to the sentence internal structural ambiguity discussed
in section 2.4.2 of the preceding chapter. Following Gardent and Webber (1998)
and Duchier and Gardent (2001) we shall refer to this as attachment ambiguity :
in general an update can attach at different sites in a described discourse tree.
Different attachments come with verifying models that are structurally different,
and result in different readings of the utterance that triggered the update. Ad-
ditional semantic constraints in the grammar and preferences generated by the
language user’s default inferences cut down ambiguity.
For the purpose of the discussion, we have simplified the example a bit by
already selecting the relation of explanation as the preferred implicit relation
linking S27 to the discourse context. Furthermore, we assume the hearer prefers
a reading in which the fact that John ate a shrimp roll explains that he was ill
over one in which John’s having eaten a shrimp roll explains that he left early,
because he was ill. This corresponds to the attachment 21∗22 and 23∗12 in ∆3:
(3.35) ∆3: r−
S+17
S18,4
John left early
S19
Rel20
explanation
S−21
S+22
S−23
S+12
He was ill
S24
Rel25
explanation S
−
26
S+27
He...shrimp roll
Independently of right-closure of the discourse description, the attachment of the
update leads to the closing off of part of the discourse description. Whatever the
attachment position of the next update is going to be, all nodes dominated by
or identical to the node named 23 in (3.35) are now structurally inaccessible to
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subsequent updates. In other words, the hearer may deduce
(3.36) ∆3: r−
S17
S18,4
John left early
S−19
Rel20
explanation
S−21
S+22
S23,12
He was ill
S24
Rel25
explanation S
−
26
S+27
He...shrimp roll
The potential attachment sites of this discourse description are the nodes named
r, 17, 21, 22, 26 and 27. As the reader can see from the above series of pictures,
there is something like a right frontier in LDG. In TAG for discourse and LDM
the right frontier is roughly the right edge of the discourse parse tree, at which
the adjunction of trees representing newly processed input takes place, see section
3.4. What is updated in LDG is not a discourse tree, however, but a discourse
description, a collection of logical statements whose verifying models are tree
structures. Right frontier , in LDG, is essentially a pictorial term for the set of
potential attachment sites or structurally accessible nodes named in a discourse
description. A given discourse description may be verified by more than one tree
structure, and each of these tree structures comes with its own right frontier, in
the sense of TAG for discourse or LDM. The discourse description underspecifies
these right frontiers.
As in TAG for discourse and LDM, attachment at the right frontier is a
consequence of the incrementality of the grammar. Due to the fact that, first,
all input descriptions are anchored to at least one terminal element, second, all
terminal elements are strictly ordered by precedence, and third, incrementation
takes place from left to right, the nodes that are structurally accessible to a new
update can only be nodes in what might be dubbed the ‘right frontier zone’ of
the pictorial representation of the discourse description.
Exactly how far this zone stretches depends on the axioms of the grammar,
and the integrity constraints on the form of elementary trees described in the
lexicon. While in simple examples like the one discussed above, it is easy to show
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which nodes in a given discourse description are structurally accessible it is a
matter for further research what can be said about the attachment potential of
discourse descriptions in general, given the formal properties of LDG. This relates
directly to the issue of monotonic transfer of conclusions from one phase in the
parsing process to the next, touched upon in section 3.5.4. It all concerns the
inherent closure properties of discourse descriptions.
3.5.6 Deterministic Discourse Processing
The processing of an arbitrary discourse contribution results in an incrementa-
tion of the input discourse description. The incrementation operation +, defined
in section 3.5.3, is monotonic: one or more logical statements are added to the set
of statements that make up the input discourse description. Apart from the tem-
porary right-closure statements, and, sometimes, conclusions drawn earlier on the
basis of default reasoning, no statement is ever removed from a discourse descrip-
tion. Disregarding the effect of right closure and default reasoning, every update
strengthens the discourse description and eliminates potential verifying models of
the discourse. As we shall see in the next chapter, this goes for all updates, includ-
ing those induced by corrective discourse contributions. While in terms of their
semantic interpretation they are nonmonotic, they induce monotonic updates of
discourse descriptions.
An incrementation step results in an update of the discourse description. The
language user may subsequently reason about the attachment of the newly added
input description. Once again, this is a monotonic operation: node names, domi-
nance relations, and possibly node identifications are added to the discourse de-
scription, but no statements are retracted from it. Other than in TAG, where the
adjunction operation changes properties of the parse tree it operates on, attach-
ment in description grammar only adds information to the discourse description.
By virtue of the monotonicity of both the incrementation operation and the
attachment of newly processed input descriptions, the discourse model allows
for deterministic discourse processing in standard cases of attachment ambiguity,
cooccurring with what might be called argument underspecification. In general,
it is possible that the argument of a discourse relation is not completely specified
yet at a given moment in processing the discourse, and that it is extended by a
subsequent update. Consider
(3.37) a. I’m not going to ask Jacky to take care of the children,
because she always calls off at the last moment.
The current right argument of the connective ‘because’ is the proposition ‘she
always calls off at the last moment’. As the continuation in (3.38) shows, this is
not necessarily the final right argument, or the whole reason why the speaker is
not going to ask Jacky to take care of the children.
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(3.38) a. I’m not going to ask Jacky to take care of the children,
because she always calls off at the last moment.
b. She isn’t very nice to them either.
The reason for not asking Jacky to take care of the children is not just that she
always calls off at the last moment, but also that she is not very nice to the
children. As is observed in Gardent and Webber (1998) and Duchier and Gardent
(1999, 2001), argument underspecification is closely related to incrementality.
Since the information conveyed in a discourse is only made available step by step,
and arguments can be complex discourse units, it is unavoidable that an argument
is not always specified completely in a single update. Argument underspecification
is modeled directly in description grammar, through the underspecification of the
dominance relation between ‘current’, and ‘final’ arguments of discourse relations.
The following discourse description, resulting from processing (3.38a) illustrates
this.
(3.39) ∆1: r−
S+17
S18,4
I am not...children
S19
Rel20
because
S−21
S+12
she always...moment
The node named 12 represents the current right argument of the causal con-
nective, the node named 21 its final right argument. Reasoning under the right-
closure assumption, the hearer will identify the two, and obtain the meaning of
the discourse as it is after processing (3.38a) is obtained. When the discourse is
continued, however, the current argument can be extended.
In Gardent and Webber (1998) and Duchier and Gardent (1999, 2001) it is
pointed out that the description grammar treatment of argument underspeci-
fication and attachment ambiguity conforms to the deterministic hypothesis of
Marcus et al. (1983). The hypothesis says that cases of attachment ambiguity
that require no conscious reanalysis are processed deterministically. Indeed, the
extension of an ‘uncompleted’ argument, as occurring in (3.38b), does not seem to
lead to an increase in processing load. This seems to hold for cases of attachment
ambiguity as well. Intuitively, no reinterpretation or backtracking takes place in
the incrementation step. If this intuition is correct, then description grammar
models incrementation in a cognitively plausible way.
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Interestingly, there are also cases of ambiguity—so-called garden-path ambigu-
ity—which do require conscious reanalysis. The deterministic hypothesis says that
this type of ambiguity is not processed deterministically. Consider, for instance,
the garden-path expression ‘The horse raced ...’ as occurring in the following two
sentences.
(3.40) a. The horse raced past the barn.
b. The horse raced past the barn fell.
Sentence (3.40a) tells us that there is a horse which raced past the barn. Sentence
(3.40b) says that there is horse that was raced past the barn, and which fell. In
(3.40a) ‘raced’ is the finite verb, taking ‘the horse’ as its subject, in (3.40b) it
is a participle heading the modifying phrase ‘raced past the barn’. Especially in
(3.40b), the hearer may get on the wrong track. Initially he may interpret ‘raced’
as the finite verb, and repair this only when at the end of the sentence ‘fell’ is
encountered.
As is pointed out in Gardent and Webber (1998), garden-path ambiguity can-
not be captured just by dominance underspecification in description grammar. It
can, however, be represented by a disjunction over syntactic or semantic alterna-
tives within the sentence description—this is a logical possibility in description
grammar. And the ambiguity can be resolved by monotonically adding further
information to the description, just like ambiguities represented by dominance
underspecification. Thus, relative to these examples the grammar is not con-
straining enough: it does not predict that there is backtracking or indeterminacy
in the parsing process.
As is suggested in Gardent and Webber (1998), if we want to account for
examples of this kind, which lead to cognitive processing difficulties, we need an
approach which combines underspecification with a preference system that high-
lights a specific reading: the reading which corresponds to the hearer’s currently
preferred interpretation. In other words, on the basis of such a preference system,
or a set of ‘biases’, one of the disjunctive alternatives is chosen nondeterministi-
cally. When in the course of the parsing process the chosen option turns out to be
incorrect, the preference is canceled and the previously dispreferred alternative
pursued.
The treatment of garden-path sentences is one of the aspects of discourse
interpretation that motivated us to make room for a preference system in the
framework of discourse interpretation (see section 3.2). We assume that the lan-
guage user generates preferences over alternative verifying models of discourse
descriptions, on the basis of his world knowledge and default rules in .
As we have seen in the preceding sections, the preference system is applicable
in a much wider domain than just garden-path sentences. Many cases of attach-
ment ambiguity involve the choice of an appropriate, but underspecified discourse
relation, linking the new input description to the discourse description. Some fur-
ther preferences relevant for discourse processing are mentioned in Gardent and
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Webber (1998) and Duchier and Gardent (2001). A well-known constraint in
cognitive linguistic approaches is a bias towards ‘low attachment’: a preference
for structures in which the incoming unit attaches ‘low in the tree’ and can be
obtained by minimising the most recent dominance link.20 It is certainly worth-
wile to investigate the implementation of this, and similar cognitively motivated
constraints on discourse interpretation in LDG.
3.6 Summary and Loose Ends
Summarizing, in this chapter we put forward a framework of discourse interpre-
tation which is built up around an incremental LDG formalism. The framework
consists of an incremental grammar system G+, a reservoir of world knowledge K,
and a default inference component . G+ includes a discourse grammar G. The
discourse grammar represents the language user’s grammatical knowledge, the
reservoir of world knowledge models his nonlinguistic knowledge, and the default
inference component models part of his reasoning capacity. G+ generates logical
descriptions of discourse. Discourse is processed stepwise, and each processing
step induces an incrementation of the discourse description built up so far. Pars-
ing is reasoning about discourse descriptions: the hearer reasons about the tree
models that verify a discourse description given G and K.
Generally speaking, discourse cannot be fully disambiguated on the basis of
grammatical knowledge alone. Underspecification is ubiquitous at discourse level.
Anaphoric elements must find some suitable antecedent, discourse connectives
must find an appropriate attachment position, and discourse relations must be
semantically specified. While the syntactic and semantic constraints in G deter-
mine the potential readings of a discourse, the hearer employs his knowledge of
the world and default reasoning to make choices between these readings. We as-
sume the hearer is able to weigh alternative readings against each other and opt
for one or more preferred ones. The role of the default inference component in
the framework of discourse interpretation is to generate preferences over verifying
models of discourse descriptions. In the presence of new information preferences
may be dropped.
Thus, the framework implies a division of work in line with the architecture
of discourse interpretation systems as proposed in both Webber et al. (1999) and
Asher and Lascarides (2003). The grammar accounts for the lexical and compo-
sitional semantics of discourse. The semantics can be underspecified, however.
Defeasible reasoning accounts for further disambiguation. Asher and Lascarides
explicitly identify the interaction between compositional semantics and defeasi-
ble reasoning with the semantics-pragmatics interface: the task of pragmatics is
to replace the underspecified elements with more complete information (p.113).
20See for example Crain and Steedman (1985), Frazier (1995), and Chen and Vijay-Shankar
(1995).
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Though this is obviously a theory-dependent characterisation of pragmatics, it is
one sensible way of coming to grips with the notion. We will follow their sugges-
tion and will henceforth use the term pragmatics in our framework for matters
of discourse analysis that must be accounted for in terms of the language user’s
preferences and nonlinguistic knowledge.
The grammar system G+ is an incremental variant of LDG as proposed in Muskens
(2001). Discourse is processed stepwise, and each processing step induces an in-
crementation of the discourse description built up so far. The incrementation
operation adds a new input description to the ones gathered so far and makes the
tree described by the input description into the immediate right neighbour of the
described discourse tree. The grammar predicts that any grammatical discourse
is structurally coherent in the sense that every newly processed sentence is struc-
turally linked to its discourse context, either through an overt discourse operator,
or through an implicit discourse relation. Attachment takes place at the right
frontier of the discourse description, that is, at some structurally accessible node
named in the description. The selection of a semantically most coherent reading
of a given discourse builds essentially on preferences.
The move to an incremental grammar system necessitated some changes in the
LDG formalism. Instead of circumscription of lexical nodes per input description,
the nodes representing lexical elements in the input descriptions are stated to be
immediately consecutive. Furthermore, all discourse descriptions are left-closed,
that is, there is a leftmost lexical node named in a discourse description, and
this node cannot be preceded by any other node in verifying trees. Finally, af-
ter each incrementation step the language user may reason under the hypothesis
that the last lexical element named in a discourse description is the rightmost
lexical node in verifying trees of the discourse description. This was called hypo-
thetical right-closure. When a discourse description is both left- and right-closed,
the lexical nodes in a verifying model must be exactly those specified in the dis-
course description. As in nonincremental LDG, positively and negatively marked
nodes can then be clicked together, and the verifying tree models of the discourse
description are obtained.
The dynamic closure procedure raises an interesting question for further re-
search: how much of the conclusions drawn on the basis of right-closed discourse
descriptions can be moved monotonically from one discourse description to the
next, after an incrementation step? To put it differently, what can be concluded
from discourse descriptions that are left-closed but not right-closed?
Clearly it is desirable that certain properties should hold. Fortunately, this is
the case for the structural coherence property, which plays a central role in the
inference of implicit discourse relations. The conclusion that there is an implicit
relation (if there is no overt discourse operator) is preserved under incrementation.
The specification or choice of a particular discourse relation in a given discourse
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is not necessarily preserved, however. This is the type of conclusion that builds
on preferences or default reasoning; it can be cancelled when more information is
available.
Secondly, we want the completed parse of clauses below sentence level and
possibly also of complex sentences to be preserved under incrementation. Rel-
ative to this matter a further articulation of sentence theory will be relevant.
Additional constraints defining clause bounderies, or rather clauses as maximal
domains of interpretation for the quantifiers they contain, are necessary anyway.21
Furthermore, it is sometimes claimed that sentencehood has a particular semantic
impact of its own, for example on the interpretation of kataphors, so there may
be reason to implement a notion of sentence-boundedness as well. In both cases
the characterisation of a particular type of constituent as a local maximal domain
will reduce the attachment possibilities of subsequent updates.
Apart from these considerations, it seems that the completion of discourse
units is sometimes linguistically marked. The clearest example of this is with
discourse units linked by the parallel (or list) relation, where intonational marking
of the nonfinal elements of the list signals the continuation of the listing, while
the final element in the parallel relation is intonationally marked as the last
item. Furthermore, the end of a sentence is usually intonationally marked as
such.22 In each case, the intonational marking could be viewed as a trigger for
the hypothetical closure of the part of the discourse description that covers the
discourse unit under consideration.
Incrementation is a monotonic operation in the LDG system. Whatever the se-
mantic update effect of a newly processed discourse contribution is, the incre-
mentation of the discourse description it induces is a pure expansion: apart from
hypothetical end statements and conclusions drawn on the basis of preferences,
no information is retracted from a discourse description. Attachment of trees de-
scribed by new input descriptions at what is commonly referred to as the right
frontier of the discourse description is monotonic as well: node name identifica-
tions and dominance relations are added to the discourse description. As such,
the treatment of incrementality in LDG conforms to the determistic hypothesis
of Marcus et al. (1983): standard cases of attachment ambiguity, as induced by
incremental discourse processing, do not require conscious reanalysis. They are
processed deterministically in LDG.
The deterministic hypothesis also says that when conscious reanalysis or ‘back-
tracking’ does occur, discourse is not processed monotonically. This prediction
applies to the treatment of garden-path sentences in LDG. As it turned out, how-
ever, the grammar system on its own is not sufficiently constraining to explain
21Compare Cimiano and Reyle (2005) on clause boundedness of quantifier scope in
LDG/UDRT.
22See Pierrehumbert and Hirschberg (1990), on the form and interpretation of boundary
tones.
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the backtracking. Only in combination with default reasoning, which triggers a
preference for a reading which later turns out to be unacceptable, the prediction
is born out. Thus, the treatment of garden-path sentences provides some inde-
pendent support for the idea that in one form or another a preference system or
set of ‘weak constraints’ must be part of a framework of discourse interpretation.
The precise implementation of this awaits further research. What we are inter-
ested in in this dissertation is the function specification of the preference system:
what are the kind of linguistic phenomena that could or should be explained in
terms of biases or preferences? The distinctive feature, of course, is cancelabil-
ity: preferences can be violated, and when this happens it does not lead to the
prediction that the described discourse is ungrammatical. This sets them apart
from the constraints that make up the grammar G. These must be satisfied for
the discourse to be grammatical. The grammar system processes discourse de-
terministically. Nondeterministic aspects of the interpretation process are to be
accounted for in terms preferences or default conclusions.
Chapter 4
Discourse Semantics
4.1 Introduction
In the preceding chapter a framework for discourse interpretation was introduced.
The focus was on the general properties of the framework, on discourse syntax
and the characterisation of incremental Logical Description Grammar. In this
chapter we unfold the semantic theory of the framework.
A central issue in discourse semantics is context dependence of interpretation.
Discourse contributions are not made in an information vacuum. They relate in
many ways to what was said and implicitly assumed in the preceding discourse, to
the actual situation in which the discourse takes place, and to the world knowledge
of the participants. The semantics of our framework must be arranged so that in
principle such dependencies can be accounted for.
In answer to this demand we adopt a dynamic perspective on meaning, in
which the meaning of a discourse contribution is viewed as the change it brings
about in the context of interpretation (Kamp 1981; Heim 1982). We shall zoom
in on the notion of discourse meaning in section 4.2, defining it as the update
of what is implicitly presupposed at the start of the discourse with what is said.
The discourse meaning resulting from an initial part of discourse serves as the
context of interpretation for the next contribution in the discourse. Different
classes of contributions may be distinguished according to their update effect and
the requirements they put on the context of interpretation. Notably, we shall
distinguish nonmonotonic discourse contributions, which result in revisions of the
context of interpretation, from monotonic ones, which only expand it (section
4.3). General felicity conditions on consistent and informative updating can be
specified in the semantic theory as general constraints on discourse meanings.
In the main body of this chapter (section 4.4) we will formulate these general
constraints, but we will mainly be concerned with aspects of context dependence
of interpretation that result from the use of particular elements or linguistic con-
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structs in the language. Broadly speaking, such aspects of context dependence
fall under the heading of anaphoricity, presupposition, information structure,1
and coherence relations. Information structure will not be discussed in this work,
but we will provide a treatment of various anaphors, presupposition triggers, dis-
course connectives and discourse relations. As in chapter 2, discourse relations are
implicit elements in the lexicon of the grammar, which, like explicit connectives,
describe or model relations of coherence in discourse. It shall be argued that all
of the elements mentioned generate constraints on what we shall call, in line with
Karttunen (1974), their local context. The local context of a linguistic expression
is the semantic, contextual information that is accessible to it given its position in
the discourse structure. We will define a notion of local context for each node in
a discourse tree, and incorporate constraints on local contexts in the elementary
descriptions of context sensitive elements of the language.
Thus, in our framework context sensitive constraints shall figure as an ad-
ditional parameter in the compositional semantics of discourse. By incorporat-
ing conditions on local contexts in the lexical descriptions of context sensitive
elements a straightforward declarative treatment of anaphora resolution, presup-
position satisfaction, and appropriateness conditions of discourse operators will
be obtained. In addition, through the simultaneous description of syntax and
semantics in LDG there will be a smooth integration of grammatical levels.
A prerequisite for the account of discourse meaning and context sensitivity
that we have in mind is that a less sketchy specification of the semantics featur-
ing in discourse descriptions is provided than was given in the preceding chapters.
Remember that the description language of the grammar framework is classical
type logic L. In this chapter we shall employ a sublanguage of L as semantic
representation language within the linguistic descriptions. This will be a compo-
sitional DRT along the lines of Muskens (1996). In fact it will be a variant of
compositional DRT that offers a notion of DRSs which is somewhat more fine-
grained than the one developed there. The finegrained DRT sublanguage of L is
defined in appendix A.
The choice of compositional DRT for semantic representation language sup-
ports the comparability of our framework with other discourse theories employing
DRT or underspecified DRT, notably SDRT (Asher and Lascarides 2003), and
furthers the synthesis of linguistic analyses across these frameworks. The logical
description method, however, is independent of the particular semantic formalism
it is applied to here and other choices could be made.2 Relatedly, our aim will be
1We use the term ‘information structure’ to refer to the subdivision of linguistic expressions
(and their meanings) in parts with an informationaly different function, such as theme-rheme,
focus-background, and topic-comment.
2Various alternative semantic representation languages figure in related linguistic models.
For example, ‘flat semantics’ is used in the ‘TAG for discourse’ paradigm (Stone and Web-
ber 1998); Vijay-Shanker’s description grammar features logical forms (Vijay-Shanker 1992);
in the Saarbru¨cken approach towards description grammar for discourse ‘constraint language
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not so much to develop ‘new’ theories of anaphora and presupposition resolution,
or of discourse relations and coherence, but rather to show that such theories can
be integrated in the framework of discourse interpretation simply through adding
constraints to the grammar. As before, a language user will obtain a (possibly
underspecified) interpretation of the discourse by reasoning about the verifying
models of the discourse description given his grammar and his world knowledge.
Thus, we hope to illustrate the functionality of the LDG framework as a logical
toolkit for the specification of discourse theory in general.
We leave to further investigation the issue how participants change and extend
their knowledge, attitudes, and commitments through conversation, and how this
can best be treated in the LDG framework of discourse interpretation. The dis-
course semantics as it will be implemented will be defined in terms of the bare
semantic contents of the participants’ contributions. Discourse meanings are ‘de-
scriptions of reality’ resulting from the sequence of contributions made in the
discourse; they change with the participants’ point of view and always reflect the
most recent speaker’s view of the reality described. They do not represent di-
rectly the commitments and attitudes of all participants at every moment in the
discourse. We expect, however, that the framework can be extended to account
for participants’ commitments, either by adding inference rules so that partici-
pants’ commitments can be inferred from the update history of the discourse, or
by integrating commitments directly in semantic values and discourse meanings.
We conclude in section 4.5.
4.2 Discourse Meaning
We presuppose a framework of discourse interpretation Fa = 〈G
+,K, 〉 of the
kind developed in the preceding chapter. Fa models the knowledge of an inter-
preting agent or language user a, who can, but need not be a participant in the
discourse under consideration. The incremental grammar system G+ includes a
description grammar for discourse G, which represents the language user’s gram-
matical knowledge of a given natural language. K represents his nonlinguistic,
general knowledge or world knowledge, and stands for his default reasoning ca-
pacity and capacity to assign preferences over verifying tree models of discourse
descriptions. can access both linguistic and nonlinguistic knowledge.
For any given stretch of discourse T the grammar system generates a discourse
description ∆T . This is a set of statements in a logical language describing the
syntactic and semantic relations characterising the discourse processed so far.
Discourse descriptions figure as underspecified representations of the discourse or
discourse contexts. They represent the language user’s knowledge of the discourse
for lambda structures’ is used (Egg et al. 2001); the Linguistic Discourse Model employs a
Montague-style semantics with unification variables (Pru¨st et al. 1994). Finally, SDRT (Asher
and Lascarides 2003) employs segmented DRSs, a combination of DRT and rhetorical relations.
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processed so far. In this chapter we shall introduce the notion of a local context.
Local contexts are semantic objects attached to the nodes in a discourse tree.
They represent, so to speak, the semantic dimension of the discourse context for
each individual discourse unit.
On the basis of a left- and right-closed discourse description, the language user
can reason about the tree models or linguistic structures that verify a discourse
description given G. In particular, he may reason about the semantic content of
the sentences uttered, and the meaning of the discourse processed so far. The
(possibly underspecified) semantic content of the discourse is represented by σr,
the semantic value of the root node in a discourse description. This value is built
up compositionally from the semantic values of the clauses or sentences uttered
in the discourse. The meaning of a discourse will be defined as B⊕σr, the update
of an ‘implicit background’ or main local context B with σr.
3
From a dynamic point of view, the implicit background can be thought of
as the initial context of interpretation. From a static point of view it should be
thought of as consisting of whatever is taken for granted or presupposed4 by the
participants during the conversation in question, according to the interpreting
agent a. The background is highly underspecified, as what is presupposed is open
for negotiation between discussion participants. Hence, we speak of the implicit
background. In the course of the conversation it is specified, or as it were, con-
structed, through the linguistic presuppositions or context sensitive constraints
evoked by the discourse.
The implicit background must be distinguished from the interpreting agent’s
reservoir of world knowledge K. B is a semantic object in a discourse description,
K is not. While B models what counts as presupposed given the current discourse
in the eyes of the interpreting agent a, K represents his private world knowledge. B
is not necessarily completely supported by all of the participants at every moment
in the discourse, given their private knowledge and beliefs. In contrast, K is always
supported by the interpreting agent a. When a is a participant in the conversation
there is a systematic interaction between the linguistic presuppositions attached
to his contributions and K. For example, if a is truthful, he will not confirm a
statement which carries presuppositional information which is in conflict with
K. Rather, the conflict will motivate him to utter a correction or to query the
statement made. Rules describing such interactions may be specified within the
discourse model, but this will not be done in this dissertation.
A language user a may evaluate a discourse contribution resulting in a dis-
course description ∆ by hypothetically updating his world knowledge K with
(B ⊕ σr)
∆, the possibly underspecified discourse meaning determined by ∆. On
the basis of the hypothetical update he may generate preferences over the verify-
3⊕ is a merge operator conjugating DRS’s, see section 4.4.1.
4This is pragmatic presupposition or ‘common background belief’, in the sense of Stalnaker
(1974).
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ing trees of ∆, employing his default reasoning engine .
Participants’ attitudes and commitments In our framework of discourse
interpretation we concentrate on semantic contents of utterances rather than the
participants’ attitudes towards that content. Discourse descriptions describe how
semantic contents relate to each other, and discourse meanings are determined
by them. As participants may disagree on certain points, it is not necessarily the
case that all of the semantic content of a discourse is believed or supported by
each of the participants at any point in the conversation. Rather, the semantic
content of a discourse represents what is currently proposed for acceptance to
the hearer by the most recent speaker. Our discourse model does not tell directly
how a given discourse contribution changes the attitudes or commitments5 of the
participants in a given conversation, but it defines, somewhat more abstractly,
pre- and postconditions of acceptance on discourse contributions made relative
to arbitrary contexts of interpretation.
We embrace a dynamic notion of discourse meaning.6 Discourse contributions
in our model result in ‘snapshots’ or descriptions of reality representing the most
recent speaker’s point of view. With discourse contributions such as denials and
corrections, the discourse meaning changes nonmonotonically: the previous snap-
shot is lost and cannot be retrieved from the new one. To illustrate, consider the
following discourse, in which participant A asserts that a man jumped off the
bridge and participant B corrects that statement.
(4.1) A: A man jumped off the bridge.
B: No, he was pushed. Strawson (1952)
The correction can be paraphrased as “The man (whom you are talking about)
did not jump off the bridge, he was pushed (and that’s how he got off).” Thus,
the first snapshot, made by participant A, shows a man who jumps off a given
bridge, at some past time; the second snapshot, made by participant B, shows
the same man and bridge at the same past time, but now he is pushed off. The
discourse meaning can be compared to the film composed of the snapshots, in
other words, the meaning of the discourse is in the change from one snapshot to
another.
5Following Hamblin (1971) commitments may be thought of ‘as if-beliefs’ or, in our own
terms, ‘public beliefs’. A participant’s commitments need not be consistent with his private
beliefs, but the other participants will assume this is so as long as there is no evidence to the
contrary. We view commitments as a particular kind of attitude.
6Within the dynamic semantic paradigm discourse contributions are viewed as update op-
erations. The meaning of a discourse contribution is defined as the change it brings about in
the context of interpretation. Formulating it somewhat differently, a participant in a conversa-
tion who knows the meaning of a discourse contribution is aware of its update effect, that is,
he knows the consequences of accepting its (possibly underspecified) semantic content in the
context of interpretation. See Muskens et al. (1997) for an overview.
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What we aim at accounting for in our discourse model is the update effect of
discourse contributions at the level of semantic contents. For example, the update
effect of the correction in (4.1) is to change a description of reality in which a
man jumped off the bridge into a description of reality in which that man was
pushed off the bridge (and did not jump). The grammar will ensure that if B’s
utterance is analysed as a correction of A’s statement, its semantic content is
interpreted as a rival description of the situation already described by A. The
grammar will predict that accepting the semantic content of the correction in
this discourse context involves rejecting the semantic content of the preceding
utterance, or part of it.
It remains as a challenge for further research to extend the grammar so as to
account as well for the update effect of discourse contributions at the level of the
participants’ attitudes or commitments. Clearly, every contribution introduces or
changes a commitment on the speaker’s part, and relates in a manner character-
istic for the type of contribution to the commitments already established through
the preceding discourse. In the case of the correction in (4.1) B commits himself
to a description of reality conflicting with the one participant A is committed to.
Presuming A’s commitments to be consistent, A can only accept B’s correction
and at the same time preserve consistency by dropping his commitment to the
corrected description of reality.
The commitments of the participants in a conversation relate systematically to
the semantic content of their utterances and the types of contributions they make.
With respect to assertions, one might say that each participant is committed to
what he asserted, or explicitly or implicitly agreed to, but did not retract so
far in the discourse (Hamblin 1971). It seems reasonable to suppose that if the
language user administrates who makes what kind of contribution at which point
in the discourse he is able to infer who is committed to what at any moment
in the conversation. Discourse descriptions are sufficiently informative to allow
such inferences in principle. Thus, an extension of the discourse grammar may
be built which regulates these inferences, and which characterises different types
of discourse contributions in terms of the requirements they put on the resulting
attitudinal context of interpretation.7
7An extension of this kind would in effect be a ‘grammar of discourse contributions’. Re-
member that discourse contributions are not described in discourse descriptions in LDG, rather
they are modeled by updates of discourse descriptions. What characterises an update ∆+ δ of a
discourse description ∆ is not just the tree structure described by δ, but also the attachment of
that stree structure relative to the discourse tree structure described by ∆. While the semantic
content of a given discourse contribution could be assumed to be represented by the semantic
value of the top node of the tree described by δ, what the speaker commits himself to through
his contribution crucially depends on the attachment of the update it induces. The following
example illustrates this.
(4.2) A: If the weather is good we go on a cycle tour.
B: And we go swimming.
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Alternatively, a modification of the discourse grammar might be considered
in which the semantic values of discourse units are composed of commitments,
rather than bare sentence contents. The ‘snapshots’ resulting from discourse con-
tributions might in that case be descriptions of what we would like to call a joint
commitment space, containing the information to which all the participants are
committed and their individual commitments when these are not shared. Dis-
course meanings would then represent a neutral outsider’s perspective, instead of
changing dynamically with the last speaker’s perspective. The approach, which
basically consists in importing discourse contributions to object level, has poten-
tially far-reaching consequences for the interaction with anaphora resolution, and
for discourse structure and the categorisation of discourse relations.
In our view, both approaches are worth pursuing. We cannot tell, at this point,
whether one will be more effective than the other. One way or another, an ex-
tension of the discourse model that integrates participants’ attitudes relative to
the things they say shall be necessary if we want to cover the interpretation of
discourse contributions in all possible dimensions. We do not pursue such cover-
age here, however. We concentrate on what must be, in any formal treatment of
discourse interpretation, at the basis of the semantic theory, namely the manip-
ulation of bare semantic content through linguistic means.
Consider B’s contribution. The semantic value of the top node of the tree described by δ would
be σk ⊕K, where σk is an underspecified value, and K stands for ‘we go swimming’. The most
obvious attachment of δ to ∆ would be one in which σk would stand for ‘we go on a cycle tour’,
and the tree described by δ would form the main clause of the conditional structure. Given
that attachment, participant B does not commit himself to ‘we go on a cycle tour and we go
swimming’ by making his contribution, but to ‘if the weather is good, we go on a cycle tour
and we go swimming’. In other words, the embedding structure matters and the commitment
must be inferred nonlocally.
Likewise, the attachment of the update induced by a given discourse contribution determines
the content of the appropriateness conditions the contribution imposes on the commitments
or attitudes of the participants established through the preceding discourse. (For example, a
confirmation may be assumed to trigger a condition that what it confirms must be something
which the hearer is already committed to or is proposing to commit himself to.) Thus, the
challenge in specifying a ‘grammar of discourse contributions’ is to account systematically for
the communication of semantic content from (object level) discourse descriptions to (metalevel)
discourse contributions and vice versa, while doing justice to the individual character of each
type of discourse contribution. A very simple approach towards inferring commitments from
discourse descriptions would be to suppose that after each contribution the speaker is committed
to the discourse meaning resulting from his contribution, while the hearer is still committed to
the discourse meaning resulting from his own most recent contribution to the discourse. This,
however, would not support an independent characterisation of different types of discourse
contributions in terms of their preconditions and update effect on the attitudinal tier of the
context of interpretation.
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4.3 Nonmonotonic Discourse Contributions
In the preceding section, discourse meaning was defined as B ⊕ σr, the update
of the implicit background B with the semantic content of the discourse σr. Dis-
course meanings function as contexts of interpretation for discourse contributions.
The meaning of a discourse contribution is its update effect on the context of in-
terpretation established through the preceding discourse. We use (B ⊕ σr)
∆rcl
to indicate the context of interpretation determined by a right-closed discourse
description ∆rcl. For a discourse contribution resulting in an update ∆+δ, its
meaning may abstractly be represented as a function from the context of inter-
pretation before processing the contribution to the context of interpretation after
processing it: (B ⊕ σr)
∆rcl → (B ⊕ σr)
(∆+δ)rcl .
Discourse contributions may subsequently be classified in terms of properties
of this update function. A distinction we want to highlight here is the one between
monotonic and nonmontonic discourse contributions. The difference is illustrated
by the following two exchanges.
(4.3) A: A man jumped off the bridge.
They couldn’t stop him.
In (4.3) the second utterance gives some background information about the event
described in the first. The speaker says that a man jumped off the bridge, and
then adds that they could not stop him. The second contribution does not change
the description of reality put forward through the first one, it only expands it.
This is different in the following discourse.
(4.4) A: A man jumped off the bridge.
B: No, he was pushed.
The second contribution in (4.4), discussed as (4.1) in the preceding section, is a
correction. In contrast to the one in (4.3) it revises the picture of reality provided
through the first contribution: it no longer follows that the man jumped off the
bridge. We shall call contributions like the continuation in (4.3) monotonic, and
contributions such as the correction in (4.4) nonmonotonic. The first expand
and preserve the context of interpretation, the second induce a revision of the
context of interpretation. Using the semantic specification language that will be
introduced in the next section, we define these classes of contributions as follows.
B ⊕ σr, K are of type DRSs and |≍ denotes an entailment relation on DRSs.
8
8Our semantic specification language CDRT+ is introduced in the next section and fully
specified in appendix A.
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Monotonic contribution A discourse contribution resulting in an update ∆+δ
of a discourse description ∆ is monotonic iff
∀K if ∆rcl |= (B ⊕ σr |≍ K) then (∆ + δ)
rcl |= (B ⊕ σr |≍ K).
Nonmonotonic contribution A discourse contribution resulting in an update
∆ + δ of a discourse description ∆ is nonmonotonic iff
∃K such that ∆rcl |= (B ⊕ σr |≍ K) and (∆ + δ)
rcl 6|= (B ⊕ σr |≍ K).
This says that a discourse contribution resulting in an update ∆+δ is monotonic
if (B⊕σr)
∆+δrcl entails all statements entailed by (B⊕σr)
∆rcl, and nonmonotonic
if not. In the latter case, there are statements which follow from (B⊕ σr)
∆rcl but
which do not follow from (B ⊕ σr)
∆+δrcl.
Crucially, when we call a discourse contribution nonmonotonic, we are re-
ferring to its update effect on the context of interpretation or discourse meaning
established by the relevant discourse context. This must carefully be distinguished
from its the update effect on the discourse context as such, as represented by a
discourse description. Like all other discourse contributions, nonmonotonic ones
result in monotonic incrementations of the discourse description: one or more log-
ical statements are added to the description and no statement is removed from it.9
The updates induced by corrections or denials attach to the discourse description
like all other updates and do not result in backtracking or a redo of the discourse
description. This is indeed as it should be: corrections do not change the interpre-
tation of a previous statement,10 they only provide conflicting information on the
semantic tier of the discourse context. They do not seem to come with a heavier
processing load than monotonic discourse contributions.
Interestingly, the monotonicity and nonmonotonicity property are defined in
terms of a notion of discourse meaning or context of interpretation which is an un-
derspecified object in our discourse model. At the level of the verifying tree models
of a discourse description, this corresponds to a collection of potential semantic
values, namely one for each of the verifying tree models of a discourse descrip-
tion. Thus, the meaning of a discourse contribution can be viewed as a relation
between a set of potential input contexts of interpretation and a set of potential
output contexts of interpretation. An in-depth investigation of the properties of
this relation is outside the scope of this dissertation. Due to the interaction with
underspecification and ambiguity it is a complex matter. We can, however say
something about the distinction between monotonic and nonmonotonic discourse
contributions.
9The one exception to this is the right-closure assumption, which is hypothetically added
to the discourse description after each incrementation step, and dropped when the discourse
continues.
10Although they may induce the local accommodation of presuppositions which, on the basis
of the interpreting agents’ preferences, were previously globally accommodated.
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To simplify matters, let us consider only discourse contributions which nei-
ther introduce new ambiguities nor resolve any of the existing ones in the input
discourse description. Furthermore, let us suppose that in these cases there is a
one-to-one correspondence between the set of potential input contexts of inter-
pretation and the set of potential output contexts of interpretation, such that
intuitively speaking, for every input context there is a successor output context
which is most similar to it and only differs from it in the update effect of the
contribution.11
Now it can be seen that monotonic discourse contribution induces a monotonic
update on all of its potential input contexts of interpretation. So each successor
context entails all statements entailed by its input context. Similarly, a nonmono-
tonic discourse contribution induces a nonmonotonic update on all of its potential
input contexts of interpretation, in other words, no successor context entails all
statements entailed by its input context.
This characterisation of nonmonotonicity covers any contribution which does
not preserve the context of interpretation in one way or another. It ranges not just
over obvious cases such as denials and corrections, but also over various types of
qualifications which arise from stating exceptions or alternatives to a statement,
or adding conditions to it. In principle a third category of contributions can
be thought of, which might be called ‘partially nonmonotonic’. Contributions
of this kind would induce updates such that some input contexts are entailed
by their successor but others are not. It is an interesting question whether, in
terms of conventional classifications of discourse contributions, there is a class
which is characterised by this property. Objections or counterarguments, which
in a conversation can either be granted and result in a nonmonotonic update,
or be explained away and result in a monotonic one, might be examples of this.
On the other hand, it is not clear how this property should be defined at the
level of the underspecified discourse meanings. So on purely formal grounds it is
predicted that this is not a distinctive property in the characterisation of discourse
contributions.
4.4 Context Sensitive Compositional Semantics
Discourse contributions relate in many ways to the discourse context, the actual
situation in which the conversation takes place, and the world knowledge of the
participants. By defining the meaning of a discourse contribution as its update
effect on the discourse meaning resulting from the preceding discourse we have
placed context dependence of interpretation at the heart of our semantic theory.
11We intend to convey only an intuitive understanding of the properties involved; the successor
relation, and the similarity relation on which it builds, are not spelled out in any formal detail
here. For a formulation of ‘similarity’ as a primitive relation on (sets of) possible worlds, see
for example Lewis (1973).
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We can now take a closer look at the linguistic parameters that constrain the
relation of a discourse contribution to its context of interpretation.
We will distinguish between global requirements and local conditions. The
first are general conditions on discourse meanings or contexts of interpretation,
which must be satisfied after each discourse contribution, irrespective of the type
of contribution. In LDG they are formulated as general descriptions or semantic
axioms. The well-known requirements that discourse contributions preserve con-
sistency and induce informative updates of the context of interpretation can be
formulated as global constraints in the grammar (see section 4.4.5).
Local conditions are constraints on so-called local contexts, induced by specific
classes of linguistic elements, such as anaphora, presupposition triggers, discourse
connectives and discourse relations. In line with Karttunen (1974), the local con-
text of a linguistic element shall be the contextual semantic information that is
accessible to it given the logical structure of the discourse embedding the sentence
in which it occurs. All nodes in a discourse tree structure shall be decorated with
local contexts (section 4.4.2) and context sensitive constraints shall be integrated
in the lexicon of the grammar (section 4.4.3 and 4.4.4). By incorporating con-
straints on local contexts in the lexical descriptions of context sensitive elements
in the language, a unified and declarative treatment of anaphora resolution, pre-
supposition satisfaction, and appropriateness conditions of discourse operators is
obtained. Local contexts and context sensitive constraints figure as an additional
parameter in the compositional semantics of discourse; thus the result may be
called a context sensitive compositional semantics.
Through the combined force of the global requirements on discourse inter-
pretation and the local constraints triggered by the context sensitive elements
occurring in a contribution the resulting discourse meaning is constrained. In
general that meaning will still be underspecified. On the basis of his world knowl-
edge and default reasoning capacity a language user may generate preferences over
different possible readings and obtain a single preferred reading. Thus, pragmatic
reasoning interacts with the language user’s syntactic and semantic reasoning in
the determination of the discourse meaning. We go through an example of this in
section 4.4.6 and section 4.4.7. Readers who prefer to see first how the semantic
theory will be employed in a concrete example may want to go on to these sections
directly and turn back to the preceding ones afterwards.
In the preceding chapters it was simply assumed that linguistic tree representa-
tions come with semantic values; no particulars were given about the semantic
representation language employed in the description grammar. In this chapter
we must fill in the gap. In fact, we need not look for a semantic representation
language which differs very much from what is already present in LDG. Recall
that the description language of the grammar is classical type logic L, and that L
is used to talk about all aspects of linguistic structures including their semantic
values. Hence, it figures as the semantic representation language as well. Part of
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L is specifically tuned to the description of semantic values. In Muskens (2001),
this part or sublanguage of L mimics predicate logic. The technique used is vir-
tually identical to the technique used for obtaining the embedding of DRT in L
known as compositional discourse representation theory or CDRT (Muskens 1996;
Muskens 2001). Here, we shall employ a treatment of DRT in type logic which is
similar to CDRT but offers a somewhat more fine-grained notion of DRSs (Van
Leusen and Muskens 2003).
As before, a Logical Description Grammar (LDG) will be a logical theory G,
and whenever we have a discourse description ∆T stating some simple properties
of a discourse T , the combined theory G+∆T describes the syntax and semantics
of T . The models of G + ∆T contain trees decorated with semantic values; a
function (or, in fact, family of functions) σ associates values with tree nodes. The
description logic talks about natural language semantics and natural language
syntax. In its models we get semantically annotated trees (this in addition to the
usual objects and relations) and in its proof theory we can reason about these.
As was argued in the preceding chapters underspecification naturally falls out
of this view. Since a description G + ∆T can have more than one model, the
syntax and semantics of T may remain underspecified. In particular, it can be
shown that, with the right set-up, certain stages in the reasoning process that
takes G+∆T as its point of departure are closely analogous to the Underspecified
Discourse Representation Structures of Reyle (1993). There is no need to postulate
a separate structural level of the latter, we get UDRSs for free if the hearer’s
simultaneous reasoning about the syntax and semantics of an input expression is
modeled.
Thus, a powerful formal theory of discourse semantics is integrated in our
framework of discourse interpretation. As was noted in the introduction, it is not a
technical necessity for LDG to employ DRT as semantic representation language;
other choices could be made. This particular choice supports the comparability
of our framework with other theories employing (U)DRT and the synthesis of
linguistic analyses across these frameworks. In what follows we will assume the
reader is familiar with standard DRT as laid down in Kamp and Reyle (1993). As
a preliminary to the presentation of our ‘context sensitive compositional discourse
semantics’, in the next section we introduce some basic concepts and notation of
finegrained compositional DRT; a full specification of the semantic representation
language can be found in Van Leusen and Muskens (2003) and in appendix A.
4.4.1 Finegrained CDRT: Basic Concepts and Notation
Like CDRT, finegrained CDRT is an emulation of DRT in type logic. Semantic
representations look like DRS’s, but are abbreviations of formulae in type logic
mimicking the behaviour of DRT. For example, a DRS condition such as ‘wr :
came-in u1’ abbreviates 〈λi.came-in(V (u1)(i), V (wr)(i)), λv[v = u1 ∨ v = wr]〉
in finegrained CDRT. The variable i ranges over states or assignments (type
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s), v ranges over registers or discourse referents (type π), and V is a function
which delivers the individual that occupies a given register in a given state. A
condition is a pair of a set of states (the states in which the condition holds)
and a set of registers (those that are free in the condition). In the example,
λi.came-in(V (u1)(i), V (wr)(i)) denotes the set of states such that in that state
the individual occupying the register denoted by u1 is an individual of which the
property came-in is true in the world occupying the register denoted by wr, and
λv[v=u1 ∨ v=wr] is the set of discourse referents that are free in the condition.
An essential characteristic of CDRT is that type logic is used to talk at object
level about notions which in standard DRT belong to the metalanguage, such as
assignments (verifying embeddings) and variable binding. In CDRT registers and
assignments are objects in the model, that is, semantic objects. Thus, some of
the structure present in the representations of standard DRT is imported to the
level of the semantic objects they denote.
In finegrained CDRT this applies to the body of conditions of DRS’s as
well: DRS’s are defined so that the semantic object denoted by a DRS reflects
the structure of its body, which in the representation is a collection of inde-
pendent conditions. ‘Boxes’,12 such as [u1 |wr : came-in u1, wr : sit-downu1 ] and
[ |wr : sneeze u1 ], abbreviate formulae of type πt×(st×πt)t, that is, the semantic
value of a DRS is a pair consisting of a set of discourse referents—the universe
of the DRS—and a set of conditions . We shall generally use τ as a shorthand for
πt × (st × πt)t. This fine-structure is introduced with a view to the treatment
of corrections later on. It can be argued that corrections and other nonmono-
tonic discourse contributions induce a split, or a selective downdate of a DRS,
with some conditions disappearing or ending up in the scope of a negation while
others are preserved. The language user may sometimes reason about arbitrary
subsets of a given DRS and, so, must be able to address conditions in isolation.
Given the above typing of DRSs the following two basic operations on DRS’s
can easily be defined. The merge of a DRS K and a DRS K ′, denoted by K⊕K ′,
is the DRS resulting from taking the union of the universes, and of the sets
of conditions of the two DRS’s, respectively. Unlike the merge operation ‘;’ in
Muskens (2001), ‘⊕’ is a symmetric operation, in the style of Zeevat (1989). The
inclusion of a DRS K and a DRS K ′, denoted by K ⊑ K ′, holds if the universe
of K is included in the universe of K ′ and the set of conditions of K is part of
the set of conditions of K ′. For example, we will have that
[u1 |wr : sneeze u2 ] ⊑ [u1 u2 |wr : came-inu1, wr : sneeze u2 ]
but not
[u3 |wr : sneeze u3 ] ⊑ [u2 |wr : sneeze u2 ]
12We employ representations with brackets instead of the boxes of standard DRT: DRS’s
are of the form [ . . . | . . . ]. To the left of the | sign is the universe or set of declared discourse
referents of the DRS, to the right its body of conditions .
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We shall sometimes want to require that a DRS is proper, or contains no free
(‘unbound’) discourse referents. The free referents of a DRS K are the ones that
are free in some condition of K but do not belong to the universe of K. We shall
use proper(K) to denote that K has no free referents.
Furthermore, we shall distinguish three kinds of registers, generated by u, o,
and w, functions from nodes to registers. The semantic axioms of the grammar
ensure that fresh registers come with each node in a tree structure. The values
of u will be associated with new referents, while the values of o are referents
that belong to the background B of the discourse. The difference between o- and
u-generated referents will help to distinguish names from pronouns and other
anaphoric elements.
The values of w are registers that can store worlds. While states correspond to
assignments and registers correspond to variables in predicate logic, the notion of
a possible world of course corresponds to the technical notion of a model. Possible
worlds play an essential role in defining a notion of entailment at object level, a
matter to which we turn below. In this dissertation we will only use w(r), the
w value of the root.13 The occupant of w(r) is the ‘actual world’ or world of
evaluation. It will be ensured that wr is always present in the universes of the
‘local contexts’ of nodes, and indeed in the global context, or background B. A
notational convention that we find useful is to write arguments of u, o, and w as
subscripts, for instance u3 instead of u(3), wr instead of w(r) etc.
In our treatment of context sensitive aspects of interpretation we will want to
put constraints on contexts and typically these constraints can take two forms.
One possibility is to require that a context contains certain material. For exam-
ple, for lexical nodes k that carry the proper name ‘Pedro’, we will demand that
[ok | wr:Pedro ok] ⊑ B. Another possibility is that a DRS K is required to follow
from a context. We will see an illustration of this in chapter 6, where presuppo-
sitions shall be required to be satisfied in their local contexts. In this chapter, it
shall be exemplified by the implementation of appropriateness constraints associ-
ated with discourse relations and discourse operators. For this purpose, a notion
of entailment at the level of the describing logic is made available. It is obtained
by quantification over worlds: an entailment holds if the conclusion is true in all
worlds in which the premises are true. We employ K |≍ K ′ to indicate that a
DRS K entails a DRS K ′.
All of the notions introduced above are defined in appendix A. This also con-
tains a truth-preserving translation from our CDRT-sublanguage to predicate
logic, and a definition of truth stated in terms of this. An alternative dynamic
treatment along the lines of Groenendijk and Stokhof (1991) is briefly discussed.
In the course of the chapter some further notation will be introduced, to allow us
to talk with some precision about aspects of the semantics whose full formal treat-
13But in extensions containing modal operators it would be natural to use other values of w
as well.
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ment awaits future research. We shall use |
pi
≍ to indicate object level entailment
given the application of common sense reasoning or default inference to the left
argument. Furthermore, we shall introduce a function ̺, from nodes to registers,
the occupants of which are local reference points. They shall figure in statements
constraining the spatio-temporal and mereological structure of discourse. This
presupposes an event semantic extension of the semantic representation language.
4.4.2 Decorating Tree Structures with Local Contexts
We set out to provide a discourse semantics that can deal with context sensi-
tivity in general. In particular, we promised to provide a unified and declarative
semantics of anaphoric or presuppositional elements in the language. The treat-
ment that we have in mind consists in integrating local contexts and constraints
on them in LDG. More specifically, the elementary tree structures in the lexi-
con of the grammar shall be outfitted with local contexts, so that every node in
a linguistic tree structure comes with a local context. Local contexts may then
serve as a parameter in the compositional semantics of context sensitive elements.
Different classes of anaphoric or presuppositional elements can be characterised
in terms of the specific constraints on local contexts they trigger.
The notion of a local context derives from Karttunen (1974). Karttunen proposes
to account for the projection of presuppositions triggered within complex sen-
tences in terms of the ‘satisfaction’ of the presupposition relative to the relevant
context of interpretation, as established by the complex sentence. Contexts are
modeled as sets of logical forms, and satisfaction comes down to entailment. In
subsequent work, this proposal has been taken up and formulated in terms of
updates on sets of possible worlds and definedness conditions on contexts, see
for instance Heim (1983). Here, we are interested in the basic idea, namely that
the context of interpretation for a presupposition triggered by a given, simple
sentence in a discourse, is a function of the logical composition of the discourse
preceding and embedding the sentence.
As Karttunen says, “in compound sentences, the initial context is incremented
in a left to right fashion giving for each constituent sentence a local context
that must satisfy its presuppositions”. Local contexts of embedded sentences are
defined recursively in terms of the logical form of the compound sentence that is
the embedder. Karttunen provides such definitions for compound sentences of the
form ‘If A then B’, ‘A and B’, ‘A or B’, and sentences with a sentential subject or
object. Though Karttunen talks about presuppositions only, the approach carries
over to constraints triggered by context sensitive elements in general.
The manner in which local contexts are constructed in our discourse grammar
is essentially the same; the main difference is that in LDG, local contexts are
DRS’s rather than sets of logical forms, and of course the available discourse syn-
tactic structure is employed in defining them. For each node k in a tree structure,
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its local context Γ(k) is computed top-down from the local context of its mother
node (if it has one) and the semantic values of its (left) sister nodes. This is
regulated by means of the elementary structures in the lexicon and the semantic
axiom A18 below. The axiom sets the local context of the root node Γ(r) to the
implicit background or global context of the discourse B (a type τ constant), and
it says that nodes of a syntactic category other than S inherit the local context
of their mother node. Here k1 k2 abbreviates k1
+ k2 ∧¬∃k[k1
+ k∧ k+ k2],
that is,  denotes the immediate dominance relation.
A18 Γ(r) = B ∧ ∀k1k2 [[k1  k2 ∧ ℓ(k2) 6= s]→ Γ(k2) = Γ(k1)]
The computation of the local contexts of S-nodes other than the root is captured
in the lexicon of the grammar. To illustrate this, consider the following lexical
descriptions. They describe the syntax and semantics of the sentence connectives
and and if. As in chapter 2, we employ pictures to represent lexical descriptions.
The conventions that are followed in our graphic representations are the same as
before. In addition, the semantic value σ(k) of a node k may be written under it
and we typically write σk for σ(k), and Γk for Γ(k).
(4.5)
S+k1
σk2 ⊕ σk3
S−k2
Γk2 = Γk1
Conk
and
S−k3
Γk3 = Γk2 ⊕ σk2
S+k1
[ |σk2 ⇒ σk3 ]
Sk4
Subk
if
S−k2
Γk2 = Γk1
S−k3
Γk3 = Γk2 ⊕ σk2
In each case, node k1 will receive its local context from some negatively marked
node it can be identified with, when the lexical description of the construction
features in a sentence or discourse description. Thus, Γk1 shall be the local context
resulting from the preceding discourse. In the lexical description of and , Γk2, the
local context of the left conjunct, is identified with Γk1, and the local context of
the right conjunct, Γk3 , is an update of this with σk2 , the semantic value of the
left conjunct. Similarly, in the lexical description of if , the local context of the
antecedent of the conditional is identified with Γk1 , and the local context of the
consequent is an update of this with the semantic value of the antecedent. All of
this reflects Karttunen’s treatment of compound sentences composed with and or
if directly. His theory of presupposition satisfaction may be implemented in LDG
by requiring presuppositions to be entailed by the local contexts of the linguistic
elements that trigger them.
Following Karttunen (1974), the lexical description of the connective or may
be given as in (4.6), or as in (4.7).
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(4.6) S+k1
[ | σk2or σk3 ]
S−k2
Γk2 = Γk1
Conk
or
S−k3
Γk3 = Γk1 ⊕ [ | notσk2 ]
In (4.6), the local context of the second disjunct is the local context resulting
from the preceding discourse updated with the negation of the semantic value of
the left disjunct.
(4.7) S+k1
[ | σk2or σk3 ]
S−k2
Γk2 = Γk1 ⊕ [ | notσk3 ]
Conk
or
S−k3
Γk3 = Γk1 ⊕ [ | notσk2 ]
In (4.7), the local context of the each disjunct is the local context resulting from
the preceding discourse updated with the negation of the semantic value of the
other disjunct. Karttunen discusses both possibilities. Each comes with its own—
desirable or undesirable—consequences for the theory of presupposition. What
matters to us, however, is not so much the particular choices to be made for each
connective in the language, but rather, the general approach, the integration of
local contexts as such in the semantics of LDG.
All elementary tree structures anchored by (explicit) discourse operators and
(implicit) discourse relations in the lexicon shall be decorated with local contexts
in this manner, so that, with the help of axiomA18, the local context of each node
in a discourse tree structure can be composed top-down. It may be observed that
given the composition of local contexts as laid down in the grammar, the local
context of every node in a discourse parse tree contains the implicit background B.
Furthermore, the local contexts of discourse units or S-nodes, like their semantic
values, are all DRSs.
Local contexts relate to the notion of accessibility in standard DRT in the
sense that whenever a discourse referent is accessible from an a pronoun in DRT,
in our discourse grammar, that referent is in the universe of the local context
of the node at which the pronoun sits, and, hence, can bind or resolve it. What
is contained in the local context of a pronoun includes at least the information
one comes across in standard DRT when walking the accessibility path from the
pronoun to the main DRS disregarding information that may have been added
through subsequent incrementation steps.14 For any given node in a discourse tree
14In some cases the Karttunen-style local context contains more information than what would
be the information collected on the accessibility path in standard DRT. For instance, when a
discourse contains a disjunction, the Karttunen style local context of the right argument of the
disjunction contains the negation of the semantic value of the left disjunct. In standart DRT,
however, neither the semantic content of the left disjunct, nor its negation is on the accessibility
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we shall say that its local context represents the information which is semantically
accessible at that node.
4.4.3 Lexical Descriptions of some Basic Word Classes
Let us take a closer look at the lexicon, and zoom in on some basic word classes.
We will discuss the semantics of the determiner a, and of (instances of) verbs,
common nouns, names, and pronouns. The point of interest is, of course, the
treatment of context sensitivity in the lexicon. As discussed in the preceding
section, elementary tree structures are decorated with local contexts. Here we
shall see that anaphoric elements such as names and pronouns come, in addition,
with constraints on their local contexts.
As in the preceding chapters, there will be classifying descriptions and elemen-
tary tree descriptions in the lexicon. Of these, the elementary tree descriptions
carry most information, but the classifying descriptions play a useful role in con-
necting elementary tree descriptions with open class words. We speak of a lexical
description when, for a given lexical item or discourse relation, the classifying
and elementary tree descriptions are combined.15
In (4.8) below classifying descriptions for the open class words Pedro, has,
and mule are given. (4.8a) states that whenever a node k carries the word has,
it must be classified as a transitive verb (tv) and its semantics σpi(piτ)(k) is λv′λv
[ | wr: v has v
′]. (If α is a type, we will let σα denote a function from tree nodes to
objects of type α.) The description for mule in (4.8b) is similar, but the word is
classified as a common noun (cn) and its semantic value is of type πτ . Lastly, the
classifying description for Pedro in (4.8c) sets the semantics to a type πτ property
as well but classifies the element as a proper name (pn). Differences between
common nouns and proper names will become apparent when we consider the
elementary tree descriptions they select.
(4.8)a. ∀k[has(k)→ (tv(k) ∧ σpi(piτ)(k) = λv′λv[ | wr: v has v
′])]
b. ∀k[mule(k)→ (cn(k) ∧ σpiτ (k) = λv[ | wr:mule v])]
c. ∀k[pedro(k)→ (pn(k) ∧ σpiτk =λv[ |wr:Pedro v])]
As before, classifying descriptions will be associated with elementary tree de-
scriptions via the wordclasses or syntactic categories they select (tv, cn, pn, etc.).
Elementary descriptions specify the syntactic structure and semantic features
lexemes of a given word class provide, or subcategorize for. Like classifying de-
scriptions, they are formulated in type logic. As in chapter 3, however, we prefer
to use graphical notation for elementary descriptions. The official representations
path from the right disjunct upto the main DRS. If wanted, the local contexts in LDG can also
be made to correspond exactly to what is on the accessiblity path in standard DRT.
15In Van Leusen and Muskens (2003) both classifying and elementary descriptions are called
lexical descriptions.
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of elementary tree descriptions can always be reconstructed from the more user-
friendly pictorial representations.
The picture in (4.9) is a graphic representation of the elementary tree de-
scription for elements of word class tv, that is, for transitive verbs like has , in
(4.8a). It says that whenever a tree contains a transitive verb, it must have cer-
tain other properties as well. The transitive verb must be labeled ‘V’, it must
have an immediately dominating node labeled ‘VP’, which in turn is dominated
by a (possibly identical) node labeled ‘VP’, whose left sister is a node labeled
‘DP’, etc. The description also contains anchoring information and semantic in-
formation. For brevity, superscripts on σ indicating the type of a semantic value
are often dropped.
(4.9) tv: S+k1
σk3(σk2 )
DP−k2 VP
−
k3
VP+k4
σk(σk5 )
V3k DP
−
k5
The description in (4.9) covers the whole class of transitive verbs. If it is conjoined
with the information that k carries the lexeme has and with the classifying de-
scription (4.8a) we get the lexical description of the word, graphically represented
by (4.10). Note that the semantics of VPk4 now has a more complete specification.
(4.10) S+k1
σk3(σk2 )
DP−k2 VP
−
k3
VP+k4
λv[ | wr: v has σk5 ]
Vk
has
DP−k5
For common nouns (cn) and proper names (pn) we will have the following ele-
mentary tree descriptions.
(4.11) cn: NP+k1
σk
N3k
pn: DP+k1
ok
[ok | ]⊕ σ
piτ
k (ok) ⊑ B
D3k
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The elementary description for common nouns sets the semantic value of the
maximal projection (the NP) to the semantic value of the noun. The elementary
description for proper names is of a slightly different nature. Firstly, it sets the
semantics of the DP to the discourse referent ok; this referent will figure as an
argument of a predicate (verbal or otherwise) when the DP node is identified with
an open slot in some other elementary tree. Secondly, it introduces a requirement
which enforces that the implicit background of the discourse B contains the DRS
[ok | ]⊕ σ
piτ
k (ok), where σ
piτ is the property specified in the classifying description
of the proper name. This in fact implements the usual DRT requirement that dis-
course referents connected with names must be present in the universe of the main
DRS and that the descriptive material connected with such discourse referents
must likewise be available globally.16
Combining the elementary descriptions in (4.11) with the classifying descrip-
tions in (4.8c,b) we obtain the lexical descriptions of mule and Pedro.
(4.12) NP+k1
λv[ | wr:mule v]
Nk
mule
DP+k0
ok
[ok |wr:Pedro ok ] ⊑ B
Dk
Pedro
For closed class words it is often expedient to represent the individual lexical
items directly by means of a lexical description. Here, for example, is an entry for
the indefinite a.
(4.13) S+k1
[uk | ]⊕ σk4 (uk)⊕ σk2
S−k2
Γk2 = Γk1 ⊕ [uk | ]⊕ σk4 (uk)
DP+k3
uk
Dk
a
NP−k4
The idea here is that the DP that is projected from the indefinite translates
as a discourse referent uk and that the declaration of that discourse referent
16The o-generated discourse markers belong to the implicit background or global context
of the discourse. A referential interpretation of proper names may be obtained by adopting a
truth definition for DRSs which ensures that discourse markers present in the universe of the
implicit background receive their interpretation directly from the state of evaluation i. This will
be discussed in section 4.4.7.
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[uk | ] and its restriction σk4(uk) are quantified-in at some higher S level. The
semantic value of the DP, uk, functions exactly like a trace and in the process of
semantic composition it is bound by the quantifier higher up in the structure. Sk1
should be compared to the place where adjunction of the DP takes place after
Quantifier Raising in generative grammar.17 Note that Γk2, the local context of
the lower S node, is set to be the merge of the local context of the higher S
node and the ‘restrictor’ material of the semantics of that higher node in (4.13).
Unresolved pronouns will seek a referent in this local context, and presuppositions
may likewise resolve to it.
The determiners no and every may similarly receive lexical descriptions as in
(4.14).
(4.14) S+k1
[ | not ([uk | ]⊕ σk4(uk)⊕ σk2 )]
S−k2
Γk2 = Γk1 ⊕ [uk | ]⊕ σk4(uk)
DP+k3
uk
Dk
no
NP−k4
S+k1
[ | ([uk | ]⊕ σk4(uk))⇒ σk2 ]
S−k2
Γk2 = Γk1 ⊕ [uk | ]⊕ σk4 (uk)
DP+k3
uk
Dk
every
NP−k4
Finally, here is a lexical description of the pronoun he.
(4.15) DP+k1
σpik
[σpik | ] ⊑ Γk1
Dk
he
Pronouns, like names, come with a semantic value and an additional constraint on
their local context. The semantic value of the DP is set to σpik , a register generated
at the terminal anchor, node k. The statement [σpik | ] ⊑ Γk1 requires this value to
be present in the universe of the local context of the DP. Unlike discourse referents
introduced by indefinites the semantic values of pronouns are underspecified. The
statement [σpik | ] ⊑ Γk1 enforces their identification with a semantically accessible
discourse referent, thus implementing the binding condition on pronouns familiar
from DRT.
The lexicon of the grammar is now sufficiently specified to generate descrip-
tions of sentences like ‘Pedro has a mule’, ‘He has Pedro’, etc. The two context
17This treatment of quantifiers in general is motivated in Muskens (2001). See also Cimiano
and Reyle (2005) for some critical discussion.
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sensitive, or anaphoric elements in this tiny fragment of English are characterised
semantically not just in terms of their semantic values but also of particular con-
straints on local contexts. In the next section we will zoom in on the semantics
of the elements that ‘glue’ sentences together, that is, discourse connectives and
discourse relations. As may be expected, these shall be treated as context sen-
sitive elements in the lexicon as well. After that, in section 4.4.5, we shall talk
about the implementation of two nonlexical, or global semantic constraints on dis-
course interpretation, namely consistency and informativity. The interaction of
context sensitive constraints and semantic values in the composition of discourse
meanings will be discussed when we go through the interpretation of an example
discourse in sections 4.4.6 and 4.4.7.
4.4.4 Discourse Relations, Connectives, and Adverbials
In interpreting discourse, a language user constructs a coherent whole on the basis
of what is explicitly stated. Every utterance is taken to relate in some more or
less specific way to what was previously conveyed in the discourse. Whether or
not that relation is explicitly described through discourse connectives and other
discourse operators, the language user will infer that it is there. Consider
(4.16) A: John was late. He had a flat tire.
The most preferred reading of this discourse is one in which there is a causal
relation linking the second statement to the first: John was late because he had
a flat tire. We assume or infer that the second statement is an explanation of
the first. The speaker might have used the connective ‘because’ to convey this
explicitly. Very often, however, as in (4.16), coherence relations are partly or
completely underspecified. The task of a discourse grammar is to explain that,
despite this, discourse is interpreted as a coherent whole.
As we saw in chapter 3, following common practice in discourse theory, we
propose to account for coherence in discourse in terms of a collection of discourse
relations, representing or modeling the relations of coherence that glue together
the utterances in a discourse. In our treatment, discourse relations are implicit
elements in the lexicon of the grammar. They characterise coherence relations
only partially in the sense that they do not describe the impact of coherence
relations on the participants’ commitments, intentions or attitudes. Apart from
this however, in principle every discourse relation fully describes the content-
parameters of a given coherence relation, so that every coherence relation whose
semantic-pragmatic impact is purely at the level of content is fully characterised
by a single discourse relation. Optionally, in line with Asher and Lascarides (2003),
it may be assumed that coherence relations stand for speech act types, or types
of contributions.18
18Ones intuitive understanding of what speech acts and coherence relations are may point in
the direction of a one-to-one correspondence between coherence relations and speech act types,
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Note that we distinguish between discourse relations, which are implicit ele-
ments in the lexicon of the grammar, and coherence relations, the objects in re-
ality they model or describe. Coherence relations can also be explicitly described
through the lexemes in an utterance. In fact, they are always at least partially
determined through the presence of discourse connectives and other discourse
operators, and through the tense, aspect, mood and modality of the sentence
uttered, and its information structure. The linguistic properties of the sentence
constrain, but do not necessarily uniquely determine a coherence relation. Even
when explicit connectives are present coherence relations can be underspecified.
As in Knott and Mellish (1996) we account for all this by letting discourse opera-
tors describe properties (or in their terminology: features) of coherence relations
rather than full coherence relations. This immediately also explains that discourse
operators can in principle be ‘stacked’ or combined (Webber et al. 1999).
Discourse relations Discourse relations are not phonologically expressed but,
like lexemes, they anchor elementary tree structures, and each relation comes with
its own description in the lexicon of the grammar. The axioms of the grammar
ensure that discourse relations are in complementary distribution with (two-place)
discourse connectives: when the one is present, the other is excluded. Furthermore,
if a tree representation of a sentence is linked to the discourse context through
a discourse relation, discourse syntax allows the presence of maximally one such
element.
Discourse relations are semantically characterised through the combination of
their semantic value and a particular set of context sensitive constraints or ap-
propriateness conditions. The latter constrain the relation between the semantic
value of the newly processed discourse unit which they link to the discourse con-
text and its local context. In addition, through the selection of a coordinating or a
subordinating elementary structure, discourse relations have a particular impact
on the topical structure of the discourse. (Though the discourse topical structure
is a parameter of discourse interpretation still to be filled in in our grammar).
To illustrate, here is an entry for the discourse relation continuation, of word-
class rel . Rel is a closed class, the elements of which are represented by type νt
predicates or labels such as continuation, explanation, elaboration, and correc-
tion. For easy reference, we decorate conditions on local contexts with labels such
as [inf], [cnq], and [inc], abbreviating ‘informativity’, ‘consequence’, and ‘incom-
patibility’ respectively; the labels are not part of the descriptions, however.
but it is a moot point what the implications of that assumption will be for speech act theory.
Since in our grammar discourse relations model coherence relations, and discourse units are
composed of discourse relations and clauses or complex discourse units, it would follow that
speech acts can be composed of (embedded) speech acts, and we would end up with a typically
linguistic perspective on speech act theory. An alternative approach would be to assume that
more than one coherence relation may contribute to a single speech act type.
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(4.17) S+k1
σk2 ⊕ σk3
S−k2
Γk2 = Γk1
Rel⋄k
continuation
S−k3
Γk3 = Γk2 ⊕ σk2
The continuation relation19 is a coordinating relation which combines a contex-
tually given discourse unit (at node k2) with a subsequent clause or discourse
unit (at node k3). The local context of the contextual argument (Γk2) of the con-
tinuation is set to the local context of the whole node (Γk1). The local context
of the right argument (Γk3) is set to that of the left argument updated with the
left argument’s semantic value. Semantically, a continuation results in the merge
of the semantic values of its arguments. Optionally, an appropriateness condition
[inf] Γk3 6|≍ σk3 could be included in (4.17). This would require the informativity
(non-entailment) of the right argument relative to its local context. Informativity
conditions are discussed in more detail in section 4.4.5.
The semantic value and appropriateness conditions of a discourse relation may
involve any of the parameters that constrain discourse meaning: logical relations,
spatio-temporal relations, part-whole relations, aspectual distinctions, modality
and causality. As we haven’t made available an eventuality semantic extension
of finegrained CDRT, not all of this can currently be expressed in our semantic
representation language. To be able to talk about these parameters nonetheless,
we will introduce some schematic notation.
For example, consider the following entry in the lexicon, for the discourse
relation explanation. A state of affairs A may be assumed to explain a state
of affairs B if in the context of interpretation A causes B. Hence, explanation
comes with the appropriateness condition [cau]. The condition requires that the
semantic value of the right argument of the discourse relation (the explanation)
‘causes’ the semantic value of the left argument (the thing to be explained) given
the local context of the right argument. The predicate cau in the semantics
denotes a primitive relation of causation. This is purely notation; the predicate
may be seen as a place-holder for a theory of causation which is yet to be specified.
19Adopted from Asher and Lascarides (2003). The continuation relation is a semantically
not very constraining discourse relation which resembles what is called a ‘list’ structure in the
Linguistic Discourse Model. As far as we can see a continuation cannot be used in an out-of-the-
blue context at the beginning of a discourse, in other words, it usually plays a subsidiary role
with respect to some other, more specific or constraining discourse relation. This could easily
be implemented in LDG by adding constraints to the lexical description of the continuation
relation.
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(4.18) S+k1
σk2 ⊕ σk4
S−k2
Γk2 = Γk1
Sk3
Relk
explanation
S−k4
Γk4 = Γk2 ⊕ σk2
[cau] Γk4 |≍ [ | wr :σk4cauσk2 ]
In our discussion of example (4.16) we claimed that the coherence relation link-
ing ‘He had a flat tire’ to ‘John was late’ is a relation of explanation. We expect
our framework of discourse interpretation to predict that when interpreting the
discourse in (4.16) the hearer infers the discourse units representing the two sen-
tences are linked through the implicit discourse relation explanation. It may be
observed however that given the descriptions in (4.17) and (4.18) whenever expla-
nation can be inferred, the relation continuation can be inferred as well. The first
is more specific than the second. Though continuation does not enforce a causal
relation, it is compatible with it. Thus, it is possible to infer continuation while
the discourse gets exactly the same interpretation as with explanation, resulting
in a void prediction of ambiguity or underspecification.
For reasons of semantic hygiene we want to avoid this. We will assume that
whenever the language user’s preference system generates a preference for a cer-
tain reading, the most specific discourse relation allowing that reading is selected.
This situation must be distinguished from the one in which there are two pos-
sible, distinct readings of a discourse, one of them more specific than the other.
For instance, ‘He had a flat tire’ could be interpreted as a neutral continuation of
‘John was late’, where it is undecided whether there is a causal relation or not.
Then there is a real ambiguity between a continuation reading and an explana-
tion reading of the discourse. According to our intuitions about this particular
example, the second reading is preferred. This might be explained on the assump-
tion that the language user’s preference system contains a general preference for
more specific or semantically stronger readings (and hence, discourse relations).
The selection of maximally coherent readings in general may be explained from
the interaction with other preferences, such as for instance a preference for local
attachment, or a preference for a most normal or uncontroversial specification of
the implicit background B.
The lexicon of the grammar may also be taken to include a description of
discourse relation result , which is, as it were, the inverse of explanation.
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(4.19) S+k1
σk2 ⊕ σk4
S−k2
Γk2 = Γk1
Sk3
Relk
result
S−k4
Γk4 = Γk2 ⊕ σk2
[cau′] Γk4 |≍ [ | wr :σk2cau σk4 ]
This relation applies to examples like the following, where the most preferred
interpretation is one in which we infer that the eventuality described by the first
statement causes the eventuality described by the second, given the context of
interpretation.
(4.20) John pushed Alice. She fell.
For some discourse relations, their main characterising property is their impact
on the spatio-temporal and mereological relations within discourse. This applies,
for example, to elaborations and narrations. Narrations are coordinating relations
which induce a relation of temporal sequence between their arguments. If both
arguments describe events, the event described by the right argument must tem-
porally succeed the one described by the left argument. If the arguments describe
states or events, the state or event described by the right argument should not
temporally precede the one described by the left argument. A lexical description
generalising over these cases this might look as follows.20
(4.21)
S+k1
σk2 ⊕ σk3 ⊕ [ ̺k1 |wr :̺k2⊆̺k1 , wr :̺k3⊆̺k1 , wr :̺k2t ̺k3 ]
S−k2
Γk2 = Γk1
Rel⋄k
narration
S−k3
Γk3 = Γk2 ⊕ σk2 ⊕ [ ̺k1 ρk3 |wr :̺k2⊆̺k1 , wr :̺k3⊆̺k1 , wr :̺k2t ̺k3 ]
The CDRT+ language employed in (4.21) is furnished with some notation signi-
fying eventualities and temporal relations. This is basically cosmetics, and builds
on the assumption that an eventuality semantic extension of the semantic repre-
sentation language can be made available. We employ a ̺-operator (of type νπ)
which generates what we propose to call local reference points for each S-node
in an elementary description. The values of ̺ are registers that can store even-
tualities. We assume that local reference points govern the temporal referential
20This treatment of narration allows that its arguments convey either states or events. One
may, of course, distinguish cases in which both arguments express an event from event-state, or
state-event sequences, and introduce different discourse relations for each case. This results in
a more fine-grained classification of discourse relations.
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structure of discourse, and can be related in the appropriate way to each other
and to temporal discourse referents or discourse referents of type eventuality gen-
erated from the lexical input. A condition of the form wr : ̺k t ̺k′ says that a
local reference point ̺k temporally precedes or starts at the same time as a local
reference point ̺k′ in world wr; wr :̺k⊆̺
′
k says that ̺k is part of (or equal to) ̺
′
k
in world wr.
Semantically, narration produces the merge of the semantic values of its ar-
guments and introduces a local reference point ̺k1 which is required to contain
the local reference points of the arguments ̺k2 and ̺k3 . These local reference
points are temporally ordered through ̺k2t ̺k3 . The effect of this should be that
within some implicitly understood time span given by ̺1 two (complex) eventu-
alities took place, each in their own time span constrained by ̺k2 and ̺k3 , where
the first does not start later than the second. On the assumption that constraints
on the spatio-temporal referential structure are part of the basic compositional
semantics of discourse relations they are included directly in the semantic value
of the resulting discourse unit k1 and in the local context of the right argument
of the discourse relation, Γk3 . Indeed, we assume that all discourse relations to a
greater or lesser extent constrain the spatio-temporal and mereological structure
of discourse. The corresponding constraints will be represented in our descriptions
of discourse relations only when it is relevant to the discussion, however.
The discourse relation elaboration is usually taken to be a subordinating re-
lation, whose main semantic characteristic is that the semantic value of the sub-
ordinated right argument zooms in on the semantic value of the head of the
construction, represented by the left argument. This can be implemented in our
grammar by requiring that the local reference point of the right argument of the
elaboration is part of the local reference point of the left argument. This is what
the following lexical description says.
(4.22) S+k1
σk2 ⊕ σk4 ⊕ [ ̺k1 |wr :̺k1 =̺k2 , wr :̺k4⊆̺k2 ]
S−k2
Γk2 = Γk1
Sk3
Relk
elaboration
S−k4
Γk4 = Γk2 ⊕ σk2 ⊕ [ ̺k1 , ̺k4 |wr :̺k1 =̺k2 , wr :̺k4⊆̺k2 ]
Instead of the rather space-consuming pictures of descriptions such as (4.21)
and (4.22) we will generally employ more succinct representations like the ones
in (4.23) below. Here the conditions on the spatio-temporal and mereological
relations are listed under the semantic value of the top node, and labeled [lrp],
which stands for local reference point. The pictures in (4.23) simply abbreviate
the ones in (4.21) and (4.22) and represent exactly the same lexical descriptions.
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(4.23)
S+k1
σk2 ⊕ σk3
[lrp] wr :̺k2⊆̺k1 , wr :̺k3⊆̺k1 , wr :̺k2t ̺k3
S−k2
Γk2 = Γk1
Rel⋄k
narration
S−k3
Γk3 = Γk2 ⊕ σk2
S+k1
σk2 ⊕ σk4
[lrp] wr :̺k1 =̺k2 , wr :̺k4⊆̺k2
S−k2
Γk2 = Γk1
Sk3
Relk
elaboration
S−k4
Γk4 = Γk2 ⊕ σk2
A final distinction we would like to introduce here is the one between veridical
and nonveridical discourse relations. Veridical discourse relations or discourse op-
erators imply the truth of the semantic values of their arguments. Building on
Zwarts (1995) and Asher and Lascarides (2003) we shall call a discourse relation
or a discourse connective veridical if the semantic value it results in (that is, the
semantic value of the topnode of the elementary structure it anchors) entails the
semantic values of its arguments in arbitrary contexts of interpretation, and non-
veridical if it does not. The discourse relations discussed in this section so far are
veridical. This is obviously the case when only the ‘merge’ operator is employed
in composing the output semantic value of a discourse relation or connective.
Nonveridical connectives are ‘if’, ‘or’ and ‘not’; an example of a nonveridical dis-
course relation is denial , the semantic impact of which might be defined as in the
following lexical description.
(4.24) S+k1
[ | notσk2 ]⊕ σk4
S−k2
Γk2 = Γk1
Sk3
Relk
denial
S−k4
Γk4 = Γk2 ⊕ [ |notσk2 ]
[inc] Γk2 ⊕ σk2 |≍ [ |notσk4 ]
The semantic value of the top node is the negation of the semantic value of the
contextual argument merged with the semantic value of the right argument. Thus,
the contextual information that is rejected through the denial is captured in the
scope of a negation.21 Given this output value, denial is a nonveridical discourse
relation.
Veridicality could be viewed as a local monotonicity property of discourse
relations. In section 4.3, monotonicity was defined as a global property of discourse
21As observed in various places (van der Sandt 1991; Asher 1995; van der Sandt and Maier
2003; van Leusen 2004) a treatment like this both over- and undergenerates. Our treatment is
slightly improved in chapter 6, where it is made sure that, through the interaction with local
accommodation, presuppositional material can be captured in the scope of denials. Further
refinements are necessary, however.
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contributions. A discourse contribution resulting in an update ∆+δ is monotonic if
and only if its semantic update effect preserves the input discourse meaning: (B⊕
σr)
∆+δrcl |≍ (B⊕σr)
∆rcl, and it is nonmonotonic if not. Corrections and denials are
nonmonotonic discourse contributions. It is not necessarily the case, however, that
nonmonotonic discourse contributions employ nonveridical discourse relations.
Incrementing a discourse description with a nonveridical discourse relation or
connective embedded in the argument of another nonveridical one may result in
a monotonic update, while the use of a veridical discourse relation or connective
embedded in the argument of a nonveridical one may induce a nonmonotonic
update.
As can be seen from (4.24), discourse relation denial comes with an appropri-
ateness condition [inc]: Γk2 ⊕σk2 |≍ [ |not σk4 ]. As is argued in Asher (1995) and
van Leusen (2004) it may be assumed that what makes a denial appropriate in its
context of interpretation is that the semantic content of the denial is inconsistent
with it. The incompatibility condition [inc] expresses this. Note that the appro-
priateness condition is defined relative to the ‘nonrevised’ local context Γk2⊕σk2 ,
while Γk4, the local context which will be percolated downwards, is revised: the
‘culprit’ information σk2 is replaced by its negation. Thus, the semantic impact
of the denial is taken into account in the local contexts of discourse constituents
embedded in the right argument of the denial.
Sometimes a veridical discourse relation or discourse operator comes with
a kind of incompatibility requirement too. This typically applies to discourse
operators like ‘but’, ‘however’, and ‘nonetheless’. All of these deny or reject some
default expectation supported by the context of interpretation. The following
example illustrates this.
(4.25) John insulted me. He is a nice guy, however.
If John insulted the speaker, presumably, he is not a nice guy. The second utter-
ance conveys that, contra expectations, John is a nice guy. Crucially, the infor-
mation that John insulted the speaker is not rejected as a result of the second
utterance. Discourse contributions like these cannot be handled just like denials
and corrections because the information they reject is not the semantic value of
their contextual argument. Just adding [inc] as an appropriateness constraint
would result in an inconsistent discourse meaning, which is incorrect. The only
way to handle such cases properly seems to be to allow the semantic represen-
tation language to talk about commonsense inference or the ‘normally implies’
relation.
Following Lakoff (1971) we shall call the relation of coherence involved ‘de-
nial of expectation’.22 We may introduce the discourse relation denial-exp in the
22Most current treatments of the discourse connectives mentioned analyse the relation in-
volved as one of contrast rather than denial of expectation. We view denial of expectation as
an instance of contrast. Contrast can be treated as a requirement of incompatibility on the
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lexicon of the grammar to model it. The relation is characterised by the appro-
priateness constraint [n-xp]. This features the predicate ;, which stands for a
relation of commonsense inference or default implication. The condition [n-xp]
says that in the local context of the right argument of the discourse relation the
semantic value of the left argument normally implies the negation of the semantic
value of the right argument.
(4.26) S+k1
σk2 ⊕ σk4
S−k2
Γk2 = Γk1
Sk3
Relk
denial-exp
S−k4
Γk4 = Γk2 ⊕ σk2
[n-xp] Γk4 |≍ [ |σk2 ;notσk4 ]
In the case of example (4.25), it may be assumed that the hearer selects the
discourse relation denial-exp as a suitable link between the two statements. The
commonsense rule defined by [n-xp] would be instantiated as ‘if John insulted me,
it normally follows he is not a nice guy’. The appropriateness condition enforces
the selection of a local context in which this commonsense rule holds. Thus, in the
absence of counter-information, Γk4 supports the default expectation that John is
not a nice guy. We will say that Γk4 pragmatically entails that John is not a nice
guy, and employ the notation Γk4 |
pi
≍ [ | not σk4 ] to represent this.
23 Crucially,
the discourse meaning resulting from the second utterance does not support the
default expectation, even though [n-xp] is satisfied. Since the speaker asserted
that John is a nice guy, the commonsense rule does not ‘fire’: B⊕σr 6|
pi
≍ [ | not σk4 ].
The negative expectation is cancelled, as it were.
Discourse operators Like discourse relations, discourse connectives, adver-
bials and other discourse operators are context sensitive elements. They come
with appropriateness conditions or presuppositions characterising their relation
to the context of interpretation. These conditions describe properties of coherence
relations; they constrain the coherence relation that links the internal argument
of the discourse operator its the discourse context. The appropriateness condi-
tions attached to a discourse operator need not uniquely determine a coherence
relation, but may underspecify it. Furthermore, discourse operators can be com-
local context, defined in terms of potential semantic alternatives of the internal argument of
the connective. As we have not provided a definition of ‘semantic alternatives’ we keep to the
simpler treatment in terms of denial of expectation here.
23For a common sense rule or default implication K ′ ; K ′′ we would have that if Γ |≍ K ′ ;
K ′′ and Γ |≍ K ′ then Γ |
pi
≍ K ′′. Similarly for a causal implication K ′ cau K ′′. Furthermore we
would have that if Γ |≍ K then Γ |
pi
≍ K, but not vice versa.
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bined in a single utterance as long as their syntactic and semantic contraints do
not clash and the total of their appropriateness conditions can be satisfied.
When implicit discourse relations are inferred, their characterising properties
must be consistent with the constraints triggered by the discourse operators that
are explicitly present. To illustrate this, consider the following lexical descriptions,
characterising the discourse connective ‘so’ and the adverbial ‘consequently’.
(4.27) S+k1
σk2 ⊕ σk4
S−k2
Γk2 = Γk1
Sk3
Subk
so
S−k4
Γk4 = Γk2 ⊕ σk2
[csq] Γk4 |
pi
≍ σk4
S+k1
σk2
Advk
consequently
S−k2
Γk2 = Γk1
[csq] Γk2 |
pi
≍ σk2
Both elements come with the appropriateness condition [csq] (‘consequence’). It
requires that the semantic value of the internal argument σk4 follows from its
local context Γk4, given the potential use of commonsense reasoning. We follow
Webber et al. (2003) in treating discourse adverbials as one-place, rather than two-
place operators. Webber c.s. argue that discourse adverbials behave anaphorically
in that they admit the crossing of structural dependencies, and have a wider
range of options with respect to their external argument than do coordinating
and subordinating connectives. In our grammar the appropriateness conditions
express the anaphoric or presuppositional relation to the context.
As we saw in chapter 2, in the absence of an explicitly conveyed structural
link to the preceding discourse, the grammar predicts the presence of an implicit
discourse relation, which anchors the structural link. Obviously, the discourse
relation that is selected must be compatible with the semantic value and the
appropriateness conditions attached to the discourse adverbial. Consider
(4.28) John didn’t leave the party in time. Consequently, he missed the train.
The adverbial ‘consequently’ requires that ‘John missed the train is a probable
consequence in a context in which John did not leave the party in time. This is
obviously so if the fact that John did not leave the party in time caused him to
miss the train. Hence, the implicit discourse relation result is a suitable candidate.
Furthermore, on the basis of the preferences mentioned earlier in this section,
implicit discourse relations that are compatible with the adverbial but not as
specific as result will be excluded. The discourse description in (4.29) shows the
resulting structure and constraints.
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(4.29) Sr
σ2 ⊕ σ5
S2
S3
Rel4
result
S5
σ6
Γ5 = B ⊕ σ2
[cau′] Γ5 |≍ [ | wr :σ2 cau σ5]
Adv11
consequently
S6
Γ6 = Γ5
[csq] Γ6 |
pi
≍ σ6
In general, discourse adverbials and other discourse operators constrain, but do
not necessarily uniquely determine the implicit discourse relation (and hence, the
coherence relation) that links their internal argument to the discourse context.
On the basis of his world knowledge and preference system, the language user
may strengthen the interpretation of the utterance, and thereby select any of the
coherence relations that fits the requirements of the connective. As the following
example shows, even when no discourse relation is inferred, because an explicit
discourse connective is present, coherence relations can be underspecified.
(4.30) a. Peter plays basketball and Jack plays badminton.
b. John came in and took off his hat.
c. John didn’t leave the party in time and missed the train.
d. John missed the train and didn’t leave the party in time.
In (4.30a), the connective ‘and’ simply conjugates two statements: it tells us
that the eventualities (states) described by its arguments hold. In (4.30b) and
(4.30c) something more is inferred. In (4.30b) we assume that John took off his
hat after coming in, in (4.30c) that John missed the train because he didn’t
leave the party in time. The interpretations obtained correspond to having a
narration relation, and a relation of result, respectively. Interestingly, in (4.30d)
the inference that John missed the train because he did not leave the party in
time seems to be blocked. The most preferred reading of (4.30d) is one in which
the conjuncts sum up unrelated facts or eventualities, which corresponds to a
relation of continuation.
Given these observations we propose that the compositional semantics of the
connective ‘and’ is simply the merge of the semantic values of its arguments, as
in (4.31) below, while the interaction with the language user’s world knowledge
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and preference system should explain the strengthening of the readings occurring
with the connective.
(4.31) S+k1
σk2 ⊕ σk3
S−k2
Γk2 = Γk1
Con⋄k
and
S−k3
Γk3 = Γk2 ⊕ σk2
The observations made relative to (4.30) could be explained on the assumption
that the language user’s preference system includes a preference for assigning a
temporal order to a pair of consecutive discourse units that reflects their sequential
order in the discourse. This would explain why in (4.30b) we assume that John
took off his hat after coming in, instead of before, why in (4.30c) we assume
that John’s being in a state of not leaving the party in time started before he
missed the train.24 and why, in (4.30d) we do not infer that John missed the
train because he did not leave the party in time. The not leaving in time would
temporally precede the missing of the train, and this would violate the preference.
Finally, in (4.30a), the preference would be overruled by a general preference for
uncontroversial or nonexceptional background assumptions.
Things are more complicated than that, however. Consider the following min-
imal pair, which repeats (4.30d) as (4.32a).
(4.32) a. John missed the train and didn’t leave in time.
b. John missed the train. He didn’t leave in time.
In (4.32b) it is completely unproblematic to infer that John missed the train
because he did not leave in time, in other words, there is a relation of explanation.
Why doesn’t the preference for inferring a temporal order that follows text order
prevent this reading? The explanation can be maintained if we accept that the
preference is attached to the connective ‘and’ specifically. But this means that
preferences may be set differently for different elements in the lexicon, which
seems unattractive. Further research is needed, to find out how the preference
system can be fit to the subtleties of the linguistic data.
As in Webber and Joshi (1998), our discourse model predicts a difference
between aspects of interpretation supported by the compositional semantics of
discourse, and aspects of interpretation induced by the world knowledge and
preferences of the language user. The latter are cancellable, but the first are not.
Crucially, context sensitive constraints are part of the compositional semantics
of lexical elements and discourse relations in our treatment. When an element
in a sentence comes with a context sensitive constraint, the constraint must be
24The independent preference for chosing a more specific reading when there is a choice would
account for the additional causal link in (4.30c).
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satisfied and its implications are predicted to be uncancellable. This holds even
when the constraint in question talks about default inferences or commonsense
reasoning, as is the case with [n-xp], or [csq] in (4.19). Indeed, as the following
example shows, if the condition is part of the discourse description because it is
triggered by a lexical element in the discourse, it cannot be cancelled.
(4.33) John didn’t leave in time. Consequently, he missed the train.
# As the train was late he missed it for another reason however.
In contrast, if a default conclusion results from pragmatic strengthening of a
reading on the basis of world knowledge and preferences over potential readings, it
can be cancelled. Indeed, although the cancellations in (4.34) may be unexpected,
they are not unfelicitous.
(4.34) a. John didn’t leave in time and he missed the train.
As the train was late he missed it for another reason however.
b. John didn’t leave in time. He missed the train.
As the train was late he missed it for another reason however.
Summary and discussion Summarising, in this section it was proposed that
implicit discourse relations, discourse connectives and other discourse operators
are context sensitive elements. They come with appropriateness conditions which
describe properties of coherence relations. Discourse relations are implicit ele-
ments in the lexicon which stand for full coherence relations. Discourse connectives
and adverbials partially describe coherence relations through their appropriate-
ness conditions. Discourse operators and discourse relations can be combined as
long as the total of their context sensitive conditions can be satisfied. Despite the
presence of explicit discourse operators, coherence relations may be underspec-
ified. The interplay with the language user’s reservoir of world knowledge and
preference system explains the selection of most preferred readings or coherence
relations.
Clearly, the specification of the preference system, and the reasoning involved
in generating preferences over alternative readings of discourse, is an area for
further research. It is a common assumption in cognitive linguistic and discourse
semantics that language users strive to maximise discourse coherence in their
interpretations. Preferences should be set so that possible readings that are intu-
itively more coherent than others will be preferred. The parameters involved in
this are diverse and often gradient. Asher and Lascarides (2003) mention, among
more, the number of anaphoric expressions whose antecedents are resolved, and
the specificity of a common topic induced by a rhetorical relation (more in gen-
eral, the quality of the rhetorical relation). The preference for semantically more
specific interpretations introduced in this section could be added to this. Syn-
tactic preferences, such as the preference for low attachment to the discourse
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structure proposed in Gardent and Webber (1998) may be taken to contribute to
the maximisation of coherence too. As we have seen, unlike what follows from the
compositional semantics of a discourse, conclusions based on preferences are can-
cellable in the presence of new information. Thus, cancellability may be employed
as a criterion in deciding whether aspects of discourse interpretation should be
captured by means of the preference system or not.
In our choice of discourse relations and their semantic characterisation we more
or less followed Asher and Lascarides (2003). The fragment presented here is far
from complete, however, both in the sense that many discourse relations have been
left undiscussed, and in the sense that certain aspects of their characterisation
have not been specified. Notably the interaction between discourse relations and
the information structure of their arguments awaits further research. What we
have been concerned with is not so much full descriptive coverage. Rather, we
have tried to show the potential of LDG as a description language for discourse
theory.
As a typically grammatical approach towards coherence, our treatment is
closer to TAG for discourse (Webber and Joshi 1998; Gardent and Webber 1998)
and the Linguistic Discourse Model (Scha and Polanyi 1988). The LDG formalism
does not enforce a particular taxonomy or categorisation of discourse relations.
The class of discourse relations in the lexicon is only required to be a closed class.
Optionally, an integrity constraint might be adopted which says that the charac-
terising properties of discourse relations do not differ from those that characterise
the explicit lexemes of the language, so that as a class, implicit discourse relations
are a natural extension within the lexicon of the language. What is accepted as
a suitable set of discourse relations must come out of practical experience with
what is needed to account for different types of discourse, and be based on ex-
tended investigation of the possibilities of use of explicit discourse operators in
the language.25
Given the crucial role of the preference system in accounting for the selec-
tion of most preferred readings and corresponding discourse relations, it can even
be argued that once a fully worked out preference system is available, the class
of discourse relations could be reduced to a single implicit discourse relation of
‘adjunction’ or ‘update’. This relation is semantically underspecified, but the lan-
25See for example (Knott 1996; Knott et al. 2001; Marcu 1997; Marcu 2000; Sporleder and
Lascarides 2007). We like to set a pointer in particular to Sporleder and Lascarides, who test
the use of automatically labelled examples to classify rhetorical relations in text, even when
no explicit discourse operator is present. Their results suggest that training on this type of
data, where explicit discoure operators are as it were replaced by rhetorical relations, may not
be such a good strategy, as classifier models trained in this manner do not seem to generalise
very well to data containing no explicit operators. They suggest that a reason for this may be
that examples with and without explicit discourse operators are too dissimilar linguistically.
This fits in nicely with our own hunch, that implictness suits some coherence relations better
than others. Furthermore, it confims the idea that it is not just discourse connectives, cues, and
adverbials, that constrain or determine coherence relations.
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guage user infers a suitable semantics on the basis of his preferences.26 The specific
discourse relations that were introduced in the lexicon of the grammar before can
then be viewed as conventionalised representations of the usual outcome of the in-
ference process. They do not in themselves explain why a particular interpretation
is inferred, but they do tell us something about what interpretations are normally
inferred. As such they play an essential role in the investigation of the preference
system, even though eventually they can be eliminated from the grammar.
4.4.5 Global Consistency and Informativity Conditions
It is commonly assumed in discourse semantics that for a contribution to a conver-
sation to be ‘felicitous’ or ‘appropriately used’ relative to the context established
by that conversation, various requirements must be satisfied. In the wake of Austin
(1962) and Searle (1969), a theory of discourse interpretation may focus on the
requirements or felicity conditions that are specific to particular types of contri-
butions or speech acts, and which characterise them as, for example, promises,
assertions, questions, warnings, or objections. Building on Grice (1975), Grice
(1978), it may also aim at specifying general requirements characterising cooper-
ative conversation.
In the LDG framework of discourse interpretation both types of requirements
can be modeled. General requirements characterising cooperative conversation
can be implemented as global conditions on discourse meanings. And felicity con-
ditions that are specific to particular types of contributions may be implemented
as local constraints, in other words, constraints on local contexts, triggered by
specific linguistic elements. In the latter case, it is tacitly assumed that there is
a systematic relation between discourse relations and the types of contributions
occurring in conversations, so that the constraints attached to a given discourse
relation reflect (part of) the felicity conditions characterising a discourse contri-
bution of the same name.
Here we discuss the treatment in LDG of two general conditions, descending
from the Gricean maxims of Quality and Quantity respectively. We shall refer to
them as the consistency and the informativity condition. These two are widely
accepted as a minimal set of felicity conditions for discourse aimed at information
exchange. They figure as acceptability conditions on updates in presupposition
theory (Stalnaker 1978; van der Sandt 1988) and in update semantics (Veltman
1996). The consistency condition says that discourse contributions must preserve
26This seems to converge with the approach taken towards discourse relations in Webber et al.
(2003). Their LTAG for discourse contains an elementary structure anchored by punctuation,
the semantics of which is inferred on the basis of the interaction of compositional discourse
semantics, anaphor resolution, and inference triggered by adjacency. A precursor of the latter
component figures in Webber et al. (1999) as ‘inference based on world knowledge, usage con-
ventions, etc., which can make defeasible contributions to discourse interpretation’. This would
correspond to our preference system.
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the consistency of the context of interpretation. The informativity condition re-
quires that every contribution provides new information: the update it induces
must ‘make a difference’ and change the context of interpretation.
Both requirements can in principle be formulated as global constraints on
discourse meanings in LDG. However, while the consistency requirement can
straightforwardly be stated at object level in the description language, the in-
formativity requirement refers to different stages of the discourse description and
can only be stated at metalevel.
Global Consistency B ⊕ σr 6|≍ ⊥
Global Informativity For a discourse contribution updating a discourse de-
scription ∆ to ∆ + δ, there must be a DRS K such that
∆rcl 6|= (B ⊕ σr |≍ K) and (∆ + δ)
rcl |= (B ⊕ σr |≍ K).
Global Consistency prevents that a discourse contribution results in an inconsis-
tent discourse meaning. Global Informativity ensures that every discourse con-
tribution results in a discourse meaning which is at least partly new: there must
be information K entailed by the output discourse meaning which is not entailed
by the input discourse meaning. We will adopt Global Consistency as a semantic
axiom of the grammar. With respect to the other requirement, however, it is less
clear that it should be accepted. Different types of contributions come with their
own felicity or appropriateness conditions, and in some cases these are not com-
patible with Global Informativity. With certain caveats and restrictions, though,
the requirement might still be adopted.
Consistency Global Consistency interacts in an interesting way with the mono-
tonicity property of discourse contributions. It enforces that contributions which
add information that is inconsistent with what was previously stated or presup-
posed in the discourse result in nonmonotonic updates. If a nonmonotonic reading
is excluded the contribution is predicted to be infelicitous. Consider the examples
in (4.35) and (4.36).
(4.35) A: It is raining.
B: No, it isn’t.
If B’s utterance in (4.35) would be interpreted as a monotonic contribution, the
resulting discourse meaning would be inconsistent and Global Consistency would
be violated. Hence, B’s utterance can only be interpreted felicitously as a non-
monotonic discourse contribution, replacing ‘it is raining’ by ‘it is not raining’.
Then, the resulting discourse meaning is consistent, so that Global Consistency
is satisfied. In the case of (4.35) such a reading is available: B’s utterance can be
interpreted as a denial of A’s statement. Now consider
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(4.36) A: It is raining and it is not raining.
In contrast, in (4.36) a nonmonotonic reading is not available, due to the presence
of the connective ‘and’. The semantic value that ‘and’ produces is the merge of
the semantic values of its arguments and ‘merge’ is a veridical operator, that is, it
preserves the semantic values of its arguments. Since the statements which ‘and’
connects contradict each other, its use results in a violation of Global Consis-
tency. The language user’s grammar will fail to come up with a reading for this
discourse, and (4.36) is predicted to be semantically anomalous, or ungrammatical
on semantic grounds.27
Notice that the Global Consistency condition is formulated independently of
the language user’s reservoir of world knowledge K. When interpreting a discourse,
he will evaluate discourse meanings relative to K. Obviously, checking the consis-
tency of the discourse meaning with respect to K will be part of the evaluation. In
general, he will have a preference for readings of the discourse that are consistent
with his world knowledge. As the exchange in (4.35) shows, however, it may very
well occur that a statement made by another participant in the conversation is in-
consistent with his world knowledge, without being semantically anomalous. The
language user may evaluate a statement like that relative to his world knowledge
K by computing the revision of K that would be induced if he were to accept
the discourse meaning resulting from the statement while preserving consistency.
His preference system would tell him which of the alternative possible revisions
to prefer. Discourse meanings are not in general required to be consistent with
the hearer’s world knowledge.
Finally, observe that the effect of Global Consistency could also be obtained
by integrating local conditions on consistency in the lexical descriptions of dis-
course operators and discourse relations. To illustrate, the following would be a
description of the connective and including such a local consistency requirement:
(4.37) S+k1
σk2 ⊕ σk3
S−k2
Γk2 = Γk1
Conk
and
S−k3
Γk3 = Γk2 ⊕ σk2
Γk3 ⊕ σk3 6|≍ ⊥
Γk3 ⊕ σk3 6|≍ ⊥ is a condition on the local context of the right argument of the
connective updated with the semantic value of that argument. Post-conditions of
27It may be observed that in some situations, for instance when explaining to a person that
he cannot be right, or when reasoning ad absurdum, the aim of the argument is expressly to
establish inconsistency. Exchanges or arguments of that kind should not be predicted to violate
Global Consistency and hence to be semantically anomalous; they should somehow escape the
effect of the condition. This might be done by making sure that the inconsistency they create
is captured in the scope of a negation in their output semantic value.
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this kind could be added to all relevant elements in the lexicon. Since the outcome
of every discourse contribution must be a consistent discourse meaning, however,
we prefer to treat consistency as a global condition.
In some cases, it can be argued that particular types of discourse contributions
induce consistency or inconsistency requirements on input discourse meanings.
This applies, for example, to denials and corrections, which may be claimed to
be felicitous only if an inconsistency with the context of interpretation can be
established. As was proposed in the preceding section, these can be handled by
means of pre-conditions on local contexts triggered by discourse relations and
connectives. This is perfectly compatible with Global Consistency.
Informativity Global Informativity is a more worrisome notion, both in terms
of the intuitive judgements it is supposed to cover, and in terms of its interaction
with other constraints in the grammar formalism. The fact that the requirement
can only be formulated at a metalevel in our grammar seems ominous: we are
considering a notion which in a sense falls outside the scope of our discourse
grammar, and which more properly belongs to what we previously called a sepa-
rate grammar of discourse contributions.
It is not clear whether Global Informativity applies to each and every type of
discourse contribution. Different types of contributions come with their own set of
appropriateness constraints, and the interaction of these constraints with Global
Informativity is a matter for careful consideration. In some cases the individual
appropriateness conditions of a contribution make Global Informativity super-
fluous as an independent constraint. This goes, for example, for corrections and
denials. We assume that what makes them appropriate is that their semantic con-
tent is incompatible with information present in the context of interpretation, and
that they induce nonmonotonic updates of the context of interpretation. Global
Informativity is necessarily satisfied. The informativity condition does not seem
to add anything to the analysis of these contributions.
In other cases the interaction between Global Informativity and the specific
appropriateness conditions of a particular type of contribution is more subtle.
Consider the following example, in which the second utterance expresses the con-
sequence of some event or state of affairs described in the preceding discourse.
Assume the discourse takes place in a context in which nothing was previously
stated or presupposed about the occurrence of a strike of the train personnel and
it is not known to the hearer that the trains are not running.
(4.38) A: There’s a strike of the train personnel.
So the trains are not running.
The fact that the trains are not running is, in the eyes of the speaker, a con-
sequence of the fact that there is a strike of the train personnel. Given general
knowledge about the relations between strikes, train personnel and trains, under
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normal circumstances it can be expected that the trains are not running if there
is a strike of the train personnel. A contribution of this kind is felicitous only if
what it asserts can be (and is) understood as a default consequence of the context
of interpretation. As was proposed in the preceding section, this requirement can
be implemented as a local constraint or appropriateness condition attached to the
discourse connective so, as follows.
(4.39) S+k1
σk2 ⊕ σk4
S−k2
Γk2 = Γk1
Sk3
Subk
so
S−k4
Γk4 = Γk2 ⊕ σk2
[csq] Γk4 |
pi
≍ σk4
Whereas [csq] requires pragmatic entailment of ‘the trains are not running’ in
a local context which corresponds to the discourse meaning described by the
input discourse description ∆rcl, Global Informativity requires that adding the
same information to that discourse meaning is informative: the discourse meaning
described by the output discourse description (∆ + δ)rcl should entail something
not previously entailed. For the sake of transparency, let us assume that [csq] is
defined in terms of |≍, so we have [csq] Γk4 |≍ σk4 instead of [csq] Γk4 |
pi
≍ σk4 .
Allowing pragmatic entailment in [csq] complicates, but does not undermine the
argument made here.28
We expect a violation of Global Informativity. Surprisingly, however, this does
not occur. This is because the local condition [csq] constrains only the discourse
meaning described by the output description (∆ + δ)rcl, and not the discourse
meaning described by the input description ∆rcl. Remember discourse meanings
are underspecified. The update effect of participant A’s second utterance is to
include the consequence relation in the implicit background B, and eliminate
readings of the discourse in which it does not hold. Thus, for σk4 = ‘the trains
are not running’, we have ∆rcl 6|= (B⊕σr |≍ σk4) and (∆+ δ)
rcl |= (B⊕σr |≍ σk4)
and Global Informativity is satisfied. The contribution is informative because it
teaches the hearer that the trains are not running and that this is a consequence
of the strike of the train personnel.
28A pragmatic entailment Γ |
pi
≍ K can hold while entailment Γ |≍ K does not. Hence, examples
like the one in (4.38) may seem to escape a violation of Global Informativity in case they build
on default inferences and commonsense reasoning rules alone. Again, however, [csq] applies
to the output discourse meaning, rather than the input discourse meaning. If [csq] induces
accommodation, that explains why GI is not violated. Only if we consider cases in which [csq]
does not induce accommodation can it be argued that the satisfaction of GI enforces essential
use of commonsense reasoning in the satisfaction [csq].
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In fact, what this means is that, as far as Global Informativity is concerned,
a contribution which induces the accommodation of information counts as infor-
mative.29 The condition only predicts the infelicity of contributions which do not
teach the hearer anything new in any way, that is, cases in which both the pre-
supposed and the asserted material is already established as an entailment of the
discourse meaning described by the input discourse description. The problem is
that, relative to arbitrary contexts of interpretation, we do not know beforehand
what is in B; though contributions headed by so, like the one in (4.38), very often
induce accommodation, they cannot be assumed to do so generally. Thus, this
type of contribution still poses a problem for Global Informativity. This is defi-
nitely the case with modus ponens arguments that are spelled out in conversation,
as for instance in
(4.40) A: During a heat-wave, the school is closed.
We’re having a heat-wave right now.
Consequently, the school is closed.
Consider the last contribution in (4.40). The input discourse meaning of this
contribution entails that the school is closed. Global Informativity cannot be
satisfied and the contribution is incorrectly predicted to be infelicitous. It may
tentatively be concluded that the predictions in the case of (4.38) are accidentily
correct, or right for the wrong reasons.
We are not the first to observe that modus ponens arguments in discourse
flout the informativity requirement. A common way out of this problem is to
assume that Global Informativity only applies to discourse contributions or dis-
course aimed at information exchange. It does not apply to logical reasoning. The
question is, of course, how such a restriction could be made concrete in a formal
discourse model such as ours. An alternative solution would be to drop Global
Informativity altogether and account for the ‘standard’ cases of informativity by
means of local informativity constraints only. Local informativity conditions could
be attached as appropriateness conditions to some of the discourse relations and
discourse operators in the lexicon.
For example, consider the following, extended lexical description for the con-
nective and . The condition [inf] requires the second conjunct of the construction
to be informative relative to the local context established by the first conjunct.
29The term accommodation was introduced in Lewis (1979) to denote the implicit process of
adjustment of the context of interpretation of a statement, when without such adjustment no
suitable interpretation can be got. Our underspecification formalism allows us to model accom-
modation as exactly what it is: the specification of hitherto underspecified implicit background
information, triggered by the interpretation of the ongoing discourse.
130 CHAPTER 4. DISCOURSE SEMANTICS
(4.41) S+k1
σk2 ⊕ σk3
S−k2
Γk2 = Γk1
Conk
and
S−k3
Γk3 = Γk2 ⊕ σk2
[inf] Γk3 ⊕ σk3 6|≍ σk3
Decorating discourse operators and discourse relations at large with local infor-
mativity conditions may easily cause problems, however. As the following example
shows, if we actually adopt (4.41), the resulting theory of informativity may well
be too strong.
(4.42) A: There’s a strike of the train personnel.
Consequently, the trains are not running and there are questions in
Parliament.
Consider participant A’s second utterance. We assume the conjunction and is in
the scope of the discourse operator consequently . The adverbial consequently trig-
gers the [csq] requirement on ‘the trains are not running and there are questions in
Parliament’, while the connective and triggers the [inf] requirement on ‘there are
questions in Parliament’. But then, the two appropriateness conditions threaten
to contradict each other. Only the fact that [csq] is defined in terms of pragmatic
entailment while [inf] is defined in terms of entailment saves the example from a
conflict between the constraints. It is questionable, however, whether all contri-
butions headed by consequently or so necessarily specify default consequences. If
they do not, the grammar predicts a conflict where it should not.
Thus, including an informativity condition in the lexical description of the
connective and may not be a good idea after all. Clearly, if informativity is to be
accounted for in terms of local informativity conditions, fine-tuning is necessary.
Further research will have to show whether perhaps only some classes of elements
in the lexicon, for instance discourse relations, come with local informativity
conditions. If that would not bring us closer to getting observationally correct
predictions, we might consider implementing local informativity constraints as
weak constraints or preferences, rather than hard constraints in the grmmar, as
they are now.
Finally, there are types of contributions that are informative in a way that
escapes Global Informativity altogether because as it stands our semantics does
not talk about participants’ commitments, intentions or attitudes. Consider the
following exchange, in which the second utterance serves as a confirmation of the
first.
(4.43) A: Freddy is a marvelous guitar player.
B: He is.
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Confirmations often just repeat information that is already present in the context
of interpretation. At the level of semantic content, they do not necessarily add
any new information. Rather, they are informative in the sense that they convey
a new speaker’s commitment. Global Informativity incorrectly predicts these con-
tributions to be infelicitous, and thus should not be taken to apply to such cases.
Which aspects of confirmations can be captured by means of local informativity
conditions is, once again, a matter for further investigation.
We conclude that informativity is a much more diversified concept than consis-
tency. Despite the intricacies of the data and the issue at hand, it may tentatively
be assumed that Global Informativity captures a characteristic of a certain class
of discourse contributions, namely those which act at the level of plain seman-
tic content, and which figure in discourse aimed at information exchange. Given
some future extension of the grammar that covers the participants’ commitments,
intentions and attitudes, Global Informativity might be maintained as a seman-
tic or pragmatic constraint of the discourse theory. Unlike Global Consistency,
it applies at metalevel rather than object level in our grammar formalism. Lo-
cal informativity conditions can be assigned to discourse relations or discourse
operators when Global Informativity should not suffice to account for the lin-
guistic observations, or when fine-tuning of the theory of informativity is desired.
Care should be taken, however, that the resulting set of constraints is not too
strong. In chapter 5 our discussion of informativity and consistency requirements
is continued.
4.4.6 Inferring Semantics from Discourse Descriptions
In the preceding sections, we talked about discourse meanings and context depen-
dence of interpretation. context sensitive elements, such as names, pronouns, dis-
course relations, and discourse connectives, were introduced in the lexicon, and
two global constraints on contexts of interpretation, namely consistency and in-
formativity, were introduced as semantic axioms of the discourse theory. We are
finally ready to consider the interaction of all constraints in the analysis of a
concrete example.
Consider the interpretation of the following discourse. The procedure is exactly
the same as in chapter 3. Upon hearing the sentence
(4.44) Pedro has a mule.
the language user will construct a discourse description, on the basis of an input
description summing up the lexemes in the sentence as immediately consecutive
elements, as in (4.45).
(4.45) ∃k0k1k2k3(k0 ≺l k1 ≺l k2 ≺l k3 ∧ lex(k0) ∧ lex(k1) ∧ lex(k2) ∧ lex(k3) ∧
pedro(k0) ∧ has(k1) ∧ a(k2) ∧mule(k3))
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This being the first sentence of a discourse, the hearer will know that Pedro is
the start element of the discourse and conclude that the discourse description is
left-closed. As the discourse can be taken to be temporarily finished at this point,
the hearer may reason about the discourse description under the assumption that
it is right-closed as well. Combining the input description with the appropriate
elementary tree descriptions in his lexicon, and taking (fresh) witnesses for the
existential quantifiers in the elementary tree descriptions, the resulting discourse
description will be something like (4.46).30
(4.46) ∆rcl1 : S−r
Γr = B
DP+10
o0
[o0 | wr:Pedro o0] ⊑ B
D0
Pedro
S+11
σ13(σ12)
DP−12
VP−13
VP+14
λv[ | wr: v has σ15]
V1
has
DP−15
S+16
[u2 | ]⊕ σ19(u2)⊕ σ17
S−17
Γ17 = Γ16 ⊕ [u2 | ]⊕ σ19(u2)
DP+18
u2
D2
a
NP−19
NP+20
λv[ | wr :mule v]
N3
mule
As before, the anchoring axioms of the grammar enforce that positively and neg-
atively marked nodes are paired off and the pairs identified. In the case of (4.46),
the only way to do this that is in accordance with the tree axioms is given in
(4.47).
(4.47) r = 16 ∧ 11 = 17 ∧ 10 = 12 ∧ 13 = 14 ∧ 15 = 18 ∧ 19 = 20
If our hearer adds this inferred information to his description of the discourse,
the picture in (4.48) results.
30In Van Leusen and Muskens (2003) the root in a discourse description is anchored to a
startsymbol, whose characterising property is the left closure statement. Furthermore, there is
a distinction between T-nodes (for ‘text’) and S-nodes (for sentences or clauses), which is not
maintained here.
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(4.48) ∆rcl1 : S16
[u2 | wr: o0 has u2, wr:mule u2]
[o0 | wr:Pedro o0] ⊑ B
S11
DP10
D0
Pedro
VP14
V1
has
DP18
D2
a
NP20
N3
mule
Note that in (4.48) not only the positively and negatively marked nodes have been
‘clicked together’ but that the identifications also allowed some semantic compu-
tation. The semantics of r can be computed to be [u2 | wr: o0 has u2, wr:mule u2]
and there still is a constraint [o0 | wr:Pedro o0] ⊑ B on the background B.
31
These two pieces of information are typical of the kind of information that will
be collected during the processing of any discourse. The semantics of the root,
σr, will be interpreted as an update of the background B, while other information
constrains the background. As we saw in section 4.2, the background must in a
sense be constructed by the discourse participants. It is only partially constrained
by what is said during a conversation and it will therefore remain largely under-
specified. The meaning of the discourse given a certain background B will be
identified with B⊕σr, what was presupposed updated with what was said. In the
present example this discourse meaning is B ⊕ [u2 | wr: o0 has u2, wr:mule u2].
Our hearer now has inferred certain information from the input description
of sentence (4.44). But of course, the discourse may continue, in which case he
will drop the right-closure hypothesis and increment the discourse description ∆1
with an input description of the newly processed sentence. For example, suppose
the discourse is continued with
(4.49) He feeds it.
After processing (4.49), the hearer may increment ∆1 with the appropriate input
description. In that case the following picture emerges.
31Remember the values of u are associated with new referents, while the values of o are
referents that belong to the background B of the discourse. As will be explained in section
4.4.7, o-generated referents receive a referential interpretation in our semantics.
134 CHAPTER 4. DISCOURSE SEMANTICS
(4.50) ∆2: S−r
Γr = B
S+16
[u2 | wr : o0 has u2, wr:mule u2]
[o0 | wr:Pedro o0] ⊑ B
Pedro has a mule
DP+24
σ5
[σ5 |] ⊑ Γ24
D5
He
S+25
σ26(σ27)
DP−26 VP−27
VP+28
λv[ | wr: v feeds σ29]
V6
feeds
DP−29
DP+30
σ7
[σ7 | ] ⊑ Γ30
D7
it
Note that the semantics of pronouns is not specified. While the indefinite a is
associated with a discourse referent u2, the constraint on the pronouns is that
[σpik | ] ⊑ Γk, where k is the terminal anchor of the elementary tree structure of
the pronoun. This statement requires their semantics (a register) to be present in
the universe of their local context.
Adding a new hypothetical end-statement to the discourse description, the
hearer may reason about the syntactic and semantic composition of the new
sentence and the discourse as a whole. As in our discussion in the preceding
chapter, positively and negatively marked nodes in a discourse description of this
kind can only be paired off in accordance with the axioms of the grammar if some
implicit anchor introducing additional syntactic structure is present. Furthermore,
the grammar allows only discourse relations to select implicit anchors. Thus, our
hearer infers there is an implicit discourse relation which links the newly processed
sentence to its discourse context through the elementary tree structure it anchors.
On the basis of his world knowledge K and preferences induced by he may select
elaboration as the discourse relation most suitable to express the link of coherence
between the new sentence and the preceding discourse.
(4.51) ∆rcl2 :
S−r
Γr = B
S+16
[u2 | wr: o0 has u2, wr:mule u2]
[o0 | wr:Pedro o0] ⊑ B
Pedro has a mule
S+21
σ22 ⊕ σ23
[lrp] w :̺21=̺22, w :̺23⊆̺22
S−22
Γ22 = Γ21
S31
Rel4
elaboration
S−23
Γ23 = Γ22 ⊕ σ22
[inf] Γ23 6|≍ σ23
S+25
[ | wr :σ5 feeds σ7 ]
[σ5 | ] ⊑ Γ24, [σ7 | ] ⊑ Γ30
He feeds it
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For expository purposes the discourse relation elaboration is temporarily enriched
with a local informativity condition Γ23 6|≍ σ23. Again there is a unique way for
the + and − nodes to click together and the picture below results. Here, with
the help of A18 and lexical information about Γ, the local context of each of
the pronouns has been computed to be B ⊕ [u2 | wr: o0 has u2, wr:mule u2], the
discourse meaning of the previous chunk of discourse.
(4.52) ∆rcl2 :
S21,r
[u2 | wr : o0 has u2, wr :mule u2, wr :σ5 feeds σ7]
[lrp] w :̺21=̺22, w :̺23⊆̺22
S16
[u2 | wr: o0 has u2, wr:mule u2]
[o0 | wr :Pedro o0] ⊑ B
Pedro has a mule
S31
Rel4
elab
S25
[ | wr:σ5 feedsσ7 ]
[σ5 σ7 | ] ⊑ (B ⊕ [u2 | wr: o0 has u2, wr:mule u2])
[inf] B ⊕ [u2 | wr: o0 has u2, wr:mule u2] 6|≍
[ | wr :σ5 feedsσ7 ]
He feeds it
The constraints on spatio-temporal and mereological structure of discourse indi-
cated by [lrp] are in fact part of σr and Γ25 (see section 4.4.4). Given an appro-
priate treatment in an eventuality semantic variant of the CDRT sublanguage,
they should imply, in this particular discourse, that Pedro’s ownership of a mule
in part consists in feeding it. We will suppress this aspect of the interpretation in
what follows. The discourse meaning which can be obtained from ∆rcl2 is B⊕ [u2|
wr: o0 has u2, wr:mule u2, wr: σ5 feeds σ7]. As before, the meaning of the discourse
is what was implicitly taken for granted (B), updated with what was said (σr).
Both what was said and what was taken for granted, however, is constrained
through the conditions generated by the various context sensitive elements in the
discourse. Moreover, Global Consistency and Global Informativity (introduced in
section 4.4.5) must be satisfied. The next section contains further discussion of
these semantic constraints.
4.4.7 Testing Context Sensitive Constraints
Above we have seen how a hearer’s reasoning from a discourse description resulted
in the piecewise compositional construction of parts of a DRS. Here we shall see
how further reasoning about the constraints on local contexts of various context
sensitive elements, and general requirements on consistent and informative updat-
ing, results in a full or maximally specific discourse meaning given the discourse
description. We will discuss the context sensitive constraints in turn, wrapping
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up at the end of this section. As a preliminary to the discussion, we briefly zoom
in on some properties of the implicit background B and the interpretation of
discourse referents in the universe of the background.
Some Properties of the Background The background B will be constrained
by context sensitive constraints that arise in the discourse. There are also a few
general constraints, however, and these are summed up in A19. We use fst(B) to
denote the first element of the denotation of B, i.e. its universe; snd(B) would
denote its second element, that is, its set of conditions.
A19 proper(B) ∧ ¬∃k fst(B)(uk) ∧ fst(B)(wr)
First, we take it that the background is proper. Modulo the naming of discourse
referents, it should be possible for a background to have arisen out of previous
discourse (with original background [wr | ]). Since discourse generates only proper
DRSs, that is, DRSs in which each discourse referent occurring in a condition was
declared in some universe accessible to it, backgrounds too should be proper. A
second constraint is that the universe of the background does not contain registers
that are values of u, as the latter will be reserved for discourse referents that arise
during conversation. A last requirement on the background is that its universe
contains wr as an element.
Discourse referents that are present in the universe of the background ar-
guably should be interpreted referentially rather than existentially. The referent
wr, which stands for the world of evaluation, may serve as an illustration, for Pe-
dro has a mule should not be interpreted as ‘there is some world in which Pedro
has a mule’ but as ‘Pedro has a mule in this world.’ The discourse referent corre-
sponding to Pedro should also be interpreted as given and similarly should deictic
pronouns and perhaps even definite descriptions whose referent is accommodated.
A notion of truth that treats all background referents referentially will result if
the following definition of truth is adopted:32 a DRS K is said to be true in state
i with respect to background B if true(〈fst(K)− fst(B), snd(K)〉)(i) holds, that is,
referents present in the background’s universe will not be interpreted existentially
but will receive their interpretation from the state i. It will be assumed that
discourse participants interpret the discourse with respect to some state i0 that
they take the discourse to be about33 and we will often be interested in the truth
of some DRS K in i0 with respect to a given background.
32See appendix A for the original truth definition in fine-grained CDRT, of which this is a
revision.
33Austin (1961): “A statement is said to be true when the historic state of affairs to which
it is correlated by the demonstrative conventions (the one to which it ‘refers’) is of a type
with which the sentence used in making it is correlated by the descriptive conventions.” In the
present context, i0 (or its sequence of values) can be compared to Austin’s ‘historic state of
affairs’. Presumably, our states are somewhat richer than Austin’s states of affairs, for besides
a possible world they contain values for all kinds of referents. On Austinian propositions, see
also (Barwise and Perry 1983).
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To illustrate this further, let us consider the DRS K =
[wr o1 u3 | wr:Pedro o1, wr: o1 has u3, wr:mule u3]
and assume that wr and o1, but not u3, are members of the universe of background
B. If, in general, we agree, for readability, to write δ0 for V (δ, i0), we can express
the truth of K in i0 with respect to B as follows. The function wp translates a
formula in the CDRT sublanguage into predicate logic, see appendix A.
wp([u3 | wr:Pedro o1, wr: o1 has u3, wr:mule u3],⊤)
i0 =
∃x3 [Pedro (o
0
1, w
0
r) ∧ has (o
0
1, x3, w
0
r) ∧mule (x3, w
0
r)]
Here the values of o01 and w
0
r depend on the state i0, which functions much as an
external anchor in the sense of Kamp and Reyle (1993), pp. 246–248.34
With the notion of background now elucidated, let us see how reasoning from
input descriptions can result in a process familiar from DRT: While indefinites
create fresh referents, pronouns will pick up old referents (or must get a deictic
interpretation). The material connected with proper names is relegated to the
main Discourse Representation Structure. Constraints on local contexts must ei-
ther be satisfied or accommodated. Global Consistency and Informativity when
satisfied constrain global accommodation.
Proper Names Proper names end up in the main DRS. The lexical descrip-
tion for Pedro contains the statement in (4.53a), requiring the semantic material
connected with the name to be in the background.
(4.53) a. [o0 | wr:Pedro o0] ⊑ B
b. [wr o0 | wr:Pedro o0] ⊑ B
c. σr = [u2 | wr: o0 has u2, wr:mule u2, wr: σ5 feeds σ7]
d. [wr o0 u2 | wr:Pedro o0, wr: o0 has u2, wr:mule u2, wr: σ5 feeds σ7]
⊑ B ⊕ σr
In fact, using A19, this can be strengthened slightly to (4.53b). Using (4.53c)
(which was found in (4.52)), the hearer can now derive (4.53d). The discourse
meaning B ⊕ σr must contain (and therefore entail) a certain DRS containing
the material connected with the name. It should be clear that this is in fact an
implementation of global accommodation.
34While Kamp and Reyle (1993) use anchors only for proper names, our use is wider as we let
i0 interpret all referents in the discourse’s background. There is some room for fine-tuning here
and it may also be held that some referents from the background are referential while others
are interpreted existentially. See section 6.2.4 in chapter 6.
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Pronouns Indefinites create fresh referents, but pronouns pick up old referents.
That indefinites create fresh referents is a property they share with many other
expressions. Their creation is a by-product of the perpetual creation of fresh node
names. The referent u2 connected with the indefinite a in (4.52) was created in this
way. The moment that it was established that there was some node 2 carrying the
lexeme a the referent u2 also sprung into existence. Note that, by the injectivity
of u, u2 cannot corefer with a referent created at any other node.
35 Since, by A19,
u2 can not be an element of the universe of B and since, by the same axiom, B
is proper, there can also be no condition in B in which u2 occurs. The referent is
therefore truly fresh to the discourse.
The process whereby pronouns get bound by referents that already exist takes
a little more care to explain. In (4.54a) a constraint is shown that was collected
in (4.52). It resulted from the requirement on pronouns that [σpik | ] ⊑ Γk (with
k the node carrying the pronoun). This was required of the he and it nodes
and in both cases the local context Γk could be computed to be B ⊕ [u2 |
wr: o0 has u2, wr:mule u2]. Using (4.53a) and the idempotency of ⊕ it is seen
that in fact (4.54b) must hold.
(4.54) a. [σ5 σ7 | ] ⊑ B ⊕ [u2 | wr: o0 has u2, wr:mule u2]
b. [σ5 σ7 | ] ⊑ B ⊕ [wr o0 u2 | wr:Pedro o0, wr: o0 has u2, wr:mule u2]
This puts constraints on what σ5 and σ7 are, but there are still many possibilities
for these referents to resolve. In principle this is what we want, as linguistic
information typically underspecifies how pronouns should resolve. However, the
constraints collected thus far leave open too many possibilities and therefore more
constraints are needed.
In order to illustrate this, let us concentrate on σ7 and see what values it
can take. One possibility is that the pronoun it has no linguistic antecedent and
that σ7 is to be identified with some register that was in the universe of the
background B but is not mentioned in the discourse. We think this possibility is
in fact welcome and corresponds to a reading of the text in which it refers to an
object that is somehow salient (for example, as a result of pointing) but that was
not introduced by linguistic means. We identify this with the deictic use of the
pronoun.
Technically, there is also the possibility that σ7 is in fact equal to wr. This
possibility is an artefact and a consequence of our choice to have one type of
register for worlds and individuals. We exclude it by postulating that no node
can have wr as its semantics.
A20 ¬∃k σpik = wr
35Of course the value of another referent may be identical with the value V (u2, i) of u2 at any
given state i. The difference between identity of referents and identity of their values is crucial
to the present discussion.
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A fuller treatment should perhaps comprise a more general type or kind distinc-
tion of the registers involved, so that A20 would fall out as a consequence.
Of the remaining possibilities, the identification σ7 = o0 should be excluded
on linguistically more interesting grounds. Since Pedro has masculine gender, it
cannot antecede it, which is neuter. Since this does not follow from the theory
we have set up thus far, and since it is of course just one manifestation of a
phenomenon that really pervades language, we must add a general mechanism
for feature constraints. In fact this is very easy and Muskens (2001) shows how it
can be done on the basis of the first-order feature theory of Johnson (1991). We
refer to the discussion in Muskens (2001) for details. Using the notation of that
paper, a general requirement to the effect that coreferring nodes should agree (on
number and gender) could be formulated as follows.
(4.55) ∀kk′ [σpik = σ
pi
k′ → ∀f [arc( k ,agr, f)→ arc( k
′ ,agr, f)]]
This could be added as an axiom, together with the three axioms (axiom schemes)
for features in Muskens (2001). Note the mixed semantic / syntactic character of
(4.55). This is a case of genuine mutual constraint between syntax and semantics.
With a mechanism for features such as that in place, a general requirement to
the effect that coreferring nodes should agree (on number and gender) could be
added as a syntactic-semantic axiom to the grammar. Given the implementation
of this requirement, there are two possibilities left for the denotation of σ7: σ7 = u2
or σ7 /∈ {wr, o0, u2}. Similarly the hearer can deduce that either σ5 = o0 or
σ5 /∈ {wr, o0, u2}. In fact the following four possibilities remain.
(4.56)a.[wr o0 u2 | wr:Pedro o0, wr: o0 has u2, wr:mule u2, wr: o0 feeds u2]
⊑ B ⊕ σr
b.[wr o0 u2 σ7 | wr:Pedro o0, wr: o0 has u2, wr:mule u2, wr: o0 feeds σ7]
⊑ B ⊕ σr ∧ [σ7 | ] 6⊑ [wr o0 u2 | ]
c.[wr o0 u2 σ5 | wr:Pedro o0, wr: o0 has u2, wr:mule u2, wr: σ5 feeds u2]
⊑ B ⊕ σr ∧ [σ5 | ] 6⊑ [wr o0 u2 | ]
d.[wr o0 u2 σ5 σ7 | wr:Pedro o0, wr: o0 has u2, wr:mule u2, wr: σ5 feeds σ7]
⊑ B ⊕ σr ∧ [σ5 | ] 6⊑ [wr o0 u2 | ] ∧ [σ7 | ] 6⊑ [wr o0 u2 | ]
The first possibility corresponds to the preferred reading (Pedro feeds the donkey),
the second to the case where it was taken deictically, the third to a deictic reading
of he, and the fourth to the case where both pronouns pick up an extralinguistic
referent. The hearer must now make a choice as to what was meant on the basis of
his world knowledge and of what he knows or may assume is in the background.
Note that each four of the possibilities offers suitable input for a translation into
predicate logic,36 and that in each case certain conclusions can be drawn from
36See Definition A.4 in appendix A. Furthermore, in each case all relevant discourse markers
can be shown to be disequal (the precondition to Theorem A.5).
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the assumption that B ⊕ σr is true in i0 with respect to background B. These
conclusions are, respectively
(4.57) a. ∃x [Pedro (o00, w
0
r) ∧ has (o
0
0, x, w
0
r) ∧mule (x, w
0
r) ∧ feeds (o
0
0, x, w
0
r)],
b. ∃x [Pedro (o00, w
0
r) ∧ has (o
0
0, x, w
0
r) ∧mule (x, w
0
r) ∧ feeds (o
0
0, σ
0
8, w
0
r)],
c. ∃x [Pedro (o00, w
0
r) ∧ has (o
0
0, x, w
0
r) ∧mule (x, w
0
r) ∧ feeds (σ
0
5, x, w
0
r)],
d. ∃x [Pedro (o00, w
0
r)∧ has (o
0
0, x, w
0
r) ∧mule (x, w
0
r)∧ feeds (σ
0
5 , σ
0
7, w
0
r)].
By evaluating the discourse meaning B ⊕ σr relative to his world knowledge the
hearer may generate preferences over the different possible readings, in other
words further narrowing down of the possibilities may be a result of pragmatic
reasoning. Deictic readings will only be preferred if some salient entity is present
in the background.
While in this example only linguistically acceptable pronoun resolutions were
left, other suitability constraints are necessary in other cases. One set of con-
straints that immediately springs to mind is that of the syntactic Binding Theory
(Chomsky 1981). As we shall see in chapter 5 the principles of Binding Theory,
and the geometric notions in terms of which it is stated, for example c-command,
can straightforwardly be formulated in LDG. The description approach allows
us to integrate theories from various levels and a syntactic theory such as the
Binding Theory, if adopted, has immediate relevance for the construction of Dis-
course Representation Structures. A related issue is the interaction with discourse
syntactic structure, or rather, discourse topical structure as induced by discourse
syntax. We will touch upon this in chapter 5.
Appropriateness Conditions on Local Contexts Appropriateness condi-
tions attached to discourse relations or connectives must be satisfied; the effect of
this is that the implicit background B is constrained. We let the discourse relation
elaboration in (4.52) introduce an informativity constraint on the local context
of the discourse unit it links to the discourse context. The constraint is given in
(4.58a). It says that certain descriptive material, corresponding to the semantic
value of the relevant discourse unit, must not be entailed by the relevant local
context. Thus it enforces that this material is new or informative in the discourse.
(4.58) a. B ⊕ [u2 | wr: o0 has u2, wr:mule u2] 6|≍ [ | wr: σ5 feedsσ7 ]
b. B ⊕ [wr o0 u2 | wr:Pedro o0, wr: o0 has u2, wr:mule u2]
6|≍ [ | wr: σ5 feedsσ7 ]
c. B ⊕ [wr o0 u2 | wr:Pedro o0, wr: o0 has u2, wr:mule u2]
6|≍ [ | wr: o0 feedsu2 ]
Using (4.53a), A19, and the idempotency of ⊕ the requirement can be strength-
ened to (4.58b). Obviously, the requirement must be satisfied given some resolu-
tion of the pronouns in ‘he feeds it’. Though in the example at hand, all of the
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possible readings summed up in (4.56) allow for the satisfaction of (4.58b), in
principle, resolutions of the pronouns that would prevent its satisfaction would
be excluded. They would result in uninformative discourse. (4.58c) represents the
informativity condition given the resolution of the pronouns in (4.56a), the most
preferred reading. Since it holds that
[wr o0 u2 | wr:Pedro o0, wr: o0 has u2, wr:mule u2] 6|≍ [ | wr: o0 feedsu2 ]
satisfaction of (4.58c) implies that the implicit background B contains no in-
formation such that [ | wr: o0 feedsu2 ] can be inferred. For example, B cannot
contain the information that if Pedro has a mule, he feeds it, or that mules are
animals and Pedro feeds all animals. The local informativity condition prevents
the accommodation of such material in B. In this way it constrains the discourse
meaning B ⊕ σr.
Global Informativity Global Informativity defines informativity at the level
of discourse contributions, or updates of discourse descriptions. It constrains in-
put discourse meanings. In the example at hand, Global Informativity results in
the following constraint.
There must be a DRS K such that
∆rcl1 6|= (B⊕[wr o0 u2 | wr:Pedro o0, wr: o0 has u2, wr:mule u2] |≍ K) and
∆rcl2 |= (B⊕[wr o0 u2 | wr:Pedro o0, wr: o0 has u2, wr:mule u2 wr: o0 feedsu2] |≍ K)
This can be satisfied in two situations. Either, there is a DRS K such that
∆rcl1 6|= (K ⊑ B) and ∆
rcl
2 |= (K ⊑ B). This means that due to processing
‘he feeds it’ there is information K which is accommodated in B but which is
not yet entailed or accommodated in B in ∆1. Global Informativity is satisfied
because of the information growth induced by accommodation. The other pos-
sibility is that part or whole of the semantic content of the contribution is new
relative to the input discourse meaning. Suppose K = [ | wr: o0 feedsu2]. It is clear
that for this choice, the second clause of the Global Informativity requirement is
satisfied. The first clause says that
(4.59) ∆rcl1 6|=
B⊕[wr o0 u2 | wr:Pedro o0, wr: o0 has u2, wr:mule u2] |≍
[ | wr: o0 feedsu2]
This prevents the accommodation in B of information that would support the
inference of [ | wr: o0 feedsu2], as with the local informativity constraint discussed
earlier. It seems reasonable to assume that if no additional constraints, specified
in ∆2, change the hearer’s assumptions about B, the constraint in (4.59) carries
over to ∆2.
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Starting out from the informativity condition [inf] in ∆2 we can reason as
follows. Either it induces accommodation in B or it doesn’t. If it induces accomo-
dation, Global Informativity is satisfied. If it does not induce accommodation, it
follows that the constraint must already be satisfied in ∆1, that is, we have
(4.60) ∆rcl1 |=
B⊕[wr o0 u2 | wr:Pedro o0, wr: o0 has u2, wr:mule u2] 6|≍
[ | wr: o0 feedsu2]
The first clause of the Global Informativity requirement (4.59) follows from this.
The second clause also holds, so Global Informativity is satisfied. In sum, if we
choose K such that it is identical to the semantic content of the contribution, then
if the local informativity condition attached to elaboration is satisfied, Global
Informativity is satisfied as well. In the case at hand either the one or the other
requirement is superfluous. As discussed in section 4.4.5, however, it is a matter for
further investigation whether in general, both types of informativity requirements
should be maintained, or one may be dropped in favour of the other.
Global Consistency We have seen that all context-sensitve constraints trig-
gered by the lexemes and implicit elements in the discourse under consideration
can be satisfied, resulting in a partial specification of the implicit background
and in four possible readings of the discourse. Evaluating the discourse meaning
relative to his world knowledge, the hearer may select from these a single most
preferred reading. For this reading, as for all grammatical readings, Global Con-
sistency requires that the discourse meaning be consistent. Thus, in addition to
the following condition must be satisified.
(4.61) B⊕[wr o0 u2 | wr:Pedro o0, wr: o0 has u2, wr:mule u2 wr: o0 feedsu2] 6|≍ ⊥
As with the informativity condition attached to the discourse relation elaboration
and the Global Informativity condition, (4.61) constrains the implicit background
by preventing the global accommodation of any material that would result in an
inconsistent discourse meaning.
Concluding, it was shown that discourse meanings are constrained in various ways
by context sensitive elements occurring in the discourse, and by global semantic
conditions. Names trigger conditions on the implicit background B so that they
either resolve to, or are accommodated in the main DRS. Pronouns introduce
conditions on their local context which force their semantic value to either unify
with an existing discourse referent, or be globally accommodated and get a deictic
interpretation. Appropriateness conditions triggered by discourse relations must
be satisfied in the relevant local context. As a consequence, they constrain the
implicit background. Global Informativity constrains the relation between input,
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and output discourse meanings. Its predictions overlap with those of local in-
formativity constraints. Global Consistency, by requiring the (output) discourse
meaning to be consistent, constrains the implicit background as well.
All of these constraints contribute to the specification of (underspecified) dis-
course meanings. Since language abounds with context sensitive elements, in a
fully fledged discourse grammar there will be many more lexical elements that
come with additional constraints on local contexts. Notably, a lot of lexemes
introduce presuppositions of one kind or another. In fact, the appropriateness
conditions attached to discourse relations and discourse operators discussed in
section 4.4.4 may be viewed as linguistic presuppositions. In chapter 6 we shall
zoom in on presuppositions attached to definite descriptions, and discuss a treat-
ment that is in some respects similar to that of pronouns and in other respects
to that of appropriateness conditions. In all these cases, context sensitive aspects
of meaning are captured in the lexical semantics. By integrating local contexts in
the lexical descriptions of these elements, a straightforward declarative treatment
of context sensitivity is obtained.
It remains to be seen how much of context sensitivity in discourse interpre-
tation can or should be accounted for in the lexicon of the grammar. Consider
the Global Consistency condition, one of the two nonlexical constraints discussed
above. Though the effect of this condition could also be obtained by including
consistency requirements on local contexts in the lexical descriptions of discourse
relations and discourse operators, we would lose a generalisation in doing so. This
may be the case for other felicity conditions attached to discourse contributions
as well. However, for any form of context dependence of interpretation normally
captured under the heading of anaphoricity or linguistic presupposition we expect
that it can be treated in the lexicon of the grammar. We expect the same for the
context sensitive constraints triggered by the information structure or topic-focus
structure of clauses.
All in all, local contexts and conditions on them can simply be treated as an
additional parameter in the semantic composition of discourse; the result may
thus be called a context sensitive compositional discourse semantics.
4.5 Conclusion
In the preceding chapters we built a framework of discourse interpretation around
a logical description grammar or LDG. For an interpreting agent or language user
a, a framework of discourse interpretation Fa = 〈G
+,K, 〉 consists of an incre-
mental LDG system for discourse analysis, a reservoir of world knowledge, and a
default reasoning module. The grammar system G+ combines a discourse gram-
mar G with discourse descriptions that are built up incrementally from input or
sentence descriptions. G represents the language user’s grammatical knowledge of
a given natural language, K his nonlinguistic, general knowledge or world knowl-
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edge, and stands for his default reasoning capacity and his capacity to assign
preferences over verifying tree models of discourse descriptions. Thus, Fa as a
whole is a knowledge system.
The framework distinguishes two levels of linguistic analysis: the level of pos-
sibly underspecified discourse descriptions and the level of the annotated tree
structures or models that ‘fit’ or verify these descriptions. For any given stretch
of discourse a discourse description is generated. This is a set of statements in type
logic, describing the syntactic and semantic relations characterising the discourse
processed so far. Discourse descriptions figure as ‘underspecified representations’
of the discourse. They represent the language user’s knowledge of the ongoing
discourse. The discourse grammar itself is also a set of logical statements in type
logic. A language user may reason about the models or tree structures that ver-
ify a given discourse description given the grammar. The tree structures feature
as fully specified representations of the discourse processed so far. Since a dis-
course description can have more than one verifying tree model, the syntax and
semantics of the discourse may remain underspecified.
Some of this underspecification may be of the ‘don’t care’ kind: the language
user may be able to draw all conclusions that he desires without further filling in
the details. But in many cases further specification is necessary and should come
from pragmatic considerations, general felicity conditions on discourse interpre-
tation, interpretational constraints that are contributed by intonation, and so on.
Pragmatic considerations are covered in our framework to the extent that a lan-
guage user may evaluate a given (underspecified) discourse meaning relative to
his world knowledge K and generate preferences over different possible readings
employing his default reasoning engine . In how far aspects of interpretation com-
monly categorised as ‘pragmatics’—such as the inference of implicatures, or the
conditions of appropriate use attached to discourse contributions—can or should
be captured in a preference system remains to be seen, however. Constraints cov-
ered by intonation are not covered in the grammar as yet. Though we do not
expect special problems in letting discourse descriptions talk about intonation,
clearly there is still an area to be explored here.
Our focus of attention is on discourse syntax and semantics. The discussion in
this chapter centered on discourse meaning and the integration of context sensi-
tive constraints in the grammar. The meaning of a discourse is defined as B⊕σr,
the update of an underspecified implicit background B with σr. This background
represents what is taken for granted by the participants, as constrained by what
is said in the conversation. Discourse meanings function as context of interpre-
tation for the next discourse contribution. General conditions on consistent and
informative updating were formulated as constraints on discourse meanings and
added as semantic axioms to the grammar. Much of the language user’s reasoning
in obtaining a discourse meaning, however, concerns the interpretation of context
sensitive elements in a discourse contribution, such as anaphors, presupposition
triggers, discourse relations and discourse operators. The context sensitivity of
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these elements is captured by integrating local contexts, and constraints on them,
in their lexical descriptions. The description method results in a unified, declar-
ative treatment of context sensitivity.
The descriptions perspective on syntax and semantics advocated in these chap-
ters leads to a considerable change in the overall logical architecture of linguistic
theory. Nevertheless it remains compatible with most existing ideas in mainstream
linguistics and can even be argued to make for a smoother integration of those ex-
isting ideas. The overall logical architecture is changed because the theory focuses
on descriptions of linguistic objects (including meanings and the form-meaning
relation) rather than on those linguistic objects themselves; it also describes the
syntactic and semantic levels of the grammar in parallel and does not follow the
more common pipelined architecture in which syntactic forms must be produced
before interpretation can take place. Thus room is created to account for an inter-
dependency of syntax and semantics. On the other hand, the view that language
users represent language by means of descriptions rather than by means of struc-
tures does not necessarily lead to any drastic revision of our understanding of
what these structures are. In this chapter combinations of standard Discourse
Representation Structures and standard phrase structure trees were taken to be
the objects of description. The theory obviously is also compatible with many
other choices, but no radical departure from common practice is needed or in-
deed desired in this respect.
In the preceding chapters the LDG framework of discourse interpretation was
presented as a work-bench for linguists, a logical tool for the specification of lin-
guistic theories. The strength of the formalism, we believe, is in its treatment of
the interaction of the various linguistic and nonlinguistic parameters that govern
the interpretation of discourse, and in the fact that underspecification of linguis-
tic information is a natural consequence of the approach. Underspecification or
implicitness in discourse is all-pervasive. Nonetheless, language users generally
arrive at sufficiently specified readings of discourse, seemingly without great ef-
fort. It is the combination of these facts that must be explained in a discourse
theory. The LDG framework, with its emphasis on the embedding of grammatical
knowledge within the language user’s general knowledge, provides a platform for
this.
By way of testing the framework, in what follows it will be applied to pre-
supposition theory. As a preliminary, we will zoom in on anaphora resolution in
chapter 5. We put forward an analytic variant of the treatment of pronoun reso-
lution that was offered in this chapter, the advantage of which is that it models
anaphoricity more clearly as an independent parameter in the discourse theory.
In terms of the predictions of the theory, there are no differences, however. Fur-
thermore, the interaction with syntactic and semantic constraints, salience and
topicality effects, and accommodation will be more fully addressed.
Chapter 6 then provides an implementation of presupposition theory in LDG.
Our aim is not so much to spell out a new treatment of presupposition, but to
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show that central aspects of existing theories can fruitfully be combined, once
they are embedded in a sufficiently powerful discourse model, which incorporates
a sufficiently fine-tuned discourse semantics. The approaches that will be com-
bined are the one based on Karttunen (1974), which models presuppositions as
tests on contexts of interpretation, and the anaphoric approach to presupposition
projection put forward in Van der Sandt (1992), which binds or accommodates
presuppositional material in accessible locations in discourse meanings. It will be
shown that, given a certain choice of preferences in the framework of discourse
interpretation, van der Sandtian predictions may in principle be obtained, while
the conceptually attractive analysis of presuppositions as tests on the context of
interpretation is maintained. The interaction with independent constraints in the
discourse grammar, and with the hearer’s reasoning about world knowledge and
his preferences is crucial for the explanation.
Chapter 5
Anaphoricity
5.1 Introduction
A main source of coherence in discourse is anaphoricity. Anaphors or anaphoric
expressions are lexical elements in natural language whose common characteristic
is that they denote entities or properties which were mentioned earlier in the
discourse, or are present in the nonlinguistic context, or can be inferred or assumed
to be present in the context of interpretation on the basis of the linguistic and
nonlinguistic context of interpretation. The term antecedent refers to a linguistic
expression in the discourse which, if present, usually precedes the anaphor and
which is responsible for introducing the entity it denotes in the discourse context.
Where anaphors that denote individual entities are concerned, we use the term
binder to indicate a discourse marker declared in the universe of the context of
interpretation whose occupant (or the value assigned to it) is the individual entity
the anaphor denotes.
Finding out the meaning of a newly uttered sentence involves resolving the
anaphors occurring in it, relative to the discourse context established by the
preceding discourse. In the context of LDG, resolving an anaphor means deter-
mining its potential binders and selecting the binding relations that result in most
preferred readings of the discourse. Nominal anaphors introduce underspecified
discourse markers which must be bound by a semantically accessible binder in the
discourse meaning. We will propose that binding is the effect of general semantic
conditions on the properness of discourse meaning and local contexts (section 5.2).
To account for context-sensitive elements whose binder is introduced via subse-
quent discourse (often called ‘kataphors’), a form of lazy interpretation may be
assumed. Furthermore, predicational anaphors, such as VP-ellipsis and so-called
‘pay-check pronouns’ may resolve as the result of parallelism requirements rather
than properness.
Differences between various classes of anaphors are laid down in the lexicon.
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Specific syntactic, semantic and informational conditions on its relation to the
discourse context may characterise a given type of anaphor. To illustrate the
classifying effect of additional syntactic constraints, we briefly discuss an imple-
mentation of the Chomskian Binding Conditions in LDG (section 5.3). Further-
more, we introduce the notion of ‘discourse availability’ (section 5.4) to get a
grasp on the constraining effect of discourse topical structure and salience effects
on anaphora resolution. One of the features that distinguishes personal pronouns
from, for example, definite descriptions is the fact that they require binders that
are most salient given the discourse topic hierarchy. Definite descriptions lack
this requirement, though they seem to be sensitive to the topical status of their
binders in some measure.
Classifying conditions of anaphoric elements not only explain what sort of
discourse context licences the use of what kind of anaphor, they also account for
differences in the anaphor’s potential to resolve to implicit background informa-
tion and induce the accommodation of a binder. Since Lewis (1979), the term
accommodation is employed in semantic theory to denote the implicit adjustment
of the context of interpretation, as induced by the interpretation of a statement
made relative to that context. In the LDG formalism it can be modeled as exactly
that: accommodation is the specification of hitherto underspecified background
information, evoked by the interpretation of the ongoing discourse.1 Anaphors
and presuppositional expressions may resolve relative to what has been explic-
itly stated in the discourse, but they may also teach the hearer something new
about what is implicitly presupposed. We will zoom in on the accommodation po-
tential of pronouns, and propose that the salience requirement on their binder is
what makes accommodation of a binder costly. Therefore it is usually dispreferred
(section 5.5).
In all of this, what makes a hearer resolve anaphoric links is his ability to
reason about what is stated in the discourse given his common knowledge. While
binding relations as such receive a purely declarative treatment in our grammar,
anaphora resolution is essentially an inference process, and that is how we model
it. Some of the information on the basis of which the hearer reasons is provided
linguistically, other information is part of his common knowledge. Given the ar-
chitecture of our framework of discourse interpretation the language user may
access these information sources in parallel.
1As in the preceding chapter, discourse meanings are defined as B ⊕ σr, the implicit back-
ground updated with the semantic content of the discourse. For the time being, accommodation
is nothing but the acceptance of information in B. This implements only global accommodation,
that is, the specification of the initial context of interpretation in possible world approaches,
or of the main DRS in DRT. In the second half of this chapter, a generalisation to local and
intermediate accommodation will be provided.
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5.2 Properness and Pronoun Resolution
The analysis of pronouns presented in the preceding chapter may be summed
up as follows. Pronouns are context-sensitive elements. Their semantic values are
underspecified discourse markers. They introduce a context-sensitive constraint
which requires that the discourse marker which is their semantic value is present
in the universe of their local context (see the lexical description in (5.1a)). Thus,
pronouns must be bound in their local context. Resolving a pronoun comes down
to finding out with which of the discourse markers present in the local context
the underspecified value can be identified and selecting one that results in a most
preferred reading.
(5.1) a. DP+k1
σpik
[ σpik | ] ⊑ Γk
Dk
he
b. DP+k1
σpik
Dk
he
We shall follow a slightly different approach here, and propose a variant of our
treatment which results in the same predictions, but which highlights that binding
as such is an independent parameter in the discourse semantics. The fact that
pronouns must be bound in their local context shall be made to follow from
general requirements on properness, rather than from lexical constraints. Instead
of descriptions such as (5.1a) we adopt descriptions of the kind illustrated in
(5.1b), which only state that the semantic value of a pronoun is a discourse
marker. Simultaneously, we add the following general axiom to the grammar. We
shall often refer to this as the Properness condition.2
A21 proper(B ⊕ σr) ∧ ∀k[ proper(Γk)]
This says that, for any discourse description, the discourse meaning B ⊕ σk, and
the local contexts of all nodes in the described structure must be proper DRSs.
As in the preceding chapter, a DRS K is proper if it has no free referents, and
the free referents of a DRS K are the ones that are free in some condition of K
but are not in the universe of K. The effect of A18 is that all discourse markers
employed in some condition in B ⊕ σr or in arbitrary local contexts are declared
in an accessible universe, in other words they are bound . Since every discourse
marker employed in the semantic value of a discourse unit figures in the local
2The condition subsumes the first part of axiom A19, introduced in the preceding chapter,
which states some properties of the implicit background: proper(B)∧¬∃k fst(B)(uk)∧fst(B)(wr).
This may now be reformulated as
A19′ ¬∃k fst(B)(uk) ∧ fst(B)(wr)
.
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context of the consecutive discourse unit, or, if the discourse unit is the currently
rightmost one of the discourse, in the resulting discourse meaning, all pronouns
whose semantic value ends up in the semantic value of the sentence that contains
them are subject to axiom A21. Hence, at every stage in processing a discourse,
these pronouns are bound in their local context.3
The properness condition expresses the intuition that discourse meanings re-
sulting from grammatical discourse, and contexts of interpretation in general, are
well-formed in the sense that they correspond to closed formulas or sentences in
predicate logic. In fact, it is a common assumption in DRT that output DRS’s re-
sulting from processing and interpreting a grammatical sentence, are proper.4 The
first half of our axiom reflects this. However, whereas in standard DRT properness
is a metalevel property of DRS’s, in LDG ‘properness’ is made availabe in the
semantics at the level of the describing logic, see appendix A. It is an object level
property which the language user’s grammar can ‘talk about’. As such, it may
naturally be employed to specify or describe parts of his grammatical knowledge,
notably presupposition theory.
We will in addition assume that properness is a built-in characteristic of the
object level relation of entailment. In grammatical discourse we are only concerned
with testing entailment relations Γ |≍ K where there are no discourse markers free
in K. A slightly modified definition of object level entailment which takes care
of this is provided in appendix A. Given this modification we can be sure that
all discourse markers introduced by anaphoric elements, either via their semantic
content or embedded in presuppositional material, are subject to a properness
condition and must be bound in the local context of the anaphor. As before, the
semantic values of pronouns are underspecified discourse markers and pronoun
resolution is reasoning about potential binding relations, but now the language
user infers that the semantic value is bound in its local context on the basis of
his general grammatical knowledge rather than lexical constraints. Binding is an
effect of a basic semantic well-formedness constraint on the discourse meaning and
local contexts of interpretation. The account carries over to all lexical elements
that introduce free discourse markers as part of their semantics.
5.2.1 Inferring Binding Relations
Let us see how this slightly modified treatment of pronoun resolution works out
for the example that was discussed in section 4.4.6 of chapter 4 before. Consider
3Arguably, just requiring proper(B ⊕ σr) is enough. But then an integrity rule or preference
should be added to the framework of discourse interpretation to prevent that bindings of dis-
course markers that are inferred at one stage in the interpretation of a discourse are changed
after incrementation steps, when new antecedents have been made available through subsequent
discourse.
4Compare (Kamp and Reyle 1993), section 1.4. Furthermore, Van der Sandt (1992) states
the properness requirement on output DRSs as one of the constraints on anaphora binding.
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the following discourse.
(5.2) Pedro owns a mule. He feeds it.
After processing the second sentence in (5.2), the hearer may increment the dis-
course description established so far with the appropriate input description. The
resulting discourse description can be graphically represented as follows.
(5.3) ∆2: S−r
Γr = B
S+16
[u2 | wr: o0 has u2, wr:mule u2]
[o0 | wr:Pedro o0] ⊑ B
Pedro has a mule
DP+24
σ5
D5
He
S+25
σ26(σ27)
DP−26 VP−27
VP+28
λv[ | wr: v feeds σ29]
V6
feeds
DP−29
DP+30
σ7
D7
it
Notice that while the name ‘Pedro’ is connected with a discourse referent o0 that
is required to be present in the universe of the implicit background B, and the
indefinite ‘a mule’ creates a fresh discourse referent u2, the pronouns in ‘he feeds
it’ introduce the underspecified discourse referents σpi5 and σ
pi
7 . Their binding must
be inferred from general axioms in the grammar.
Reasoning in the by now familiar way, the language user may pair off positively
and negatively marked nodes, and infer the presence of an implicit discourse
relation. Discourse relation elaboration is a plausible candidate in the example
at hand. Furthermore, temporarily closing off the discourse description, he may
compose the semantic values of the nodes. The following picture of the discourse
description shows the result of this reasoning.
(5.4) ∆rcl2 :
S21,r
[u2 | wr: o0 has u2, wr:mule u2, wr:σ5 feeds σ7]
[lrp]wr :̺21=̺16, wr :̺25 ⊆ ̺16
S16
[u2|wr: o0 has u2, wr:mule u2]
[o0|wr:Pedro o0] ⊑ B
Pedro has a mule
S31
Rel4
elab
S25
[ | wr:σ5 feedsσ7 ]
[inf]B ⊕ [u2| wr: o0 has u2, wr:mule u2] 6|≍
[ | wr:σ5 feedsσ7 ]
He feeds it
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Ignoring the spatiotemporal and mereological meaning components of the elab-
oration, indicated by [lrp], for the sake of simplicity, the semantic value of the
root of the described tree structure can be computed to be
σr = [ u2 | wr: o0 has u2, wr:mule u2, wr: σ5 feeds σ7]
This represents what is asserted in the discourse. As was argued in the preceding
chapter, discourse meanings consist of an implicit background B updated with
σr. The discourse meaning that can be inferred from (5.4) is an underspecified
DRS B ⊕ [u2 | wr: o0 has u2, wr:mule u2, wr: σ5 feeds σ7], where the constraints
triggered by the context-sensitive elements in the discourse must be satisfied. Two
such constraints can be collected from the discourse description; one is triggered
by the name ‘Pedro’ (5.5a), and the other is the informativity requirement trig-
gered by the discourse relation (5.5b). We will not zoom in on the specific impact
of these constraints here; look back to section 4.4.6 in chapter 4 for a discussion
of their contribution to discourse meaning.
(5.5)a. [o0 | wr:Pedro o0] ⊑ B
b. B ⊕ [u2 | wr: o0 has u2, wr:mule u2] 6|≍ [ | wr: σ5 feedsσ7 ]
Given (5.5a), axiom A19, and idempotency of ⊕, the discourse meaning that can
be inferred from (5.4) can be strengthened to
B ⊕ [u2 o0 wr | wr:Pedro o0, wr: o0 has u2, wr:mule u2, wr: σ5 feeds σ7]
On the basis of the properness condition A21 it can be inferred from this that
proper(B ⊕ [u2 o0 wr | wr:Pedro o0, wr: o0 has u2, wr:mule u2, wr: σ5 feedsσ7 ])
It follows from this that σ5 and σ7 are present in the universe of the discourse
meaning. Given the definition of properness, the language user may infer
[σ5 | ], [σ7 | ] ⊑ B ⊕ [wr o0 u2 | wr:Pedro o0, wr: o0 has u2, wr:mule u2]
and conclude for σ5 that σ5 ∈ {wr, o0, u2}, or that σ5 is in the universe of B
but not in {wr, o0, u2}. Similarly, for σ7 he may infer that σ7 ∈ {wr, o0, u2}, or
that σ7 is in the universe of B but not in {wr, o0, u2}. The same set of potential
readings results as in our discussion of this example in the preceding chapter,
section 4.4.7. In each case, the binder may be a discourse marker introduced
earlier in the discourse, or it may be an entity in the universe of the implicit
background of the discourse. In fact, as we will argue in section 5.4, pronouns in
addition require binders that count as most salient given the ongoing discourse
or occurrences in the nonlinguistic context. Hence, if the binder is an entity in
the universe of the implicit background of the conversation, it must be a salient
one. This is generally only the case when it represents an entity which is present
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in the nonlinguistic context of interpretation and can be pointed out directly in
the state of evaluation of the discourse.5 This implies that the pronoun receives
a deictic interpretation.
As before, various ungrammatical resolutions can be excluded by adding sortal
constraints on discourse referents, and constraints on number and gender agree-
ment. If this is done, four possible readings of the discourse remain. The following
alternative specifications of information in B ⊕ σr indicate these readings.
(5.6)a. [wr o0 u2 | wr:Pedro o0, wr: o0 has u2, wr:mule u2, wr: o0 feeds u2]
⊑ B ⊕ σr
b. [wr o0 u2 σ7 | wr:Pedro o0, wr: o0 has u2, wr:mule u2, wr: o0 feeds σ7]
⊑ B ⊕ σr ∧ [σ7 | ] 6⊑ [wr o0 u2 | ]
c. [wr o0 u2 σ5 | wr:Pedro o0, wr: o0 has u2, wr:mule u2, wr: σ5 feeds u2]
⊑ B ⊕ σr ∧ [σ5 | ] 6⊑ [wr o0 u2 | ]
d. [wr o0 u2 σ5 σ7 | wr:Pedro o0, wr: o0 has u2, wr:mule u2, wr: σ5 feeds σ7]
⊑ B ⊕ σr ∧ [σ5 | ] 6⊑ [wr o0 u2 | ] ∧ [σ7 | ] 6⊑ [wr o0 u2 | ]
The first possibility corresponds to the preferred reading (Pedro feeds the donkey),
the second to the case where it was taken deictically, the third to a deictic reading
of he, and the fourth to the case where both pronouns pick up an extralinguistic
referent. The hearer must now make a choice as to what was meant on the basis of
his world knowledge and of what he knows or may assume is in the background.
5.2.2 Semantic Accessibility and Parallelism
Pronouns carry underspecified discourse markers as their semantic values. Through
the interaction with the properness condition on discourse meanings and local con-
texts, it follows that these anaphoric discourse markers are bound in the pronoun’s
local context. Given the definitions of ‘free’ and ‘proper’ and the composition of
discourse meanings and local contexts in our grammar, a binder must be accessible
from the anaphoric marker (or from the pronoun) in the sense of standard DRT.
We call this semantic accessibility . We will have, for example, that a discourse
marker declared in the scope of a negation, implication, or disjunction cannot
bind a discourse marker outside the scope of the operator: it is not semantically
accessible. This accounts for well-known judgements such as the following.
(5.7) a. John owns a1 car. It1’s in the garage.
5Remember we distinguish between o-markers and u-markers. o-markers are interpreted di-
rectly relative to i0, the state of affairs the discourse is taken to be about, resulting in referential
or deictic interpretations of nominal anaphors, depending on the type of anaphor. Due to A19′ :
¬∃k fst(B)(uk) ∧ fst(B)(wr) the universe of the implicit background contains only o-markers.
See section 6.2 for some further discussion of this, and a proposal for an alternative treatment
which relaxes the constraints on markers in B somewhat.
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b. # John does not have a1 car. It1’s in the garage.
c. # Every1 student discusses a2 paper. He1 misunderstands it2.
All anaphoric elements which introduce free discourse markers as (part of) their
semantic value are predicted to be bound by some semantically accessible binder
in their local context, or induce the accommodation of such a binder, or else
fail to resolve. Interestingly, there are cases of pronoun resolution which seem
to refute this and resolve to a semantically inaccessible binder. This typically
occurs with pronouns in clauses or sentences that are semantically parallel to some
contextually available piece of information. The following discourse illustrates the
point; the relevant pronoun is underlined.6
(5.9) a. If Molly sees a stray cat, she pets it.
b. But if Dan sees it, he takes it home.
Asher and Lascarides (2003), ex.(25), p.152
The connective ‘but’ in (5.9b) requires a relation of contrast, and hence, of paral-
lelism, linking the two conditional statements. In line with Asher and Lascarides
(2003) we assume that the coordinating connective ‘but’ attaches at top level,
that is, it takes the whole of the preceding conditional as its left argument.7
In its most preferred interpretation—the so-called sloppy reading of (5.9b)—
the right argument of ‘but’ means “if Dan sees a stray cat, he takes it home.”
Crucially, this is not a coreferential reading: the cat Dan sees need not be the
one Molly sees, whenever she sees one. Rather than picking up the discourse
referent introduced through ‘a stray cat’ in (5.9a), the pronoun ‘it’ in ‘If Dan sees
it’ resolves to the parallel nominal description ‘a stray cat’. It could be claimed
that this violates semantic accessibility, since the parallel material that figures
as the antecedent is in the scope of the conditional operator. We would suggest,
however, that the pronoun in (5.9b) does not resolve to this antecedent through
‘serial’ binding; it resolves through parallelism and results in a form of analogy
or counterpartness, rather than coreference. As long as the resulting sentence
6The phenomenon is well-known and also goes under the name of pay-check pronouns , after
Karttunen’s famous example:
(5.8) The man who gave his paycheck to his wife was wiser than the man who gave it to his
mistress. Karttunen (1969)
7Both SDRT and our discourse grammar also allow for attachment at a lower position, so
that the connective takes the consequent of the conditional as its left argument and the whole
of the second conditional ends up in the scope of the first. This attachment would change the
local context of the pronoun, and make available the discourse marker introduced by ‘a stray
cat’ as a binder. This allows for a strict reading of the pronoun, but would also result in an
overall different semantic value for the discourse than with an attachment at top level. The
fact that this is possible does not obviate the need for some additional mechanism such as the
computation of parallelism, to account for sloppy readings of pronouns.
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or discourse meaning respects binding requirements there is no problem with
semantic accessibility.
Exactly how pronoun resolution through parallelism should be treated in LDG
is a question we will leave open. Let it suffice to observe that under certain
conditions, personal pronouns may receive a full descriptive interpretation, rather
than a bound variable one.8 Furthermore, it is clear that the computation of
parallellism plays a central role in the resolution process. In fact, parallellism
per se (Pru¨st 1992; Gardent 1997b), or as constrained by focus interpretation
(Gardent and Kohlhase 1995; Gardent and Kohlhase 1996; Pulman 1997), or
discourse relations (Asher 1995; Asher and Lascarides 2003), affects the resolution
of all types of anaphoric constructs, including those that are not referential in
nature, such as VP-ellipsis. One of the desiderata of our discourse theory is to fill
in this parameter.
5.2.3 Kataphors
The properness requirement A21 enforces that every anaphor has a binder in its
local context. This leads to a problem with the analysis of so-called anticipatory
anaphors or kataphors, if discourse is processed strictly on a clause by clause basis.
Kataphors are anaphoric elements which find their antecedent in the subsequent,
rather than the preceding discourse. The following example illustrates this. The
kataphoric pronoun ‘them’ is followed by its antecedent ‘the nicotine plasters’.
(5.10) Jack1 has been trying to stop smoking for ages.
He1 never expected them2 to work,
but the2 nicotine plasters actually helped quite a lot.
Since local context are defined in terms of the preceding discourse, just after
the second clause in (5.10) has been processed the local context of the pronoun
‘them’ does not contain a suitable binder. The intended binder, introduced by
‘the nicotine plasters’ is only made availabe in subsequent discourse. Since we fail
to come up with a suitable binder, the discourse is predicted to be ungrammatical
at this point.
The simplest solution to this problem is to allow a form of ‘lazy interpre-
tation’:9 a pronoun may remain unresolved untill the next processing step has
8Building on Cooper (1979), Gardent et al. (1996) argue that pronouns are ambiguous be-
tween a ‘bound variable’ semantics and a ‘full description’ semantics, and that in the context
of semantic parallelism, the second type of meaning can be selected. The computation of par-
allelism is formally modeled by means of higher order unification with equivalences.
9A suggestion which is also made in a brief discussion of kataphors in Kamp and Reyle
(1993), pp. 163–165. Furthermore, an extensive implementation of the idea is put forward in
Van Deemter (1990) who proposes ‘patient DRT’ for the treatment of kataphors. The main idea
is that an anticipatory anaphor introduces an incomplete discourse entity, to be completed by
subsequent material under certain conditions. This converges with our own suggestion—further
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taken place. This clearly helps us out in the case of (5.10), where the process-
ing and interpretation of the third clause leads to the introduction of a suitable
binder in the local context of the pronoun. As we shall argue in section 6.2, this
is the result of accommodation, induced by the definite description ‘the nico-
tine plasters’. Nothing needs to be changed about the properness requirement.
Interestingly, this account predicts that the antecedents of kataphors are pre-
suppositional expressions, names, and specific indefinites, or in general elements
with a certain accommodation potential, since otherwise the binders will not be
semantically accessible to the pronouns in their local context.
A quick at look at the overview of anticipatory anaphora in English in Hud-
dleston and Pullum (2002), however, shows that while this is certainly a strong
trend, it not always true, at least not for non-nominal antecedents:
(5.11) a. It1’s ridiculous! They’ve given the job to Pat
1.
b. Even though it1’s not absolutely certain, there are very good grounds
for believing that Ann was responsible for the change of policy1.
So a modification or refinement of our treatment shall be necessary. One option
would be to relax the properness requirement on local contexts and, for instance,
let it apply only to local contexts of completed sentences, rather than to contexts
of all clauses. But this still doesn’t account for cases like (5.11a).
Another option would be to allow the ‘provisional’ accommodation of an un-
derspecified binder of a pronoun under condition that it will be fully determined
as a result of the next processing step, and then counts as a salient topical ele-
ment. After the next processing step, the provisionally accommodated binder can
be identified with the discourse marker introduced in the domain of topical ele-
ments through the antecedent. This would explain why kataphors so often occur
in clauses or discourse units which, in terms of the topic hierarchy of discourse, are
subordinated to the discourse units that contains the antecedent. There would be
no need to relax the properness requirement. The solution would have the added
advantage of avoiding stages in processing the discourse where the discourse de-
scription is uninterpretable, at least where anaphoric reference is concerned.
We will not make a choice here, and leave as a matter for further research
exactly how the constraints in our grammar should be set to fit in anticipatory
anaphora. Relatively much is known about syntactic constraints on kataphora at
sentence level. Further investigation would have to show how this interacts with
discourse parameters such as topicality.
5.2.4 Summing up
We introduced the Properness requirement on discourse meaning and local con-
texts. Furthermore, we assumed properness to be a built-in property of our object
on—that the ‘provisional’ accommodation of a binder is allowed under certain conditions.
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level relation of entailment. As a result, anaphoric elements which introduce free
discourse markers as (part of) their semantic value are predicted to be bound
by some semantically accessible binder in their local context. We touched upon
two special cases of anaphoricity, namely so-called sloppy readings of pronouns,
and kataphors. In the first case, it was argued that the pronoun ‘resolves’ through
parallelism with its antecedent, but is not bound by it. Hence there is no violation
of the Properness requirement. In the second case, it was suggested we adopt a
form of lazy interpretation. As it turns out, the Properness requirement then still
results in somewhat too strict predictions. Refinements of the discourse theory
that would remedy this were touched upon.
As before, pronouns introduce underspecified discours markers, and the lan-
guage user may infer potential binding relations from the discourse description
and his grammatical knowledge. These potential binding relations correspond to
the possible solutions of the resolution process in the sense of Van der Sandt
(1992). They define, in our terminology, a set of grammatical readings of the dis-
course. All constraints in the grammar, either syntactic or semantic, potentially
cut down the number of grammatical readings. In practice the language hearer
will not consider these as equally acceptable readings. On the basis of his world
knowledge and general preferences he will select a single or a few most plausible
ones.
In the following sections we zoom in on two classes of further constraints in the
grammar. In section 5.3, we put forward an implementation of Chomsky’s Binding
Principles. The Binding Principles characterise the individual binding behaviour
of particular classes of anaphors, and can be incorporated in the grammar through
syntactic constraints in the lexicon. In section 5.4 we briefly turn to constraints
on pronoun resolution induced by salience and the topic structure of discourse.
5.3 Syntactic Binding Principles in LDG
Not every semantically accessible discourse marker is a possible binder for each
type of anaphor. As is well-known, anaphoric expressions may differ with respect
to the syntactic domain within which their binder can be generated. For in-
stance, personal pronouns and reflexives exhibit very different binding behaviour.
Although there are certain exceptions to the rule, it is generally the case that
pronouns and reflexives occur in complementary distribution: if a given binder
binds a pronoun, it cannot bind a reflexive in the same position, and vice versa.
The following examples illustrate this.
(5.12) a. Every1 handsome man admires himself1.
b. # Every1 handsome man admires him1.
c. # John1 believes that Mary hurt himself1.
d. John1 believes that Mary hurt him1.
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Intuitively, what seems to be the case is that when the binder is ‘close by’, for ex-
ample, when it is an argument of the same predicate as the anaphor, the anaphor
must be a reflexive, and cannot be a pronoun. This intuition is what underlies the
Binding Conditions of Government and Binding Theory (Reinhart 1976; Chom-
sky 1981), which, in one formulation or another, require that pronouns are GBfree
within the relevant syntactic domain (their ‘governing category’), while reflex-
ives must be GBbound within the same domain. We tagged these terms GB(term)
in order to distinguish them from the notions ‘free’ and ‘bound’ employed in
the semantic theory of our grammar elsewhere. They refer to the following tree
geometric notions.
(1) a. Node k c-commands node k′ if every branching node dominating k
dominates k′.
b. A node is GBbound if it is coindexed with a c-commanding node.
c. A node is GBfree if it is not bound.
It is clear that these notions can be made available in our grammar if we read
‘k and k′ are coindexed’ as σpi(k) = σpi(k′). The Binding Theory itself consists of
the following three principles.10
(A) A reflexive or reciprocal must be GBbound in its governing category.
(B) A (non-reflexive) pronoun must be GBfree in its governing category.
(C) An R-expression must be GBfree everywhere.
R-expressions are DPs that are not pronouns, e.g. names, definite descriptions,
and quantifiers. The syntactic literature contains much discussion about the cor-
rect definition of ‘governing category’, but a rough approximation is that the
governing category of a node k is the lowest k′ properly dominating k that is
labelled DP or S. Using gvc(k) to represent the governing category of a node k,
and cc(k, k′) to denote that a node k c-commands a node k′, principles (A), (B),
and (C) can be formalized as additional constraints within the present theory, as
follows.
10To avoid confusion with respect to the term ‘anaphor’, we use the formulation of the binding
principles as given in Haegeman (1994). The original formulation in Chomsky (1981) is
(A) An anaphor must be GBbound in its governing category.
(B) A pronominal must be GBfree in its governing category.
(C) An R-expression must be GBfree.
Here ‘anaphor’ should be read as ‘reflexive or reciprocal’, while the category of ‘pronominals’
includes non-reflexive pronouns and ‘R-expressions’ are DPs that are not pronouns.
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Binding Conditions in LDG
(A) ∀k[ refl(k)→ ∃k′(gvc(k)∗k′ ∧ cc(k′, k) ∧ σ(k)=σ(k′)) ]
(B) ∀k[ pron(k)→ ¬∃k′(gvc(k)∗k′ ∧ cc(k′, k) ∧ σ(k)=σ(k′)) ]
(C) ∀k[ pn(k) ∨ det(k)→ ¬∃k′(cc(k′, k) ∧ σ(k)=σ(k′)) ]
This formulation builds on a treatment of quantifiers in which either quantifiers
are raised in syntax or logical form leaving a trace of the right semantic type, or
the quantifier is ‘raised’ in the semantics, as in the in situ treatment of quantifiers
proposed in Muskens (2001). In the latter case, the semantic value of the DP is
of the right type, namely type π. The binding conditions constrain the semantic
values of the traces left by quantifier raising, or, in the case of the in situ treatment
of quantifiers that we adopt here, the semantic values of the DP’s involved.
As the reader may check for himself the binding conditions (A) and (B) explain
the grammaticality judgements in (5.12). Furthermore, condition (C) accounts for
the ungrammaticality of cases such as (5.13a), while allowing coindexations as in
(5.13b).
(5.13) a. # He1 admires Joe
1.
b. John2 is very proud of his12 brother, but I don’t like the1 boy.
The Binding Conditions describe properties of certain word classes, and as such
could also be integrated in the elementary descriptions of elements of these word
classes. When a lexeme selects an elementary description of a given word class,
the relevant binding condition is part of its lexical description. For instance, we
would have the following lexical descriptions for the lexemes ‘he’, ‘himself’, ‘Joe’,
and ‘the’, selecting the word classes pron, refl , pn, and det respectively.
(5.14) DP+k1
σpik
¬∃k′(gvc(k)∗k′ ∧ cc(k′, k) ∧ σpik =σk′)
Dk
he
DP+k1
σpik
∃k′(gvc(k)∗k′ ∧ cc(k′, k) ∧ σpik =σk′ )
Dk
himself
(5.15) DP+k1
ok
[ok |wr : Joe ok] ⊑ B
¬∃k′(cc(k′, k) ∧ ok=σk′)
Dk
Joe
DP+k1
σpik
Γk1 |≍ σk2 (σ
pi
k )
¬∃k′(cc(k′, k) ∧ σpik =σk′)
Dk
the
NP−k2
The added constraints characterise the syntactic domain in which the anaphor
can, or cannot find a binder. These constraints of course interact with the general
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requirements on properness formulated earlier in filtering out ungrammatical res-
olutions, and with the other characterising conditions attached to the anaphor.
The lexical descriptions of ‘Joe’ and ‘the’ illustrate the latter. Beside the syntactic
binding condition, each carries a semantic condition constraining its relation to
the context of interpretation. In the case of proper names that condition ensures
that the name denotes an element in the implicit background of the discourse,
see section 4.4.7 of the preceding chapter. In the case of the definite determiner
it expresses the presuppositional character of definite descriptions. We will zoom
in on this in the second half of this chapter.
Note that the constraints on anaphora resolution discussed so far are all stated
in a single describing logic, even though they came from syntax and semantics, two
separate levels of the grammar. The description approach allows us to integrate
theories from various levels and a syntactic theory such as the Binding Theory,
if adopted, has immediate relevance for the construction of discourse meanings.
In the next section we turn to the constraining effect of discourse topic structure
and salience on pronoun resolution. While what we have to say there is largely
programmatic, it does suggest that what, for want of a better term, may be
called the information status of contextual information, can be captured in the
grammar in terms of the syntactic and semantic entities and properties at our
disposal. Thus, we expect that this parameter of the discourse theory can also be
fully integrated in the grammar.
5.4 Discourse Topic Structure and Salience
Anaphors must be bound in their context of interpretation, but they can only
be bound by a semantically accessible binder. As it stands, our grammar does
not contain any structural requirement on the relation between the antecedent
introducing the binder and the anaphor, apart from the Binding Conditions in
the preceding section. It is, however, a common assumption in frameworks of dis-
course interpretation that, directly or indirectly, anaphora resolution is sensitive
to discourse structure, and that various classes of anaphors must find their an-
tecedent, or the binder it introduces, ‘at the right frontier’ of the discourse parse
tree. To put it differently, the binder must not only be semantically accessible but
also, in a sense yet to be made precise, discourse available.
In this section we want to make the notion of discourse availability a bit
clearer. The matter is complicated for various reasons. First and foremost, dis-
course availability is not a simple structural notion: there is a handful of possibly
overlapping factors, such as discourse topic structure, salience, focus of attention,
back- and foreground structure, and the syntactic position of antecedents, the
amalgamate of which is somehow responsible for making some binders available
at a given structural position, and others not. We shall not investigate each of
these factors. Our concern is the overall organisation of the grammar with dis-
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course availability playing a subordinate role. The notion must be captured in
terms of a combination of semantic factors, and these, like other parameters in
our grammar, can be grafted onto discourse syntactic structure.
Different classes of anaphors come with different demands on the discourse
availability of their binders. So, for instance, observations made relative to per-
sonal pronouns do not necessarily carry over to definite descriptions; whereas
the resolution of VP-ellipsis is sensitive to discourse structure in a relatively
straightforward manner, this is less obvious for personal pronouns; abstract ob-
ject anaphors and demonstratives come with their own requirements yet again.
Thus, we must be careful to distinguish the characteristics of specific classes of
anaphors from general aspects of discourse availability.
Finally, the accounts or treatments offered in different frameworks are hard
to compare whenever they presuppose different discourse structures. Explana-
tions made in frameworks that presuppose the flexible structures of RST, no-
tably SDRT, do not necessarily, at least not directly, carry over to frameworks
which presuppose strict tree structures, such as LDM, LTAG for discourse, and
LDG (in its current formulation). What is ‘the right frontier’ in the latter ap-
proaches is simply not the same thing as what it is in SDRT. In what follows,
strict tree structures will be presupposed; when we discuss other structures this
will be mentioned.
Let us zoom in on personal pronouns, and consider in what sense their binders
must be discourse available. Consider the following example, taken from Asher
and Lascarides (2003) pp. 8–10. The example was already briefly discussed in
chapter 3, section 3.4.
(5.16) a. Max had a great evening last night.
b. He had a great meal.
c. He ate salmon.
d. It was a beautiful pink.
The pronoun ‘it’ in sentence (5.16d) felicitously refers to the salmon Max ate,
introduced in the context of interpretation through (5.16c), the immediately pre-
ceding utterance. The statement ‘it was a beautiful pink’ elaborates on ‘he ate
salmon’, zooming in on a property of the salmon. Now compare
(5.17) a. Max had a great evening last night.
b. He had a great meal.
c. He ate salmon.
d. He devoured lots of cheese.
e. He then won a dancing competition.
f. # It was a beautiful pink.
Given background knowledge about what sort of things are normally pink, the
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most likely interpretation of (5.17f) is one in which the utterance elaborates on
(5.17c) again: the salmon Max ate was a beatiful pink. The anaphoric link between
the pronoun in (5.17f) and the antecedent in (5.17c) is infelicitous, however. The
reason for this, discourse theory claims, is that the binder which is introduced in
the domain of discourse by the antecedent, though it is semantically accessible to
the pronoun, is not discourse available to it.
So when is a binder discourse available to a given anaphor? As a first try, we
might say that the S-node or the minimal discourse unit at which the binder can
be assumed to be introduced or generated must be a potential attachment site of
the tree structure described by the input sentence description that contains the
anaphor. It must be a node ‘at the right frontier’ of the tree structure described by
the input discourse description. In the case of (5.17f) it isn’t. To see his, consider
the following picture, which is the discourse description of (5.17), as it can be
taken to result just after the incrementation step induced by (5.17f).
(5.18) ∆6: S−r
S+1
S2
(5.17a)
..evening
S3
Rel4
elab
S−5
S+6
S7
S8
(5.17b)
..meal
S9
Rel10
elab
S11
S12
(5.17c)
..salmon
Rel13
narration
S14
(5.17d)
..cheese
Rel15
narration
S−16
S+17
(5.17e)
..dancing..
S+18
S−19 S20
Rel21
elab
S−22
S+23
(5.17f)
it was ..
The discourse context of (5.17f) is represented by the part of the discourse de-
scription in (5.18) that describes (5.17a) to (5.17e). The right frontier of this part
of the discourse description is the set of nodes that may serve as an attachment
site for subsequent updates: the nodes named r, 1, 5, 6, 16, and 17. The discourse
unit at which the binder of the pronoun in (5.17f) may be assumed to be intro-
duced is node 12, but this is not a potential attachment site for the tree structure
described by the input sentence description, containing the pronoun. Hence, the
binder is not discourse available to the pronoun.
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Setting aside for the time being the obvious question what it means for a
discourse unit ‘to generate or introduce a binder’, this looks like an acceptable
explanation. As the following discourse illustrates, however, we run into problems
with the assumption that the discourse unit introducing a potential binder must
be one of the structurally accessible nodes of the discourse context. Consider
(5.19) a. A1 man was run over.
b. The bus was going too fast.
c. The driver didn’t see him1.
Asher and Lascarides (2003), ex.(24), p.151
The utterances (5.19b) and (5.19c) together function as an explanation of the fact
conveyed through (5.19a). The discourse description resulting after processing the
first two utterances may be graphically represented as follows.
(5.20) ∆2: S−r
S+1
S2
(5.19a)
a man..
S3
Rel4
explanation
S−5
S+6
(5.19b)
the bus..
The discourse description resulting from the next processing step, and some sub-
sequent reasoning about discourse relations, may be given as follows.
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(5.21) ∆3: S−r
S+1
S2
(5.19a)
a man..
S3
Rel4
explanation
S−5
S+7
S−8
S+6
(5.19b)
the bus..
Rel9
continuation
S−10
S+11
(5.19c)
the driver ..him
The pronoun in (5.19c) resolves felicitously to a binder which is introduced at a
discourse unit higher up in the embedding discourse context, namely the one rep-
resented by node 2. However, this is not one of the possible attachment sites of the
update that was induced by (5.19c), namely the nodes named r, 1, 5, and 6. It is
incorrectly predicted that the binder introduced by ‘a man’ is not discourse avail-
able. We conclude that, given the type of discourse syntactic structures described
by our grammar, discourse availability cannot be defined directly, or uniquely in
terms of structural accessibility, as it is defined in our grammar system.
This does not imply that structural relations in general are not relevant. The
reader may have noticed that there is a relation of c-command between node 2 and
node 11 in verifying trees of ∆3. So perhaps the relation between antecedent and
pronoun can be captured by requiring that a pronoun must be c-commanded by
the discourse unit that introduces its binder. The overall treatment of anaphora
resolution in for instance the Linguistic Discourse Model and in SDRT suggests
that c-command on its own will not be enough, however. There, the difference be-
tween coordinating and subordinating discourse relations is crucial. Transporting
this insight to our own grammar system, this implies that the binder introduced
at node 2 is available not only because node 2 c-commands node 11, but also
because it ‘subordinates’ it in a certain sense.
Let us zoom in on the treatment provided in SDRT. SDRT presupposes a
more flexible type of discourse structures than simple tree structures. The hier-
archical structure of SDRSs emerges in part on the basis of outscoping relations
on discourse constituents, comparable to the subordination relation on DRSs in
standard DRT. However, it also depends on the relation of topic subordination
implied by certain discourse/rhetorical relations. For example, the explanation
and the elaboration relation induce a topic subordination relation between their
arguments: the left argument is a topic for the right argument. In the resulting
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hierarchical structure the effect of this that, in our own words, the left argument
‘dominates’ the subordinated right argument. In the example under considera-
tion, this implies that the discourse segment representing the left argument of
the explanation (5.19a) is at the right frontier of the topic hierarchical structure.
Hence, the binder ‘a man’ is predicted to be discourse available to the pronoun.
In principle, the LDG formalism could be modified so that the ‘right’ nodes
end up at the right frontier of the discourse structure. This is possible if we relax
the type of graph structures that can be described by discourse descriptions in
LDG. A treatment similar to SDRT may then be obtained. We prefer to have
simple tree structures, however. The essential insight is that discourse availability
is determined, at least in part, by the discourse topic structure. A discourse topic
structure may be defined on the basis of the specific characteristics of discourse
relations and connectives, the information structure of the input clauses,11 and the
syntactic composition of the discourse per se. An independent mechanism could
be defined, that walks through the embedding discourse context top down and
from left to right and delivers at each node of the discourse tree a set of binders
that count as locally topical given the topic hierarchy of the discourse context.
Together with other factors this defines what counts as a discourse available binder
at a given node.
What would be those factors? We tentatively group together the salience of
the binder, its level of activation, and the measure to which it is in the focus of
attention. All of these center around a cognitive, gradient notion of salience or
topicality, applied to distinct entities in the domain of discourse. See for instance
Ariel (1990) for a useful discussion of anaphora, salience and accessibility levels
from a cognitive linguistic perspective, and Grosz et al. (1995) and its precur-
sor Sidner (1986) for a treatment of focus of attention in Centering Theory.12
Broadly speaking, the topic hierarchy of discourse and salience effects determine
the discourse availability of potential binders. It might even be that these two
parameters can be fused into one notion of ‘information status’ but we leave this
as a matter for further investigation.
For concreteness, we will assume that salience results in an ordering over the
discourse markers that count as topical at a given node in the discourse structure
given the topic hierarchy of the discourse. Different classes of anaphors may then
11We use the term information structure to refer to the division of clause meanings into parts
with a distinct update function relative to the context of interpretation. In much of the relevant
literature, two basic types of structures are distinguished: first, a division into background (or
focus frame), one or more foci, and contrastive topics, and second, a division into topic and
comment. Givenness and contrast constraints can be projected from the first type of structure,
constraints on subordinating topic relations and common topics can be projected from the
second. For an overview of topic-comment research, see Van Kuppevelt (1997). For an entrance
to topic-focus literature and focus interpretation theory, see chapter 3 of Vallduv´ı (1990), and
Von Stechow (1991).
12For a computational treatment of focus of attention based on Sidner (1986), see Blackburn
and Bos (1999).
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be distinguished according to their sensitivity to topicality per se, and to the
level of salience of topical elements. In line with Grosz et al. (1983), Grosz et al.
(1995), pronouns may be assumed to select topical binders that are topmost in
the salience order. Using some completely programmatic but suggestive notation,
we may indicate how a requirement of this kind can in principle be incorporated
in the elementary description of pronouns:
(5.22) pron: DP+k1
σk
σk ∈ Tmostsalientk1
D3k
In the case of example (5.19), with discourse description (5.21), the binder intro-
duced by ‘a man’ at node 2 should be in the set of most salient topical elements
at the node representing the maximal projection of the pronoun ‘him’, dominated
by node 11. This would be because the explanation relation sets its left argument
(the fact or eventuality to be explained) as a main topic for the right argument
(the explanation), and hence carried over as a common topic of the continuation
to node 11. This would make, among others, the binder introduced by ‘a man’
into a topical element at node 11. For being the patient or theme of the running
over eventuality it might be taken to count as a most salient topical element at
node 11. As such it may be inherited by the maximal projection of the pronoun
and count as a discourse available binder. In contrast, in the case of our earlier
example (5.17) with discourse description (5.18), the potential binder introduced
by ‘salmon’ would count as a topical element at node 12 given the discourse topic
hierarchy, but not at any of the possible attachment sites for node 19. Hence it
cannot be a topical element at the maximal projection of the pronoun dominated
by node 23, whatever the attachment of the update will be.
For other classes of anaphoric elements constraints on discourse availability
of the binder may be different. For example, it is often assumed that definite
description do not require salient antecedents or binders. Given the distinctions
introduced above we then have a choice between requiring the binders of definite
descriptions to be topical but not salient, or not even requiring them to be topical.
The two options are illustrated in (5.23).
(5.23) definite det: DP+k1
σpik
σk ∈ Tk1
Γk1 |≍ σk2(σ
pi
k )
Dk
the
NP−k2
DP+k1
σpik
Γk1 |≍ σk2(σ
pi
k )
Dk
the
NP−k2
Given the left lexical description, the binder of a definite description must be in
the domain of topical elements determined by the topic hierarchy, given the right
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description, the choice of a binder is completely free, apart from other constraints.
Options such as these may guide a further investigation of what notions such as
‘being a topical element given the topic hierarchy of the discourse’ and ‘salience’
stand for. For a glimpse at the search space, consider the following data.
(5.24) a. Max had a great evening last night.
b. He had a great meal.
c. He ate salmon.
d. It / the salmon was a beautiful pink.
(5.25) a. Max had a great evening last night.
b. He had a great meal.
c. He ate salmon.
d. He devoured lots of cheese.
e. # It / # the salmon / the SALMON was a beautiful pink.
(5.26) a. Max had a great evening last night.
b. He had a great meal.
c. He ate salmon.
d. He devoured lots of cheese.
e. He then won a dancing competition.
f. # It / # the salmon / # the SALMON was a beautiful pink.
As the examples show, a definite description ‘the salmon’ replacing ‘it’ in the ex-
ample under discussion can be used in more positions than the pronoun, though
not in all. Furthermore, in some positions the definite description must be accen-
tuated, so that it gets a subsectional or contrastive interpretation. These judge-
ments may be accounted for if we assume that the binder introduced by ‘salmon’
at node 12 is topical only at node 12, and definite descriptions do not require
topical binders. The accentuation of the definite description in (5.25) and (5.26)
is there for independent reasons.
Another possibility would be to assume that definite descriptions do require
topical antecedents and that in the case of (5.25) this requirement is satisfied by
resolving subsectionally to an element that is topical, namely the meal at node
7 or the summation of what is eaten at node 11. To account for the infelicity of
the accentuated definite description in (5.26) it could perhaps be argued that the
binder introduced by ‘a salmon’ is too deeply entrenched in the topical elements
at the potential attachment sites 1 and 6 to be reached by means of subsectional
anaphora.
Yet another option would be to assume that the binder introduced by ‘salmon’
is not only topical at node 12, but also at node 11 and 7. The infelicity of the
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pronoun in (5.25) could then be accounted for on the assumption that the binder,
though topical, is not most salient at the nodes 11 and 7. Definite descriptions,
however, do not require salient binders, so it is a discourse available binder to
the definite description given attachment at node 11 or 7. The accentuation of
the definite description may serve to indicate the unsalient status of the binder.
To account for the infelicity of the accentuated definite description in (5.26) it
could be assumed that definite descriptions require topical binders, but that the
putative binder is not topical at the potential attachment sites node 1, 6, and 17.
We believe each of these options to be worth considering. We do have a bias
towards a treatment of definite descriptions that makes them sensitive to what
is the local discourse topic or what count as locally topical elements.13 It seems
unlikely that some form of ‘anchoring’ to the local discourse topic would be com-
pletely irrelevant for the resolution of definite descriptions. Since the nominal
material can help to identify a suitable binder, the kind of link that a definite
description might establish towards elements in the topic domain can be more
flexible or complex than the links established by plain (singular) personal pro-
nouns. Perhaps binders of definite descriptions are not themselves required to
be topical, but must link up through bridging or inference to elements that are
topical given the discourse topic hierarchy.
Concluding, various points need to be clarified before we can provide a full-fledged
treatment of discourse availability. What sort of semantic objects are discourse
topics? How do discourse relations, connectives and other operators in the lexicon
constrain the discourse topic hierarchy, and how does the information structure of
input clauses interact with this? How do we reason from discourse topics to local
domains of topical elements? What does it mean for a discourse unit to introduce
a binder? To what extent can binders be inferred or accommodated and thus
end up in local topic domains without having been overtly introduced through
an antecedent? What determines a salience ordering over topical elements? Can
this be defined purely in terms of syntactic, semantic, and prosodic parameters of
the grammar, or does it also involve incorporating cognitive linguistic or ‘process-
ing’ constraints such as management of memory load in the grammar?14 These
questions are not new. Anaphora is a long-standing topic in linguistics, and it
13If only to make sense of the unicity or exhaustification effect that is commonly assumed to be
associated with definite descriptions. The claim that definite descriptions refer uniquely to some
element in the domain of discourse that satisfies its nominal description can only be maintained
when relativised to a very restricted and dynamically changing domain of candidates. As pointed
out in Lewis (1979), just the assumption that this is a contextually determined domain of
discourse is not enough. In his words, “the F denotes x if and only if x is the most salient F
in the domain of discourse, according to some contextually determined salience ranking.” Since
Lewis does not talk about topicality, we are not sure how his notion of ‘most salient’ elements
compares to ours. Possibly it covers elements in the domain of discourse which we would simply
call ‘topical’.
14Compare for instance Ariel (1990), Walker (1996b).
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might be called the cornerstone of discourse theory. Much is known about the
empirical facts in this field. Organising and explaining the facts in terms of a
fully transparant and unified theory of ‘informational status’ is still a challenge,
however.
5.5 Accommodating Binders
Anaphora resolution is modelled as a reasoning process in LDG. Anaphoric ele-
ments occurring in a discourse introduce underspecified discourse markers,15 and
the language user’s grammar tells him that these markers must have binders in
the local context of the pronoun, as determined by the discourse context. Given
the general constraints in the grammar, and the specific syntactic, semantic, and
informational constraints that classify the anaphor, the hearer may reason about
its possible resolutions. Given his knowledge of the actual utterance situation,
his world knowledge, and his preference for, for instance, selecting most plausi-
ble background assumptions, he may determine a few ways to resolve a given
anaphor, or a single most preferred one.
The reasoning process generally involves selecting possible models of the con-
text of interpretation that fit the preferences of the hearer and the requirements
of the grammar relative to the discourse under consideration. The context of in-
terpretation, which is represented in our grammar by the implicit background B,
is largely underspecified. The hearer may accept information in B in order to sat-
isfy constraints triggered by the interpretation of the ongoing discourse. Thus, B
gets specified, or as it were, is partly constructed, as a result of the interpretation
process. This is global accommodation, corresponding to accommodation of the
initial context of interpretation in possible worlds approaches, and to accommo-
dation of the main DRS in DRT. A generalisation of this to local and intermediate
accommodation shall be provided in the next chapter.
Here, we are concerned with the interaction between anaphora resolution and
accommodation, in particular with what might be called the ‘accommodation
potential’ of pronouns. It is a common observation that pronouns allow accom-
modation of their binders much less easily than, for instance, definite descriptions.
Given what we have seen so far of pronouns in our grammar, this must be ex-
plained from the interaction of their individual syntactic and semantic properties
with accommodation in general. The challenge for LDG is not so much to explain
that accommodation occurs, but to make clear how overgeneration is avoided.
Obviously, the hearer’s linguistic and nonlinguistic knowledge keep accommo-
dation under control in the sense that whatever is accommodated, the constraints
in his grammar and his preferences must be respected. There is a general agree-
ment that assumptions to be accommodated are to be uncontroversial and un-
15Some anaphoric elements, for instance VP-ellipsis, gapping, and ‘one’, introduce underspec-
ified properties . Parallelism requirements play a central role in resolving them.
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surprising (Heim 1992, page 212). In fact, as argued in Stalnaker (1998), this can
be explained in terms of an appropriateness requirement linked to the concept
of speaker presupposition: the speaker presupposes that the addressee is willing
to accept the presupposition. Our account stands in need, however, of a precise
explanation of what justifies the acceptance of a given background assumption,
or what counts as sufficient evidence for the hearer given the type of information
that must be accommodated.
To illustrate the above, consider the following discourse. This is Partee’s well-
known ‘ten marbles’ example.16
(5.27) I dropped ten marbles and found only nine of them.
# It’s probably under the sofa.
The second sentence in (5.27) is unfelicitous, because the pronoun ‘it’ cannot very
well be used to refer to the tenth marble. But if, as we say, pronoun resolution is
a reasoning process, then why should a hearer not infer, on the basis of his world
knowledge and the information provided in the first sentence of the discourse, that
there is a marble, namely one of the ten dropped by the speaker but not found,
accommodate that information in B, and assume that the pronoun is bound
by it? This would result in a perfectly coherent discourse, in which the second
sentence explains where the tenth marble might be. Why is accommodation of
the binder blocked? Note that if we replace the pronoun by a definite description,
the problem disappears:
(5.28) I dropped ten marbles and found only nine of them.
The tenth marble is probably under the sofa.
This suggest that inferrable information can in principle be accommodated, if
the right kind of anaphor is used. We propose to explain the infelicitousness of
the second sentence in (5.27) in terms of additional requirements on potential
binders associated with pronouns. As was argued in section 5.4, pronouns, unlike
definite descriptions, come with constraints on the informational status of their
binder. The binder must be a salient topical element in the local context of the
pronoun. It may achieve this status through linguistic properties of the preceding
discourse, or through occurrences in the nonlinguistic context of the conversation.
Just the fact that a binder can be inferred does not make it into a salient topical
discourse entity, however. Crucially, the added requirement cannot be satisfied
by simply assuming the inferrable binder to be salient and topical. Neither the
nonlinguistic context of utterance nor the discourse context sufficiently justify
this. Hence accommodation fails, or counts as strongly dispreferred.
16Compare Stalnaker (1998), where example (5.27) starts off a discussion about the way in
which an abstract context might make individuals available for reference.
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An account like this does not predict that accommodation of a binder is
completely impossible with pronouns. Rather, it predicts that it only occurs when
the relatively ‘heavy’ conditions on binders triggered by pronouns can be satisfied,
or assumed to be so, given the hearer’s linguistic and nonlinguistic knowledge and
the discourse context established so far. To illustrate this, consider the following
discourse.
(5.29) ? We don’t have a car. We sold it.
The discourse marker introduced by ‘a car’ in the first sentence is in the scope
of a negation and is therefore not semantically accessible from the pronoun in
the second sentence. Still, in our view, there is a felicitous interpretation of the
discourse in (5.29), which can be paraphrased as ‘We don’t have a car. We sold
the car that we used to own.’ According to our proposal, this reading results
from accommodating that there is a car which the speaker used to own, and
accommodating that that car is a most salient topical entity given the imme-
diately preceding discourse.17 This is possible, we suggest, if it can be taken to
be common knowledge between the speaker and hearer of the discourse that the
speaker owned a car, and the having of a car can be taken to be the discourse
topic under discussion.18 The first assumption is easily justified in a world where
almost everybody owns a car, the second involves selecting an initial context of
interpretation which is slightly primed.
The selection of a somewhat loaded initial context of interpretation occurs
more often. Consider
(5.32) He opened the door. The room was pitch-dark.
The discourse describes a situation, starting in medias res, so to speak. Inter-
preting the first sentence, we accommodate without effort that there is some
male individual who opened a door. We accept that this individual is a salient
topical element in the narration that is going on, without any support from the
17The option that the car is a salient entity in the nonlinguistic context of utterance can be
discarded as being extremely unlikely.
18Notice that this reading can be reinforced with the use of accentuation, in various ways.
One option is to use accentuation that signals polarity focus/ ‘verum-focus’/ focusing of the
truth value in the first sentence, and VP focus in the second, as in (5.30).
(5.30) We DON’t have a car. We SOLD it.
Another option is to use an accentuation that signals contrastive focus (expressing a contrast
between having, and selling a car) as in (5.31).
(5.31) We don’t HAVE a car. We SOLD it.
In each case, the articulation of the information structure of the sentences helps to accommodate
a discourse topic, relative to which the use of the pronoun becomes completely felicitous.
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immediately preceding discourse context. It has often been pointed out that this
typically occurs with the opening sentence of a story, or in general, narrative dis-
course. Apparently, in that context, the opening sentence or sequence of sentences
is allowed a kind of bootstrapping function. It may trigger the initialisation of the
implicit background with, among more, the main characters of the story, on the
basis of no other evidence than the use of the pronouns themselves. Apparently,
the authority of the speaker, who supposedly knows what he is talking about, is
sufficient justification for the accommodation of binders.
Summing up, as an underspecification formalism, LDG allows a natural treatment
of global accommodation. Global accommodation is the partial specification of
the largely underspecified general background B of the conversation, resulting
from the need to satisfy constraints that are triggered by the interpretation of
the ongoing discourse. As will be discussed in the next chapter this notion can
be generalised to cover the specification of local background information, so that
accommodation may also contribute to the construction of discourse semantic
content. Accommodation necessarily respects the general constraints of the lan-
guage user’s grammar and his preferences. For instance, since discourse meanings
must be consistent no information can be accepted in B that results in inconsis-
tency of the discourse meaning. And since the language user prefers more plau-
sible readings of a discourse meaning over less plausible ones, he will not accept
information in B that results in an implausible discourse meaning, when more
plausible alternatives are available.
Where anaphora resolution is concerned, the accommodation of binders is
further restricted by the specific syntactic, semantic and informational conditions
that characterise the anaphor’s relation to its local context. Pronouns come with
the requirement that their binder, apart from being semantically accessible, must
be a salient, topical entity. It was proposed that the fact that the presence of
a binder can be inferred from the local context is not sufficient to satisfy the
salience requirement. Salience requires a different kind of justification or evidence
from the discourse context. A salient binder is accommodated only if justification
is available or can itself be accommodated without much cost. In future work, it
needs to be spelled out what sort of information requires what sort of justification,
and how the cost of accepting a piece of information depends on the available
evidence. The theory of accommodation must be backed up with a treatment of
justification.
5.6 Conclusion
We have not at all attempted to cover a vast range of anaphoric elements in LDG
in this chapter. Neither did we propose an analysis of basic cases of anaphora that
differs radically from what is commonly assumed. With a view to the application
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of our discourse model to presupposition theory, to be unfolded in the next chap-
ter, we were interested in capturing the discourse parameter of anaphoricity as
such. We proposed to do so by letting anaphors be elements in the language that
introduce underspecified discourse markers, and stating as a general axiom in the
grammar that discourse meanings and local contexts must be proper. Given the
composition of local contexts it can be shown to follow from this that anaphors
must be bound in their local context.
The binding relation, though underspecified, is subject to all interacting con-
straints in the grammar. A benifit of using an underspecification mechanism is
that all of this can be handled declaratively in the grammar. LDG shares this fea-
ture with UDRT and (U)SDRT. There is also a procedural side to our account,
and this is in the manner in which resolution is modeled. For any given anaphor,
the hearer must find out what its potential binders are, and, if possible, pinpoint
a specific most preferred one. This is the outcome of a reasoning process in which
both linguistic and nonlinguistic knowledge are involved. The architecture of our
discourse model implements the idea that the hearer may access these knowledge
sources in tandem.
The reasoning process may result in global accommodation: the partial specifi-
cation of information in the implicit background of the discourse. In our approach,
binders of anaphors can in principle be inferred and accommodated. This, as we
shall see in the next chapter, is particularly attractive with a view to bridging
anaphors. Characterising conditions associated with each type of anaphor con-
strain the accommodation process. In the case of pronouns it was suggested that
their binders must be salient topical elements and that this is what makes accom-
modation of a binder for a pronoun costly—though not completely impossible.
As will be argued in the next chapter, definite descriptions come with differ-
ent requirements on their binders and therefore have a different ‘accommodation
potential’.
The treatment raises some interesting questions for further research. For one,
if accommodation of background information can be more, or less costly, an in-
terpreting agent must somehow be able to weigh these costs according to his
grammatical knowledge and preferences. How does he decide whether the accom-
modation is justified or not? Some completely different questions concern the
interaction between sentence grammar and discourse grammar. Is sentencehood
relevant for the treatment of kataphors? Or would a notion of topic subordination
(which applies both below and above sentence level) be sufficient to account for
the facts? Furthermore, is it useful to have both the Chomskian Binding Princi-
ples, notably Principle C, and the semantic constraints induced by the Properness
Condition in the grammar? Is there an overlap, which might be pruned? What
are the effects of the semantic constraints below sentence level?
Chapter 6
Presupposition Theory
6.1 Introduction
A discourse theory is a theory of how utterances come to mean what they mean
in the mind of a hearer given the conversation in which they take place, and given
the hearer’s linguistic knowledge and world knowledge. The LDG framework of
discourse interpretation embodies this view, even though only part of the param-
eters that govern discourse interpretation have been fully described and much of
the discourse theory remains to be specified. Our approach differs from others in
that the emphasis is not so much on the implementation of a given discourse the-
ory, but on the description method itself. LDG can be employed as a specification
language for discourse theory in general, and our framework of discourse inter-
pretation may serve as a test-bed for alternative treatments of topics in discourse
theory. When we operate out different approaches from their individual formal
surroundings and implement them in our framework, it can be seen whether the
approaches are compatible and to what extent they overlap.
In this chapter the description method is applied to presupposition theory.
In our treatment we combine the approach to presupposition theory proposed in
Karttunen (1974), Heim (1983), Beaver (2001) and others, with the approach put
forward in Van der Sandt (1992), Van der Sandt and Geurts (1991), and Geurts
(1999). The first is often called the satisfaction theory of presupposition. It treats
presuppositions as tests on the context of interpretation. For a sentence to be felic-
itous or interpretable, the context of interpretation or ‘local context’ must entail
or satisfy its presuppositions. The local contexts of embedded sentences are es-
tablished on the basis of the logical structure of the embedding discourse context.
Sometimes a presupposition can only be satisfied by strengthening the local con-
text; this is accommodation. The second approach may be called the anaphoric
theory of presupposition. Its central idea is that presuppositional material must
be bound in the discourse context of the trigger. If it cannot be bound, it must
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be inserted at some semantically accessible location in the discourse context; this
is accommodation.
In the satisfaction approach, presupposition satisfaction is defined in terms of
entailment, and contexts are modeled as sets of possible worlds or information
states (sets of sets of possible worlds). In the anaphoric approach, presupposition
resolution is defined in terms of ‘binding’ or ‘matching’ of the presupposition
in some structured representation of the context, where the semantic language
employed is usually DRT or some form of underspecified DRT.1
The key notions that we need to formulate the two approaches in our frame-
work of discourse interpretation have been made available in the preceding chap-
ters. Local contexts in LDG may serve as ‘context of interpretation’ in both ap-
proaches. On the one hand, they are modeled after Karttunen’s concept of local
context, which is central in the satisfaction approach. On the other, they are
DRSs, representing the semantic information available on the accessibility path
from a presupposition trigger to the main DRS. Satisfaction can be modeled
by means of the entailment relation |≍, and binding by means of properness re-
quirements on discourse meanings and local contexts, in the manner proposed in
chapter 5. We will say more about the notion of accommodation in a moment.
We will propose a treatment of presupposition theory in LDG that fuses as-
pects of both approaches. On the one hand, we will follow Karttunen (1974) in
requiring that presuppositions must be entailed by the local context of the expres-
sion that triggers it. We call this the ‘presuppositional condition’. On the other,
we recognize that presupposition triggers can be anaphoric elements. In the man-
ner discussed in the preceding chapter, they introduce underspecified discourse
markers in their semantic values and in the presuppositional material, and these
must find binders in the context of interpretation. Thus, in line with Van der
Sandt (1992), presuppositional material introduced by anaphoric triggers must
be bound in the local context of the trigger. If it is assumed that presupposition
triggers are anaphoric by definition, the essence of the anaphoric approach to
presupposition is captured.
The merit of the combined treatment is, very succinctly, that it adds the
explanatory power of the satisfaction approach to the concrete predictions of
the anaphoric approach. It strenghtens the anaphoric analysis in the sense that
presuppositional conditions function as suitability constraints on the resolution of
presuppositional elements. It supports a generalisation of the anaphoric account
to bridging anaphors. Moreover, it explains what sets binding and accommodation
going when it occurs. Presuppositional conditions instigate a reasoning process
which, in the case of grammatical discourse, results in their satisfaction in the
context of interpretation. Finally, the fusion of the two approaches results in a
more complete, and intuitively appealing treatment of accommodation.
1See for instance Van der Sandt (1992), Geurts (1995), Keller (1997), Asher and Lascarides
(1998b), Blackburn and Bos (1999), and Kamp (2001a).
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The basic treatment is laid down in section 6.2. Presupposition theory is a fully
integrated part of discourse theory. As before, language users obtain the meaning
of an utterance in context by reasoning about discourse descriptions given their
grammatical knowledge, their world knowledge, and by employing common sense
reasoning and computing preferences over alternative possible readings.
Both the satisfaction approach and the anaphoric account refer to parameters
in the discourse theory outside presupposition theory to account for some of
their data, be it not the same sets of data. Beaver (1997) points to common
sense reasoning and a preference for plausible readings to account for readings
in the context of conditional sentences that come out logically stronger than
may be expected on the basis of presupposition satisfaction alone. Van der Sandt
(1992) introduces constraints on informativity and consistency to account for
readings where presuppositional material is bound or accommodated locally, and
which otherwise would be too strong. All of these constraints and preferences are
already available in the LDG framework for independent reasons, and restrict the
number of most preferred possible readings of a given sentence. In section 6.3
we zoom in on the informativity and consistency requirements in particular, and
reassess their place in the grammar given their interaction with presupposition
and accommodation.
So far, accommodation in our framework was defined as the free specification
of world knowledge in B, the implicit background of a conversation. The implicit
background models the initial context of interpretation, and what is accommo-
dated in it may very well be distinct from the presuppositional material, as long as
it is conducive to the satisfaction of the presupposition or other context-sensitive
constraints. This corresponds to global accommodation in the satisfaction ap-
proach, and to what is called ‘context restriction’ in Van der Sandt (1988). It
differs from the notion of accommodation in the anaphoric approach to presup-
position, however. We will continue to refer to it as global accommodation.
In section 6.4 global accommodation is complemented by a form of resource
bound accommodation that results in the specification of the semantic content of
a discourse, rather than its implicit background. We will call this content modifica-
tion. It corresponds to the concept of accommodation in the anaphoric approach,
where presuppositional material is inserted in accessible locations within a dis-
course representation, outscoping the trigger. Content modification will allow us
to model what is generally called ‘local’ and ‘intermediate accommodation’ along
the lines of the anaphoric approach to presupposition. It also covers ‘global ac-
commodation’ in the sense of the anaphoric approach.
With the full power of global accommodation and content modification avail-
able, the question becomes urgent how the number of possible readings can be
restrained. Generally speaking, this will be a matter of adding constraints and
specifying preferences. In particular, it will be discussed how some preferences
adopted in the anaphoric account, such as the preference for binding over accom-
modation, and the preference for global over local or intermediate accommodation
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can be incorporated in our framework. We will consider how these preferences re-
late to others in our framework, such as the preference for choosing more plausible
readings. In addition, building on Kamp (2001b), we will adopt a preference for
minimizing accommodation when it takes the form of content modification.
In section 6.5 the resulting treatment is applied to a series of examples. We
focus on cases where through the interaction with independent constraints and
preferences in the framework, presupposition triggers are bound ‘nonglobally’
either by a linguistic antecedent or by accommodated presuppositional material.
Broadly speaking, the predictions of our discourse grammar will be those of the
anaphoric approach, if the preferences in the grammar are set in accordance with
the preferences in Van der Sandt (1992). Presuppositional conditions serve to
explain what suitable binders are, and how presupposition interpretation may
lead to the specification of general background information. Furthermore, with the
help of additional justification conditions on the insertion of background material
in specific locations we can account for the abduction of bridging links whenever
presuppositional anaphors do not resolve directly to an antecedent present in the
discourse context. It may thus be concluded, as we do in section 6.6, that the two
approaches are not incompatible and can fruitfully be combined.
6.2 Binding and Satisfaction in Tandem
As announced, the approach to presupposition that we will follow combines as-
pects of Karttunen’s (1974) satisfaction theory of presupposition projection and
Van der Sandt’s (1992) presupposition projection as anaphora resolution ap-
proach. As in Karttunen (1974) presuppositions shall be viewed as conditions on
local contexts, and the relation of satisfaction shall be implemented as a relation
of entailment. Presupposition triggers are lexical elements or phrases that come
with presuppositional conditions. Suppose a sentence contains a trigger which
introduces a certain presuppositional condition. We will say that the sentence is
presupposing if, when it is uttered as the first sentence in a discourse, the effect
of the interpretation process is that the context of interpretation of the sentence
entails the presuppositional material. Embedded sentences may be called presup-
posing if, as a result of the interpretation process, the local context relative to
which they are tested entails the presuppositional material.
As before, discourse meanings in our grammar are defined as B ⊕ σr, what
is taken for granted by the participants in the discourse updated with what is
explicitly stated in it. Presupposition satisfaction may induce the partial specifi-
cation of B, that is, the language user may accept information in B in order to
satisfy a given presupposition. This is global accommodation. Information which
is globally accommodated ends up in the main DRS of the discourse meaning, and
is entailed by it. In what follows, we will use the terms ‘local’ and ‘intermediate
accommodation’ in line with Van der Sandt (1992), to refer to cases where the
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accommodated information ends up in a subordinated DRS and is not entailed by
the resulting discourse meaning. A technical treatment of this in LDG is provided
in section 6.4.
Discourse interpretation is a reasoning process, and presuppositional condi-
tions are just one of the many constraints that must be satisfied to obtain a
number of grammatical readings of a sentence in a given discourse. In satisfying
presuppositions, there is interaction with the general constraints in the gram-
mar. Notably, whenever a presupposition trigger is anaphoric in the sense that
it introduces a free discourse marker in its semantic value and in the presup-
posed material, the Properness Condition, introduced in chapter 4, enforces the
binding of the marker in the local context of the trigger. The presuppositional
condition then is, in effect, a suitability requirement on the resolution of the
presuppositional element, and presupposition interpretation results in the selec-
tion of a suitable binder. This is a point where our treatment converges with
the presupposition projection as anaphora resolution approach. Given a general
choice of presupposition triggers as anaphoric elements, and modulo a certain
choice of preferences and general acceptability constraints on output readings,
the predictions of Van der Sandt (1992) will be obtained, while the concept of
presuppositions as conditions on the context of interpretation may be preserved.
Our combined approach will be applied to some simple examples in this sec-
tion, so that the basic treatment is clear. As a preliminary, we take a closer look
at some presupposition triggers in the lexicon (section 6.2.1). After that, we con-
sider a case of plain binding to an antecedent present in the discourse context
(section 6.2.2), and some cases where a binder is made available through global
accommodation (section 6.2.3). In a brief intermezzo, the interpretation of dis-
course markers in the universe of the implicit background B, and the distinction
between referential and existential readings of definite descriptions is discussed
(section 6.2.4). Next, we explain how ‘weak’ presuppositional conditions, in in-
teraction with the other constraints and preferences of the discourse theory, may
result in ‘strong’ readings (section 6.2.5). We subsequently zoom in on the func-
tion of the presuppositional condition as a suitability constraint, illustrating this
with a so-called ‘partial matching’ case (section 6.2.6). Finally, we touch upon
the treatment of bridging anaphora (section 6.2.7).
6.2.1 Presupposition Triggers in the Lexicon
We will focus on definite descriptions such as the man or that book, but the
treatment in principle applies equally to other presupposition triggers, such as
for example cleft constructions, change-of state verbs, and temporal clauses. We
follow Webber (1978) and Heim (1982) in assuming that definites generally must
either pick up a discourse referent that is already present in their local context or
accommodate such a discourse referent. Definite descriptions, in other words, are
much like pronouns in this respect. In the elementary description of the definite
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determiner (6.1a) below this is captured by letting their semantic value be an
underspecified discourse referent σpik . Properness requirements force σ
pi
k to either
unify with an existing discourse referent, or to be included in the universe of the
background.2
Unlike pronouns, definite descriptions also carry descriptive material that is
contributed by their common nouns. This material, it is widely assumed, is of
a presuppositional character. In line with Karttunen (1974) we require that it
is entailed by the local context of the point where it is triggered. In (6.1a) the
requirement Γk1 |≍ σk2(σ
pi
k ) implements this. The result of combining (6.1a) with
a description of a common noun is shown in (6.1b). Here the process of taking
arbitrary witnesses has resulted in certain instantiations for k, k1 and k2.
(6.1) a. DP+k1
σpik
Γk1 |≍ σk2(σ
pi
k )
Dk
the
NP−k2
b. DP+8
σpi7
Γ8 |≍ [ | wr:mule σpi7 ]
D7
the
NP9
mule
The underspecified, free discourse marker σpik is what makes definites into anaphoric
elements. The context-sensitive condition Γk1 |≍σk2(σ
pi
k ) classifies them as presup-
position triggers. Potential binders of the definite description must ‘fit’ the de-
scription given by the presuppositional condition; the presuppositional condition
serves as a suitability requirement on the resolution of the definite. Our gram-
mar, in this respect, goes somewhat further than Van der Sandt’s (1992) formal
treatment, which implements only consistency and informativity as limiting con-
straints on the matching or insertion of presuppositional material in the context
of interpretation.
Note that the underspecified discourse marker in (6.1a) and (6.1b) is like a
pivot, linking the semantic content of the definite to the presupposed material.
The presupposition can only be satisfied given some binding of the shared dis-
course marker in the common local context, and the properness requirements
of our grammar enforce binding. Thus, as in the anaphoric approach to presup-
position projection, problems potentially arising from stating presuppositions of
definite descriptions as existentially quantified statements independently of the
asserted material do not arise. Neither do we predict the projection of certain
unwanted universally quantified presuppositions, as occuring in the approach of
for example Heim (1983).3
2Alternatively, as in Van Leusen and Muskens (2003), binding requirements of the form
[σk | ] ⊑ Γk1 can be incorporated in the elementary description of the definite determiner.
3Heim (1983) predicts that the sentence in (6.2a) presupposes or projects (6.2b). This basi-
cally results from having a free variable (or unbound discourse marker) in the presuppositional
material triggered by ‘his bicycle’.
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The lexemes and linguistic constructs that are usually called presupposition
triggers are known to be quite a diverse lot.4 Given the tools available in our
grammar, they may each be classified in the lexicon according to their specific
characteristics as context-sensitive elements. Thus, though anaphoricity may well
be a general characteristic of presupposition triggers, the extent to which their
interpretation in context exhibits binding effects depends on their precise semantic
characterisation, and this may be varied. To illustrate this, (6.3) shows a possible
lexical description of the change-of-state verb ‘sell’, which is commonly taken
to presuppose that the agent of the selling event is in a state of owning the
thing sold. As in chapter 4, we introduce some notation that suggests an event-
semantic analysis of the lexeme: ek, ek1 are discourse markers of type eventuality,
which covers both states and events, ek1 is the main eventuality over which the
semantic value of k1 is predicated, and ek ⊘ ek1 means that (pre-state) ek obtains
at the moment when (event) ek1 starts.
5
(6.3) S+k1
σk3(σk2 )
Γk1 |≍ [ ek|wr : ek : σk2 own σk5 , wr : ek ⊘ ek1 ]
DP−k2 VP
−
k3
VP+k4
λv′λvλe[ |wr : e : v sell v′](σk5 )
Vk
sell
DP−5
With verbal triggers such as these, it seems less clear that they are directly
anaphoric, like definite descriptions. The presuppositional condition
Γk1 |≍ [ ek|wr : ek : σk2 own σk5 , wr : ek ⊘ ek1 ]
reflects this. The discourse marker ek, representing the state of ownership, is
fully specified and bound within the presuppositional material. The condition is
(6.2) a. A fat man was pushing his bicycle.
b. Every fat man owns a bicycle.
Heim considers this an unintuitively strong prediction, and points out the desirability of having
an alternative treatment in which accommodation results in the more acceptable reading that
there was a fat man who had a bicycle and was pushing it. This in fact corresponds to the
most preferred possible reading of (6.2a) predicted by our treatment. It results from resolving
the possessive pronoun to ‘a fat man’ and globally accommodating that he owns a bicycle. Our
predictions are in line with those of Van der Sandt’s anaphoric account here.
4See for instance Levinson (1983), chapter 4, for an overview.
5This is very sketchy and only serves to illustrate the point; we are ignoring complications
potentially arising from the interaction with tense, VP-modifiers, and quantification in an event-
semantic analysis here.
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satisfied when the existence of a state of this kind can be inferred from the local
context. Binding effects are predicted to result only indirectly, from the binding
of σ2 and σ5 in the discourse context. Further research would have to show in how
far this analysis fits the observable facts.
There are also cases in which the presuppositional condition seems to be su-
perfluous and the presupposition trigger is essentially an anaphor. The temporal
adverb ‘then’ is an example of this. Following Webber et al. (1999) and Webber
et al. (2003) the discourse adverbial ‘then’, as occurring in, for instance, “John
handed in his resignation and went home. Then he made himself a stiff drink.”
may be taken to presuppose a telic eventuality, and to assert that the eventuality
described by the argument clause starts after its culmination.
This may be expressed by means of the following lexical description, where
ek2 represents the eventuality described by the argument clause (Sk2) and σ
pi
k is an
underspecified discourse marker which stands for the presupposed telic eventual-
ity.6 The temporal relation between the presupposed eventuality and the asserted
one is expressed by wr: σ
pi
k <t ek2 . We assume that sortal restrictions on σ
pi
k can
be added, to make it into a discourse referent that can only be occupied by telic
eventualities. The main eventuality of the whole sentence is represented by ek1 ,
and the condition wr: ek2 ⊆ ek1 adds some referential fine structure. We assume
ek2 is bound in σk2 .
(6.4) S+k1
[ ek1 | ]⊕ σk2 ⊕ [ | wr: ek2⊆ek1 , wr:σ
pi
k <t ek2 ]
Advk
then
S−k2
As with pronouns, the underspecified discourse marker σpik , which is free in σk1 ,
must find a binder in Γk1. As we saw in the preceding chapter, the Properness
requirement says that discourse meanings must be proper. It follows from this
that σpik must be bound in the discourse meaning. Given the composition of local
contexts, the embedding context of σk1 in the discourse meaning is precisely the
local context of the discourse unit, Γk1. Hence σ
pi
k must be bound in Γk1. The
presupposition trigger is basically a temporal anaphor. Sortal properties constrain
its resolution.
As a final example, we would like to mention triggers such as ‘too’, which
are also known as focusing adverbs. It might be argued that in these cases, fo-
cus interpretation overlaps with presupposition theory, and the ‘focus frame’ or
‘background’ that can be inferred from the focus articulation of the argument
of the adverb constitutes the presuppositional material. It is commonly assumed
6Remember there is a family of functions σα, assigning semantic values of any given type
α to a node in a tree structure. We employ this multiplicity here by letting σpi generate an
underspecified discourse marker at node k, while σττ produces the ‘standard’ or ‘main’ semantic
value of the adverbial.
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that focus frames must in some sense be ‘given’ in the context of interpretation.7
One way of implementing this could be to treat them just like presuppositions,
and require that focus frames be entailed by the local context of the clause that
triggers them.
To illustrate this, consider the following lexical description of ‘too’. We use
fv k2 to denote the focus value of the argument of the adverb. A focus frame may
in principle be obtained from this by replacing the focus value in the semantic
content of the clause with a free variable xk of the same type α.
8 The presuppo-
sitional condition can then be stated as Γk1 |≍ {x
α
k/fv
α
k2
}σk2 , where {x
α
k/fv
α
k2
}σk2
indicates the substitution of fvαk2 by x
α
k in σk2 . Satisfying the condition should
result in finding some specific value that matches xαk . If α = π, x
α
k is an under-
specified discourse referent and the Properness requirement applies to it as usual.
(6.5) S+k1
σk2
Γk1 |≍ {x
α
k/fv
α
k2
}σk2
contrast(σk2 , x
α
k , fv
α
k2
,Γk1)
S−k2 Advk
too
Besides givenness of the focus frame, focus interpretation is usually taken to in-
volve another requirement, namely distinctness or contrastivity of the focus value
with the value that resolves xk.
9 We would like to suggest that the semantic rela-
tion of contrast, whatever its precise definition is, is a context-dependent notion.
The schematic representation of the condition contrast(σk2 , x
α
k , fv
α
k2
,Γk1) reflects
this. In fact, the givenness requirement on the focus frame could be viewed as
a component or corollary of the contrastivity requirement. The focusing adverb
exhibits binding effects to the extent that {xαk/fv
α
k2
}σk2 contains free discourse
markers. As for its accommodation potential, we can say very little; as with
pronouns and definite descriptions, it depends on the interaction with other con-
straints associated with the trigger.
Clearly, much of the above is tentative and sketchy. The behaviour of various
classes of presupposition triggers is the topic of extensive research, the discussion
of which would take too much space in this chapter. Furthermore, a full treatment
in our grammar would require at least a definitive specification of a fragment of
English in event semantic compositional DRT, and an implementation of focus
theory. Both will have to wait for some later time. We hope to have shown,
7Starting from Jackendoff (1972) and Dahl (1974). See also Rooth (1985), Krifka (1993),
Partee (1991), Geurts and van der Sandt (1997).
8Compare Gardent and Kohlhase (1995), Pulman (1997) in the context of higher order
unification theory and matching, and see Kamp (2004), Riester (2005), for the construction of
focus frames in DRT.
9Compare Kaplan (1984), Rooth (1992).
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however, that with the means standardly available in our discourse semantics,
such as context-sensitive constraints and properness requirements, a unified and
declarative treatment of linguistic presupposition can be provided, while doing
justice to the diversity of the triggers in the lexicon.
6.2.2 Reasoning about Presuppositional Conditions
After this brief look at the lexicon, let us zoom in on the interplay between bind-
ing, presupposition satisfaction and accommodation in the interpretation process.
This can best be illustrated with some simple examples. Consider the first one of
these, given in (6.6).
(6.6) Pedro has a mule. The mule is happy.
As before, upon hearing each sentence the language user constructs an input
description, and increments the existing discourse description with it. The dis-
course description representing the hearer’s knowledge of the discourse just after
processing (6.6) can be represented as in (6.7). For transparancy, we assume some
node identifications have already taken place, and the syntax and semantics of
the predicate ‘is happy’ is simplified.
(6.7) ∆2: S−r
Γr = B
S+16
[u2 | wr : o0 has u2, wr:mule u2]
[o0 | wr:Pedro o0] ⊑ B
Pedro has a mule
DP+24
σ5
Γ24 |≍ [ | wr:mule σ5]
D5
the
NP6
mule
S+25
σ26(σ27)
DP−26 VP−27
VP+28
λv[ | wr: happy v]
V7
is
AP29
happy
Reasoning on the basis of his grammatical knowledge, world knowledge, and pref-
erences the hearer may further parse the input sentence, and select a suitable dis-
course relation, expressing its link to the preceding discourse. Discourse relation
elaboration seems an appropriate candidate. On the assumption that the discourse
is temporarily ended, he may subsequently infer the discourse description shown
in (6.8).
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(6.8) ∆rcl2 :
S21,r
[u2|wr: o0 has u2, wr:mule u2, wr: happy σ5]
[lrp]wr :̺21=̺16, wr :̺25 ⊆ ̺16
S16
[u2 | wr: o0 has u2, wr:mule u2]
[o0 | wr:Pedro o0] ⊑ B
Pedro has a mule
S31
Rel4
elab
S25
[ | wr : happy σ5 ]
[inf]B ⊕ [u2|wr: o0 has u2, wr:mule u2] 6|≍ [ | wr: happy σ5 ]
B ⊕ [u2|wr: o0 has u2, wr:mule u2] |≍ [ | wr:mule σ5]
the mule is happy
As before, our hearer may obtain the meaning of the discourse by reasoning about
B ⊕ σr given satisfaction of the constraints triggered by the various context-
sensitive elements in the discourse. The discourse meaning that can be inferred
from (6.8) is the underspecified DRS (6.9a), where the conditions in (6.9b-d)
hold. Condition (6.9b) was introduced by the name ‘Pedro’, (6.9c) is the local
informativity condition introduced by the elaboration relation, and (6.9d) is the
presuppositional condition triggered by the definite description.
(6.9) a. B ⊕ [u2 | wr: o0 has u2, wr:mule u2, wr: happy σ5]
b. [o0 | wr:Pedro o0] ⊑ B
c. B ⊕ [u2 | wr: o0 has u2, wr:mule u2] 6|≍ [ | wr: happy σ5]
d. B ⊕ [u2 | wr: o0 has u2, wr:mule u2] |≍ [ | wr:mule σ5]
As discussed in chapter 4, the requirement in (6.9b) induces global accommo-
dation of the presence of an individual named ‘Pedro’. Furthermore, the infor-
mativity requirement in (6.9c) prevents the accommodation of information that
supports that σ5 is happy in the local context of the second sentence, for any
possible binding of σ5. Now what about the presuppositional condition (6.9d)?
Given (6.9b), axiom A15, and idempotency of ⊕, (6.9a) can be strengthened to
B ⊕ [wr o0 u2 | wr:Pedro o0, wr: o0 has u2, wr:mule u2, wr: happy σ5 ]
Given the properness requirement A18, the hearer may infer from this that
proper(B ⊕ [wr o0 u2 | wr:Pedro o0, wr: o0 has u2, wr:mule u2, wr: happy σ5 ])
With respect to the underspecified discourse marker σ5, he may subsequently
infer
[σ5 | ] ⊑ B⊕[wr o0 u2 | wr:Pedro o0, wr: o0 has u2, wr:mule u2, wr: happy σ5 ]
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and conclude that σ5 ∈ {wr, o0, u2}, or that σ5 is in the universe of B but not
in {wr, o0, u2}. Of the four potential binders, wr can immediately be excluded on
the basis of sortal constraints. Of the other binding options, identifying σ5 with
o0 or assuming σ5 6∈ {wr, o0, u2} results in dispreferred readings of the sentence.
The most preferred reading results from identifying σ5 with u2; the definite de-
scription then resolves to ‘the mule Pedro owns’. It is clear that for this choice
the presuppositional condition in (6.9d) holds:
B ⊕ [u2 | wr: o0 has u2, wr:mule u2] |≍ [ | wr:mule u2]
The corresponding discourse meaning (6.10a) is constrained as in (6.10b).
(6.10) a. B ⊕ [wr u2 | wr: o0 has u2, wr:mule u2, wr: happy u2]
b. [o0 | wr:Pedro o0] ⊑ B ∧
B ⊕ [u2 | wr: o0 has u2, wr:mule u2] 6|≍ [ | wr: happy u2]
This is a reading in which the presupposition is ‘caught’ or ‘bound’ by previous
linguistic material. Nothing needs to be accommodated in B in order to satisfy
the presuppositional condition. The discourse in (6.6) can be assumed to have
been uttered in an implicit context that does not contain any reference to mules
at all.
As we saw, there are two other possibilities to bind σ5 and satisfy (6.9d),
resulting in possible but dispreferred readings of the discourse. One of these is
to identify σ5 with o0 and globally accommodate that Pedro is a mule. It might
be argued that lack of sufficient justification for what must be accommodated
explains why this reading is dispreferred. Only in specific (story-telling) contexts,
mules may own one another. Presumably, the selection of such a context in the
absence of any linguistic or nonlinguistic evidence supporting it is not very well
justified, and dispreferred when better alternatives are available. Another reason
why this reading is dispreferred might be that it implies that there is more than
one mule present in the context of interpretation, possibly within the relevant
domain of topical elements, while the descriptive material in ‘the mule’ is not
distinctive enough to select one of these uniquely. It could be argued that the use
of the definite description in that situation is uncooperative on the part of the
speaker, because the hearer is not given enough information to disambiguate. On
the hypothesis that the speaker does act cooperatively, these readings cannot be
what he intends to convey by his utterance, hence they are dispreferred.
The other dispreferred reading results when σ5 is taken to refer to an individual
in the implicit background other than Pedro, and it is globally accommodated that
this individual is a mule. The fact that the descriptive material is not distinctive
enough to select a candidate uniquely may explain the dispreferredness of this
reading as well. On top of this, given the specific interpretation of discourse-
markers in the universe of the implicit background B in our semantics, the definite
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description would receive a deictic or referential interpretation—a point somewhat
further discussed below. As with pronouns, it might be argued that deictic or
referential readings require specific evidence from the linguistic or nonlinguistic
context of interpretation; in its absence accommodation is not suffiently justified.
Generally speaking, the hearer’s preferences govern the interpretation of these
and similar cases, and should explain why some readings are preferred and oth-
ers are dispreferred. A direct explanation of the judgements in the example at
hand is obtained if we follow the anaphoric account to presupposition of Van
der Sandt (1992) and adopt an explicit preference for ‘binding’ presuppositional
material over ‘accommodating’ it. In our treatment this corresponds to adopting
a preference for binding a presupposition to a discourse marker introduced di-
rectly by a linguistic antecedent over binding it to an accommodated one. This
produces the correct predictions for discourse (6.6): the most preferred reading is
the one in which the presupposition is satisfied and bound relative to ‘a mule’.
In the dispreferred readings it is satisfied and bound relative to accommodated
material.
The preference for binding to a linguistically introduced binder may itself
be explained in terms of a preference for more cohesive interpretation, on the
assumption that resolution to explicit antecedents is generally perceived to be
more cohesive than resolution to inferred information. We leave open whether
this is so. As we have tried to indicate in the above discussion, it is also possible
to explain the judgements in terms of other preferences, such as the preference
for selecting most plausible or uncontroversial background information, and a
preference for taking the speaker to avoid ambiguous reference. All of this may
be seen as the starting point for further research, where the question what makes
one reading more costly than the other is central. A theory of justification, or
justified acceptance of information in B is part of this.10 In section 6.4.3 we will
take up the issue of the interaction between the various preferences in our analysis
again.
6.2.3 Binders can be Globally Accommodated
In the previous example, the most preferred reading was one in which the definite
description was bound by an antecedent present in the preceding discourse. This
is not necessarily so, however. A case where global accommodation of the binder
and the presuppositional material is clearly preferred is given in (6.11a). We
assume the hearer constructs a discourse description for this text as before. Local
informativity requirements are not relevant for the present discussion and we
10In for instance Dalrymple et al. (1994), Zeevat (1999), and Blutner (2000) the idea that
there is an overall preference for stronger possible readings over weaker ones is considered. The
three readings discussed here, however, are not ordered in terms of logical strength relative to
each other, so we cannot use them as a test case for this hypothesis. We will come back to this
when discussing local accommodation further on.
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ignore them for the time being. Given satisfaction of the condition triggered by
the proper name in (6.11a), the presuppositional constraint triggered by ‘the sun’
may be given as in (6.11b). A consequence of the Properness requirement is shown
in (6.11c).
(6.11) a. Pedro is asleep. The sun is shining.
b. B ⊕ [wr o0 | wr:Pedro o0, wr: asleep o0 ] |≍ [ | wr: sun σ4]
c. proper(B ⊕ [wr o0 | wr:Pedro o0, wr: asleep o0, wr: shining σ4])
Given (6.11c) it follows that σ4 is bound in the universe of the discourse mean-
ing. For reasons similar to those mentioned before, identifying σ4 with o0 and
accommodating that Pedro is the sun results in a dispreferred reading. The only
preferred option is to assume the discourse referent, σ4, to be already present
in the background B, in other words, to accommodate [σ4| ] ⊑ B. In addition,
the background must contain sufficient material to satisfy the presupposition in
(6.11b). A simple way to satisfy this requirement is if in fact [ | wr: sun σ4] ⊑ B.
Thus, the hearer may infer that discourse meaning (6.12a) is constrained as in
(6.12b).
(6.12) a. B ⊕ [ wr | wr: asleep o0, wr: shining σ4]
b. [ o0 | wr:Pedro o0 ]⊑B ∧ [ σ4 | wr: sun σ4 ]⊑B
In the preceding chapter (section 4.4.7) it was assumed that all discourse refer-
ents in the universe of the implicit background of a conversation are interpreted
referentially . It was assumed that discourse participants interpret the discourse
with respect to some state i0 which they take the discourse to be about, and
the discourse markers in the universe of B receive their interpretation from i0
directly. The state i0 functions much as an external anchor in the sense of Kamp
and Reyle (1993), pp. 246–248. Given that treatment, the definite description
in (6.11a), whose binder is globally accommodated, is interpreted referentially.
In (6.11a) this is intuitively appropriate: the speaker, when he utters ‘the sun
is shining’, is referring to a particular entity present in the world he is talking
about.
What justifies global accommodation of a binder can be more than just common
sense knowledge or knowledge about the world; it can also be information that is
provided explicitly in the discourse. Consider the conditional sentence in (6.13a),
which in one of its possible readings presupposes that John has children. We
agree with Van der Sandt (1992) that this is its most preferred reading. The fact
that in continuations such as (6.13b) the pronoun ‘they’ can be used to refer to
John’s children attests that the presupposition is globally accommodated; if it
were locally accommodated or satisfied in the scope of the conditional it could
not bind the pronoun.
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(6.13) a. If John has grandchildren, his children must be happy.
Van der Sandt (1992), ex.(27), p.349
b. They always wanted off-spring.
Our treatment accounts for this reading as follows. The definite description ‘his
children’ introduces a presuppositional condition on its local context. Given res-
olution of the possesive pronoun ‘his’ to ‘John’ that presupposition can be para-
phrased as ‘there are individuals who are Johns children’. The local context of
the triggers, established by the antecedent of the conditional, includes the infor-
mation that John has grandchildren. The information that individuals who have
grandchildren have one or more children too may readily be accepted in B, being
common knowledge. It then follows that John has one or more children. We as-
sume that the fact that this information can be inferred from common knowledge
plus the information provided by the embedding discourse is sufficient to justify
the accommodation of a suitable binder in the local context of the presupposition
trigger.
As the continuation in (6.13) shows, the accommodated material must be
accepted in the implicit background in B. If it were not, it could not bind the
anaphor ‘they’. The inference that John has children builds crucially on infor-
mation from the antecedent of the conditional which is not globally available,
however. So one might ask what justifies global accommodation of the binder in
the reading discussed.
For one, it may be assumed that a general preference for global accommo-
dation is at work. It is a widespread assumption that a preference of this kind
is part of a language user’s preference system, see for instance Heim (1983) and
Van der Sandt (1992). This means that, unless grammatical constraints or other
preferences interfere, a reading resulting from global accommodation is predicted
to be the most preferred. Another option is to try and explain the effect in terms
of constraints or preferences already available to the hearer for independent rea-
sons, such as the preference for more plausible readings, and informativity or
appropriateness conditions associated with conditional constructions. We would
suggest that in the example at hand, the information that is accommodated (John
has children) is a natural precondition of what is stated in the antecedent of the
conditional (John has grandchildren). If one considers the possibility of John hav-
ing grandchildren, one normally adopts a background in which he has children.
Thus, there is a sense in which the global reading corresponds to an optimally
informative or appropriate use of the conditional.
Since our discourse semantics in its current form allows only global accommo-
dation, our theory predicts only the reading discussed here. Given an extension
of the semantics that allows for local accommodation, to be provided in section
6.4, the grammar predicts possible readings resulting from local accommodation
for (6.13b) as well. The continuation in (6.13b), however, enforces the selection of
the reading in which it is globally accommodated that John has children as the
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only possible one.
6.2.4 Referential and Existential Readings of Definites
While for the purpose of this chapter there is no particular need to change the in-
terpretation of discourse markers in the universe of B that we adopted, we would
like to point out that the semantics allows for variations, and a set-up may be
chosen that results in a more diversified interpretation of nominal elements whose
binders are in the implicit background of the the conversation. In particular, a
treatment might be chosen in which referential interpretations are not assigned
generally to definite descriptions whose binder is globally accommodated. Con-
sider the following example.
(6.14) A girl fainted. Her boy-friend called the doctor.
It may be claimed that in addition to a referential reading, an existential reading of
‘the doctor’ in (6.14) is available. In that reading the speaker is not talking about a
particular individual, but about any given individual that fits the description. He
just conveys that a doctor was called.11 In order to account for this, a treatment
could be adopted in which some discourse referents declared in the universe of
the global background are referential while others are interpreted existentially.
This can be achieved by employing the existing difference between o-markers
and u-markers to distinguish between referential and existential interpretations,
rather than ‘background’ and ‘new’ markers. The following semantic axiom may
be introduced to regulate this; ‘ref ’ is a πt-type predicate which marks a discourse
referent as referential.
A22 ∀k.ref (ok) ∧ ∀k.¬ref (uk)
To allow existential readings of background material, u-markers must no longer
be excluded from the universe of the global background of the conversation. Ar-
guably, it may also be required that o-markers are declared in the universe of the
global background only.12 Thus, instead of
11There is a convergence here with Donnellan’s (1966) distinction between a referential, and an
attributive use of definite descriptions. With Donnellan’s referential use, the definite description
serves to (let the audience) pick a given, particular object or individual. The descriptive material
is presumed to apply to that object or individual, but is not essential in establishing its identity.
With the attributive use, the attributed property is essential. It is assumed that there is an
individual to which the description applies. A definite description of the form ‘The F’ might be
paraphrased as “the F, whichever or whoever it may be,...”. While Donnellan’s ‘referential use’
seems to fit our treatment of o-markers as externally anchored referents, his ‘attributive use’
seems to correspond best to our ‘existential readings’, where a u-marker must be accommodated.
12Though in fact, it is not necessary to state this explictly. In the fragment of our grammar
names are the only elements introducing o-markers, and the the declaration of these markers
in the universe of B is achieved by assigning names a context-sensitive condition which requires
the discourse marker and its description to be in the universe of B.
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A19 proper(B) ∧ ¬∃k fst(B)(uk) ∧ fst(B)(wr)
We would now have
A19′′ proper(B) ∧ ∀k fst(B)(ok) ∧ fst(B)(wr)
In addition, the truth definition we had (‘a DRS K is said to be true in state i
with respect to background B if true(〈fst(K)− fst(B), snd(K)〉)(i) holds.’) may be
replaced with one that excludes the set of all o-markers from interpretation as an
existentially bound variable: ‘a DRS K is said to be true in state i with respect
to a set of externally anchored referents ‘ref ’ if true(〈fst(K) − ref , snd(K)〉)(i)
holds.’ As before, it would be assumed that discourse participants interpret the
discourse with respect to some state i0 which they take the discourse to be about,
and o-markers receive their interpretation from i0 directly.
Whether the elements of a certain word class select referential or existential
readings, or allow both, is regulated in the lexicon of the grammar. For instance,
in our fragment names carry o-markers, and indefinites introduce u-markers. The
first will consequently be interpreted referentially, the second existentially.13 Ele-
ments which introduce underspecified discourse markers, such as definite descrip-
tions and personal pronouns, allow for both referential and existential interpreta-
tions. They can select either o-markers or u-markers as a binder. Elements which
get deictic readings only, such as ‘I’, ‘you’, and now’ could be assumed to carry
o-markers. Clearly, there is a vast diversity and subtlety in the interpretation of
nominal expressions. We cannot hope to address this in the scope of this chapter.
We merely want to show that a certain measure of fine-tuning can be provided
in the semantic language we employ.14
6.2.5 Accommodating Weak and Strong Readings
In our grammar, global accommodation is the specification or abduction of gen-
eral background information. What is globally accommodated can be any infor-
mation that is sufficient to satisfy the presupposition, and which the language
user is willing to accept as background information, given his world knowledge
and preferences. It need not be precisely the presuppositional material. Crucially,
what is globally accommodated can be logically stronger than what is minimally
required to satisfy a given presuppositional condition. Any specification of the
13It is well-known that indefinites can be used referentially, as in ‘John invited a certain
girl’, where ‘a certain girl’ refers to a specific individual known to the speaker and hearer. The
expression is then called a specific indefinite. This reading can be obtained by allowing the
identification of the u-marker introduced by the indefinite with an accessible o-marker (under
condition of sufficient justification). The indefinite will ‘inherit’ a referential interpretation from
the o-marker. The identification with an accessible o-marker is not enforced by any constraint
and will typically only occur when it is justified on the basis of available background knowledge.
14Compare Maier (2006) for a similarly sophisticated treatment of deixis and referential and
descriptive uses of names in Layered DRT.
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background that satisfies the condition will do, in this respect. What specifica-
tions count as most preferred choices is determined on the basis of all constraints
in the hearer’s grammar and the total of his preferences; it does not depend on
the presuppositional condition alone. The interpretation process as a whole may
thus result in the selection of a reading that is stronger than the presuppositional
condition requires.
That the material that is in fact accommodated in our approach is not always
the weakest DRS such that the entailment requirement is met with is shown in
(6.15).
(6.15) a. If the weather turns out to be good, the king will be overjoyed.
b. B |≍ [ | wr:weather σ2]
c. B ⊕ [ | wr: good σ2 ] |≍ [ | wr: king σ9]
d. B |≍ [ | [ | wr: good σ2 ]⇒ [ | wr: king σ9] ]
The definite description ‘the weather’ in (6.15a) evokes the presupposition (6.15b);
‘the king’ evokes the one in (6.15c). We concentrate on the latter. Notice that
(6.15c) is equivalent to (6.15d). Thus, in order to satisfy the presupposition trig-
gered by ‘the king’, it would be sufficient to assume that the background contains
σ9, plus a condition that can be paraphrased as ‘if the weather turns out good
σ9 is king’.
15 But clearly this is not what is accommodated in ordinary contexts,
where plain ‘σ9 is king’ is preferred. In the first case we would have (6.16a), in
the second (6.16b)—given satisfaction of (6.15b).
(6.16) a. [ σ9 | [ | wr: good σ2 ]⇒ [ | wr: king σ9] ] ⊑ B
b. [ σ9 | wr: king σ9] ⊑ B
We agree with Beaver (2001) that accommodation, while constrained by require-
ments that derive from properties of the linguistic system, is also a matter of
common sense reasoning. The linguistic requirement for a felicitous utterance of
(6.15a) is that B entails ‘if the weather turns out good σ9 is king’, but there are
many ways in which this requirement can be met. Common sense reasoning is
needed to pick out the most likely of these ways, or in other words, to develop
preferences over potential readings. In the case of conditional statements such as
the one accommodated in (6.16a) it should help to gauge the meaningfulness or
naturalness of the dependency expressed in them.16
15This prediction is dubbed ‘the proviso problem’ in Geurts (1995) and Geurts (1998). It arises
when a presupposition χ is triggered relative to a local context of the form c[ϕ1][ϕ2] . . . [ϕn], n ≥
0, where c is the global context and each [ϕi] an update. In this situation only a presupposition
of the form (ϕ1 ∧ϕ2 ∧ ...ϕn)→ χ will survive, whereas the intuitive inference will often be that
χ is true.
16Interesting matter for comparison is the treatment of presupposition resolution in con-
ditional sentences in Asher and Lascarides (2003). They argue that a general preference for
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While the specification of the hearer’s preference system is an open research
task, and we have nothing to contribute to the theory of commonsense reasoning,
it is clear that by integrating presupposition theory in a full-fledged discourse
theory, the occurrence of logically stronger readings than is necessary to satisfy a
given presuppositional condition can straightforwardly be accounted for. It is the
effect of interaction with independent constraints and preferences in the discourse
theory.17 This reconciles our Karttunen (1974)-style treatment of presupposition
with the predictions of the anaphoric account.
6.2.6 Partial Matching and Suitability
In the preceding we encountered some examples in which the material associated
with a definite description could either be unified completely with material already
in the linguistically generated part of the local context of that description or had
to be accommodated in its entirety. For good measure we also give an example
where some material (the discourse referent) is unified with existing material,
while other material must be presumed to be in the background. These are called
partial matching cases in the anaphoric approach to presupposition.18 Consider
(6.17a).
(6.17) a. If John marries a woman, the unlucky female will be unhappy.
b. B ⊕ [wr o1 u3 | wr: John o1, wr: o1 marries u3, wr:woman u3]
c. [ | wr: female u3, wr: unlucky u3]
d. [u9 | wr:woman u9]⇒ [ | wr: female u9]
e. [u9 | wr: o1 marries u9]⇒ [ | wr: unlucky u9]
The local context of the unlucky female in this sentence is given in (6.17b) and
it is clear that its discourse referent can be taken to be equal with u3. If this
identification is made, (6.17c) must be entailed by (6.17b) and the common sense
more plausible or likely interpretations, as proposed in Beaver (1996), is not enough to account
for all of the relevant data, and that rhetorical relations (among which are various types of
consequence relations) determine what we should be measuring the plausibility of. Rephrasing
somewhat freely, conditional constructions come with their own specific constraints on what is
plausible, and this overrules the general notion of plausibility.
17This point is made in Asher and Lascarides (1998b) and Asher and Lascarides (2003) as
well, although they do not formulate presupposition theory in terms of entailment conditions
on local contexts. Rather, they build on the anaphoric approach to presupposition and provide
a powerful generalisation over Van der Sandt’s ‘binding’ and ‘accommodation’ cases in SDRT.
The overall interaction with discourse theory explains that some readings are more coherent
than others, hence more preferred.
18Partial matching is extensively discussed in Van Deemter and Krahmer (1998). They provide
a generalised treatment of NPs-as-anaphors, which covers, among others, subsectional anaphora
and bridging anaphora. The latter differ from the cases discussed in this section, in the sense
that a binder must be also be accommodated or inferred from existing material.
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reasoning component must abduce one or more plausible conditions such that, if
these conditions are assumed to be in B, the desired entailment holds. Clearly,
one condition that can easily be assumed to be in B is (6.17d), ‘women are
females’, and a more contentful assumption is (6.17e), ‘whoever is married by
John is unlucky’.19 If these assumptions are made, the required entailment holds.
Examples like these illustrate in particular that with anaphoric triggers, the
presuppositional condition serves as a suitability requirement on the resolution
of the anaphor. A suitable binder is a discourse marker whose occupant can be
inferred to fit the description given the context of interpretation. The suitability
test is what sets the abduction of background information going. It is a fully in-
tegrated part of the semantics of presupposition triggers. This can be seen as an
enrichment of the anaphoric approach to presupposition of Van der Sandt (1992),
where a suitability requirement of this kind is not implemented.20 The selection of
suitable antecedents there results from interaction with informativity and consis-
tency requirements, and discourse properties like salience and the contribution of
nonlinguistic knowledge. Thus, to some extent the notion is covered in the prag-
matics of the discourse theory surrounding DRT, but this is not formally spelled
out.
6.2.7 Bridging
One of the things the preceding discussion shows is that in our reasoning model,
general background knowledge can freely be abduced or accommodated. If the
presence of binders can subsequently be inferred on the basis of what is asserted
and accepted as background information, accommodation of these binders is jus-
tified in principle. This is attractive in that it offers a natural account of bridging
anaphora, a phenomenon that pervades natural language.21 Bridging anaphors
are expressions whose binder is not introduced in the universe of the context of
interpretation through an antecedent in the preceding discourse, but which can
be assumed to be present on the basis of what we know about the elements that
19We require that u9 is a fresh witness for the discourse referent in (6.17d) and (6.17e). Notice
that u9 is not generated at a node named 9; in fact it must be avoided that there is a node
named 9 in the discourse structure.
20Though compare Van Deemter and Krahmer (1998), who present a modified version of Van
der Sandt (1992) and integrate a semantic suitability test in their resolution algorithm. In their
treatment, definite descriptions introduce not only an ordinary discourse marker, but also a
fresh context set , which in the resolution procedure is equated with a previously introduced
discourse marker, or with the entire domain of discourse. Thus, the context set identifies the
antecedent of the definite description. Each potential antecedent comes with a so-called value-
set , which may be circumscribed as a set of linguistically generated chacterising properties. The
presuppositional material of the definite description is checked against that set; (generalised)
binding in principle succeeds if there is a non-empty intersection.
21See for instance Clark (1977), Hobbs (1979), Charniak (1983), Van Deemter (1989),
Van Deemter and Krahmer (1998), and Asher and Lascarides (1998a).
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are thus introduced and the situation under discussion. Usually, the discourse
contains an antecedent relative to which the anaphor stands in some close, non-
trivial relation, for example a relation of functional dependence, or a part-whole
relation, or a composite of those.
The following discourse illustrates this. The bridging anaphor ‘the driver’ links
up to the antecedent ‘a car crash’ by referring to the driver of the car presumably
involved in the crash.
(6.18) a. There was a car crash on the A5. The driver was making a phone-call.
b. B ⊕ [wr u3 | wr: car u3, wr: crashed-on-A5 u3]
c. [ | wr: σ9 driver-of σ
pi
10]
d. [u20 | wr: car u20]⇒ [ u21 | wr: u21 driver-of u20]
e. [ u22 | wr: u22 driver-of u3]
For simplicity, we assume that relational nouns such as ‘driver’ introduce two-
place properties such as λv.λv′[ |wr: v
′ driver-of v], applied to a self-provided un-
derspecified argument (the thing driven). The latter is represented by the under-
specified discourse marker σpi10 in the above. In the discourse under consideration
(6.18a), the definite description ‘the driver’ requires that local context (6.18b)
entails the presuppositional material (6.18c). By accepting as common knowledge
in B that cars have drivers (6.18d), inferring and accepting in B that the car that
crashed (u3) has a driver (6.18d), resolving the incorporated argument of ‘driver’
to the car in the crash by identifying σ10 = u3, and resolving ‘the driver’ to the
inferred driver of that car by identifying σ9 = u22, the presuppositional condition
can be satisfied. Note that in the process a binder for the definite description is
accommodated: this is the inferred discourse marker u22.
In the example just discussed, the bridging relation corresponds to the relation
expressed by the relational noun, and the link to a specific binder is established
by resolving the implicit anaphoric argument of the nominal description. Bridg-
ing also occurs with nonrelational nominals, however, which are not normally
assumed to contribute implicit anaphoric arguments. Nonetheless, they exhibit
the same tendency to link up to elements explicitly mentioned in the immedi-
ately preceding discourse, and to ‘anchor’ to the situation or local setting under
discussion. Consider
(6.19) John got married last April. The priest was bald.
Zeevat (1992) ex. (42)
‘The priest’ obviously refers to the individual who performed John’s marriage in
April. In inferring this link, the hearer may select an implicit background which
supports, for instance, that John’s marriage in April was a Church marriage, that
John is a Catholic, that Catholic marriages are performed by priests. He may then
infer that there was a priest involved in perfoming John’s marriage, and accept
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this information in B. If ‘the priest’ is bound to this individual, the presuppo-
sitional condition is satisfied. Crucially, what is abduced is not just determined
on the basis of the descriptive content of the definite description, and general
preferences such as the preference for plausible interpretations. The assumption
that the priest who is bald is in some way related to John’s marriage in April is
essential in constraining and guiding the abduction process. Intuitively speaking,
there seems to be a restricted domain of linguistic antecedents relative to which
the bridging link can be established, and the choice of a candidate antecedent in
that domain is the starting point of the inference process.
In general, the inference machinery is quite powerful, and there must be addi-
tional constraints at work limiting the abduction process. In line with our earlier
observations in section 5.4, we propose that there are additional syntactic, seman-
tic, or informational constraints on definite descriptions which make them resolve
locally . In particular, definite descriptions, like pronouns, may be taken to require
binders that are ‘discourse available’, given the attachment of the update induced
by the sentence they are part of. Definite descriptions put different constraints
on discourse availability than pronouns, however. It was tentatively suggested in
section 5.4 that while pronouns require their binders to be salient topical entities
in the universe of their local context, definite descriptions require some nonsalient
form of topicality.
This could be made precise in various ways. It might be assumed that binders
of definite descriptions themselves must be topical, as graphically illustrated in
(6.20a). The burden of the explanation is then completely on the theory of topical-
ity. In the case of bridging anaphora, inferred individual entities or eventualities
should count as topical when they are somehow nontrivially and closely linked to
topical entities and eventualities that are linguistically introduced in the preced-
ing discourse. The advantage of this is that a generalisation over ‘direct binding’
and bridging cases is immediately obtained, without having to complicate the
semantic analysis of definite descriptions. The difficulty that remains, obviously,
is how to delimit the “extended family” of inferrable topical elements that may
serve as potential binders given the domain of linguistically introduced topical
elements.
(6.20) definite det: a. DP+k1
σpik
σpik ∈ Tk1
Γk1 |≍ σk2 (σ
pi
k )
Dk
the
NP−k2
b. DP+k1
σpik
σpik2 ∈ Tk1
Γk1 |≍ σ
(piτ)
k2
(σpik )⊕R
pi(piτ)(σpik2)(σ
pi
k )
Dk
the
NP−k2
Alternatively, it could be assumed that only individual entities and eventualities
that are linguistically introduced can be topical, and that definite descriptions
require the linguistically provided entities to which they resolve, either directly
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or through bridging, to be topical. To be able to state the latter constraint lexi-
cally, the underspecified antecedent marker must be made available. Furthermore,
a generalisation over direct resolution and bridging must be provided. The lexical
description in (6.20b) indicates a way of doing this. Apart from the descrip-
tive material originating from the nominal phrase σ
(piτ)
k2
(σpik ), the presuppositional
condition contains an underspecified bridging relation R linking σk to an under-
specified antecedent marker σpik2 .
22 As before, we are making use of the fact that
a single node may come with semantic values of different types. The topicality
constraint now says that σpik2 must be topical at the attachment site k1.
The axioms of the grammar require that σk and σ
pi
k2
are bound in the context
of interpretation given some value of R. R is a free variable of type π(πτ) which is
specified in the interpretation process. Consider example (6.19) again. On the as-
sumption that the second sentence in (6.19) is an elaboration of the first, ‘John’ is
a topical element. If we identify the antecedent marker with the discourse marker
introduced by ‘John’ we may find, for instance, R = λv.w[ | wr : vmarried w ].
By satisfying the presuppositional condition we abduce part of the descriptive
content of the definite description; ‘the priest’ serves as as an abbreviation of ‘the
priest who married John’.
In principle, any relation that links the antecedent marker and the anaphoric
marker given the local context can be abduced. Note that if we find R = λv.w[ |
wr : v is w] the definite description is bound directly by the antecedent, thus
the treatment generalises over bridging and plain binding. The challenge is to
constrain the abduction process. What we want is that solutions of R are non-
trivial, not too complex, and intuitively make sense. Part of this may follow from
the interaction with the language user’s world knowledge, common sense reason-
ing, and the preference for plausible readings. Another constraining factor is the
topicality requirement on the antecedent marker σpik2 . Since σ
pi
k2
must be topical,
the number of candidates is restricted, and R must ‘be about’ the element that
is chosen, given the hearer’s background knowledge. A further restriction may
be obtained by requiring that the presuppositional material logically depends on
the semantic content of the left argument of the discourse relation that links the
triggering sentence to the discourse context. This would ensure that the bridging
link that is abduced is locally justified . This might be implemented by means
of appropriateness conditions associated with the individual discourse operators.
We will see more of this in section 6.5.
22This is similar to the treatment of bridging relations in Asher and Lascarides (1998b),
be it that they do not treat presuppositions in terms of satisfaction requirements on local
contexts. Building on the anaphoric approach to presupposition projection, they allow the
insertion of presuppositional material in the DRS representing the embedding discourse context.
Presuppositional material is linked to the discourse context through underspecified discourse
relations. The bridging relation Rpi(piτ) in our treatment corresponds to B in their format.
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6.3 Consistency and Informativity Revisited
Presupposition theory is fully integrated with discourse theory in our framework
of discourse interpretation. Context-sensitive elements occurring in a discourse
may trigger presuppositional conditions. These conditions constrain the discourse
meaning, in interaction with independent axioms of the discourse grammar. In
this section we zoom in on the interaction with a specific set of axioms and con-
straints, namely those governing the consistency and informativity of utterances
in their context of interpretation. As we shall see, the acceptability conditions
on presupposition resolution formulated in Van der Sandt (1988) and (1992) can
straightforwardly be implemented by means of consistency and informativity re-
quirements in LDG.23 We explore the predictions that follow from that treatment
a little bit, focusing mainly on the interpretation of conditional sentences. It will
be concluded that to obtain a perfect fit between linguistic data and the predic-
tions of the grammar, a further fine-tuning of the theory of informativity is nec-
essary. In particular, the discussion raises the issue whether informativity effects
should be handled in the grammar or in the preference system of our framework.
6.3.1 Global Consistency and Global Informativity
As we saw in section 4.4.5 of the preceding chapter, on the basis of independently
motivated conversational principles, general conditions on felicitous updating can
be formulated and integrated in the discourse theory. Two such conditions were
introduced: Global Consistency and Global Informativity. They reflect Stalnaker’s
(1978) ‘first principle’ on assertion.24 The consistency requirement can be stated
as a constraint on discourse meanings at object level in our description language.
The informativity requirement refers to different stages of the discourse descrip-
tion and must be stated at metalevel in our grammar.
Global Consistency B ⊕ σr 6|≍ ⊥
Global Informativity For a discourse contribution updating a discourse de-
scription ∆ to ∆ + δ, there must be a DRS K such that
∆rcl 6|= (B ⊕ σr |≍ K) and (∆ + δ)
rcl |= (B ⊕ σr |≍ K).
Global Consistency says that, for no stage in processing a discourse, the discourse
meaning is inconsistent. Global Informativity enforces that every discourse con-
tribution results in a discourse meaning which entails some new information K.
These conditions of course interact in a certain way with anaphora resolution and
23For an implementation of the acceptability constraints in a computational treatment of the
anaphoric approach to presupposition in DRT, see Blackburn and Bos (1999) and Bos (2003).
24‘A proposition asserted is always true in some but not all of the possible worlds in the
context set.’ (Stalnaker 1978), page 325.
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presupposition satisfaction, limiting the number of grammatical readings. Global
Consistency, for instance, prevents binding relations resulting in readings that are
not consistent with information in the general background B. Consider
(6.21) # A1 mule is feeding. The man1 is content.
If the language user selects a general background B such that it holds that mules
are not men—which is plausible enough because this is general world knowledge—
resolving ‘the man’ to ‘a mule’ in (6.21) results in an inconsistent discourse mean-
ing. Global Consistency prohibits this, hence, the reading is out.
Furthermore, given some treatment of local accommodation, Global Consis-
tency enforces local accommodation of presuppositions in discourses where global
accommodation would result in inconsistency. The following example illustrates
this.
(6.22) A: John made an appointment with Mark’s secretary.
B: Impossible. Mark doesn’t have a secretary.
Participant A’s utterance triggers the presupposition that Mark has a secretary.
This is subsequently denied or rejected by participant B. In interpreting partici-
pant A’s statement an arbitrary hearer25 may simply accept as general background
information that Mark has a secretary, in other words, he may globally accommo-
date the presupposition.26 After processing B’s reply, however, he finds out that
global accommodation is no longer acceptable: the background information that
Mark has a secretary contradicts the semantic content of the denial, resulting in
an inconsistent discourse meaning. Global Consistency prohibits this.
The situation after B’s utterance is that the denial requires a context of inter-
pretation which does not entail that Mark has a secretary, while the presuppo-
sition triggered by A’s statement must still be satisfied in its local context. The
25If participant B is the hearer, things are a bit more complicated. When he evaluates A’s
utterance relative to his private reservoir of world knowledge K, he finds out that Mark does
not have a secretary. So if he accepts the presupposition in the implicit background B, B is not
consistent with his world knowledge. We assume that though, preferably, B is consistent with
K, it is not required to be so, and there can be stages in the conversation in which it isn’t. The
hearer may (temporarily) accept information in B for the sake of getting the speaker’s meaning,
even when he disagrees with it.
26Another way of dealing with this type of examples might be to allow the selection of a
background such that the presuppositional material is not accepted as a proposotion about the
actual world wr, but about some hypothetical or counterfactual alternative to it, or about an
alternative in A’s belief space. This obviously requires a specification of an intensional fragment
in our discourse semantics. A third option would be to allow greater flexibility in the man-
ner in which presuppositional material is incorporated in the context of interpretation. Beside
simply merging it with background information, it could also be added as a condition or hy-
pothesis. This converges with the main idea of Asher and Lascarides (1998b), who propose that
presuppositional material is linked to the discourse context through (underspecified) discourse
relations.
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only way to satisfy both requirements while preserving consistency is by allow-
ing some form of local accommodation. If the presuppositional material can be
added as local background information to the semantic content of A’s statement,
the whole of this may be captured in the scope of the negation introduced by
the denial.27 In that case no inconsistency arises and both utterances receive an
intuitively appropriate interpretation, relative to a shared global background B.
The treatment of local accommodation that will be presented in section 6.4 sup-
ports this analysis. Note that in the course of the exchange, the hearer’s possible
models of the background B change from ones that entails that Mark has a sec-
retary to ones that entail that Mark does not have a secretary. The denial causes
a nonmonotonic update of the discourse meaning.
While intuitive judgements about consistency are usually clear and the pre-
dictions that follow from Global Consistency are generally correct, informativity
is a more complex notion, both in terms of the intuitions that it is supposed to
capture and in terms of the formal conditions that should reflect these intuitions.
The predictions that follow from Global Informativity are sometimes unexpected,
notably where the information growth that may result from global accommoda-
tion is concerned. The following three examples illustrate this.
First, observe that when a sentence contains an anaphoric or presuppositional
element, Global Informativity blocks readings that result from binding relations
which make the sentence uninformative in its context of interpretation. Consider
(6.23) ? A1 mule is feeding. The1 mule is feeding.
The question mark indicates our intuitive judgement: the discourse is marked
somehow, but not strongly infelicitous. Given resolution of ‘the mule’ in the second
sentence to ‘a mule’ in the first one, the second sentence is not informative. Global
Informativity predicts that this reading is ungrammatical.28
Now compare (6.24), where the presupposition triggered by the definite de-
scription in the second sentence induces global accommodation and hence in-
formation growth. This is a so-called partial matching case, as was discussed in
section 6.2. The discourse meaning resulting after the update induced by the sec-
ond sentence entails that Pedro is a lucky man, which it did not before. Hence,
Global Informativity is satisfied, and the second sentence in (6.24) is predicted
to be informative.
27Compare the lexical description of discourse relation denial shown in (6.44) further on.
This in fact mimics the treatment of denials proposed in van der Sandt (1991), where the total
information content of denied statements ends up in the scope of a negation.
28Global Informativity would in principle allow for a reading resulting from globally accom-
modating the existence of another mule, but that reading should be excluded on independent
grounds. We have seen similar examples of this in section 6.2. If we accept a general preference
for binding presuppositions to overt antecedents over binding them to accommodated discourse
markers, we get the prediction that the reading resulting from global accommodatin is dispre-
ferred. In addition, it may be assumed that topicality requirements on the binder of the definite
description, and a general preference for avoiding ambiguity make this reading dispreferred.
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(6.24) Pedro1 owns a mule. The1 lucky man owns a mule!
Finally, observe that if the second sentence in (6.24) is repeated, the resulting
third sentence is predicted to be uninformative, and the discourse as a whole
ungrammatical:
(6.25) Pedro1 owns a mule.
The1 lucky man owns a mule!
The1 lucky man owns a mule!!
The discourse in (6.25) does not seem to be much less acceptable than the one in
(6.24), however. In each case, the second sentence functions as a kind of emotional
strengthening of the first, and in the case of (6.25) the third sentence provides ad-
ditional strengthening. Maybe what one would like to say about these data is that
discourse contributions which serve as emotional strengthenings of a statement
come with their own kind of informativity. Furthermore, there may be stylistic or
literary reasons for repeating information, and this is not necessarily perceived as
unfelicitous discourse.
It is open for discussion whether such predictions are desirable or not. As was
tentatively concluded in chapter 4, Global Informativity can be assumed to have
a limited scope and apply only to discourse contributions which act at the level
of plain semantic content, rather than participants’ attitudes, and which figure in
discourse aimed at information exchange. It could be argued that the continua-
tions in (6.24) and (6.25) serve a different purpose, and are therefore not subject
to Global Informativity. But then our explanation of these examples changes: the
acceptability of the continuation in (6.24) is not due to the information growth
induced by its presupposition, but to its particular rhetorical function in the
discourse.
In line with this perspective, it could perhaps be assumed that Global Infor-
mativity is a preference, rather than a (hard) constraint in the grammar. As in
Asher and Lascarides (2003) it could then be assumed that more specific pref-
erences, or constraints associated with particular discourse relations or linguistic
constructs, overrule Global Informativity, when they apply. This would place
Global Informativity in the realm of the pragmatics rather than the semantics of
our discourse theory. In fact, we propose to take a more radical step, and drop
Global Informativity altogether, in favour of local informativity constraints.
As was suggested in chapter 4, the theory of informativity in our grammar can
be fine-tuned by means of informativity or appropriateness conditions associated
with clause and discourse operators in the lexicon. Whereas Global Informativity
is a requirement on the update effect of discourse contributions, local informa-
tivity conditions constrain the relation between a discourse unit and its local
context. To illustrate, here’s a picture of a lexical description of discourse relation
elaboration, containing a local informativity condition. It is labeled [inf].
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(6.26) S+k1
σk2 ⊕ σk4
[lrp] wr :̺k1 =̺k2 , wr :̺k4⊆̺k2
S−k2
Γk2 = Γk1
Sk3
Relk
elaboration
S−k4
Γk4 = Γk2 ⊕ σk2
[inf] Γk4 6|≍ σk4
In principle, the individual informativity requirements of particular rhetorical
types of discourse contributions can be captured by means of local informativity
conditions.29 Interestingly, in the case of the ‘emotional strengthenings’ discussed
above, it would be the absence of local informativity constraints which would
characterise these contributions. A treatment with local informativity constraints
would predict the continuations in (6.24) and (6.25) to be uninformative, and
hence unacceptable, because, unlike Global Informativity, the local constraint
would apply to the semantic content of the second sentence, rather than its total
update effect.
Since every sentence that serves as the vehicle for a discourse contribution
is represented by a discourse unit in the resulting discourse description, the ex-
planatory power of Global Informativity can be maintained by adding local in-
formativity constraints to all discourse operators. Information growth induced by
accommodation can be accounted for by either or not setting local informativity
constraints on background information. As we saw in section 4.4.5 of chapter 4,
however, if we assign local informativity requirements to all S-nodes in a discourse
structure the resulting discourse theory easily becomes too strong. The investi-
gations in the next section will confirm this finding, and will lead us to conclude
that local informativity conditions can better be treated as ‘soft constraints’, or
constraints that can be violated, in the manner of Optimality Theory.
6.3.2 Van der Sandt’s Acceptability Conditions
Conditions on the consistency or informativity of assertions or updates figure in
most theories of discourse interpretation. In the anaphoric approach to presup-
position projection they are incorporated as acceptability constraints on possible
29Though only indirectly. The assumption that there is a 1-to-1 correspondence between
rhetorical types of discourse contributions and the discourse operators in the lexicon can hardly
be maintained in our grammar. In general a composite of discourse operators can be involved
in conveying a single discourse contribution. Furthermore, discourse contributions are charac-
terised at meta-level, by their update effect on discourse meanings, whereas discourse operators
constrain the compositional semantics of discourse at object level. A characterising feature such
as a local informativity constraint of a particular discourse operator is not necessarily inherited
by the update as a whole.
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solutions, see Van der Sandt (1988) and (1992). Various constraints on binding
and accessibility result in a set of ‘logically possible interpretations’ of a sentence.
The acceptibility constraints filter out the contextually acceptable solutions or
admissible resolutions among these. Interestingly, Van der Sandt proposes not
just global, but also what we would call, in line with Beaver’s (2001) discussion
of these constraints, local conditions on consistency and informativity. They play
a crucial role in accounting for cases of presupposition resolution in which accom-
modation on subordinate levels of DRSs is preferred over global accommodation.
Van der Sandt’s acceptability constraints are listed in definition 6.1 below.30
The definition builds on the following notions and use of terminology. The
incoming DRS is the DRS representing the discourse processed so far, which is
updated when a new sentence in the discourse is interpreted. When a sentence
containing one or more anaphoric expressions or presuppositional elements is
processed, this results in an unresolved or preliminary DRS, containing a so-called
A-structure. A-structures are DRSs, representing the semantics of the anaphoric
or presuppositional elements in the sentence. An A-structure can be complex,
since one anaphoric expression may embed another. Preliminary DRSs are not
assigned an interpretation; only when they are merged with the incoming DRS,
and when all the anaphoric and presuppositional elements (or A-structures) have
been resolved, the resulting DRS is interpretable. We call this a possible output
DRS .
Anaphora and presupposition resolution may take the form of either binding
or accommodation. Both operations basically consist in the movement of the
‘anaphoric’ discourse marker and, when present, the conditions characterising
the descriptive content of the anaphor or presupposition, to a target DRS on the
accessibility path upward from the position of the anaphoric expression or the
A-structure under consideration. In the case of binding, the ‘anaphoric’ discourse
marker is, in addition, identified with an ‘antecedent’ marker in the universe of
the target DRS. To facilitate comparison with our own approach we split out
clause (iiia) and (iiib) of the original definition in Van der Sandt (1992), p. 367.
6.1. Definition. Admissible Resolutions (Van der Sandt 1992)
Let K0 be the incoming DRS, K1 the merge of a DRS with K0 and K
′
1 a possible
resolution of K1. The resolution of K0 to K
′
1 is subject to the following conditions
in order to be admissible:
1. An output DRS K ′1 is informative with respect to the incoming DRS K0,
that is, K0 does not entail K
′
1.
30A distinction between ‘local’ and ‘global’ constraints is made as well in Beaver’s reformu-
lation (Beaver 2001) of the acceptability conditions on presupposition resolution and accom-
modation of Van der Sandt (1992). Beaver’s ‘Global Informativity’ (definition D19, page 107)
corresponds to our Global Informativity condition. His ‘Local Informativity’ corresponds to
what we shall call local, or individuated informativity conditions further on, i.e. informativ-
ity conditions on local contexts. His ‘Consistency’ corresponds to what would be consistency
conditions on local contexts in our grammar, and covers global consistency as a special case.
204 CHAPTER 6. PRESUPPOSITION THEORY
2. Resolving K0 to K
′
1 maintains consistency.
3. Resolving K0 to K
′
1 does not give rise to a structure in which some subor-
dinate DRS Ki is entailed by the DRSs which are superordinate to it.
4. Resolving K0 toK
′
1 does not give rise to a structure in which the negation of
some subordinate DRS Ki is entailed by the DRSs which are superordinate
to it.
The first two conditions in this definition are modeled in LDG by Global Infor-
mativity and Global Consistency, respectively. The other two conditions can be
stated as follows, on the assumption that ‘DRSs that are superordinate to a DRS
Ki’ correspond to local contexts in LDG.
31
Local Informativity ∀k [ ℓ(k)=s→ Γk 6|≍σk]
Local Consistency ∀k [ ℓ(k)=s→ Γk 6|≍ [ | not σk] ]
This introduces informativity and consistency requirements on the semantic val-
ues of all S-clauses or discourse units in a discourse structure. Local informativity
and consistency constraints on the arguments of individual discourse connectives
and relations can be inferred from these conditions, and integrated in their lex-
ical descriptions. To illustrate, for the connectives ‘or’, and ‘if’, this implies the
following. Local informativity conditions are labeled by [inf], local consistency
conditions by [con].
(6.27) S+k1
[ |σk2 or σk3 ]
S−k2
Γk2 = Γk1
[inf] Γk2 6|≍ σk2
[con] Γk2 6|≍ [ |not σk2 ]
Conk
or
S−k3
Γk3 = Γk1 ⊕ [ |not σk2 ]
[inf] Γk3 6|≍ σk3
[con] Γk3 6|≍ [ |not σk3 ]
31Note that our local contexts have been constructed in the style of Karttunen (1974), so
that in some cases the information present in a local context diverges from what would be the
corresponding embedding context in standard DRT. For example, with disjunctive connectives
or discourse relations, we have that the local context of the right disjunct contains the negation
of the semantic value of the left disjunct, whereas in DRT, the left disjunct is simply inaccessible.
A full correspondence with DRT may be obtained by slightly changing the construction recipes
of local contexts in the descriptions of the relevant discourse operators and connectives.
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(6.28) S+k1
[ |σk2 ⇒ σk3 ]
Sk4
Sk
if
S−k2
Γk2 = Γk1
[inf] Γk2 6|≍ σk2
[con] Γk2 6|≍ [ |not σk2 ]
S−k3
Γk3 = Γk1 ⊕ σk2
[inf] Γk3 6|≍ σk3
[con] Γk3 6|≍ [ |not σk3 ]
If we want to implement definition 6.1 close to the letter, local consistency and
informativity conditions should not be assigned to discourse connectives and dis-
course relations such as ‘and’ and elaboration, whose output semantics is defined
just in terms of the merge operator. The conditions 3. and 4. in definition 6.1
apply only when there is a relation of subordination between Ki and the embed-
ding DRS, and in DRT there is no subordination relation between left and right
arguments of the merge or conjugation operation. Given the discourse syntactic
structure available in LDG, however, our treatment generates local informativity
and consistency constraints for the arguments of conjunctive discourse operators
as well. We will have, for instance
(6.29) S+k1
σk2 ⊕ σk3
S−k2
Γk2 = Γk1
[inf] Γk2 6|≍ σk2
[con] Γk2 6|≍ [ |not σk2 ]
Conk
and
S−k3
Γk3 = Γk1 ⊕ σk2
[inf] Γk3 6|≍ σk3
[con] Γk3 6|≍ [ |not σk3 ]
This can be useful in explaining the infelicitousness of sentences in which one of
the conjuncts is not informative, given what is presupposed earlier. The following
pair of examples illustrates this.32
(6.30) a. Holland has a queen, and the queen of Holland lives in The Hague.
b. # The queen of Holland lives in The Hague and Holland has a queen.
Intuitively, (6.30b) is infelicitous because the right conjunct is not informative in
the context of the left conjunct. The local informativity condition on the right ar-
gument of the connective ‘and’ in (6.29) accounts for this. The definite description
in the first conjunct triggers the accommodation of the information that there is a
32The same point is discussed in Stalnaker (1974), relative to the example ‘Harry’s wife is
great cook, and Harry is married.’ See also Beaver (2001) on this topic.
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queen of Holland. Relative to the resulting local context, the informativity condi-
tion of the right argument of the conjunction is not satisfied. Hence, the discourse
is predicted to be infelicitous. In contrast, in (6.30a) the informativity condition
of the right argument of the conjunction is satisfied. A similar argument can be
made in favour of the local informativity condition on the left argument. As noted
before, however, if local informativity conditions are accepted in conjunctive con-
structions the resulting discourse theory easily becomes too strong, due to the
interaction with other appropriateness constraints.
The implementation of Van der Sandt’s acceptability conditions in LDG opens
up the possibility to investigate these requirements as integrated in a more en-
compassing discourse theory. For a start, we may ask what intuitive notion of
‘informativity’ is captured by local informativity conditions. Global Informativ-
ity expresses a felicity condition on assertions, that is, discourse contributions of
a certain rethorical type, and it is reasonably clear what sort of intuitions underly
that requirement. But what do local informativity conditions stand for? As Van
der Sandt puts it, in incremental terms one could say that no provisional update
may lead to inconsistency and each provisional update should at least provide
some new information. Correspondingly, the conditions in definition 6.1 mark for
instance the pieces of discourse in (6.31) as unacceptable.
(6.31) a. ? John has a dog. If he has a dog, he has a cat.
b. ? John has a dog. If he has a cat, he has no dog.
c. ? John has no dog. Either he has a dog or he has a cat.
Van der Sandt (1992), ex.(63a-c), p.368
The informativity and consistency conditions attached to the connectives ‘if’ and
‘or’ in our grammar predict these texts to be ungrammatical: (6.31a) violates
local informativity on the antecedent of the conditional, (6.31b) violates local
consistency on the consequent of the conditional, and (6.31c) violates local in-
formativity on the left argument of the disjunction. According to our intuitions,
however, the texts in (6.31) are just ‘marked’ or slightly infelicitous, when uttered
out-of-the-blue. Thus, the local informativity and consistency conditions are more
constraining than our intuitive judgement of the data warrants.
As Van der Sandt observes, a local violation of consistency or informativeness
need not give rise to uninformativeness of the whole utterance processed. It often
signals that the information carried by the utterance is conveyed in an unneces-
sarily redundant and complex way. If, for example, φ has already been established
in the context of interpretation, a statement of the form ‘if φ then ψ’ is clearly
informative, since it tells us that ψ is the case. However, the same information
could have been conveyed in a shorter and thus more efficient way simply by
stating ψ. Efficiency and (global) informativeness thus are distinct notions, Van
der Sandt concludes.
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If this is on the right track, it is questionable whether violations of efficiency
deserve the heavy penalty they are getting now in our grammar, namely the pre-
diction that the resulting discourse is ungrammatical. A less stringent treatment,
which would predict that these cases are dispreferred rather than ungrammat-
ical, might be more appropriate. But this would mean that local informativity
constraints should not be treated on a par with the other (syntactic and seman-
tic) constraints in the grammar. They could perhaps be made to follow as ‘soft
constraints’ from a general preference for more efficient formulations over less
efficient ones. Local Informativity and Local Consistency could be seen as
the embodiment of that preference.
Setting this matter aside for the moment, let us take a look at some more
examples. The predictions that follow from local informativity conditions in the
grammar generally do better on presuppositional information than on semantic
contents, and in fact constitute the main reason for incorporating them in the
discourse theory. As Van der Sandt argues, there are classes of examples in which
the only admissible readings of a sentence are non-presupposing ones,33 and this
can be explained in terms of the local consistency and informativity constraints.
These examples are characterised by the fact that what is presupposed by one
argument of a connective is either entailed or contradicted by the other argument
in the context of interpretation. Consider the following case, which is a variant of
example (69) in Van der Sandt (1992).
(6.32) If John1 is married, he brings his1 wife
2.
Given resolution of the possessive ‘his’ to ‘John’, the definite description triggers
the presuppositional condition that John has a wife. Intuitively, a hearer does not
conclude from (6.32) that John is married, in other words, the conditional as a
whole is not presupposing. Given the local informativity condition associated with
the antecedent of the conditional, this is precisely what the grammar predicts.
The condition prevents global accommodation: if it were globally accommodated
that John has a wife, the informativity requirement on ‘John is married’ could
not be satisfied. The only reading allowed by the grammar is a non-presupposing
one, which can be paraphrased as “If John is married, he has a wife and he brings
her” or as “If John is married and has a wife, he brings her”. In the absence of
the local informativity constraint, the grammar would predict there is a possible
presupposing reading as well. In a similar way, nonpresupposing readings of dis-
junctive statements can be accounted for in terms of local consistency constraints
attached to the disjunctive operator.
Notwithstanding these positive effects of incorporating local informativity and
consistency constraints, the overall strength of the grammar continues to be a
problem, if local informativity and consistency conditions are attached freely to
33A non-presupposing reading of a sentence results when the presuppositional material in the
sentence is not globally bound or accommodated, in the Van der Sandtian sense of these terms.
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all available arguments of the relevant discourse and sentence operators, and
figure as hard constraints rather than preferences. Consider
(6.33) If John1 brings his1 wife
2, he1 is married.
The conditional is perfectly acceptable in a nonpresupposing reading which can be
paraphrased as “If John brings a person who is his wife, then he is married”. This
reading is predicted to be unacceptable, however, because the local informativity
condition on the consequent of the conditional cannot be satisfied: John’s having a
wife implies that he is married. The fact that the reading exists is not surprising,
since conditionals generally serve to express that if (in the given context) the
antecedent holds, the consequent follows. We conclude that at least for certain
uses of the conditional, the local informativity requirement on the consequent of
a conditional should be dropped, or allowed to be overruled.34 In fact, the local
informativity constraint on the antecedent of the conditional is also unwanted in
certain cases. The following discourse illustrates this.
(6.34) George will be present at the party,
and if George will be there, I’m not coming.
Intuitively, the conditional in (6.34) is felicitous in the context in which it is ut-
tered. The speaker conveys that she is not coming to the party, and is making
explicit the reasoning behind this decision. The discourse is predicted to be unac-
ceptable, however, because the local informativity condition on the antecedent of
the conditional is violated. We have seen this type of example before in (6.31a). It
was suggested then that violations of local informativity conditions predict ineffi-
ciency rather than uninformativeness of the statement under consideration. The
example (6.34) does not seem particularly inefficient to us, however, or infelicitous
in any other way. It simply instantiates one of the possible uses of conditionals in
discourse. In section 4.4.5 of chapter 4, a more extreme instance of this use was
mentioned, namely the use of a conditional statement in the context of a proof by
modus ponens. There, the antecedent is typically not informative; it might even
be claimed that it is required to be uninformative.
6.3.3 Conclusion - Ways to Go
Starting out from the idea that a theory of informativity can be incorporated
in the grammar of our framework of discourse interpretation, we specified two
34We might even consider replacing the informativity and consistency constraints by a re-
quirement that expresses the consequential relation inherent in conditionals, [csq] Γk3 |≍ σk3 .
As was argued in section 4.4.5 of chapter 4, however, the condition [csq] easily gets into conflict
with informativity constraints. In fact, if we adopt [csq] the only reading of (6.33) allowed by
the grammar is one in which the local [csq] requirement induces global accommodation of the
conditional statement, and hence information growth. So perhaps it is better to refrain from
the [csq] condition.
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global constraints on discourse meanings, and proposed that the resulting theory
of informativity can be refined by adding local informativity and consistency
conditions to elements in the lexicon. In fact, we proposed to replace the metalevel
Global Informativity condition altogether by (object level) local constraints.
As we saw, the acceptability conditions on sentence interpretation formulated
in Van der Sandt (1992) can be implemented by means of informativity and con-
sistency conditions in our grammar. Testing the predictions of the theory, we got
a rather mixed result: in some cases the predictions fit our intuitive judgement
of the data, in others they exclude discourses which intuitively speaking are ac-
ceptable. This suggests that our treatment is in some respects too restrictive or
not flexible enough. We can think of some different ways of obtaining a better fit
between the linguistic observations and the formal treatment. We mention them
here without making a definite choice, further research will have to show what
the most succesful approach will be.
Firstly, we can escape the unwanted predictions by assuming that local in-
formativity constraints, when they obtain, are not introduced in the lexicon, but
are ‘soft constraints’ which follow from general preferences on, among others, the
informativity of assertions, and efficiency of formulation. This type of account
clearly calls for a further specification of the preference system. It might for in-
stance be assumed that a preference for efficient formulation is counterpoised by a
preference for easy traceability or ‘perspicuity’ by the hearer. One would still have
to explain why in some exchanges the preference for efficiency wins over the pref-
erence for traceability, while in cases such as (6.34) it does not. The implication of
this solution is that the theory of informativity is a matter of pragmatics rather
than semantics. The predictions of this type of account will be more flexible, but
also much less clearcut, as long as the preference system itself is open ended.
As for a practical implementation, perhaps a treatment with violable constraints
along the lines of Optimality Theory could be provided.35
An alternative solution would be to assume that different uses of constructs
such as conditionals come with different local informativity constraints, and to
underspecify lexical descriptions of conditionals for these different uses. A disam-
biguating feature for ‘text-genre’ or ‘use’ such as logical proof, or plain information
exchange, might be added to the grammar, and discourse operators made sensitive
to this feature. This solution only has explanatory power if, in general, discourse
contexts are sufficiently specific or informative to disambiguate the different uses
or genres. An important factor in disambiguating between different informational
variants of connectives may well be the topic structure of discourse. The selection
of one specification or another of the connective could be linked to what is the
local discourse topic, or topmost issue under discussion, given the attachment of
the connective or discourse relation.
35See Hendriks and de Hoop (2001) and Blutner and Zeevat (2004), for an entrance to the
literature on semantics and pragmatics in OT.
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Finally, we could drop the local informativity constraints as they were for-
mulated in the above, and try to provide alternative conditions that are better
tuned to account for the data under consideration. This is the line of reasoning
taken in Asher and Lascarides (1998b) and (2003), where specific requirements
associated with the use of conditional constructions and discourse relations, in
interaction with the update operation as such, and their principle of Maximising
Discourse Coherence account for the data.36 The specific requirements associated
with conditionals essentially capture the relation of logical dependence between
antecedent and consequent. If the local incorporation of presuppositional mate-
rial contributes to the naturalness of the relation of dependence rather than not,
it is predicted to be preferred over global insertion. A treatment like this could
in principle be modeled in LDG by associating appropriateness conditions that
capture the dependency with conditional connectives or discourse operators.
6.4 Generalised Accommodation
As it stands, our discourse grammar handles only global accommodation or speci-
fication of the implicit background of the conversation B. The hearer may accept
general information in the implicit background, for the purpose of obtaining a
suitable interpretation of a newly processed utterance in the ongoing discourse.
The background must support what is presupposed, and the discourse meaning
as a whole must be plausible given the hearer’s world knowledge, common sense
reasoning and preferences. As in the anaphoric approach to presupposition pro-
jection, information which is globally accommodated ends up in the main DRS of
the discourse meaning, and is entailed by it. Unlike that approach, however, what
is globally accommodated need not be identical to the presuppositional material
of a given trigger, it can be any piece of world knowledge or general knowledge.
Although it can perhaps be argued that global accommodation is all that is
needed in presupposition theory, see for instance Van Rooij (2005), most theories
employ forms of local and intermediate accommodation, in order to account for
presuppositional sentences whose presuppositions do not project to the level of
the main context. Local and intermediate accommodation may be defined as
accommodation relative to some local context other than the initial or main
context of interpretation such that the accommodated information is not entailed
by the resulting discourse meaning. In the anaphoric approach to presupposition
what is accommodated locally or intermediately ends up in a subordinated DRS,
rather than the main one. Local accommodation is accommodation which results
in the expansion of the smallest DRS that contains the condition(s) in which the
semantic value of the anaphor or presupposition trigger figures. Accommodation
36Asher and Lascarides argue, on the basis of a different set of data then discussed here,
that the informativity and consistency requirements are somewhat too weak to account for
projection facts.
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resulting in the expansion of a DRS strictly subordinating the smallest one, other
than the main one, is called intermediate accommodation.
In this section we put forward an extension of the grammar which allows for
local and intermediate accommodation as well as global accommodation. Intu-
itively speaking, the idea that background information may occasionally help to
strengthen the semantic content of a discourse rather than constrain the initial
context of interpretation is not implausible. Presuppositions may constrain local
contexts other than B, and say something about situations or states that are
in a way subordinate to the actual state of affairs the discourse as a whole is
assumed to be ‘about’. From this point of view, it seems natural to attempt a
generalisation of our treatment to accommodation within σr. We shall call this
content modification. From a practical point of view, we simply want to facilitate
the integration in LDG of approaches to presupposition theory that employ local,
or local and intermediate accommodation.
After an informal discussion of some basic cases, in which intuitively speak-
ing, presuppositions do not project to top level (section 6.4.1), we will turn to an
implementation of content modification in LDG (section 6.4.2). The basic idea
will be that accommodation as such need not be restricted to the implicit general
background B alone, but that all discourse units in a discourse tree structure
come with their own local background, and that these local backgrounds be-
come specified as a consequence of the interpretation process. To avoid unwanted
weakening of discourse meanings as a result of partial underspecification of local
backgrounds, they shall be required to be fully specified and constructed of lin-
guistically generated material only. Thus, content modification is resource bound.
As such, it closely corresponds to the constructive notion of accommodation of
Van der Sandt (1992) c.s. In fact, a full correspondence with the anaphoric ac-
count of presupposition projection can be obtained by making B resource bound
as well. Since we are interested in combining the Karttunen (1974)-style treat-
ment of presupposition with the anaphoric approach we will not do that here,
however.
In the resulting treatment, a given presupposition can be satisfied via accom-
modation of the presuppositional material in any one of the local backgrounds on
the accessibility path from the trigger upwards to the main DRS of the discourse
meaning, including the local background of the root node. In principle, each of
these options constitutes a possible reading of the discourse containing the trig-
ger. At the same time, further specification of the general background B may take
place. Global accommodation and content modification come out as qualitatively
different forms of accommodation, which can co-occur. Overgeneration is avoided
through interaction with the interpreting agent’s preference system and common
sense reasoning. In section 6.4.3 various preferences are discussed. This includes
the central preferences in the anaphoric approach to presupposition, as well as the
preference for plausible readings commonly adopted in the satisfaction approach.
In addition, we will propose a preference for minimizing local backgrounds, on
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the basis of a general economy principle.
6.4.1 Some Examples of Nonpresupposing Discourse
We have already seen some examples in which, intuitively speaking, the most
preferred reading of a possibly complex sentence is a nonpresupposing one. That
is, a reading in which the presupposition under consideration is not bound and
satisfied in the context of interpretation of the whole sentence, or made to be
so through global accommodation.37 Nonpresupposing readings are the ones that
call for some form of local or intermediate accommodation, if accommodation is
required. Consider the following basic case.38
(6.35) If John1 is married, he brings his1 wife
2.
Intuitively speaking, when uttered in an out-of-the-blue context, the most pre-
ferred reading of the conditional in (6.35) is a nonpresupposing one; we do not
conclude from (6.35) that John has a wife. The reason for this is that, given world
knowledge and common sense reasoning, John’s having a wife depends on John
being married or not. On the assumption that the latter issue is undecided as
yet, it cannot be concluded that John has a wife. The most preferred readings
are ones in which the presupposition is bound and satisfied in the scope of the
conditional. They can be paraphrased as “If John is married, he has a wife and
he brings her” and “If John is married and has a wife, he brings her.”
According to our intuitions, a reading in which we accept globally that John
is married and has a wife, is not impossible but strongly dispreferred in an out-
of-the blue context.39 In the spirit of the satisfaction approach to presupposition,
it may be assumed that the preference for the nonpresupposing reading results
from the interpreting agent’s reasoning about world knowledge and a preference
for selecting most plausible discourse meanings. In line with the anaphoric ap-
proach, the preference can be explained in terms of a local informativity condition
associated with the antecedent of the conditional.
37We are using terminology in the sense of our own treatment here, in which presuppositional
conditions must be satisfied in their local context given binding of the discourse markers free
in them. Anaphoric presupposition triggers are always bound, either by a linguistic antecedent
or by accommodated material. In Van der Sandt’s approach presuppositions are either bound
or accommodated.
38Note that in the satisfaction approach, the presupposition triggered by ‘his wife’ in (6.35)
is satisfied directly in the local context established by the antecedent of the conditional, given
the resolution of ‘his’ to ‘John’. No local or intermediate accommodation is necessary. The
reason is that the presuppositional material is existentially bound rather than anaphoric. In
our combined approach, however, the presuppositional material is anaphoric, that is, the main
discourse marker is free in it. Hence, a binder must be accommodated in order to satisfy the
presupposition.
39A context of utterance in which this reading comes out as the preferred one is one in which
the conditional is part of a modus ponens argument. This use of conditionals was touched upon
in section 6.3.
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If there is no logical dependence between the antecedent of the conditional
and the presupposition, the presuppositional material may escape the scope of
the conditional. This is illustrated by the following example. In this case, the most
preferred reading of the conditional in an out-of-the-blue context is a presupposing
one.
(6.36) If John1 is coming to the conference, he brings his1wife
2.
We prefer a reading of (6.36) from which it can be concluded that John has a wife.
Given world knowledge and common sense reasoning, John’s having a wife does
not depend on his coming to the conference. Since many men are married, it may
simply be accepted globally that John has a wife. According to our intuitions,
there are two nonpresupposing possible readings, which are both dispreferred in
an out-of-the-blue context. One of these can be paraphrased as “If John is coming
to the conference he has a wife and he brings her.” This is an implausible reading
because it implies that John’s having a wife somehow depends on his coming to
the conference.
The other nonpresupposing reading can be paraphrased as “If John is coming
to the conference and he has a wife, he brings her.” It cannot very well be argued
that this is an implausible reading. Still, it is clearly less preferred than the presup-
posing reading of (6.36). In line with the anaphoric approach, the preference for
the presupposing reading may be accounted for in terms of a general preference for
global accommodation over local or intermediate accommodation. Alternatively
it could perhaps be explained in terms of specific appropriateness conditions as-
sociated with conditionals. It might be assumed that presuppositional material
is only accommodated in the scope of a conditional if it nontrivially depends on
the antecedent, given the context of interpretation.
The idea that a theory of presupposition requires a treatment of intermediate
accommodation is often motivated on the basis of examples of the following kind.40
(6.38) Either Wilma isn’t married,
or she believes that her husband is deceiving her.
Geurts and van der Sandt (1998), ex. (32b)
(6.39) If a rich man crosses the city-centre,
he enjoys doing it in his fourwheel-drive.
40Additional evidence is provided in van der Sandt (2007), who discusses Kripke’s example
(6.37) The number of planets might have been necessarily even.
Kripke (1979) ex. (41)
where the interaction with background knowledge blocks both the ‘global’ and the ‘local read-
ing’. Only the reading resulting from intermediate accommodation—in the scope of the might-
operator but outside the scope of the necessity-operator—is acceptable.
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Consider (6.38). The definite description ‘her husband’ introduces a presupposi-
tional condition which must be satisfied in the local context established by the
disjunction and the belief operator in the second disjunct. Suppose we resolve
‘she’ and the two occurrences of ‘her’ to Wilma. Intuitively speaking, (6.38) is
not presupposing, that is, we do not conclude from the whole of (6.38) that Wilma
has a husband. The sentence has two nonpresupposing possible readings, which
can be paraphrased as in (6.40a) and (6.40b).
(6.40) a. Either Wilma is not married, or (she is married and) she has a hus-
band and she believes that he is deceiving her.
b. Either Wilma is not married, or she believes that (she is married and)
she has a husband and he is deceiving her.
We assume the material in parentheses is inferred in the interpretation process,
but not necessarily accommodated. In (6.40b) the presupposition is satisfied by
accommodating it at the deepest embedded available location, namely in the
scope of the belief operator in the right disjunct. This is local accommodation. In
(6.40a) the presupposition is satisfied by accommodating it one level less deeply
embedded, namely in the scope of the disjunction but outside the scope of the be-
lief operator. This is intermediate accommodation. To our taste, the ‘intermediate
reading’ (6.40a) is the most preferred one of the two.
Setting aside the question what the exact semantics of the belief operator
must be, the preference for a nonpresupposing reading over a presupposing one
can readily be understood. If—without taking a counterfactual or revisional point
of view—it is considered possible that Wilma is not married, it cannot be accepted
that she has a husband, because that would imply she is married. Global accom-
modation would result in an inconsistent local context, and hence an implausible
reading. In line with the anaphoric account of presupposition, local consistency
requirements can be associated with the individual disjuncts in order to prohibit
this. The preference for ‘intermediate’ (6.40a) over ‘local’ (6.40b) may perhaps
be explained in terms of the overall preference for more plausible readings over
less plausible ones, or, in line with Van der Sandt (1992) and Geurts (1999), in
terms of a preference for accommodation as closely as possible to the main DRS.
In the other example, here repeated in (6.41a), again, the most preferred read-
ing is often claimed to be one resulting from intermediate accommodation of the
presupposition triggered by ‘his fourwheel-drive’. We consider only readings where
the possessive pronoun ‘his’ resolves to ‘a rich man’ in the antecedent of the con-
ditional. Given that restriction, properness requirements exclude a presupposing
reading resulting from global accommodation. We consider two nonpresuppos-
ing readings, one resulting from intermediate accommodation and paraphrased
in (6.41b), the other resulting from local accommodation and paraphrased in
(6.41c).
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(6.41) a. If a rich man crosses the city-centre, he enjoys doing it in his fourwheel-
drive.
b. If a rich man owning a fourwheel-drive crosses the city-centre, he
enjoys crossing it in that car.
c. If a rich man crosses the city-centre, he owns a fourwheel-drive and
enjoys crossing it in that car.
(6.41b) is a statement about (the subset of) rich men who own a fourwheel-drive.
The reading can be considered plausible if the individuals under discussion can be
taken to be ‘rich men who own fourwheel-drives’. (6.41c) is a statement about rich
men, and implies that all rich men who cross the city-centre own fourwheel-drives.
This reading can be considered plausibe if it is accepted as general background
information that rich men normally own fourwheel-drives and if the individuals
under discussion can be taken to be default cases of rich men. Considering (6.41a)
in an out-of-the-blue context, reading (6.41b) seems to be preferred over reading
(6.41c). The anaphoric approach explains the preference for ‘intermediate’ (6.41b)
over ‘local’ (6.41c) in terms of a preference for accommodation as closely to the
main DRS as possible, as before. An explanantion in terms of a preference for most
plausible interpretations alone does not seem sufficient, though it could possibly
be argued that what needs to be accommodated to obtain a plausible reading of
‘local’ (6.41c) is overall more costly than is the case with ‘intermediate’ (6.41b).
Intuitions about ‘intermediate’ versus ‘local’ readings are, generally speaking,
subtle, and often disputed among authors. There is an ongoing debate about these
and similar data in relation to presupposition accommodation, domain restriction
in conditionals and quantificational constructions, and the topical structure of
discourse (Beaver 1994; Asher and Lascarides 1998b; Geurts and van der Sandt
1998; Asher and Lascarides 2003). We will not decide in this matter. However,
since we want our discourse theory to cover nonpresupposing readings like the
ones discussed above, we will make available the technical means to accommodate
locally and intermediately.
6.4.2 Content Modification—
Local, Intermediate, and in the Main DRS
We start out from the idea that accommodation need not be restricted to the
general background B of a discourse, but may apply to its semantic content σr as
well. We propose that accommodation may occur at any S-node k in the discourse
description and strengthen its semantic content with background information. In
particular, each S-node comes with an underspecified local background—beside
its local context—that may absorb presuppositional material. Local backgrounds
shall be merged with the semantic values of the nodes. The semantic content of
a discourse will be composed of the resulting values and local contexts will be
constructed in terms of them.
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We must take care now that our notion of discourse meaning does not become
to weak. Discourse meaning, in our underspecification formalism, is essentially
what can be deduced from B ⊕ σr given the discourse description, the gram-
mar, and the hearer’s world knowledge and preferences. Having underspecified
local backgrounds as components in the compositional semantics of discourse
leads to a weakening of the discourse meaning whenever an underspecified local
background sits in the scope of a logical operator other than plain conjunction.
The interpreting agent cannot draw the conclusions which intuitively speaking,
he should be able to draw. To remedy this, we require that local backgrounds
are resource bound, or more precisely, designated to be composed from linguisti-
cally generated material only. Though local backgrounds are underspecified, the
language user knows or can deduce what they are maximally composed of. The
possible specifications of a given local background can be summed up.
This can be implemented in the grammar in the following way. Every S-node
k in a discourse description, including the root node r, comes with a background
set b(k) of type νt, a possibly empty set of nodes. The nodes function as pointers
to linguistically generated material. In principle, any lexical element or implicit
anchor with accommodation potential can provide this material, but we focus
on anaphors and presupposition triggers here. These come with a value Πk of
type τ which constitutes the background material generated by the trigger. In
the case of anaphoric triggers, it is composed of the presuppositional material
plus a binder of the anaphoric marker of the trigger. To illustrate, (6.42) shows
updated versions of the lexical descriptions of the definite determiner ‘the’ and
the pronoun ‘he’. For elements in the lexicon with no accommodation potential,
the Π-value must be set to [ | ].
(6.42) definite det: DP+k1
σpik
σk ∈ Tk1
Γk1 |≍ σk2(σ
pi
k )
Πk = [σ
pi
k | ]⊕ σk2(σ
pi
k )
Dk
the
NP−k2
pronoun: DP+k1
σpik
σpik ∈ T
mostsalient
k1
Πk = [σ
pi
k | ]
Dk
he
When an underspecified binder σk is accommodated, a discourse marker that is
new in the domain of discourse must be chosen.
For every node k, a local background or background value βk of type τ is computed
from its background set b(k) by taking the (generalised) merge of the background
material at the nodes in b(k):41
41In this, and the following axioms, ∀k, k′[ k′ ∈ b(k)] stands for ∀k, k′[b(k)(k′)], and
∀k[βk =
⊕
{Πk′ | k′ ∈ b(k)} ] abbreviates the following statement:
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A23 ∀k[ βk =
⊕
{Πk′| k
′∈ b(k)} ]
In order to account for intermediate accommodation in conditionals and quantifier
structures, it may be assumed that S-nodes come, in addition, with a subsidiary
background set b¯(k) of type νt, likewise containing pointers to background ma-
terial. Axiom A23 must then be strengthened to A23′.
A23′ ∀k[ βk =
⊕
{Πk′| k
′∈ b(k)} ∧ β¯k =
⊕
{Πk′| k
′∈ b¯(k)} ]
In any given discourse tree structure, local backgrounds must be composed of
presuppositional material generated by the stretch of discourse they are the local
background of. The following axiom takes care of this.
A24 ∀k, k′[(k′∈ b(k) ∨ k′∈ b¯(k))→ (term(k) ∧ k ∗ k′)]
Axiom A24 says that background sets b(k), or b¯(k), contain only terminal nodes
k′ dominated by k. The effect of this is that the background value of an arbitrary
node or discourse unit k will be constructed only from background material intro-
duced by elements in the lexical yield of k. All of the material in it can be traced
back to lexical elements or implicit anchors occurring in the relevant stretch of
discourse.
Arguably, background material, if it is accommodated, can only be consumed
once. To avoid multiple accommodation, axiom A25 may be adopted.42
A25 ∀k, k′, k′′[(k′∈ b(k) ∧ k′∈ b(k′′))→ k′′ = k] and
∀k, k′, k′′[(k′∈ b¯(k)↔ k′ 6∈ b(k)) ∧ ((k′∈ b¯(k) ∧ k′∈ b¯(k′′))→ k′′ = k)]
Another option would be to adopt a preference for smaller, or smallest possible
local backgrounds. This will be discussed further on. The preference would result
in the prediction that cases of multiple accommodation are dispreferred in general,
though not excluded under all circumstances. If that prediction sufficiently fits
the data, A25 could be dropped in favour of the preference.
Background values are to be incorporated in the semantic content of discourse,
and in the local contexts of discourse constituents. We will do this by defining
the output semantic value of sentence and discourse operators in terms of the ‘in-
formation content’ of their arguments, where information contents are composed
of background values and semantic values. For each S-node k, its information
content ik is the merge of its background value and its semantic value:
∀k[∀v(fst(β(k))(v)↔ ∃k′(b(k)(k′) ∧ fst(Π(k′))(v)))∧
∀c(snd(β(k))(c)↔ ∃k′(b(k)(k′) ∧ snd(Π(k′))(c)))]
42But compare Zeevat (1992), who allows for accommodation of a single presupposition at
all levels of embedding downward from the level of accommodation maximally allowed by the
other constraints on the interpretation process, and who employs multiple accommodation to
account for presupposition projection in belief contexts.
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A26 ∀k[ℓ(k) = s → ik = βk ⊕ σk]
Discourse meanings may now be described as the update of the general back-
ground B with the information content of the discourse: B ⊕ ir.
As we said, the output semantic values of sentence and discourse operators are
composed of the information contents of their arguments, rather than their bare
semantic values. In the case of conditional connectives or discourse relations, and
quantificational operators other than the indefinite, they also employ subsidiary
background values.43 Likewise, local contexts incorporate background values: for
any given S-node k, its local context is constructed top down from the local
context of its mother node, the information content of left sister nodes when
present, and its own local background. All of this is laid down in the lexicon of
the grammar, as illustrated by the lexical descriptions in (6.43), (6.44) and (6.45).
In addition, the following axiom, which is a revised version of A18, sets the local
context of the root node r to B⊕βr and the local contexts of non S-nodes to the
local context of their mother node.
A18′ Γ(r) = B ⊕ βr ∧ ∀k1k2 [[k1  k2 ∧ ℓ(k2) 6= s]→ Γ(k2) = Γ(k1)]
(6.43)
S+k1
ik2 ⊕ ik3
S−k2
Γk2 = Γk1 ⊕ βk2
Conk
and
S−k3
Γk3 = Γk1 ⊕ ik2 ⊕ βk3
S+k1
[ | ik2 ⊕ β¯k3 ⇒ ik3 ]
Sk4
Subk
if
S−k2
Γk2 = Γk1 ⊕ βk2
S−k3
Γk3 = Γk1 ⊕ ik2 ⊕ β¯k3 ⊕ βk3
43These operators are often claimed to allow intermediate accommodation in their antecedent
or restrictor. The relation between the antecedent or restrictor and the presupposition trigger
cannot be described in our grammar purely in terms of the syntactic relation of dominance.
A description in terms of c-command would be feasible but would enforce a different syntactic
form on quantifiers than the one adopted in LDG. The subordination relation in DRT could
then be seen as a relation between nodes in the discouse tree structure and defined in terms
of c-command and dominance. However, we decided not to change the syntax of quantifiers
in our grammar and employ subsidiary background values instead. For those who believe that
‘intermediate readings’ of conditionals and quantifiers can, technically speaking, be obtained
through other means than intermediate accommodation of presuppositional material, the gram-
mar formalism can easily be adapted: the subsidiary background values and the axioms in the
grammar concerning them can simply be excluded or pruned.
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(6.44)
S+k1
[ | ik2 or ik3 ]
S−k2
Γk2 = Γk1 ⊕ βk2
Conk
or
S−k3
Γk3 = Γk1 ⊕ [ | not ik2 ]⊕ βk3
S+k1
[ | not ik2 ]⊕ ik4
S−k2
Γk2 = Γk1 ⊕ βk2
Sk3
Relk
denial
S−k4
Γk4 = Γk1 ⊕ [ |not ik2 ]⊕ βk4
[inc] Γk1 ⊕ ik2 |≍ [ |not ik4 ]
(6.45) S+k1
[uk | ]⊕ σk4(uk)⊕ ik2
S−k2
Γk2 = Γk1 ⊕ [uk | ]⊕ σk4 (uk)⊕ βk2
DP+k3
uk
Dk
a
NP−k4
S+k1
[ | ([uk | ]⊕ σk4 (uk)⊕ β¯k2)⇒ ik2 ]
S−k2
Γk2 = Γk1 ⊕ [uk | ]⊕ σk4(uk)⊕ β¯k2 ⊕ βk2
DP+k3
uk
Dk
every
NP−k4
With the above definitions and revised lexical descriptions put in place, the in-
formation content of a discourse ir can be modified or locally strengthened in the
interpretation process. As before, presuppositional elements contain a condition
which says that the presuppositional material must be entailed by the local con-
text of the element. That requirement may be satisfied directly, by binding the
presupposition trigger to a discourse marker which was already introduced by an
antecedent present in the discourse. It may also be satisfied by accommodating
the presuppositional material in one of the background values in the local context
of the trigger. In that case, the trigger is bound by the accommodated material.
All of this may co-occur with global accommodation, that is, the specification of
world knowledge in the implicit background to the conversation B.44
44In a brief paper, Hunter and Asher (2005) propose a treatment of presupposition, which,
like ours, is hybrid in the sense that it combines the possibility to satisfy a presupposition with
the option to accommodate or insert presuppositional material. As they say ‘presupposition is
resolvable in a sequence of contexts just in case some subsequence entails the presupposition
or it is accommodated at some element in the sequence. Resolving the presupposition means
choosing some witness for the existential quantifier that binds the presuppositional material.’
Satisfaction-plus-choosing a witness results in what we have called ‘binding’ readings in the
anaphoric approach. Insertion or accommodation of the presuppositional material corresponds
to ‘accommodation’ in the anaphoric approach. Their set-up seems to differ in perspective from
ours in the sense that the starting point of our treatment is that presuppositional conditions
are always there and must be satisfied. This may or may not involve accommodation. In our
treatment, accommodation and satisfaction are not viewed as alternative resolution procedures.
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While global accommodation implements the concept of accommodation of
the satisfaction approach to presupposition, content modification corresponds to
the notion of accommodation in the anaphoric approach. Our treatment of content
modification compares to the anaphoric approach in the sense that the readings
resulting in that approach from moving presuppositional or anaphoric material
along the accessibility path upward from a trigger and either binding or accom-
modating it in one of the locations along the path, are obtained by describing
all possible ‘landing sites’ for the presuppositional material while underspecify-
ing where it may actually end up. Thus, as in Keller’s (1997) implementation of
Van der Sandt (1992) in UDRT and Asher and Lascarides’s treatment in under-
specified SDRT, our underspecification formalism allows us to model parts of the
resolution procedure in the anaphoric account purely declaratively.
In the case of content modification, the material that is accommodated very
obviously satisfies the presuppositional condition. In a way, content modification
cuts short the reasoning which in our treatment justifies or explains accommo-
dation as such. There is no explicit constraint that says that the accommodated
material itself must be inferrable in the local context of the node where it is
inserted. So it seems that part of the explanatory force of the presuppositional
condition is lost.
This is only partially true, because for any given presupposition there is a
choice to be made between satisfying it through content modification or not.
Below we will propose a preference which, all other factors being equal, makes
content modification more costly than global accommodation, or no accommoda-
tion at all. Each possible reading comes with a certain cost, and finding out what
must be accommodated to obtain these readings, either globally or through con-
tent modification, is essential in computing the cost. Presuppositional conditions
set the necessary reasoning process going. Still, as will become clear when we go
through some examples, notably cases of bridging anaphora, there is some need to
recompensate for lost explanatory power. This will take the form of adding con-
straints on background values and their local context, regulating exactly where
presuppositional material ends up when content modification takes place.
6.4.3 Preferences
What counts as a possible landing site for presuppositional material is subject to
grammatical constraints. What may subsequently be selected as preferred pos-
sible readings depends on the hearer’s preferences and common sense reasoning.
Various constraints and preferences have been discussed in the preceding. The
anaphoric account to presupposition can be implemented to the letter by accept-
ing local and global informativity constraints (weak or strong) and by including
its preferences. The main preferences specified in Van der Sandt (1992) are, first,
a preference for ‘binding’ over ‘accommodation’, and, second, a preference for
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accommodation in the main DRS45 over local or intermediate accommodation. A
slightly more sophisticated version of the latter says that accommodation at the
least subordinated, or ‘highest’ possible level allowed by the other constraints on
the interpretation process is most preferred, see Geurts (2000; 2005).46
Given the treatment of presupposition theory in our grammar, the first pref-
erence translates as a preference for satisfying a presuppositional condition by
binding the presupposition trigger to a discourse marker which was linguistically
introduced by an explicit antecedent, over satisfying it by binding it to a discourse
marker that was accommodated in the interpretation process. The second comes
out as a preference for accommodation in B or in a background value βk such
that βk ⊑ (B ⊕ ir) over accommodation in a background value βk which is in
the scope of one or more subordinating operators in (B ⊕ ir). The preference for
accommodation at the least subordinated possible level can easily be defined in
terms of the subordination relation on sub-DRSs of (B ⊕ ir).
In order to model the anaphoric approach of Van der Sandt (1992) as closely as
possible, these preferences can be accepted as such in the framework of discourse
interpretation. We may also ponder a bit about what might explain these prefer-
ences, and whether they could possibly be made to follow from more general prin-
ciples of interpretation. In the case of the preference for binding to linguistically
introduced material over binding to accommodated material, it might be argued
that this is the effect of a general preference for maximally cohesive discourse. If
binding relative to an explicit antecent results in more cohesive discourse than
binding to inferred or accommodated information, the preference is explained.
But what is cohesion? Are readings resulting from accommodation, but satis-
fying all other constraints and preferences in the grammar, intuitively speaking
less cohesive than readings resulting from plain binding? Are readings resulting
from bridging anaphora perceived to be less cohesive than anaphors that resolve
directly to an antecent? It seems that making this argument involves defining
cohesion in terms of the preference: discourse is more cohesive if, among other
factors, the anaphors in it resolve through direct binding to some explicit an-
tecedent. This, we believe, is perfectly acceptable as a hypothesis about what
establishes cohesion in discourse, but it does not add very much to what we were
trying to explain.
Alternatively, the preference might be explained in terms of an economy prin-
ciple in the sense of Kamp (2001b), on the assumption that binding an anaphor
45This is global accommodation in the sense of the anaphoric account: presuppositional ma-
terial K is globally accommodated if it ends up in the main DRS of the discourse meaning,
that is, if K ⊑ (B ⊕ ir). This can result from ‘global accommodation’ in our sense, but also
from accommodation in any local background in ir which is not in the scope of a negation,
disjunction or implication.
46In fact, Geurts proposes something more general in his Buoyency Principle, namely that
all ‘backgrounded’ material tends to float up to the main DRS. This applies not only to accom-
modated, but also to bound presuppositional material.
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or a presupposition trigger to a binder that is already present in the local context
due to an overt antecedent is less costly than having to infer and accommodate a
binder. Kamp considers an economy principle “according to which presupposition
justification must make use of as much contextual information it can get hold of,
thereby minimising what remains to be supplied by accommodation.” He speci-
fies a preference which says that accommodating a DRS K is to be preferred over
accommodating a DRS K ′ iff there is a reason for preferring K over K ′ but not
for preferring K ′ over K. There is a reason for preferring K over K ′ if K ′ involves
at least as many new discourse referents as K, and, given an identification of
discourse markers in K ′ with marker in K that can be seen as playing the same
argument roles, the conditions of K ′ entail those of K.
A requirement similar to this can be formulated in our grammar. We propose
the following preference, which constrains the local background values of nodes.
It may be viewed as an implementation of the economy principle.
[Prefer smaller local backgrounds]
For all nodes k and DRSs K,K ′, prefer βk = K over βk = K
′ if K ⊑ K ′.
The effect of this preference is that readings resulting from nontrivial content
modification are predicted to be less preferred, or ‘more costly’, than those that
do not require content modification at all. The Van der Sandtian preference for
‘binding’ over ‘accommodation’ follows from this. A further consequence is that
readings in which a given anaphor is interpreted in terms of plain binding to
an explicit antecedent are predicted to be preferred over readings in which the
anaphor is bound via a bridging link. We could not say off-hand whether this is
observationally correct, but it is open for testing.47
Note that the preference for smaller local backgrounds does not say anything
about the costs of global accommodation or the specification of the implicit back-
ground B. As was suggested in previous sections, global accommodation comes
with variable costs, depending on factors as diverse as the plausibility or implau-
sibility of what is accommodated, the type of evidence available for what is to
be accommodated, and the authority of the speaker. It may be assumed that
the acceptance in B of information that counts as common knowledge between
discussion participants according to the interpreting agent is costless. It then
follows that, all other factors being equal, a reading resulting from satisfying a
presupposition by binding the trigger relative to globally accommodated common
knowledge is just as preferred as satisfying it through plain binding to an explicit
antecedent. Correspondingly, readings that require nothing more than the accep-
tance of common knowledge in B are predicted to be preferred over readings that
47It seems to be an implicit assumption in Van Deemter and Krahmer (1998), who provide a
resolution algorithm for anaphoric NP’s which tries to resolve them first through plain binding;
if that fails, resolution through partial matching or brdiging is attempted.
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require content modification. Again this may be tested.
We haven’t got an explanation yet for the other main preference in the anaphor-
ic account, the one in favour of accommodation in the main DRS of the discourse
meaning, or for accommodating ‘higher up’ on the accessibility path from a trigger
upward. The preference for smaller background values does not make accommo-
dation in a local background higher up on the accessibility path less costly than
accommodating it lower down, in other words, the economy principle does not
explain the effect. Let us consider some other factors that may possibly explain
it.
It has been suggested in some places48 that there is an overall preference for
logically stronger readings over weaker ones. This would explain the preference for
accommodation in the main DRS of the discourse meaning. It is not clear that the
preference for logically stronger readings is observationally correct, however. As
discussed in Geurts (2000), if we consider presupposition accommodation in the
scope of constructions headed by a universal quantifier, the preference predicts
that a presupposition triggered in the nucleus of the quantifier will preferably be
accommodated in the nucleus, because the resulting reading will be stronger than
the one resulting from accommodating it in the quantifier’s domain. According to
some people’s judgements, however, the reading resulting from accommodation
in the quantifier domain is preferred. Furthermore, the preference predicts that
the preferred readings of quantificational sentences vary systematically with the
choice of quantifier. This prediction is not born out.
Alternatively, an explanation might be given in terms of the general preference
for more plausible readings. On the basis of this preference accommodation in the
main DRS is to be expected whenever what is to be accommodated can be taken
to be normal or uncontroversial in the actual world, or in the state of affairs
the discourse is about, given the hearer’s world knowledge and common sense
reasoning. On the other hand, readings that describe exceptional or non-default
situations given the hearer’s background knowledge will be discredited. As was
suggested in section 6.4.1, however, the preference for more plausible readings
alone is not discriminating enough to account for all observations.
Moreover, the preference can be overruled. As is pointed out in Asher and
Lascarides (1998b), there are cases in which less plausible reading are preferred
over more plausible ones, while the preferred reading is one in which material is
accommodated in the main DRS. Thus, a preference for plausible readings can
only be a part of the explanation. The example they discuss, originating from
Beaver (1997), is shown in (6.46a). The presupposition under consideration is the
one triggered by ‘the knowledge that David is a computer program running on a
PC’. The ‘intermediate reading’ is paraphrased in (6.46b) the reading resulting
from global accommodation in (6.46b).
48See Dalrymple et al. (1998), Zeevat (1999), Blutner (2000), and Geurts (2000).
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(6.46) a. If David wrote the article, then the knowledge that David is a computer
program running on a PC will confound the editors.
b. If David wrote the article and he’s a computer program running on a
PC, then the knowledge that David is a computer program running on
a PC will confound the editors.
c. David is a computer program running on a PC, and if he wrote the
article, then the knowledge that David is a computer program running
on a PC will confound the editors.
The intuitively most preferred reading of (6.46a) is (6.46c). In terms of general
background knowledge, however, this a less plausible reading than (6.46b). Asher
and Lascarides explain this in terms of the interaction with the preference for
global accommodation. The example suggests to us that it may simply be a
default rule of interpretation that nominal descriptions are interpreted relative to
the here and now and the actual world wr, unless some explicit operator present
in the discourse indicates otherwise, or other constraints and preferences interfere.
The preference for global accommodation can be seen as an effect of this rule.
What we want to emphasize here is that preferences, by nature, can be over-
ruled, and that in explaining the observations the grammar and the preference
system must be taken as a whole. It is the interaction that explains the obser-
vations, not singular preferences. Plausibility is only one of the factors that may
account for the observation that readings resulting from accommodation in the
main DRS are generally preferred. We would like to mention two more factors
that may contribute to an explanation.
One is the sensitivity of anaphoric or presuppositional elements to the dis-
course topic structure or the topicality status of their binders. In section 5.4 and
section 6.2.7 it was proposed that pronouns and definite descriptions must have
binders that count as topical given the topic hierarchy of the embedding discourse.
When binders are accommodated in the course of the interpretation process they
are subject to this requirement and must count as topical elements given the pre-
ceding discourse as well. Since the discourse topics available to a given, embedded
clause may very well be established outside the scope of the operators embedding
it, it is not surprising that binders, when they are accommodated, end up outside
the scope of these operators as well.
The other is the potential impact of appropriateness conditions attached to
specific connectives or discourse relations. For instance, it might be assumed that
conditional connectives or discourse operators are most appropriately used when
given the context of interpretation, world knowledge and common sense reasoning,
there is a relation of logical dependence between the antecedent and the conse-
quent, and all of the conjunctive components in the antecedent or the consequent
contribute nontrivially to the dependence. Specifically it might be assumed that
background material is only appropriately present in the scope of the conditional
if it logically depends on the semantic value of the antecedent (and is not trivially
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satisfied in the sense that the local context of the conditional already supports
it). In line with our discussion in section 6.3 this could be implemented by means
of soft constraints on the local contexts of the arguments of the operator. Opti-
mally satisfying these constraints would then result in most preferred readings in
which presuppositional material is only captured in the scope of a conditional if
it logically depends on the antecedent, given the context of interpretation.
In sum, we have briefly considered the constraining effect of a preference for
logically stronger readings, a preference for more plausible readings, requirements
on the topicality status of binders, and appropriateness conditions associated
with individual sentence or discourse operaters. In our view, it is not implausible
that the observation that readings resulting from accommodating in the main
DRS of discourse meanings are generally preferred over readings resulting from
accommodating in subordinated locations can be accounted for in terms of the
interaction of these constraints and preferences. This claim can only be tested in
a fully developed and formally spelled out preference system, however.
Awaiting such testing, the preference for accommodating in the main DRS
may be accepted as such, since it appears to be observationally correct. If the
preference can be explained from principles, or independent preferences and con-
straints in the grammar, this only reinforces its credibility. As for the more sophis-
ticated variant of the preference which says that accommodation at less suborda-
tion locations is preferred over accommodation at more subordinated locations,
we are not certain that it is observationally correct. We feel the safest approach
here is to refrain from regulating anything and trust that the subtle intuitions
can eventually be explained in terms of interacting preferences and grammatical
constraints.
Concluding, the result of our considerations is that we have adopted a pref-
erence for minimizing local backgrounds, which implements a form of ‘economy’.
The more material is accepted in local backgrounds, the more costly the corre-
sponding reading is. We assume that in general costly readings must be avoided.
The preference for ‘binding’ over ‘accommodation’ in the anaphoric approach
to presupposition follows from this. The preference for ‘global accommodation’,
that is, accommodation in the main DRS of a discourse meaning, cannot be ex-
plained in terms of economy. It was suggested, however, that this preference may
well be an effect of independent preferences and constraints in framework of dis-
course interpretations. Awaiting further research, we adopted it explicitly in the
discourse theory. Meanwhile, factors such as the preference for more plausible
readings, constraints on the topical status of potential binders, consistency and
informativity requirements, and appropriateness conditions associated with indi-
vidual clause and discourse operators in the lexicon limit the number of possible
preferred readings each in their own way.
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6.5 The Extended Theory Applied
To end this chapter, let us go through some examples, and see how our ‘com-
bined approach’ to presupposition theory, enriched with the possibility to modify
the discourse content through the specification of local background information,
fares with them. As always, the interpretation of a sentence is modeled as a rea-
soning process. The hearer draws conclusions about the discourse meaning on
the basis of the discourse description resulting from processing the sentence in
its discourse context. Employing his grammatical knowledge, world knowledge,
and preferences, he determines the most preferred readings of the discourse. A
substantial part of his reasoning, as we will see, concerns the acceptance of back-
ground information.
We will start with a standard case of direct binding relative to an explicit
antecedent (section 6.5.1). Subsequently, we discuss a nonpresupposing condi-
tional sentence in which informativity constraints play an important role (section
6.5.2), a presupposing conditional which motivates the introduction of ‘justifica-
tion conditions’ on background material occurring in the scope of conditionals
(section 6.5.3), a nonpresupposing conditional which illustrates the phenomenon
of ‘trapping’ (section 6.5.4), a quantificational example which leads to some fur-
ther discussion of intermediate readings and domain restriction (section 6.5.5), a
case of bridging anaphora (section 6.5.6), a disjunctive nonpresupposing construc-
tion in which local consistency constraints play an essential role (section 6.5.7),
and finally, a denial in dialogue, which enforces the local accommodation of a
presupposition (section 6.5.8).
Since many of our examples feature possessive definite descriptions, some prelim-
inary words on the analysis of the possessive determiner are in order. To facilitate
our treatment of presupposition, we will assume that the possessive pronoun ‘his’
embeds an anaphoric element ‘he’, and adopt a syntactic analysis in which the
embedded personal pronoun and the genitive morphology are separate anchors.49
The genitive morphology introduces the main discourse marker of the DP while
the pronoun generates a discourse marker of its own. The pronoun’s marker fills
an ownership role relative to the main marker of the DP. When the possessive is
combined with a relational or functional nominal predicate, the pronoun’s marker
fills an internal role of the predicate. The following lexical descriptions of the pos-
sessive definite descriptions ‘his car’ and ‘his wife’ illustrate this.
49If this is not acceptable syntactically, alternatives can easily be provided. Suppose there is
only a single terminal anchor for ‘his’. It could either be assumed that a single node can come
with more than one Π-value. Or it could be assumed that there is a single, maximal Π-value,
and that background values are constructed from subsets of Π-values.
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(6.47) DP+k1
σpik′
σpik′ ∈ Tk1 , σ
pi
k ∈ T
mostsalient
k1
Γk1 |≍ [ | wr: car σ
pi
k′ , wr :σ
pi
kowns σ
pi
k′ ]
Πk′ = [σ
pi
k′ | wr: car σ
pi
k′ , wr :σ
pi
kowns σ
pi
k′ ]
Πk = [σ
pi
k | ]
D
[GEN ]
k3
Dk
he
Possk′
’s
NPk2
car
DP+k1
σpik′
σpik′ ∈ Tk1 , σ
pi
k ∈ T
mostsalient
k1
Γk1 |≍ [ | wr:σ
pi
k′wife-of σ
pi
k ]
Πk′ = [σ
pi
k′ |wr:σ
pi
k′wife-of σ
pi
k ]
Πk = [σ
pi
k | ]
D
[GEN ]
k3
Dk
he
Possk′
’s
NPk2
wife
Furthermore, for convenience, we repeat the local informativity en consisteny
conditions here. We will view these conditions as preferences, and will assume
that they trigger soft constraints on the arguments of sentence and discourse
operators that figure in a given discourse description. We will only represent the
constraints in pictures of discourse descriptions when they are relevant to the
discussion.
Local Informativity ∀k [ ℓ(k)=s→ Γk 6|≍σk]
Local Consistency ∀k [ ℓ(k)=s→ Γk 6|≍ [ | not σk] ]
6.5.1 Binding Relative to an Overt Antecedent
Nothing is changed in our treatment of anaphora resolution and binding. As be-
fore, the Properness Requirement enforces that anaphoric elements are bound,
and that presuppositional conditions are satisfied given binding of the anaphoric
discourse markers in the presuppositional material. In comparison with the pre-
vious discussions, the economy principle introduced in the preceding section now
leads to a more clearcut prediction that readings in which the presupposition is
bound by an overt antecedent are preferred over readings that require content
modification. Consider the following basic example.
(6.48) Pedro has a mule. The animal is happy.
After the hearer’s processing of (6.48), and his reasoning about node identifi-
cations under the assumption that the discourse description is right-closed, the
resulting description may be represented as follows. The DRSs at the nodes rep-
resent semantic values, as usual. We assume that discourse relation elaboration
composes the semantic value of its topnode from the information contents of
its arguments, and constructs the local contexts of its arguments just like the
connective ‘and’, see the lexical description of ‘and’ in (6.43).
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(6.49) S21,r
β16 ⊕ [u2|wr: o0 has u2, wr :mule u2 ]⊕ β25 ⊕ [ | wr: happy σ5]
[lrp]wr: ̺21=̺16, wr: ̺25 ⊆ ̺21
S16
[u2 | wr: o0 has u2, wr:mule u2]
[o0 | wr:Pedro o0] ⊑ B
Pedro has a mule
S31
Rel4
elaboration
S25
[ | wr: happy σ5 ]
Γ25 |≍ [ | wr: animal σ5 ]
the animal is happy
The discourse meaning B⊕ir that can be obtained from (6.49) is given in (6.50a),
where (6.50b) and (6.50c) must be satisfied. The proper name ‘Pedro’ introduces
(6.50b), the definite description ‘the animal’ triggers the presuppositional condi-
tion (6.50c).
(6.50)a.B ⊕ β21 ⊕ β16 ⊕ [u2|wr: o0 has u2, wr:mule u2 ]⊕ β25 ⊕ [ | wr: happy σ5]
b. [o0 | wr:Pedro o0] ⊑ B
c.B ⊕ β21 ⊕ β16 ⊕ [u2|wr: o0 has u2, wr:mule u2 ]⊕ β25 |≍ [ | wr: animal σ5 ]
d. [ | [ u22 | wr:mule u22 ]⇒ [ | wr: animal u22 ] ]
e. [ | wr: animal o0 ]
There are various ways in which the presuppositional condition can be satis-
fied. One option is to identify σ5 = u2 and accept as common knowledge in B
that mules are animals (6.50d). On the basis of the preference for smaller local
backgrounds, all local background values can be identified with [ | ]. On the as-
sumption that the accommodation of common knowledge is costless, this is a ‘no
cost’ reading, and therefore a (most) preferred one.
Another option is to identify σ5 = o0 and accept in B that Pedro is an animal
(6.50e). Again the local background values can be identified with [ | ]. As far as
the preference for smaller backgrounds is concerned, this is also predicted to be
a no cost reading. Intuitively, however, it is less preferred, at least when (6.48) is
uttered in an out-of-the-blue context. An explanation of this may be given along
the following lines. Suppose Pedro is a human being. Then it is slightly uncommon
to refer to a him as an animal. Alternatively, suppose Pedro is an not a human
being but an animal. Then it is somewhat uncommon to talk about an animal
that owns a mule. In each case it might be argued that a somewhat exceptional
or nondefault context of interpretation is presupposed. Apparently, without any
preliminary priming of the context of interpretation in the utterance situation,
accommodation of nondefault information is more costly than accommodation of
what is perceived to be standard common knowledge. Possibly, the reason why
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accommodation is more costly is that what must be accommodated has got to do
with setting the parameters of the ‘genre’ or ‘conversation type’ of the discourse,
rather than just accepting some world knowledge.
Finally, another set of possible solutions results from accepting presupposi-
tional material in a local background that is part of the local context of the def-
inite description. Given axiom A25, there are three mutually exclusive options:
[ σ5 | wr: animal σ5 ] ⊑ β21, or [ σ5 | wr: animal σ5 ] ⊑ β16 or [ σ5 | wr: animal σ5 ] ⊑
β18. Choosing a new discourse marker for σ5, for instance u5, all of these options
correspond to a reading in which there is some animal, not necessarily the mule
or Pedro, which is happy. On the basis of the preference for smaller local back-
grounds, however, this reading is dispreferred relative to the ones resulting from
binding the presupposition trigger either to ‘Pedro’ or to the mule. The most
preferred reading of (6.48) remains the one in which ‘the animal’ refers to the
mule Pedro owns. The corresponding discourse meaning is (6.51a) as constrained
by (6.51b).
(6.51)a.B ⊕ [wr o0 u2 |wr:Pedro o0, wr: o0 has u2, wr:mule u2, wr: happy u2]
b. [ | [ u22 | wr:mule u22 ]⇒ [ | wr: animal u22 ] ] ⊑ B
6.5.2 Nonpresupposing Conditional
Now consider an example in which the most preferred reading involves content
modification. We simplify the discussion by considering only readings in which
both the personal pronoun ‘he’ and the possessive ‘his’ resolve to ‘John’.50
(6.52) If John1 is married, he1 brings his1 wife.
After processing the sentence, reasoning about node identifications, and resolving
both ‘he’ and ‘his’ to the most salient topical element in the context of interpre-
tation, the hearer’s discourse description may be taken to look as follows.
(6.53) S21,r
[ | (β18 ⊕ [ |wr: is-married o1]⊕ β¯19)⇒ (β19 ⊕ [ | wr: o1 brings σ7]) ]
S20
Sub0
if
S18
[ | wr: is-married o1 ]
[ o1 | wr: John o1] ⊑ B
[inf] Γ18 6|≍ [ | wr: is-married o1 ]
[con] Γ18 6|≍ [ | not[ | wr: is-married o1 ] ]
John is married
S19
[ | wr: o1 brings σ7 ]
Γ19 |≍ [ | wr:σ7 wife-of o1]
he brings his wife
50The example was previously discussed in section 6.4.1, labelled as (6.35).
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The discourse description defines a discourse meaning (6.54a) where the con-
straints in (6.54b-e) must be satisfied. The condition (6.54b) is introduced by the
proper name ‘John’, and the definite description ‘his wife’ triggers the presup-
positional condition (6.54c); (6.54d) and (6.54e) are the local informativity and
consistency constraints associated with the antecedent of the conditional.
(6.54)a.B⊕β21⊕ [| (β18⊕ [ |wr: is-married o1]⊕ β¯19)⇒ (β19⊕ [ | wr: o1 brings σ7])]
b. [o1 | wr: John o1] ⊑ B
c.B ⊕ β21 ⊕ β18 ⊕ [ | wr: is-married o1 ]⊕ β¯19 ⊕ β19 |≍ [ | wr: σ7 wife-of o1]
d.B ⊕ β21 ⊕ β18 6|≍ [ | wr: is-married o2 ]
e.B ⊕ β21 ⊕ β18 6|≍ [ | not[ | wr: is-married o1 ] ]
A simple way of satisfying the presuppositional condition would be to accept as
common knowledge in B that John is married and has a wife:
[u22 | wr: is-married o1, wr: u22 wife-of o1 ] ⊑ B
If the hearer has no specific information about John indicating that he is not
married, this is uncontroversial information and he may globally accommodate
it. This would result in a cost-free reading. It can immediately be seen however,
that this solution would violate the informativity and consistency conditions as-
sociated with the antecedent of the conditional, as in the anaphoric account of
presupposition interpretation. Since we assume that these conditions are soft con-
straints, our predictions are less strong, though. The grammar predicts that the
resulting reading of the discourse is dispreferred. Accommodation of the back-
ground material [ σ7 | wr: σ7 wife-of o1] in β21 results in a dispreferred reading for
the same reason.
The other options are to accept [σ7 | wr: σ7 wife-of o1] as background material
in β19 or in β¯19; axiom A24 excludes the inclusion of [ σ7 | wr: σ7 wife-of o1]
in β18. On the basis of the economy principle, the hearer will minimize local
background values, and assume either β19 = [ σ7 | wr: σ7 wife-of o1] or β¯19 =
[ σ7 | wr: σ7 wife-of o1], while the other local background values are set to [ | ]. The
first option corresponds to ‘local accommodation’, the second to ‘intermediate
accommodation’. The corresponding discourse meanings, constrained by (6.55c-
d), are given in (6.55a) and (6.55b) respectively.
(6.55)a.B ⊕ [wr o1 | wr: John o1
[ |wr: is-married o1]⇒ [ σ7 | wr: σ7 wife-of o1, wr: o1 brings σ7]]
b.B ⊕ [wr o1 | wr: John o1
[ σ7 |wr: is-married o1, wr: σ7 wife-of o1 ]⇒ [ | wr: o1 brings σ7]]
c.B 6|≍ [ | wr: is-married o2 ]
d.B 6|≍ [ | not[ | wr: is-married o1 ] ]
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Our treatment does not predict a difference in acceptability between these read-
ings. The preference for accommodation in the main DRS (in B or in β21) does
not distinguish them. Furthermore, the topicality requirement on σ7 is satisfied
in each case by resolving the embedded anaphor to ‘John’, ‘John’ presumably
being a salient element in the local topic domains of both the antecedent and
the consequent of the conditional. For the example at hand it does not seem
to matter, since we have no clear intuition that the one or the other reading is
more preferred. We may just leave it at that and accept both readings as equally
preferred.
Interestingly, the preferred readings of the sentence require content modifica-
tion. In terms of the preference for selecting smaller background values, they are
less than maximally preferred. As we saw, however, a violation of the preference
for local informativity of the antecedent of the conditional results in a dispreferred
reading. Thus, what we want our theory to say in this case is that flouting the
preference for selecting smaller backgrounds is less costly than flouting the local
informativity requirement, or that the second preference overrules the first. The
need for further spelling out the preference system is apparent here.
6.5.3 Presupposing Conditional—
Introducing Local Justification Conditions
Now compare the following example. As we saw in section 6.4.1, where (6.56) was
labelled (6.36), the most preferred reading of this sentence is a presupposing one:
we conclude from (6.56) that John has a wife.
(6.56) If John1 is coming to the conference, he1 brings his1 wife.
Interpreting (6.56), the hearer will construct a discourse description analoguous
to the one in (6.53). It can easily be seen that in this case, the presuppositional
condition triggered by ‘his wife’ can be satisfied through global accommodation
without violating the informativity and consistency constraints associated with
the antecedent of the conditional. Accepting as common knowledge in B that
John has a wife is a cost free solution and the resulting reading will be predicted
to be the most preferred one. The preference for accommodating in the main DRS
of a discourse meaning will strengthen this prediction.
If we want to capture the intuition that the presuppositional material is projected
outside the scope of the conditional because it does not in any way depend on
the antecedent of the condition, we may take up the suggestion made earlier and
associate appropriateness conditions with the conditional, constraining the rela-
tion between local backgrounds and their context of interpretation. The revised
lexical description of the conditional connective in (6.57) shows a way of doing
this. In combination with the following general axiom, it ensures that background
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material is accepted in the scope of a conditional only when it is inferrable in the
local context established by the antecedent of the conditional, but not in the local
context of the conditional as a whole. In other words, the background material it
is informative outside the scope of the conditional.
A27 ∀k[ (k 6=r ∧ β(k) 6=[ | ]) → Γ(top(α−(k)) 6|≍ β(k) ]
We use top(k) to indicate the topnode in the elementary structure anchored by
node k;51 as before, α−(k) is the node to which a node k is negatively anchored.
For nonempty background values, axiom A27 generates the constraints Γk1 6|≍ βk2,
Γk1 6|≍ β¯k3, and Γk1 6|≍ βk3 in conditional structures described by (6.57).
(6.57) S+k1
[ | ik2 ⊕ β¯k3 ⇒ ik3 ]
Sk4
Subk
if
S−k2
Γk2 = Γk1 ⊕ βk2
Γk1 ⊕ σk2 |≍ βk2
S−k3
Γk3 = Γk1 ⊕ ik2 ⊕ β¯k3 ⊕ βk3
Γk1 ⊕ ik2 |≍ β¯k3 ⊕ βk3
As the reader may check for himself, the combination of A27 and (6.57) will push
background material which does not depend on the antecedent of the conditional
but which is satisfiable at some less embedded level in the discourse meaning
outside the scope of the conditional. Note that axiom A27 applies to all clause
and discourse operators. The effect of the axiom is that we can no longer a
have series of nodes upward the accessibility path from a given trigger such that
accommodation at these nodes results in the same reading. Choosing a different
location for accommodation will result in a different reading. If there is a series of
nodes upward the accessibility path of a trigger such that in all of these positions
the background material of the presupposition would be satisfiable in principle,
A27 enforces that the highest position is chosen. Thus, the axiom seems to account
for the ‘drift upward’ of accommodated material.
Dependency constraints like the ones we associated with the conditional con-
struction can in principle be incorporated in the lexical description of other dis-
course and sentence operators as well. We will generally refer to the combination
of constraints triggered by A27 plus the dependency constraints on background
values associated with individual operators as justification conditions. They jus-
tify the insertion of background material in a certain location, when content
modification takes place.
51∀k, k′[ top(k)=k′ ↔ (k=α+(k′) ∧ ¬∃k′′[k=α+(k′′) ∧ k′′+k′]) ]
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6.5.4 Trapping through Direct Binding
We have seen a case in which presuppositional material was captured in the scope
of a conditional because of local informativity constraints. As in the anaphoric
account to presupposition, background material may also be ‘trapped’ in the scope
of an operator because it is bound by one or more discourse markers introduced
in the scope of the operator. This is what happens, for instance, in the following
example.
(6.58) If a1 woman goes shopping she1 takes her1 cell-phone.
We only consider readings in which the indefinite ‘a woman’ binds the anaphoric
elements ‘she’ and ‘her’. Suppose the hearer constructs the discourse description
shown in (6.59).
(6.59)
S21,r
[| (β18 ⊕ [ u1|wr:woman u1, wr: shopping u1]⊕ β¯19)⇒ (β19 ⊕ [ | wr :u1 takes σ7])]
S20
Sub0
if
S18
[ u1|wr:woman u1, wr : shopping u1]
[inf] Γ18 6|≍ [ u1|wr:woman u1, wr : shopping u1]
[con] Γ18 6|≍ [ | not[ u1|wr : woman u1, wr : shopping u1] ]
A woman goes shopping
S19
[ | wr:u1 takes σ7 ]
Γ19 |≍
[ |wr :cell-phone σ7, wr:u1 owns σ7]
she takes her cell-phone
A discourse meaning of the kind (6.60a) can be computed from this, where vari-
ous conditions must be satisfied. One of these is the presuppositional condition in
(6.60b), which is triggered by ‘her cell-phone’. Two others are the local informativ-
ity and consistency conditions associated with the antecedent of the conditional,
(6.60c) and (6.60d).
(6.60)a.B ⊕ β21 ⊕ [| (β18 ⊕ [ u1|wr:woman u1, wr: shopping u1]⊕ β¯19)⇒
(β19 ⊕ [ | wr: u1 takes σ7])]
b.B ⊕ β21 ⊕ β18 ⊕ [ u1 | wr:woman u1, wr: shopping u1 ]⊕ β¯19 ⊕ β19 |≍
[ | wr: cell-phone σ7, wr: u1 owns σ7]
c.B ⊕ β21 ⊕ β18 6|≍ [ u1|wr:woman u1, wr: shopping u1]
d.B ⊕ β21 ⊕ β18 6|≍ [ | not[ u1|wr:woman u1, wr: shopping u1] ]
The last two conditions once more illustrate the point made in section 6.3 that
the local informativity and consistency conditions, when associated as hard con-
straints with all discourse units, are too constraining. The conditions in (6.60c)
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and (6.60d) require that the local context neither supports that there is a woman
who goes shopping, nor supports that it is not the case that there is a woman who
goes shopping. Given world knowledge, the second may plausibly be accepted, but
the first seems unlikely. Unless we have a reason to interpret the semantic content
of the antecedent of the conditional much more specifically than we do here, it is
hard to satisfy the informativity condition. Intuitively speaking there is no infor-
mativity problem with (6.58), the sentence is felicitous. Whether or not there are
women who go shopping in the actual world does not matter. The assumption
that the local informativity conditions are soft constraints saves the account: [inf]
can be violated without making the conditional infelicitous. What remains to be
explained, however, is why violating the informativity preference is unproblematic
in this case, while in, for instance, (6.52) it leads to a dispreferred reading.
Now consider the presuppositional condition in (6.60b). If we attempt to sat-
isfy this by accommodating the information [σ7 |wr: cell-phone σ7, wr: u1 owns σ7],
which might be paraphrased as “u1 owns a cell-phone”, outside the scope of the
conditional, there is a problem with the Properness requirement. Discourse marker
u1 will not be bound. We assume that when a binder is accommodated a fresh
discourse marker is selected. Consequently, the Properness requirement cannot
be satisfied by accommodating [ u1 | ] in addition. The only possibility is to ac-
commodate [σ7 |wr: cell-phone σ7, wr: u1 owns σ7] in β¯19 or β19.
52
Suppose we accept in our discourse theory the justification conditions associated
with the conditional that were introduced above. Then what are the implications
for examples like (6.58)? Setting either β19 or β¯19 to [ | ] on the basis of the economy
principle, the appropriate conditions look as follows. (6.61a) might be called the
dependency constraint triggered by the conditional, (6.61b) may be referred to
as the informativity requirement on local background information.
(6.61)a.B ⊕ β21 ⊕ β18 ⊕ [ u1 | wr:woman u1, wr: shopping u1 ] |≍
[ σ7 | wr: cell-phone σ7, wr: u1 owns σ7]
b.B ⊕ β21 6|≍ [ σ7 | wr: cell-phone σ7, wr: u1 owns σ7]
As for the informativity requirement (6.61b), note that given our definition of
the entailment relation |≍, for any pair of DRSs K,K ′, K 6|≍ K ′ is satisfied if
K ′ contains a free referent. Thus, (6.61b) is satisfied without having any further
effect on the interpretation of the discourse. The dependency constraint (6.61a)
takes on the task of the presuppositional condition at the location where content
52Note that, generally speaking, it is quite plausible that there is / are individuals who own
cell-phones. As common knowledge, this can be accepted in B. Again, it should be avoided
that in accommodating this information, the discourse marker u1 is re-declared, resulting in
requantification of the discourse marker in the output discourse meaning. In other words, we
will not have [ u1 u22 | wr : cell-phone u22, wr : u1 owns u22] ⊑ B. This can be excluded by
adopting a general constraint that prohibits the occurrence of discourse markers in universes
other than the one in which they are base-generated.
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modification takes place. The constraint is very much like the presuppositional
condition in (6.60b), the only difference is that the presuppositional material in
(6.61a) is bound. (6.61a) says that the local context must entail that u1 owns a
cell-phone. Given axiom A25 the background material [ σ7 | wr: cell-phone σ7, wr :
u1 owns σ7] can only be accommodated once.
The dependency constraint is satisfied if, for example, we are prepared to ac-
cept as common knowledge that all women own cell-phones. Alternatively, it may
be assumed that the conditional is a statement about women who own cell-phones,
that is, the dependency constraint induces a restriction on the elements in the
topic domain. Yet another option would be to accept as common knowledge that
women normally own cell-phones, and that the conditional is a statement about
‘default women’. The first of the resulting readings is somewhat implausible, the
other two, however, seem plausible enough. The reading in which the conditional
talks about women who own cell-phones corresponds to the one resulting from
intermediate accommodation (6.62a); the reading in which the conditional talks
about default women corresponds to the one resulting from local accommodation
(6.62b).
(6.62)a.B⊕
[ | [u1 σ7 |wr:woman u1, wr: shopping u1, wr: cell-phone σ7, wr: u1 owns σ7]
⇒ [ | wr: u1 takes σ7] ]
b.B ⊕ [ | [ u1|wr:woman u1, wr: shopping u1]⇒
[ σ7 | wr: cell-phone σ7, wr: u1 owns σ7, wr: u1 takes σ7] ]
6.5.5 Intermediate Readings
It should be clear from the above how so-called ‘intermediate readings’ of condi-
tional or quantificational sentences will be treated in our grammar. Consider
(6.63) Every0 child brings his0 pet animal to school.
Suppose the hearer constructs a discourse description after interpreting (6.63).
He subsequently computes a discourse meaning of the kind (6.64a) from the de-
scription, where various conditions must be satisfied. One of these is the presup-
positional condition shown in (6.64b), which is triggered by ‘his pet animal’.
(6.64)a.B ⊕ β21 ⊕ [| ([ u0|wr: child u0 ]⊕ β¯19)⇒
(β19 ⊕ [ | wr: u0 brings-to-school σ4]) ]
b.B ⊕ β21 ⊕ [ u0 | wr: child u0 ]⊕ β¯19 ⊕ β19 |≍
[ | wr: pet-animal σ4, wr: u0 owns σ4 ]
As with example (6.58), the presuppositional condition cannot be satisfied by
accepting as common knowledge that all children own pet-animals, and accept-
ing the information [ σ4 | wr: pet-animal σ4, wr: u0 owns σ4 ] either in B or in
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β21. Discourse marker u0 would not be bound and the Properness Condition on
(6.64a) prohibits this. The background material can only be accepted in β¯19 or
β19, resulting in the ‘intermediate’ and the ‘local’ reading, respectively.
Just like the conditional connective, the quantifier ‘every’ can be decorated
with conditions on background values in its scope, which ensure that the inser-
tion of background material in the restrictor or the nucleus of the quantificational
structure is justified given the local context. We may adopt the following lexi-
cal description of ‘every’. Axiom A27 will trigger Γk1 6|≍ β¯k2 and Γk1 6|≍ βk2 for
nonempty β¯k2, βk2.
(6.65) S+k1
[ | ([uk | ]⊕ σk4(uk)⊕ β¯k2)⇒ ik2 ]
S−k2
Γk2 = Γk1 ⊕ [uk | ]⊕ σk4 (uk)⊕ β¯k2 ⊕ βk2
Γk1 ⊕ [uk | ]⊕ σk4(uk) |≍ β¯k2 ⊕ βk2
DP+k3
uk
Dk
every
NP−k4
This results in predictions analoguous to the ones we had in the case of (6.58).
The local dependency constraint Γk1 ⊕ [uk | ] ⊕ σk4(uk) |≍ β¯k2 ⊕ βk2 will be
satisfied if we are prepared to accept as common knowledge that every child has
a pet animal. This is implausible, however, because it concerns all children in the
domain of discourse. Alternatively, it may be assumed that (6.63) is a statement
about children that own pet-animals, that is, the dependency constraint induces
a restriction on the elements in the topic domain. This reading may be taken to
correspond to the one resulting from intermediate accommodation, (6.66a). Yet
another option would be to assume that children normally have pet-animals, and
that the conditional is a statement about ‘default children’. This can be taken to
correspond to the reading resulting from local accommodation, (6.66b).
(6.66)a.B ⊕ [ | [ u0 σ4 |wr: child u0, wr: pet-animal σ4, wr: u0 owns σ4]⇒
[ | wr: u0 brings-to-school σ4] ]
b.B ⊕ [ | [ u0 |wr: child u0 ]⇒
[ σ4 | wr: pet-animal σ4, wr: u0 owns σ4, wr: u0 brings-to-school σ4] ]
We leave open how domain restriction should be implemented, and exactly how
it relates to the possibility of accommodating in subsidiary background values in
our grammar. Technically speaking, we can envisage alternative ways in which ‘in-
termediate readings’ can be accounted for. For instance, subsidiary background
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values might be eliminated so that only standard background values would be
available for the insertion of background material. In addition, it might be as-
sumed that quantifiers link up anaphorically to a domain of elements established
outside the scope of the quantificational structure. That domain may be partially
underspecified. Subject to various other constraints, it may be strengthened as a
result of the interpretation process as a whole. Intermediate readings could then
be accounted for in terms of a combination of local accommodation and domain
restriction of the quantifier domain.
A full-fledged account of domain restriction with quantifiers must explain un-
der what conditions domain restriction, as induced by presupposition, is possible,
and when it is not. For instance, it should somehow account for the contrast
between the following examples.
(6.67)a.# Few of the team members can drive, but every team member will come
to the match in her car.
b. Few of the team members can drive, but every team member who owns
a car will come to the match in her car.
Geurts and van der Sandt (1998), ex. 34, based on Beaver (1994).
Intuitively, the statement in (6.67a) is infelicitous, because it suggests that every
team member owns a car. Given world knowledge and common sense reasoning,
this is incompatible with the information that few team members own a car. In
(6.67b), there is no problem, because the second conjunct explicitly talks only
about team members who own a car. As it stands, (6.67a) presents a problem for
our account, because nothing prevents the intermediate accommodation of the
presupposition “x owns a car” resulting in domain restriction of the quantifier
in the second conjunct. The theory predicts that (6.67b) is a possible reading of
(6.67a). Following Geurts and van der Sandt (1998) it may be assumed that inter-
mediate accommodation, and the restriction of the quantifier domain, is excluded
because the domain is already bound to the total set of team members. It must be
assumed that this binding of the quantifier domain takes priority over the restric-
tion of that domain that is potentially induced by presupposition interpretation.
Note that the binding of ‘every team member’ in (6.67a) to the superset of ‘few
team members’ is reinforced by the relation of contrastive parallelism that links
the arguments of ‘but’.
6.5.6 Bridging
Bridging anaphors relate to an antecedent in the preceding discourse through
an implicit bridging link. Although the link is implicit one would expect bridg-
ing anaphors to behave exactly like elements that contain an overt embedded
anaphor, such as, for instance, possessive definite descriptions. Furthermore, the
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dependency and informativity constraints associated with conditionals can be ex-
pected to come in useful, in that they will help to compute or abduce a locally
relevant bridging link, when content modification occurs. As will be shown, this
is correct, but only if we are willing to adopt an analysis of definite descriptions
in which the underspecified bridging link is part of the presuppositional material.
Consider (6.68), which is a variant of example (6.19), discussed in section
6.2.7. We concentrate on readings where ‘he’ resolves to ‘John’.
(6.68) If John1 is married, he1 blackmailed the priest.
Intuitively, in interpreting (6.68) we assume that there was a priest involved in
John’s marriage in some way and we resolve the priest whom John blackmailed to
that individual. This still allows for different readings. The most preferred reading,
in our view, is one resulting from local accommodation, which can be paraphrased
as “If John is married then there is an arbitrary priest involved in his marriage
and John blackmailed him.” There is also a possible reading resulting from global
accommodation, which may be paraphrased as “There is a certain priest, and
if John is married, he blackmailed him.” With additional strengthening of the
implicit background B with information about this priest and John’s relation
to him53 this is an acceptable reading as well, but we will focus on the reading
resulting from local accommodation here.
Interpreting (6.68), the hearer may construct the following discourse descrip-
tion.
(6.69) S21,r
[ | (β18 ⊕ [ |wr: is-married o1]⊕ β¯19)⇒ (β19 ⊕ [ | wr : o1 blackmailed σ7]) ]
S20
Sub0
if
S18
[ | wr: is-married o1 ]
[ o1 | wr: John o1] ⊑ B
[inf] Γ18 6|≍ [ | wr: is-married o1 ]
[con] Γ18 6|≍ [ | not[ | wr: is-married o1 ] ]
John is married
S19
[ | wr: o1 blackmailed σ7 ]
Γ19 |≍ [ | wr: priest σ7]
σ7 ∈ T19
he blackmailed the priest
He may compute discourse meaning (6.70a) from this, where various conditions
must be satisfied. One of these is the presuppositional condition shown in (6.70b),
triggered by ‘the priest’. The other (6.70c) is the local informativity constraint
associated with the antecedent of the conditional.
53For instance, he is the priest performing all marriages in John’s neighbourhood, and known
to be very strict on certain issues, and that’s why John needed to blackmail him.
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(6.70)a.B ⊕ β21⊕
[ | (β18 ⊕ [ |wr: is-married o1 ]⊕ β¯19)⇒ (β19 ⊕ [ | wr: o1 blackmailed σ7]) ]
b.B ⊕ β21 ⊕ β18 ⊕ [ | wr: is-married o1, ]⊕ β¯19 ⊕ β19 |≍ [ | wr: priest σ7 ]
c. [ u22 |wr: priest u22, wr: u22married o1 ]
d.B ⊕ β21 6|≍ [ |wr: is-married o1 ]
To satisfy the presuppositional condition, B may be strengthened with suitable
background information—as in our discussion of (6.19)—on the basis of which it
may be inferred that there is a priest, namely the priest who performed John’s
marriage. The inferred information may look like (6.70c). The informativity re-
quirement (6.70d) prevents that this is accepted in B or in β21. It follows that the
presuppositional condition is satisfied through content modification. If we work
this out, however, there is a surprise: in satisfying the presuppositional condition
through content modification, the bridging link is lost. The background material
introduced by the definite description ‘the priest’ is [ σ7 |wr: priest σ7 ]. Accepting
this material in either β19 or β¯19 and minimizing local background values results in
discourse meanings (6.71a) and (6.71b), constrained by various other conditions.
(6.71)a.B⊕ [ | [ |wr: is-married o1 ]⇒ [ σ7 |wr: priest σ7, wr: o1 blackmailed σ7] ]
b.B⊕ [ | [ σ7 |wr: priest σ7, wr: is-married o1 ]⇒ [ | wr: o1 blackmailed σ7] ]
As in the anaphoric approach to presupposition projection, the descriptive mate-
rial plus a binder is inserted in an accessible location in the discourse meaning. We
could leave it at this, and assume that on the basis of the preference for plausible
readings, the hearer selects an implicit background B which explains why there
is a priest if John is married. But in fact, this is exactly what the justification
conditions associated with the conditional were supposed to regulate. Do they
not enforce the compution of the bridging link? In the example under considera-
tion, the dependency constraint and the informativity constraint triggered by the
conditional are instantiated as follows.
(6.72)a.B ⊕ β21 ⊕ [ |wr: is-married o1 ] |≍ [ σ7 | wr: priest σ7 ]
b.B ⊕ β21 6|≍ [ σ7 | wr: priest σ7 ]
Since common knowledge tells us that there are priests, (6.72a) is easily satisfied.
But then (6.72b) cannot be satisfied. Even when we take into account that σ7
must be in the local topic domain, and allow inferrable entities such as ‘the priest
who married John’ in the topic domain, it is not clear that this would result
in restricting the domain of individuals relative to which [ σ7 | wr: priest σ7 ]
is evaluated. The safest approach to the problem seems to be to represent the
potential underspecified bridging link in the descriptive material of the definite
description. In section 6.2.7 a proposal to this effect was made. The extended
analysis of the definite description is shown in (6.73).
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(6.73) definite det: DP+k1
σpik
σpik2 ∈ Tk1
Γk1 |≍ σ
(piτ)
k2
(σpik )⊕R
pi(piτ)(σpik2)(σ
pi
k )
Πk = [σ
pi
k | ]⊕ σ
(piτ)
k2
(σpik )⊕R
pi(piτ)(σpik2)(σ
pi
k )
Dk
the
NP−k2
Suppose we employ the lexical description in (6.73). Now, if we locally accommo-
date the background material carried by ‘the priest’ in the example under consid-
eration, the resulting discourse meaning will feature the underspecified bridging
relation R. Choosing ‘John’ as a potential antecedent, the justification constraints
on background values associated with the conditional look as follows.
(6.74)a.B ⊕ β21 ⊕ [ |wr: is-married o1 ] |≍ [ σ7 | wr: priest σ7 ]⊕ R
pi(piτ)(o1)(σ7)
b.B ⊕ β21 6|≍ [ σ7 | wr: priest σ7 ]⊕R
pi(piτ)(o1)(σ7)
The constraints in (6.74) are satisfied if, for instance, R = λv.w[ | wr : vmarried w ],
and common knowledge that supports this inference, such as discussed in section
6.2.7), is accepted in B. Thus, in this set-up, the dependency and the informa-
tivity condition associated with the conditional connective induce the abduction
of the bridging link. At the same time they justify the accommodation of the
background material in the scope of the conditional. The discourse meanings rep-
resenting the two resulting, nonpresupposing readings are shown in (6.75a) and
(6.75b), as constrained by further conditions.
(6.75)a.B ⊕ [ | [ |wr: is-married o1 ]⇒
[ σ7 |wr: priest σ7, wr : σ7married o1, wr: o1 blackmailed σ7] ]
b.B ⊕ [ | [ σ7 |wr: priest σ7, wr : σ7married o1, wr: is-married o1 ]⇒
[ | wr: o1 blackmailed σ7] ]
We leave open what route to follow from here. On the one hand, the anaphoric
approach to presupposition interpretation of Van der Sandt (1992) can be mod-
eled in our grammar without adopting the additional appropriateness constraints
associated with conditionals here, and it simply does not make any claims about
bridging anaphora. On the other hand, it is obviously desirable to extend the the-
ory to cover bridging anaphors. They are quite common, and certainly a theory of
presupposition that combines anaphoricity with inference must have something
to say about them. Thus, it will be worthwile to work out the analysis proposed
here.
A central question to be answered shall be whether the format presented above
can be employed for all definite descriptions. How does the analysis work out for
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definite descriptions which resolve to an explicit antecedent directly? Are there
cases in which there really is no anaphoric link of any kind, in which the definite
description is still felicitously used?54 And what about possesive descriptions?
Is the built-in ownership relation the bridging link by definition, or is there an
independent underspecified bridging link in addition? Furthermore, given the im-
portant role of the justification conditions on local backbground values, it will be
necessary to specify them for all clause and discourse operators in the grammar.
6.5.7 Nonpresupposing Disjunction
In the preceding examples, the preference for nonpresupposing readings was ex-
plained in terms of the interaction with local informativity constraints and proper-
ness requirements. Local consistency constraints play a role in accounting for
nonpresupposing readings of disjunctive constructions. Consider the following sen-
tence, which is a variant of (6.38a) discussed in section 6.4.1. We concentrate on
readings in which the possessive, and the pronoun ‘her’ resolve to ‘Wilma’.
(6.76) Either Wilma1 is not married or her1 husband left her1 long ago.
After processing (6.76), the hearer may compose a discourse description of the
following kind.
(6.77) S22,r
[ | (β18 ⊕ [ | not[ | wr: is-married o1 ] ])or (β19 ⊕ [ | wr:σ6 left o1 ]) ]
S21
Adv0
either
S18
[ | not[ | wr : is-married o1 ] ]
[ o1 | wr :Wilma o1] ⊑ B
[inf] Γ18 6|≍ [ | not[ | wr: is-married o1 ] ]
[con] Γ18 6|≍ [ | not[ | not[ | wr: is-married o1 ] ] ]
Wilma is not married
S20
Con6
or
S19
[ | wr:σ6 left o1 ]
Γ19 |≍ [ | wr:σ6 husband-of o1 ]
her husband left her
The hearer may compute discourse meaning (6.78a) from this, as constrained
by various conditions. Among these are the presuppositional condition triggered
by ‘her husband’ (6.78b), the informativity constraint associated with the first
disjunct (6.78c), and the consistency requirement associated with the the first
disjunct (6.78d).
54Heim’s (1982) analysis of definites in terms of familiarity implies that they are always
anaphoric in some way (see in particular the discussion on pp. 364–384). Note that accommo-
dation is a way of satisfying the familiarity requirement.
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(6.78)a.B⊕β22⊕ [ | (β18⊕ [ | not[ | wr: is-married o1 ] ]) or (β19⊕ [ | wr: σ6 left o1 ]) ]
b.B ⊕ β22 ⊕ [ | not(β18 ⊕ [ | not[ | wr: is-married o1 ] ]) ]⊕ β19 |≍
[ | wr: σ6 husband-of o1 ]
c.B ⊕ β22 ⊕ β18 6|≍ [ | not[ | wr: is-married o1 ] ]
d.B ⊕ β22 ⊕ β18 6|≍ [ | not[ | not[ | wr: is-married o1 ] ] ]
Consider (6.78b). The presuppositional condition can in principle be satisfied
by accepting as common knowledge in B that Wilma has a husband. Alter-
natively, this information can be accepted in β22 or in β19. Note that accep-
tance in β18 is prevented by axiom A24, moreover, it would not help to satisfy
(6.78b). Of the three options that are still open, the interaction with the consis-
tency requirement (6.78d) excludes accepting [ σ6 | wr: σ6 husband-of o1 ] ⊑ B
or [ σ6 | wr: σ6 husband-of o1 ] ⊑ β22. Note that it follows from (6.78d) that
B ⊕ β22 ⊕ β18 6|≍ [ | wr: is-married o1 ].
55 Since common knowledge tels us that
when a woman has a husband, she is married, it is clear that this condition can-
not be reconciled with accommodating [σ6 | wr : σ6 husband-of o1 ] in B or in β22.
The only option is to accept [ σ6 | wr : σ6 husband-of o1 ] ⊑ β19. Given minimiza-
tion of local background values, this results in the following discourse meaning,
as constrained by various other conditions:
(6.79) B ⊕ [wr o1 | wr:Wilma o1,
[ | not[ | wr: is-married o1 ] ] or [ σ6 | wr: σ6 husband-of o1, wr: σ6 left o1 ] ]
Note that Global Consistency, which requires discourse meanings to be consistent,
does not enforce local accommodation. If we would accommodate the background
material outside the scope of the disjunction, this would not result in an inconsis-
tent discourse meaning. In the corresponding reading, the first disjunct would be
untrue in the context of interpretation and hence irrelevant, however. The local
consistency requirements associated with the disjuncts prevent this.
Although there is a lot of room for variation in the analysis of disjunctive con-
structions, as far as we can see the justification conditions that may be associ-
ated with the disjunctive construction will be satisfied in the nonpresupposing
reading. Axiom A27, which requires the informativity of local background values
outside the scope of the operator that anchors them, triggers the justification
constraint Γ19 6|≍ β19 for the second conjunct. This would be instantiated as
B ⊕ β22 6|≍ [ σ6 | wr: σ6 husband-of o1 ]. If B contains the common knowledge that
only married woman have husbands, then if the informativity constraint on the
first disjunct (6.78c) is satisfied, this requirement must be satisfied as well. As for
dependency conditions on the background values of the arguments of the disjunc-
55In general we have, for a pair of DRSs Γ,K such that Γ⊕K is proper, if Γ 6|≍ [ | not[ | notK ] ]
then Γ 6|≍ K.
6.5. THE EXTENDED THEORY APPLIED 243
tion, given our asymmetric analysis of disjunction, we might consider assigning
one to the second disjunct. We might have, for example
(6.80) S+k1
[ | ik2 or ik3 ]
S−k2
Γk2 = Γk1 ⊕ βk2
Conk
or
S−k3
Γk3 = Γk1 ⊕ [ | not ik2 ]⊕ βk3
Γk1 ⊕ [ | not ik2 ] |≍ βk3
Instantiating the dependency condition in the example under discussion will pro-
duce the requirement
(6.81) B ⊕ β22 ⊕ [ | not[ | β18 ⊕ [ | not[ | wr: is-married o1 ] ] ] |≍ β19
The hearer may now reason as follows. Suppose [σ6 | wr: σ6 husband-of o1 ] ⊑ β19.
It then follows from (6.81) that the following condition must be satisfied
(6.82) B ⊕ β22 ⊕ [ | not[ | β18 ⊕ [ | not[ | wr: is-married o1 ] ] ] |≍
[ σ6 | wr: σ6 husband-of o1 ]
On the basis of economy, set β22 = [ | ] and β18 = [ | ]. It then follows the condition
reduces to
(6.83) B ⊕ [ | not[ | not[ | wr: is-married o1 ] ] ] |≍ [ σ6 | wr: σ6 husband-of o1 ]
On the assumption that B contains the common knowledge that when a woman
is married she has a husband, and that Wilma is a woman, it holds that
(6.84) B ⊕ [ | not[ | not[ | wr: is-married o1 ] ] ] |≍
[ | [ | wr: is-married o1 ]⇒ [ σ6 | wr: σ6 husband-of o1 ] ]
It also holds that
(6.85) B ⊕ [ | not[ | not[ | wr: is-married o1 ] ] ] |≍ [ | wr: is-married o1 ]
The hearer may conclude from (6.84) and (6.85) that
(6.86) B ⊕ [ | not[ | not[ | wr: is-married o1 ] ] ] |≍ [ σ6 | wr: σ6 husband-of o1 ]
which shows that, given reasonable assumptions about common knowledge in
the implicit background B, the requirement (6.83) holds. In other words, the
background value in the second disjunct is justified in the local context established
by the first conjunct.
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6.5.8 Denial
We like to end this section with a rather different kind of example than is usually
discussed when local accommodation is concerned, namely cases of presupposition
denial or rejection at discourse level. The following exchange, which is a simplified
version of (6.22) discussed in section 6.3, illustrates the phenomenon.
(6.87) A: John made an appointment with Mark’s secretary.
B: Mark doesn’t have a secretary.
Participant A’s utterance triggers the presupposition that Mark has a secretary.
This is subsequently contradicted by participant B. We shall argue that in the
course of the discourse, the presupposition is first accommodated in the main
DRS, but next, as a result of participant B’s reply, accommodated locally. The
presuppositional material is then captured in the scope of a negation introduced
by discourse relation denial.
Let us place ourselves in the position of participant B. After processing A’s
utterance, he may construct a discourse description of the following kind.
(6.88) ∆rcl1 S16,r
[ | wr: o0 made-app-with σ6 ]
[o0 | wr: John o0] ⊑ B
[o5 | wr:Mark o5] ⊑ B
Γ16 |≍ [ |wr: secretary σ6, wr: o5 owns σ6 ]
[inf] Γ16 6|≍ [ | wr: o0 made-app-with σ6 ]
[con] Γ16 6|≍ [ | not[ | wr: o0 made-app-with σ6 ] ]
John made an appointment with Mark’s secretary
A discourse meaning can be inferred from this in the usual way. With some reason-
ing, participant B may deduce discourse meaning (6.89a), where the constraints
in (6.89b-d) must be satisfied. (6.89b) is the presuppositional condition triggered
by ‘Mark’s secretary’, (6.89c) and (6.89d) are the constraints triggered by the
local informativity and the local consistency conditions, respectively.
(6.89)a.B ⊕ β16 ⊕ [wr o0 o5 | wr: John o0, wr:Mark o5, wr: o0 made-app-with σ6 ]
b.B ⊕ β16 |≍ [ |wr: secretary σ6, wr: o5 owns σ6 ]
c.B ⊕ β16 6|≍ [ | wr: o0 made-app-with σ6 ]
d.B ⊕ β16 6|≍ [ | not[ | wr: o0 made-app-with σ6 ] ]
Consider the presuppositional condition (6.89b). This can only be satisfied by
accepting as background information that there is an individual who is Mark’s
secretary. As participant B’s reply shows, this is in fact incompatible with his
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private knowledge or beliefs. Accommodating the presupposition will violate B’s
preference for plausible readings. Nonetheless we assume that, for the sake of
getting A’s meaning, participant B accommodates that there is an individual
who is Mark’s secretary. In principle there are two options. He may accept either
[ σ6 |wr: secretary σ6, wr: o5 owns σ6 ] ⊑ B or [ σ6 |wr: secretary σ6, wr: o5 owns σ6 ]
⊑ β16.
Each of these results in a discourse meaning which entails that there is an indi-
vidual who is Mark’s secretary. Since we have been assuming all along that what
is accepted in the general background B counts as common knowledge, which
is shared between the participants in the conversation, the first option implies
assigning the status of common knowledge to the presupposition. Moreover, if we
maintain the semantics specified in section 4.4.7 (but compare the alternative in
section 6.2.4) discourse markers declared in the universe of B must be o-markers,
and will get a referential interpretation. This means that ‘Mark’s secretary’ would
get a referential interpretation. If the background material is accepted in β16 it
does not receive the status of common knowledge and the definite description can
get an existential interpretation. Depending on whether participant B wants to
conform to what he thinks A intends to convey, or to his private knowledge, he
may prefer either the first or the second option. We assume that both are possible
readings.
The informativity and consistency conditions in (6.89c) and (6.89d) prevent
that any information is accepted in B from which it would follow that John does
(or does not) have an appointment with Mark’s secretary.
Now participant B utters his reply. We suppose that in the preceding stage
of the discourse, participant A, or an arbitrary interpreting agent, built up a
discourse description analoguous to the one represented in (6.88). Processing B’s
contribution, he may construct an updated description of the following kind.
(6.90) ∆rcl2
S21,r
[ |not(β16 ⊕ [ | wr : o0 made-app-with σ6 ]) ]⊕
β25 ⊕ [ | not[u12 |wr : o8 have u12, wr : secretary u12 ] ]
S16
[ | wr : o0 made-app-with σ6 ]
[o0 | wr : John o0] ⊑ B
[o5 | wr:Mark o5] ⊑ B
Γ16 |≍
[ |wr: secretary σ6, wr: o5 owns σ6 ]
J made an app with Mark’s secretary
S31
Rel4
denial
S25
[ | not[u12 |wr: o8 have u12, wr: secretary u12 ] ]
[o8 | wr:Mark o8] ⊑ B
[inc] Γ21 ⊕ i16 |≍ [ | not(β25⊕
not[u12 |wr: o8 have u12, wr: secretary u12 ]) ]
Mark doesn’t have a secretary
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A new discourse meaning (6.91a) can be computed from this, where several con-
ditions must be satisfied. Some are triggered by the names occurring in the dis-
course (6.91b-d), others are the presuppositional condition that we had before
(6.91e) and the incompatibility requirement [inc] introduced by the denial relation
(6.91f). Incompatibility is a characterising condition of denials which enforces that
the semantic content of the denial is incompatible with the information content
of the statement it denies.56 Thus, there is a reason for rejecting or negating the
information that is denied. The incompatibility requirement overrules or makes
superfluous the local informativity and consistency constraints that would apply
to node 25. The informativity and consistency constraints on node 16 (6.91g) and
(6.91h) still apply, however.
(6.91)a.B ⊕ β21 ⊕ [ |not(β16 ⊕ [ | wr: o0 made-app-with σ6 ]) ]⊕
β25 ⊕ [ | not[ u12 |wr: o8 haveu12, wr: secretary u12 ] ]
b. [o0 | wr: John o0] ⊑ B
c. [o5 | wr:Mark o5] ⊑ B
d. [o8 | wr:Mark o8] ⊑ B
e.B ⊕ β21 ⊕ β16 |≍ [ |wr: secretary σ6, wr: o5 owns σ6 ]
f. B ⊕ β21 ⊕ β16 ⊕ [ | wr: o0 made-app-with σ6 ] |≍
[ | not(β25 ⊕ [ | not[ u12 |wr: o8 haveu12, wr: secretary u12 ]) ]
g.B ⊕ β21 ⊕ β16 6|≍ [ | wr: o0 made-app-with σ6 ]
h.B ⊕ β21 ⊕ β16 6|≍ [ | not[ | wr: o0 made-app-with σ6 ] ]
It may be observed that the use of the name ‘Mark’ leads to the introduction of a
fresh discourse marker with the second occurrence. With the first use of a name in
a discourse, the participants (or arbitrary hearers) select a referent directly in the
state of affairs the discourse is about. The referent must be an individual which
their world knowledge tells them is known to all of them, is known to carry this
name, and which is the most plausibe candidate given what is stated about him
or her in the discourse. Known individuals are easily uniquely identifiable given
the situations and events in which they figure. This carries over to the second
use of a name in the discourse, so that on the force of the common knowledge of
the participants, and the speaker’s duty to provide sufficient information for the
hearer to be able to identify the individuals he refers to uniquely, it is likely that
they will pick the same referent with repeated use of the name.57
This does not fully explain, however, why the same referent is picked unfail-
ingly with the repeated use of the name in discourse. There is something of a
discourse effect going on, which ensures local continuity of reference. We suggest
56For some motivation of this requirement, see Van Leusen (2004).
57This also explains why there are relatively few misunderstandings between the participants
in a conversation about who is the intended referent of a given name.
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that names introduce topical individuals, and that they come with the additional
requirement that they should uniquely identify an individual in their local topic
domain. In the case of example (6.87) the discourse relation denial may be taken
to set the topic domain of its right argument to the topic domain of the left ar-
gument, so that the denial and the statement denied have a common topic. The
uniqueness requirement on the name ‘Mark’ relative to the local topic domain
then enforces that o8 and o9 have the same occupant in the state of evaluation.
The interpreting agent may accept [ |wr : o8 is o9 ] ⊑ B.
What about the presuppositional condition (6.91e) triggered by ‘Mark’s sec-
retary’? The denial results in a discourse meaning which entails that Mark does
not have a secretary. The only way to satisfy both Global Consistency and the
presuppositional condition is by accommodating the background material in β16:
[ σ6 |wr: secretary σ6, wr: o5 owns σ6 ] ⊑ β16. Setting β16 to [ σ6 |wr: secretary σ6,
wr: o5 owns σ6 ] and β21 and β25 to [ | ] on the basis of the preference for smallest
possible background values, the interpreting agent may infer discourse meaning
(6.92a), where (6.92b-e) are satisfied. (6.92c) is the incompatibility condition trig-
gered by the denial relation. Clearly, this is satisfied. The local informativity and
consistency conditions on the left argument of the denial (6.92d) and (6.92e) can
be satisfied as before.
(6.92)a.B⊕[ |not[ σ6 |wr: secretary σ6, wr: o5 owns σ6, wr: o0 made-app-with σ6 ],
not[ u12 |wr: o8 haveu12, wr: secretary u12 ] ]
b. [wr o0 o5 o8 | wr: John o0, wr:Mark o5, wr:Mark o8, wr : o8 is o9] ⊑ B
c.B ⊕ [ σ6 |wr: secretary σ6, wr: o5 owns σ6, wr: o0 made-app-with σ6 ] |≍
[ | not[ | not[ u12 |wr: o8 haveu12, wr: secretary u12 ] ] ]
d.B ⊕ [ σ6 |wr: secretary σ6, wr: o5 owns σ6 ] 6|≍ [ | wr: o0 made-app-with σ6 ]
e.B ⊕ [ σ6 |wr: secretary σ6, wr: o5 owns σ6 ] 6|≍
[ | not[ | wr: o0 made-app-with σ6 ] ]
In short, in interpreting B’s reply participant A finds out that global accommo-
dation of the presupposition is no longer an option: the information that Mark
has a secretary contradicts the semantic content of B’s contribution, resulting in
an inconsistent discourse meaning. Global Consistency prohibits this. A reading
is selected so that the background material is captured locally, in the scope of
the negation introduced by the denial. In the course of the exchange, the hearer’s
model of the discourse meaning changes from one that entails that Mark has a
secretary to one that entails that Mark does not have a secretary. In this sense
the presupposition evoked by the first speaker’s utterance is cancelled through
the denial.
As with the disjunctive discourse connective, a justification condition might
be assigned to the right argument of the denial operator. In the example at hand,
where β25 is set to [ | ], it would be trivially satisfied. The justification axiom A27
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triggers a nonsatisfaction constraint on the local background value of the left ar-
gument, β16. This is instantiated as B 6|≍ [ σ6 |wr: secretary σ6, wr: o5 owns σ6 ]
which given Global Consistency and the discourse meaning (6.92a)must be satis-
fied. Axiom A27 enforces that background material accommodated in the scope
of the denial is noninferrable outside its scope. Conversely, presuppositional con-
ditions introduced through the statement that is denied which may plausibly be
satisfied outside the scope of the denial will not be accommodated within its
scope.
6.6 Conclusion
The aim we set ourselves was to integrate two approaches to presupposition the-
ory in our framework of discourse interpretation. One we dubbed the ‘satisfaction’
approach and the other the ‘anaphoric approach’ to presupposition interpretation.
The central claim of the first is that a presupposition evoked by a given clause
must be entailed or satisfied in the local context of the clause. The initial con-
text of interpretation may be strengthened in order to satisfy a presupposition;
this is global accommodation. The main point of the other approach is that pre-
suppositions are anaphoric; if they can be bound in the embedding context, the
descriptive material carried by the presupposition trigger must be inserted where
the binder sits, otherwise, the presupposition is accommodated. This means that
the descriptive material (including a binder) is inserted in an appropriate place
in the discourse meaning.
On the assumption that these approaches capture different, but equally impor-
tant aspects of presupposition theory we provided a combined approach in which,
on the one hand, presupposition triggers can be analysed as anaphors, and on the
other, they introduce a context-sensitive condition which says that the descrip-
tive material they carry must be entailed in their local context. Presupposition
interpretation is modeled as a reasoning process in which binding and satisfac-
tion go hand in hand. If a trigger is anaphoric, the presuppositional condition
must be satisfied given the binding of the anaphoric marker or markers in the
presuppositional material. Conversely, the presuppositional condition functions
as a suitability condition on the resolution of the anaphoric marker. Although
we concentrated on the analysis of definite descriptions, an immediate advantage
of our combined treatment is that it allows a unified analysis of various types of
presupposition triggers, while individual differences can be accounted for.
Fusing the two approaches, we found that each comes with its own type of
accommodation. Starting out from the perspective of satisfaction theory, we de-
fined accommodation as the specification of general background knowledge in the
implicit background of the conversation B. We called this global accommodation.
In order to satisfy presuppositional conditions, world knowledge may freely be
accepted in B—in as far as this is compatible with the other constraints and pref-
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erences in the grammar, of course. Different from what we find in the anaphoric
approach, what is accommodated need not be precisely the presuppositional ma-
terial. It can be any information which the interpreting agent is willing to accept
as common knowledge, either permanently or temporarily. What is accepted in
B will count as information shared between himself and the other discussion
participants.
While global accommodation accounts for strengthening of the initial context
of interpretation, it cannot account for cases in which the interpretation process
calls for the strengthening of local contexts other than B and results in the mod-
ification of the semantic content of a discourse. Most authors agree that there is
a class of ‘nonpresupposing’ readings for presupposition evoking sentences which
can best be accounted for if we accept that binders and presuppositional material
can be accommodated in subordinated positions in a discourse meaning. In the
anaphoric approach this is easily accounted for. There, accommodation is the in-
sertion of presuppositional material in a location on the accessibility path upward
from the presupposition trigger in the DRS that represents the semantic content
of a discourse.
We incorporated the anaphoric notion of accommodation in our grammar
by generalising the original treatment over local background values, associating
these with all discourse units in a discourse description. To avoid unwarranted
weakening of discourse meanings, local backgrounds, though underspecified, are
required to be composed of linguistically generated material only. By restricting
the background material to presuppositional material and binders, we obtain a
constructive treatment of accommodation as in the anaphoric approach to pre-
supposition. This form of accommodation was called content modification. The
outcome, in our combined approach, is that we have two qualitatively different
forms of accommodation. Both are the effect of the hearer’s effort to obtain a
possible and most preferred discourse meaning; if the interpretation task calls for
it, they may co-occur.
Presupposition theory, as implemented in our framework of discourse inter-
pretation, is an integrated part of discourse theory. When a sentence contains a
presupposition trigger, obviously the satisfaction of the presuppositional condi-
tion is a factor in its interpretation. It is not the only factor by far, however. The
hearer may use the total of his grammatical knowledge combined with what the
discourse description tells him, to infer the possible grammatical readings of a
sentence. Reasoning on the basis of his preferences and world knowledge, he will
determine the most preferred readings of the sentence. What comes out as a most
preferred reading is accounted for in terms of the interaction of all grammatical
constraints and preferences involved. This explains that sentences that may be
said to evoke weak presuppositions can get strongly presupposing interpretations.
An important restriction on what may count as acceptable or felicitous read-
ings is represented by the conditions on consistency and informativity in our
grammar. We distinguished global consistency and informativity conditions from
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local ones. The first constrain output discourse meanings, the second constrain
the semantic values of discourse units relative to their local context. The accept-
ability conditions on presupposition resolution of the anaphoric approach can be
modeled in LDG by means of these conditions. It was shown that, while on the
one hand, local informativity and consistency requirements account for various
cases of nonpresupposing discourse, on the other, associating them uniformly with
all discourse units results in a discourse theory that is too strong.
To remedy this, it was suggested that local informativity and consistency
conditions are ‘soft constraints’, which can be violated without resulting in com-
pletely infelicitous discourse. This places local informativity and consistency con-
ditions in the realm of pragmatics in our discourse grammar. Readings which
violate the conditions are no longer predicted to be ungrammatical. Rather, they
are predicted to be dispreferred, and may come in various degrees of infelicity
in principle. Soft constraints on individual discourse units would follow from a
general preference for more informative discourse. It remains to be seen how the
testing of soft constrains can be implemented technically in our grammar.
Preferences play a prominent role in the account in general. They are essential
in cutting down the number of possible readings of a given sentence. Both the
satisfaction approach and the anaphoric approach to presupposition make refer-
ence to the interaction with preferences and world knowledge. Though we have
not provided a formal treatment of the preference system, we may claim that
‘reasoning with preferences’ finds a place naturally in our framework of discourse
interpretation. It supplements logical deduction and common sense reasoning,
and interacts freely with the interpreting agent’s world knowledge, and syntactic
and semantic knowledge in the interpretation task.
We adopted a general preference for more plausible readings, a preference for
smaller background values (economy), and a preference for accommodation in
the main DRS. The last one corresponds to the preference for global over non-
global accommodation in the anaphoric account. The preference for ‘binding’ over
‘accommodation’ in the anaphoric account follows from the second one. Various
candidate preferences popped up in the discussion of the examples: a preference
for logically stronger readings was briefly considered, a preference for avoiding
ambiguity was suggested, and a preference for selecting readings reflecting the
speaker’s point of view (contra hearer’s world knowledge) was mentioned. It was
hinted that when interpreting discourse in an out-of-the-blue context, hearers
preferably set the parameters for ‘genre’ or ‘conversation type’ to unspecific, de-
fault values.
As for the predictions resulting from our combined treatment of presupposi-
tion, if presupposition triggers are analysed as anaphors, and if the preferences
in the discourse grammar are set in the manner of the anaphoric account, the
predictions conform to those of the anaphoric approach. The explanatory force
of the satisfaction approach is preserved in the assumption that presupposition
triggers introduce context sensitive conditions: presuppositions are tests on the
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local context of the expression that triggers them. As such, they set going the rea-
soning process that eventually results in the binding of presuppositional material,
either by an explicit antecedent, or by accommodated material.
Content modification, however, takes away part of the explanatory power of
the presuppositional conditions: under certain conditions, presuppositions are sat-
isfied by their own presuppositional material. As became clear in the course of our
investigations, this can be remedied by adding what we have called ‘justification
conditions’ on background material. Justification conditions explain why back-
ground material is inserted where it is. In as far as we have specified them, they
come partly as dependency constraints associated with individual discourse oper-
ators, and partly in the form of an informativity constraint on the local context
of the incorporating operator.
If we accept justification conditions in our discourse theory, the overall picture
that emerges from our treatment is one in which, one the one hand, presupposi-
tion interpretation is constructive to the extent that it results in the insertion of
presuppositional material at a location in the discourse tree representation. On
the other, the selection of a most suitable location for the projected material is
controlled by satisfaction and non-satisfaction conditions on background material
that sits in these locations. We leave as a question for future research whether jus-
tification conditions could possibly replace the presuppositional condition, given
some leaner set-up of our treatment where the background material carried by a
trigger corresponds exactly to the presuppositional material.
Justification conditions, as they were implemented in our grammar, do not
replace the informativity and consistency constraints on semantic values men-
tioned earlier. They express that background information must be rooted locally,
in its context of interpretation. This is most clearly illustrated with bridging
anaphors, where justification conditions induce the computation of the bridging
link. In their way, justification conditions contribute to the establishment of co-
hesion, and the selection of cohesive readings of discourse as the most preferred
ones. The same goes for the presuppositional conditions associated with triggers.
In fact, the two factors that are combined in our treatment of presupposition,
namely anaphoricity and inference in local contexts, represent main sources of
cohesion in discourse.
We conclude that the satisfaction approach to presupposition and the anaphoric
approach can fruitfully be combined in a single framework of discourse inter-
pretation, if the discourse semantics is rich and fine-grained enough to describe
constraints on binding as well as conditions on local contexts. The approaches
are not incompatible, and with the right setting of preferences and constraints
in the grammar, can be seen to strengthen each other. Integrating them in a
full-fledged discourse theory reduces the work load of presupposition theory as
such. Anaphoric aspects of presuppositions can be explained in terms of the in-
teraction with independent conditions on the properness of discourse meanings,
and topicality and salience requirements on their binders. The analysis of pre-
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suppositions as conditions on local contexts fits in with the general treatment of
context-sensitivity in our grammar framework. The interaction with preferences
and the hearer’s nonlinguistic knowledge in the interpretation task are part and
parcel of the framework.
The treatment of presupposition that we provided can be worked out further,
and as we tried to indicate, in various spots alternative solutions can be chosen.
We have been more concerned with showing some different corners of the search
space, than with putting forward the one and only correct presupposition the-
ory. We hope that on the basis of a careful consideration of that search space,
motivated choices can eventually be made. This may concern, for instance, the
treatment of so-called ‘intermediate readings’ occurring with conditionals and
quantificational structures. Or it may involve making a choice in the precise lex-
ical description of definite descriptions, with a view to the treatment of bridging
anaphors. It may consist in the further spelling out and testing of justification
conditions on background material, and possibly, providing some refinement on
the preference for smaller background values that we adopted. An account of the
costliness of accommodation may be provided.
The coverage of the theory could be extended by the investigation of other
presupposition triggers then the definite determiner, both with respect to their
anaphoricity and their accommodation potential. Furthermore, it might be in-
vestigated whether the local backgrounds, that are now used only to capture
material introduced by presupposition triggers, can be employed in, for instance,
focus interpretation, and the computation of parallellism. Finally, some general
parameters of the discourse theory must be specified. A notorious candidate for
this, by now, is discourse availability, or the theory of discourse topicality and
salience. Another is the preference system.
Chapter 7
Conclusion
In this work, the LDG framework of discourse interpretation was presented. The
framework treats linguistic analysis as a part of human reasoning. It combines a
Logical Description Grammar for discourse with a reservoir of world and com-
mon sense knowledge, and a preference system. While the grammar represents a
language user’s grammatical or linguistic knowledge, the reservoir of world and
common sense knowledge stands for his nonlinguistic knowledge. The preference
system represents his capacity to draw default inferences on the basis of his lin-
guistic and nonlinguistic knowledge, and weigh possible readings of discourse
relative to each other, in order to determine most preferred ones.
The grammar formalism, developed in Van Leusen and Muskens (2003) build-
ing on Vijay-Shanker (1992), Muskens (1995; 2001), and Gardent and Webber
(1998) presupposes two levels of linguistic analysis: the level of discourse descrip-
tions, and the level of the tree structures or linguistic representations that verify
these descriptions. The processing of a discourse T results in a discourse de-
scription ∆T , which is a set of statements in a logical language representing the
language user’s knowledge of the discourse. The logical language or description
language is type logic. The grammar G is a set of statements in type logic as well.
The combined logical theory G +∆T describes the syntax and semantics of T in
parallel. A language user obtains verifying trees by reasoning about ∆T given G.
Thus, parsing is logical deduction. Descriptions can be partial. Since G+∆T can
have more than one model, the syntax and semantics of T may remain underspec-
ified. Discourse is processed incrementally, and the incrementation operation is a
monotonic, that is, no information is ever retracted from a discourse description.
Linguistic representations of discourse are tree structures, decorated with syn-
tactic and semantic information. The semantic information at each node consists
in a semantic value, a local context composed in the style of Karttunen (1974),
and a background value. The semantic representation language is fine-grained
CDRT, a variant of compositional DRT which is spelled out in Van Leusen and
Muskens (2003). The semantic value of the root is constructed compositionally
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from the semantic values and background values of the nodes it dominates. The
discourse meaning is defined as the update of what is taken for granted in the
implicit general background of the discourse with the semantic value of the root
node.
Sentence grammar is fully integrated with discourse grammar. As in Lexi-
calised Tree Adjoining Grammar the lexicon is the ‘motor’ of the grammar system.
All the nodes, structure, and semantic values occurring in a discourse tree are con-
tributed by lexemes or implicit discourse relations described in the lexicon, and
occurring in the discourse. Beside a unified treatment of sentence and discourse
analysis, the LDG architecture guarantees a smooth integration of grammatical
levels. The grammar describes syntax and semantics in tamdem, and the prefer-
ence system covers pragmatics aspects of interpretation. The language user may
access all knowledge sources in parallel.
As a neutral, constraint based system, the framework is a useful tool for the
specification of linguistic theory. While, obviously, we have made certain choices
in the set-up of the discourse theory, individual parameters can be set differently,
even where basic matters like the syntactic structure of discourse representations
or the semantic representation language are concerned. The framework can thus
be employed to integrate and compare different approaches towards one and the
same topic in discourse theory. To show the flexibility of the discourse model, it
was applied in the domain of anaphoricity and presupposition theory.
We found that with a discourse semantics that is sufficiently fine-grained and
rich, approaches to presupposition projection as different in perspective as the
so-called satisfaction approach to presupposition (Karttunen 1974; Heim 1983;
Beaver 1995) and the anaphoric approach (Van der Sandt 1992; Geurts 1999) can
be integrated in a single treatment. The first treats presuppositions as tests on
the context of interpretation. For a sentence to be felicitous or interpretable, the
context of interpretation must entail its presuppositions. Sometimes a presuppo-
sition can only be satisfied by strengthening the context of interpretation; this
is accommodation in the sense of the satisfaction approach. The central claim
of the second approach is that presuppositional material must be bound in the
discourse context of the trigger. If it cannot be bound, it must be inserted at some
semantically accessible location in the discourse context; this is accommodation
in the sense of the anaphoric approach.
We put forward a treatment of anaphoricity in which anaphoric elements
introduce underspecified discourse markers. Through properness conditions on
local contexts and the discourse meaning, the grammar enforces that these dis-
course markers are bound. Anaphora resolution is a reasoning process, in which
a language user determines possible binders for a given anaphoric marker and
selects solutions that result in a most preferred reading of the discourse. We pro-
pose that presuppositional elements in the language introduce a condition that
requires the entailment of the descriptive material they carry in their local con-
text. The relations of entailment and inclusion are made available at object level
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in the semantics. By letting presupposition triggers introduce presuppositional
conditions while at the same time analysing them as anaphors, the gist of both
approaches to presupposition projection is captured.
Presupposition theory is part of discourse theory. The two approaches are for-
mulated in terms of the interaction of general parameters in the discourse theory.
Two parameters that obviously play a role are anaphoricity , and givenness or
inferrability of information in the context of interpretation. A third factor in the
account is accommodation, that is, the specification of background information.
A final one is the constraining effect of preferences. Main preferences in our treat-
ment concern the consistency and informativity of discourse units relative to their
local context, the plausibility of resulting readings, a preference for accommoda-
tion at top level in the discourse meaning, and ‘economy’ or the measure to which
readings require accommodation at all.
Accommodation comes in two forms in our treatment. One is called ‘global ac-
commodation’, and consists in the specification of the implicit general background
of the discourse; in line with the satisfaction approach common knowledge may
freely be accepted in the implicit background if the interpretation task calls for it.
The other is called ‘content modification’, and consists in the insertion of back-
ground material in locations in the discourse meaning that are accessible from
the presupposition trigger. In line with the anaphoric approach what is accommo-
dated is precisely the presuppositional material, including binders. Our treatment
predicts that global accommodation and content modification may co-occur.
The predictions of our combined presupposition theory are variable, because
they depend on the setting of preferences, and choices in the implementation of the
discourse theory in general. If we analyse presupposition triggers as anaphors, the
predictions conform to those of the anaphoric approach, though generally speak-
ing we can distinguish more readings. This is due to the fact that our treatment
of accommodation is richer, and more of the account is handled with preferences.
What comes out as a most preferred reading is the result of the interaction of all
grammatical constraints and preferences involved. Thus, sentences that may be
said to evoke weak presuppositions can get strongly presupposing interpretations.
We conclude that the satisfaction approach and the anaphoric approach to
presupposition are not incompatible. In terms of predictions they overlap and
in terms of explanatory force they can be seen to strengthen each other. This is
particularly clear with accommodation, where ‘satisfaction type’ global accommo-
dation may co-occur with ‘anaphoric style’ content modification. Some spin-off
of our treatment in an underspecification formalism is that a neat declarative
implementation could be provided of aspects of presupposition projection which
are often handled procedurally in the anaphoric approach to presupposition. Fur-
thermore, though our focus was on definite descriptions, because of the flexibility
and generality of our analysis we expect that it can easily be extended to other
classes of presupposition triggers. Next, due to the fact that inferrability in the
local context can be stated as a characterising condition of context-sensitive ele-
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ments in the language a straightforward treatment of bridging anaphors could be
provided. Finally, we gained some insight in the role of informativity and consis-
tency constraints in discourse theory. It was tentatively concluded that these can
better be handled by means of the preference system or soft constraints than by
means of hard constraints.
Much remains to be done, both where the specification of discourse theory
and where the formal properties of the grammar system are concerned. Our treat-
ment of presupposition theory can be further investigated and consolidated. For
instance, the role of so-called ‘justification conditions’, which govern the inser-
tion of background material in accessible locations, could be further explored.
The computation of parallelism and a treatment of focus interpretation might be
spelled out, and its interaction with global accommodation and content modifi-
cation in our grammar investigated. A theory of topic-comment structure and its
effect on the topic hierarchy of discourse needs to be specified. In terms of this
the parameter of discourse availability, topicality, and salience could be filled in,
and its interaction with various classes of anaphors made concrete.
The grammar can be rolled out in different directions. For one, a component
of phonology and intonation needs to be specified. Furthermore, the semantics
can be extended by providing an event semantic fragment and treatment of in-
tensionality in fine-grained CDRT. A semantics for interrogative sentences might
be integrated in the grammar, and we could try to deal with the semantics and
pragmatics of questions and answers. The semantics of argumentative discourse
and nonmonotonic discourse contributions could be further explored. With this
topic, which essentially concerns the commitments and beliefs of the participants,
we probably cross the limit between what can be treated at object level in dis-
course descriptions, and what must be treated at meta level. Generally speaking,
we expect that the specification of a ‘grammar of discourse contributions’ or a
treatment of speech act theory will be a meta level affair.
Technically, there are various questions waiting to be answered. First, we have
seen that preferences play a crucial role in our explanations. We are in the pro-
cess of uncovering what preferences are relevant, and of delimiting aspects in
discourse theory that can be handled by hard constraints from those that re-
quire a treatment with soft constraints. We assumed that a language user can
reason with preferences just as with his other knowledge sources but we have not
provided an implementation of this. A treatment along the lines of Optimality
Theory1 could be pursued. Furthermore, computional aspects of the formalism, in
particular of reasoning with discourse descriptions need to be explored. Concep-
tually, the grammar models the interaction between different grammatical levels
transparantly, but can reasoning about syntax and semantics in tandem in type
logic also be implemented efficiently? What will be the effect on the computa-
1See Prince and Smolensky (1997), Gilbers and de Hoop (1998), Blutner and Zeevat (2004),
and Blutner et al. (2006) on Optimality Theory.
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tion of verifying models for discourse descriptions if we allow less strict linguistic
structures than tree structures?2 And what is the effect of choosing a different se-
mantic representation language? In general, how can the intertwining of linguistic
parsing and logical inference best be tackled in practical implementations?
Furthermore, formal aspects of the grammar as an incremental system may
be explored. In our discourse model, language users reason about the verifying
trees of discourse descriptions given temporary right-closure of the description. It
is clear that when the right-closure assumption is dropped, part of the inferences
or conclusions drawn from the description are lost. One would like to know what
part of the conclusions drawn is independent of the right-closure assumption and
are preserved from update to update. Of the other inferences one would like to
be able to say which will be preserved by default across incrementation steps.
I would like to end here with a plea for synthesis and generality in discourse
theory. Much of the current work in descriptive sentence and discourse semantics
is highly specialised in terms of the issues it addresses, and there is a great variety
in the formal representation systems employed. Still it is tacitly agreed upon that
all findings in a given natural language are to be explained from a single model of
a language user’s linguistic capacity. An isolated analysis of, say, the word ‘again’
in English, can hardly be evaluated on its merits if it is not an integrated part of
discourse theory, where we can see how it interacts with presupposition theory,
focus interpretation, and tense, to name some relevant parameters. Analyses of
different topics in linguistics must be combined so that they may help to evaluate
and strengthen each other. But even when such interactions are taken into ac-
count, our analyses remain gratuitous if there is no common base of assumptions
that we all agree upon. I think that common base is present, but it certainly takes
an effort to dig it up from the diversity of formal systems and competing theories.
The description grammar method may bring some unity in diversity, and help to
specify our discourse theories in one and the same language.
2Compare Blackburn and Gardent (1998) and Duchier and Gardent (1999) on the compu-
tation of minimal models when the verifying structures are DAGs.
Appendix A
A Fine-grained Compositional DRT
In the main text a formalism for semantic representation was introduced in a
somewhat loose fashion. The purpose of this appendix is to give a tighter formal-
isation of this system.
Recall that the description language that was chosen for the grammar is classi-
cal type logic L, and that L is used to talk about all aspects of linguistic structure
including semantic values. Hence, it figures as the semantic representation lan-
guage as well. Our task thus is not to introduce a new logic, but to specifically
tune L to the description of semantic values and semantic relations. In fact, L
(plus some axioms) will be used to talk about semantic mechanisms that are
normally only described metalinguistically. In Muskens (2001) it was shown how
some essential mechanisms of predicate logic can be mimicked on the level of
the object language, using a technique virtually identical to the technique used
for obtaining the embedding of DRT in L known as compositional discourse rep-
resentation theory or CDRT (Muskens 1996). In this appendix, which is based
upon Van Leusen and Muskens (2003), we introduce a treatment of DRT in type
logic which is similar to CDRT but offers a somewhat more fine-grained notion
of DRSs. We shall sometimes refer to it as ‘fine-grained CDRT’ or CDRT+.
Typographical Conventions Let us start with an overview of the typograph-
ical conventions that will be used. We work in classical type logic with ground
types e (entities), ν (tree nodes), l (tree labels), π (registers or discourse markers),
and s (states). It will be expedient to have pairing and projection in the logic. We
will assume that whenever A is a term of type α and B a term of type β, 〈A,B〉
is a term of type α×β. Also, whenever A is a term of type α×β, fst(A) will be a
term of type α (denoting the first element of the denotation of A) and snd(A) a
term of type β (denoting the second element). These terms will have the obvious
semantics.
Since we will have occasion to use many variables and constants in the ground
types that were mentioned and in complex types composed out of these primitive
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Variable Type
x, y, z e
k ν
v π
i, j s
c st× πt
Constants Type
r, 0, 1, . . . ν
pedro, has, . . . νt
elaboration, . . . νt
lex, imp, term νt
pn, cn, tv, rel, . . . νt
dp, vp, d, . . . l
ℓ νl
α+, α− νν
u, o, w νπ
σβ νβ
Constants Type
≺, + (ν × ν)t
V (π × s)t
E (e× e)t
W et
Pedro, . . . (e× e)t
sleeps, . . . (e× e)t
loves, has, . . . (e× e× e)t
B τ
Γ ντ
Table A.1: Some variables and constants with their associated types. Here β varies
over types and τ is an abbreviation of πt× (st× πt)t (the type of DRSs).
ones, it will be convenient to have conventions of the form: ‘whenever v is used,
it will be a variable of type π.’ Table A.1 lists these and also gives the types
of certain constants that will be employed. (Why these types are chosen will
hopefully become clear below.)
Binding Since the treatment of variables (discourse referents) and binding in
Discourse Representation Theory, the theory we wish to emulate internally, is
fundamentally different from their treatment in classical logic, it will be necessary
to axiomatize it here. This is done with axioms A28, A29 and A30 below (see
Muskens 1991, 1996, 2001 for more information1). Variables will be modeled as
registers, memory locations that can hold certain values. They will have type π.
A state (type s) intuitively is an assignment of values (type e) to each register.
We write V (v, i) for ‘the value of register v in state i’ and if δ1, . . . , δn are terms
of type π, we write i[δ1 . . . δn]j for
∀v [(v 6= δ1 ∧ . . . ∧ v 6= δn)→ V (v
′, i) = V (v′, j)] ,
i.e. for ‘i and j differ at most in δ1, . . . , δn’ (with v the first variable in some fixed
ordering which is not free in δ1, . . . , δn). The first axiom, A28, says that, in each
state, each register can be updated selectively, i.e. its value can be set to any x
while the values of other registers remain unchanged. This axiom makes states
and registers essentially behave as assignments and variables respectively.
A28 ∀i∀v∀x∃j [i[v]j ∧ V (v, j) = x]
A29 ∀kk′ ρ(k) 6= ρ′(k′), if ρ, ρ′ ∈ {u, o, w} are distinct
1Note that the axiom numbers here differ from the ones employed in these papers
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A30 ∀k1k2 [ρ(k1) = ρ(k2)→ k1 = k2], if ρ ∈ {u, o, w}
We let u, o, and w be functions from nodes to registers. Axiom A29 ensures that
the images of these functions are disjoint, while A30 requires each to be injective.
In this way we make sure that fresh registers come with each node. This in turn
will make it easy to let indefinites be associated with new discourse referents. The
values of u will typically be associated with new referents, while the values of o
are referents that belong to the ‘background’ of the discourse. The values of w
are registers that can store worlds (see below). In this dissertation we will only
use w(r), the w value of the root.2 A notational convention that we find useful is
to write arguments of u, o, and w as subscripts, e.g. u3 instead of u(3), wr instead
of w(r) etc.
Worlds While states correspond to assignments and registers correspond to
variables, the notion of a possible world corresponds to the technical notion of a
model. We will make some use of possible worlds here, but will not change the
logic—a step often associated with their introduction. Instead we will consider
possible worlds to be objects of type e, i.e. we will simply take them to be (ab-
stract) entities. The predicate letter W will be used for the predicate ‘is a world’
and E will be an existence predicate, so that E(x, y) stands for ‘object x exists
in world y’ and λx E(x, y) is y’s domain. In our semantics we shall make use of
a (finite) set V of predicate letters ({Pedro, has, mule, feeds, . . . }) all of whose
arguments are of type e and whose last arguments are to be interpreted as worlds.
For instance, has(x, y, z) should be read as ‘x has y in world z’. The following
axiom scheme requires that last arguments indeed are worlds and, somewhat rig-
orously, demands that all other arguments of an V relation denote objects in this
world’s domain.3
A31 ∀x1 . . . xn y [R(x1, . . . , xn, y)→ (W (y) ∧E(x1, y) ∧ . . . ∧ E(xn, y))],
for each R ∈ V
A Principle of Plenitude While A28 in a sense required there to be enough
states present for the binding mechanism to work, the axiom scheme A32 below
will put similar requirements on worlds. We will ensure that there are enough
worlds, our models should contain at least all worlds that correspond to finite
models for the language V.4 Define a V-atom to be an atomic formula R(t1, . . . , tn)
2But in extensions containing modal operators it would be natural to use other values of w
as well.
3This will serve present purposes. That the requirement needs to be fine-tuned can be seen
from such classic examples such as ‘worship’, where the object argument need not exist. The
axiom also will need to be adapted if accessibility relations between worlds are considered,
something we shall not do here.
4Compare Van Benthem (1986), where it is argued that, in order to keep complexity down,
natural language semantics should concentrate on finite models.
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with R ∈ V. A V-literal is a V-atom or the negation of a V-atom. The axiom
scheme may be instantiated by any number of variables x1, . . . ,xn and any con-
junction of V-literals ϕ(x1, . . . , xn, y) satisfying the conditions stated.
A32 ∃x1 . . . xny [W (y) ∧ x1 6= x2 ∧ x1 6= x3 ∧ . . . ∧ xn−1 6= xn ∧
∀x [E(x, y)↔ (x = x1 ∨ . . . ∨ x = xn)] ∧ ϕ(x1, . . . , xn, y)],
where ϕ(x1, . . . , xn, y) is any conjunction of V-literals with at most x1, . . . ,xn
and y free that does not contain both a V-atom and its negation.
This axiom scheme will have instantiations such as, say,
∃x1x2x3y[W (y) ∧ x1 6= x2 ∧ x1 6= x3 ∧ x2 6= x3
∧ ∀x [E(x, y)↔ (x = x1 ∨ x = x2 ∨ x = x3)]
∧ has(x1, x2, y) ∧ ¬has(x2, x3, y) ∧mule(x2, y) ∧ hay(x3, y)] .
Thus every finite world is stipulated to exist, as we can easily produce an exhaus-
tive description in this way. Note that this does not only ensure the existence of
many worlds but also the existence of a multiplicity of states. Since, according to
A28, each register of a state can be selectively updated with type e values, and
since worlds are type e objects, each state will have many variants differing only
from it in the value of the register wr.
5
A Fine-grained Compositional DRT In the following paragraphs we will
give some definitions that will make key concepts of Discourse Representation
Theory available in the description language of the discourse grammar. The defi-
nitions are based upon the semantic axioms that were given above and the DRT
concepts that result are used throughout the book on what might be called the
semantic tier of the grammar formalism.
Compositional Discourse Representation Theory (Muskens 1996; 2001) is an
emulation of DRT in type logic. Semantic representations in CDRT look like
DRSs, but actually they are abbreviations of formulae in type logic mimicking
the behaviour of DRT. An essential characteristic of the CDRT formalism is that
L is used to talk about notions which in standard DRT belong to the metalan-
guage. We have already seen how assignments (verifying embeddings) and variable
binding can be modeled at object level and will see some more examples shortly.
Some of the structure present in the representations of standard DRT is will be
imported to the level of the semantic objects they denote.
The approach chosen here has much in common with that of Muskens (1996),
but also differs from it in an important respect. What the two approaches have
in common is that both are based on a transcription of truth conditions for DRT,
5States that have worlds in u or o registers are not formally excluded, but are of no relevance.
We will also not bother to formally exclude that worlds are elements of the domains of (other)
worlds.
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carried out within an axiomatic extension of type logic. The difference between the
two treatments results from the fact that while in Muskens (1996) the DRT truth
conditions that were transcribed were those of Groenendijk and Stokhof (1991),
we use a variant of the semantics in Zeevat (1989) here. In this way we get a
more fine-grained DRT semantics (in the sense that we get stronger requirements
on the identity of DRSs), which suits our present purposes better and may be
thought interesting in itself.
Preliminary Syntactic Sugaring Some abbreviations introducing set-theoretic
notation will come in handy.
A.1. Definition. Let A1, . . . , An be terms of some type α and let X be the first
variable of that type not free in these terms, then
{A1, . . . , An} abbreviates λX [X = A1 ∨ . . . ∨X = An] .
Furthermore, let A and B be terms of some type (α1(· · · (αnt) · · ·)) and let
X1, . . . , Xn be variables such that each Xi is of tye αi. Then
A ∪B abbreviates λX1 . . .Xn [AX1 . . .Xn ∨ BX1 . . .Xn] ,
A ∩B abbreviates λX1 . . .Xn [AX1 . . .Xn ∧ BX1 . . .Xn] ,
A ⊆ B abbreviates ∀X1 . . . Xn [AX1 . . .Xn → BX1 . . . Xn] .
Choosing Types for Conditions and DRSs In Zeevat (1989) the semantic
value of a Discourse Representation Structure K is a pair consisting of (a) a set
of discourse referents (the universe of K) and (b) a set of assignments. The latter
consists of all those assignments that verify all conditions in K. This could easily
be transposed to the present set-up by letting the first part of any DRS K consist
of a set of registers (type πt) and its second part of a set of states (type st), so
that the type of DRSs would be πt × st. However, we opt for a variant of this
approach and will deviate from Zeevat’s treatment in two respects. Firstly, we
will follow Visser (1994) in keeping track of the free discourse referents in any
DRS or condition (see also Van Eijck and Kamp (1997)). This can be done by
letting conditions be pairs of (a) sets of states and (b) sets of registers (those that
are free in the condition). The type of a condition will then become st× πt.
The second deviation from Zeevat is that we will let the second part of a DRS
K consist of a set of conditions rather than of a single condition representing their
conjunction. Having sets of conditions around without conjoining their members
embodies the hypothesis that the language system sometimes addresses one of
these in isolation.
With these modifications the type of DRSs becomes πt× (st×πt)t, which we
will often abbreviate as τ . The alternative formalization will give stronger identity
criteria on DRSs.
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Freedom and Properness Given that the free referents of a condition form
its second element, the free referents of any DRSK can easily be computed: these
are the ones that are free in some condition of K but are not in the universe of K.
A DRS will be proper if it has no free referents. These notions are made available
to the logic with the following definitions.
free(K) abbreviates λv∃c [¬fst(K)(v) ∧ snd(K)(c) ∧ snd(c)(v)]
proper(K) abbreviates ¬∃v free(K)(v)
Boolean Structure on DRSs The two following notions,merge and inclusion,
play a key role in the algebra of Discourse Representation Structures.
A.2. Definition. Let K and K ′ be terms of type τ .
K ⊕K ′ abbreviates 〈fst(K) ∪ fst(K ′), snd(K) ∪ snd(K ′)〉
K ⊑ K ′ abbreviates fst(K) ⊆ fst(K ′) ∧ snd(K) ⊆ snd(K ′)
We will typically be interested in type τ objects 〈{δ1, . . . , δn}, {γ1, . . . , γm}〉 with a
finite universe {δ1, . . . , δn} and a finite set of conditions {γ1, . . . , γm}. Such DRSs
we prefer to write as [δ1 . . . δn | γ1, . . . , γm], in a way reminiscent of the usual ‘box’
notation for DRSs.
Truth and Consequence A DRS K is true in a state i if there is a j, differing
from i at most as far as the universe of K is concerned, such that j verifies all
conditions in K. We will write true(K) for
λi∃j(∀v [¬fst(K)(v)→ V (v, i) = V (v, j)] ∧ ∀c(snd(K)(c)→ fst(c)(j))) .
Here ∀v [¬fst(K)(v)→ V (v, i) = V (v, j)] says that i and j differ at most with re-
spect to discourse referents in the universe of K, while ∀c(snd(K)(c)→ fst(c)(j)))
says that j satisfies (the first parts of) all conditions of K.
On the finite DRSs we are interested in, true(K) is equivalent with the more
readable
λi∃j (i[δ1 . . . δn]j ∧ fst(γ1)(j) ∧ . . . ∧ fst(γm)(j)) .
The notion of DRS truth immediately leads to a notion of DRS consequence:
K ′ is said to follow from K if A |= true(K) ⊆ true(K ′), i.e. if K ′ is true in
all states i in which K is true, in any model of the axioms. This notion can be
relativised to any description D by saying that K ′ follows from K given D if
D,A |= true(K) ⊆ true(K ′). It will be seen shortly how a similar notion can be
obtained on the level of the describing logic.
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The DRT Sublanguage Until now we have not paid much attention to the
internal structure of DRSs, but this will now be remedied by giving a definition
of the DRT language as a sublanguage of type theory. The next definition gives
notation for conditions.
A.3. Definition. Let R ∈ V, let δ1, . . . , δn be terms of type π (discourse refer-
ents), and let K and K ′ be terms of type τ (DRSs). Then
R{δ1, . . . , δn} abbreviates 〈λi.R(V (δ1, i), . . . , V (δn, i)), {δ1, . . . , δn}〉
δ1 is δ2 abbreviates 〈λi.V (δ1, i) = V (δ2, i), {δ1, δ2}〉
not K abbreviates 〈λi.¬true(K)(i), free(K)〉
K ⇒ K ′ abbreviates not (K ⊕ [ | not K ′])
K or K ′ abbreviates 〈true(K) ∪ true(K ′), free(K) ∪ free(K ′)〉
Note that R{δ1, . . . , δn} predicates R of the values of δ1, . . . , δn in some state, not
of these registers themselves. We shall write R{δ, wr} as wr:Rδ and R{δ1, δ2, wr}
as wr: δ1Rδ2. It is also worthwile to note that the definition keeps track of the
referents that are free in any condition.
Let us consider the sublanguage of type st×πt and type τ terms that is given
by the following Backus-Naur form, and dub it the DRT sublanguage. Here the δ
range over π terms that have the form ρ(n), where ρ ∈ {u, o, w} and n is a node
name. The R are taken from V.
γ ::= R{δ1, . . . , δn} | δ1 is δ2 | not K | K ⇒ K
′ | K or K ′
K ::= [δ1 . . . δn | γ1, . . . , γm]
Translation into Predicate Logic It is useful to know that there are simple
truth-preserving translations from the DRT sublanguage to predicate logic. The
following one is taken from Muskens (1996) (but see also Kamp and Reyle (1993)).
A.4. Definition. Let † be a function that injectively maps each δ to a variable
of type e. The function tr from st×πt terms in the DRT sublanguage to predicate
logical formulas and the function wp, which takes a pair consisting of a τ term
and a predicate logical formula and yields a predicate logical formula, are defined
as follows.
tr(R{δ1, . . . , δn}) = R(δ
†
1, . . . , δ
†
n)
tr(δ1 is δ2) = δ
†
1 = δ
†
2
tr(not K) = ¬wp(K,⊤)
tr(K ⇒ K ′) = ¬wp(K,¬wp(K ′,⊤))
tr(K or K ′) = wp(K,⊤) ∨wp(K ′,⊤)
wp([δ1 . . . δn | γ1, . . . , γm], χ) = ∃δ
†
1 . . . δ
†
n [tr(γ1) ∧ . . . ∧ tr(γm) ∧ χ]
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For any formula ϕ and state variable i, let ϕi be the result of substituting V (δ, i)
for δ†, for each δ† that is free in ϕ. The following holds.
A.5. Theorem. Let K be a τ term in the DRT sublanguage and let i be an
arbitrary type s variable. Let Σ contain all statements δ 6= δ′, for every pair δ, δ′
of syntactically different discourse referents in K. Then
Σ,A |= wp(K,⊤)i ↔ true(K)(i)
The disequality statements are needed: If, say, 12 and 9 corefer, it follows that
[u12 | wr:mule u9] and [u9 | wr:mule u9] corefer as well, but the translation would
not preserve this. In practice this will be no limitation at all.
For a proof of the theorem, abbreviate λiλj (i[δ1 . . . δn]j ∧ fst(γ1)(j) ∧ . . . ∧
fst(γm)(j)) as gs(K)(i)(j) and use induction on complexity in the DRT sublan-
guage construction to show that, given the axioms and disequalities, wp(K,χ)i ↔
∃j [gs(K)(i)(j) ∧ χj] and tr(γ)i ↔ γ(i), for all K and γ. This can be shown us-
ing the methods of Muskens (1996, 2001). gs(K)(i)(j) is the Groenendijk-Stokhof
notion of DRS update potential.
Note that, given these rules, wp([ | ],⊤) = ⊤, i.e. the empty DRS [ | ] will be
true in every state. Conversely wp([ | not[ | ]],⊤) = ⊥, so that [ | not[ | ]] in fact
plays the role of the falsum on the DRS level. We will sometimes abuse notation
and write ⊤ for [ | ] and ⊥ for [ | not[ | ]].
Object Level Entailment Logical relations such as entailment and consis-
tency can be approximated at the level of the describing logic, as we shall see
presently. Suppose thatK is a DRS with wr in its universe, whileK
′ does not have
wr in its universe. Then the condition K ⇒ K
′ quantifies over possible worlds.
This is best illustrated with an example: let us take K to be [wr o1 | wr:mule o1],
‘there is a mule’, and let K ′ be [u2 | wr: farmer u2, wr: u2 owns o1], ‘some farmer
owns the mule’, so that K ′ should not be made to follow from K. Then, for
arbitrary i,6
tr(K ⇒ K ′)i = ∀y∀x1 [mule(x1, y)→ ∃x2 [farmer(x2, y) ∧ owns(x2, x1, y)]] .
In view of A31 this is equivalent with
∀y[W (y)→
∀x1 [(mule(x1, y) ∧ E(x1, y))→
∃x2 [E(x2, y) ∧ farmer(x2, y) ∧ owns(x2, x1, y)]]] ,
from which it is seen that indeed quantification over worlds is involved. Note that
A32 immediately provides a singleton-domain counterexample to this purported
6Here K ⇒ K ′ is closed. This will be the typical situation in applications.
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strict implication and in general it will give finite counterexamples if there are
such.
Conditions K ⇒ K ′ are of type st × πt and we will typically want to state
conditions on the t level. The following definition adds the necessary quantification
over states / assignments, but also excludes that the condition K ⇒ K ′ contains
free discourse referents.
A.6. Definition. Let K and K ′ be terms of type τ .
K |≍ K ′ abbreviates ∀i fst(K ⇒ K ′)(i) ∧ ¬∃v snd(K ⇒ K ′)(v)
We will write K 6|≍ K ′ for ¬(K |≍ K ′). Note that |≍ in a sense only approximates
the notion of ordinary entailment: not all possible counterexample worlds are
guaranteed to exist in any model, although all finite ones are.
Object Level Substitution It will come in handy to have available a substi-
tution operation on discourse referents. We define {δ/δ′}K, ‘the substitution of
δ′ by δ in a DRS K’ as follows.
A.7. Definition. Let U range over terms of type πt (sets of discourse referents),
γ over terms of type st× πt (conditions), C over terms of type (st× πt)t (sets of
conditions), and K over terms of type πt× (st× πt)t (DRSs). We write
{δ/δ′}U for λv[(U(v) ∧ ¬v = δ′) ∨ v = δ]
{δ/δ′}γ for 〈λi∃j[i[δ′]j ∧ V (j, δ′) = V (i, δ) ∧ fst(γ)(j)], {δ/δ′}snd(γ)〉
{δ/δ′}C for λc∃c′[C(c′) ∧ c = {δ/δ′}c′]
{δ/δ′}K for 〈{δ/δ′}fst(K), {δ/δ′}snd(K)〉
Given this definition, for instance {u2/u1}[ u1 |wr: sleep u1 ] is equivalent to [ u2 |
wr: sleep u2 ].
The Background As explained in the main text, the background B should
have at least three properties. First, it should be proper, secondly, none of the
discourse referents uk, which should be novel, should already be contained in its
universe, but, thirdly, the actual world wr should be so contained. The following
axiom ensures this.
A19 proper(B) ∧ ¬∃k fst(B)(uk) ∧ fst(B)(wr)
Appendix B
Axioms of the Grammar
This appendix sums up the general descriptions or axioms in the A component
of our LDG grammar systems, apart from the ones that define the CDRT+ sub-
language of our description language, which can be found in appendix A. We also
include the main definitions of incremental LDG here.
Dominance and precedence in tree structures In the description language
of the grammar nodes are indicated by k, k1, k2, . . .. Furthermore ≺ denotes linear
precedence,  denotes immediate dominance, ∗ denotes dominance, and +
proper dominance. A node k1 dominates a node k2 if k1 properly dominates k2,
or if k1 is identical to k2.
A1 ∀k r∗k
A2 ∀k ¬ k+k
A3 ∀k1k2k3 [[k1
+k2 ∧ k2
+k3] → k1
+k3]
A4 ∀k ¬ k≺k
A5 ∀k1k2k3 [[k1≺k2 ∧ k2≺k3]→ k1≺k3]
A6 ∀k1k2 [k1≺k2 ∨ k2≺k1 ∨ k1
+k2 ∨ k2
+k1 ∨ k1=k2]
A7 ∀k1k2k3 [[k1
+k2 ∧ k1≺k3]→ k2≺k3]
A8 ∀k1k2k3 [[k1
+k2 ∧ k3≺k1]→ k3≺k2]
A9 ∀k1k2 [k1k2 → k1
+k2]
A10 ∀k1k2k3¬[k1k3 ∧ k1
+k2 ∧ k2
+k3]
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AxiomA1 states that the root r dominates all other nodes.A2–A5 ensure that+
and ≺ are strict partial orderings. The Exhaustivity property, A6, says that any
two nodes stand either in a precedence relation or in a relation of dominance.The
Inheritance property, laid down in A7 and A8, says that precedence relations
are inherited from ancestor nodes. Finally, A9 and A10 constrain the relation
between immediate dominance and proper dominance.
Syntactic Labelling and Lexical Anchoring The description language con-
tains the labeling function ℓ, which assigns syntactic category labels to nodes. To
ensure that nodes are labeled uniquely, it must be prevented that category label
names corefer. This is what A11 does.
A11 c1 6= c2, if c1 and c2 are distinct label names
The following three general descriptions are the anchoring axioms of the grammar.
The predicate lex says that a node is lexical, and the functions α+ and α− produce,
respectively, the positive and negative anchor of a node. For example α+(k1) = k2
says that k1 is positively anchored to k2.
A12 ∀k lex(α+(k))
A13 ∀k [k = r ∨ lex(α−(k))]
A14 α−(r) = r
Axiom A12 requires that the positive anchor of a node is lexical and A13 requires
the same for negative anchoring, except for the root. The root is negatively an-
chored to itself (A14). The positive and the negative anchor of a given node can
but need not be identical.
Incorporating Implicit Anchors To incorporate implicit anchors we differ-
entiate between lexically expressed nodes and terminal nodes. Terminal nodes are
nodes which do not dominate any other node:
A15 ∀k[term(k) ↔ ¬∃k′ : k+k′]
Anchors are now required to be terminal, rather than lexical. We adjust the
anchoring axioms A12 and A13, replacing ‘lex’ with ‘term’.
A12′ ∀k : term(α+(k))
A13′ ∀k[k = r ∨ term(α−(k))]
The predicate imp indicates that a node is terminal but not lexical. This makes
the node into an implicit anchor :
A16 ∀k[imp(k) ↔ term(k) ∧ ¬lex(k)]
Implicit anchors occur only with discourse relations:
A17 ∀k : imp(k) → rel(k)
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Incremental LDG The relation of immediate precedence, denoted by≺l, and
the relation of immediate lexical succession (ILS), denoted by the symbol ≺ι are
defined as follows.
Immediate Precedence ∀k1, k2[k1≺l k2 ↔ k1≺k2 ∧ ¬∃k3(k1≺k3≺k2)]
ILS ∀k1, k2[k1≺ι k2 ↔ (k1≺l k2 ∨ ∃k3(k1≺l k3≺l k2 ∧ imp(k3)))]
A node k2 immediately lexically succeeds a node k1, or k2 is a immediate lexical
successor of k1 if and only if k1 immediately precedes k2, or there is a single
implicit anchor which immediately succeeds k1 and immediately precedes k2.
The characterising properties of the incrementation operation are Addition and
Lexical Contiguity . The first adds the new input description δi+1 to the discourse
description built up so far, ∆i. The latter makes the leftmost lexical node named
in the new input description into the immediate lexical successor of the rightmost
lexical node named in the discourse description. The initial discourse description
is the empty set.
Addition ∆i ∪ {δi+1} ⊆ ∆i + δi+1.
Lexical Contiguity {nRML∆i ≺ι nLMLδi+1} ⊂ ∆i + δi+1, where i > 0.
Initial Discourse Description ∆0 = ∅
Incrementation
1. ∆0 + δ1 = ∆0 ∪ {δ1}
2. ∆i + δi+1 = ∆i ∪ {δi+1} ∪ {kRML∆i ≺ι kLMLδi+1}, where i > 0.
Left and Right Closure To compute verifying tree models of discourse de-
scriptions, they must temporarily be closed off. The following axioms constrain
‘left-closure’ (LC) and ‘right-closure’ (RC) of discourse descriptions. The special
node names 0 and nfin refer to the nodes representing the first and the last lexical
element in a discourse. nfin changes with each incrementation step.
LC ¬∃k(k ≺ 0)
RC ¬∃k(nfin ≺ k)
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Local Contexts and the Implicit Background For each node k in a tree
structure, its local context Γ(k) is computed top-down from the local context of its
mother node (if it has one) and the semantic values of its (left) sister nodes. This
is regulated by means of the elementary structures in the lexicon and axiom A18.
The axiom sets the local context of the root node Γ(r) to the implicit background
or global context of the discourse B (a type τ constant), and it says that nodes of
a syntactic category other than S inherit the local context of their mother node.
Here k1  k2 abbreviates k1 
+ k2 ∧ ¬∃k[k1 
+ k ∧ k + k2].
A18 Γ(r) = B ∧ ∀k1k2 [[k1  k2 ∧ ℓ(k2) 6= s]→ Γ(k2) = Γ(k1)]
The background B is subject to a few general constraints, and these are summed
up in A19. We use fst(B) to denote the universe of B. The implicit background
must be a proper DRS, its universe should not contain any u-markers, and the
marker occupied by the actual world, wr, must be bound in the universe of B.
A19 proper(B) ∧ ¬∃k fst(B)(uk) ∧ fst(B)(wr)
No node can have wr as its semantics:
A20 ¬∃k σpik = wr
Felicity Conditions on Consistent and Informative Updating These
come in two forms: global conditions and local ones. The first constrain discourse
meaning and may be seen as characterising conditions of discourse contributions.
The second apply to discourse constituents. They constrain the arguments of
individual discourse connectives and relations.
Global Consistency B ⊕ σr 6|≍ ⊥
Global Informativity For a discourse contribution updating a discourse de-
scription ∆ to ∆ + δ, there must be a DRS K such that
∆rcl 6|= (B ⊕ σr |≍ K) and (∆ + δ)
rcl |= (B ⊕ σr |≍ K).
Local Informativity ∀k [ ℓ(k)=s→ Γk 6|≍σk]
Local Consistency ∀k [ ℓ(k)=s→ Γk 6|≍ [ | not σk] ]
Discourse contributions may be classified in terms of the monotonicity property:
Monotonic contribution A discourse contribution resulting in an update ∆+δ
of a discourse description ∆ is monotonic iff
∀K if ∆rcl |= (B ⊕ σr |≍ K) then (∆ + δ)
rcl |= (B ⊕ σr |≍ K)
Nonmonotonic contribution A discourse contribution resulting in an update
∆ + δ of a discourse description ∆ is nonmonotonic iff
∃K such that ∆rcl |= (B ⊕ σr |≍ K) and (∆ + δ)
rcl 6|= (B ⊕ σr |≍ K)
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Properness Condition For any discourse description, the discourse meaning
B ⊕ σk, and the local contexts of all nodes in the described structure must be
proper DRSs:
A21 proper(B ⊕ σr) ∧ ∀k[ proper(Γk)]
Axiom A21 subsumes the first part of axiom A19, which states some properties
of the implicit background. The latter may now be reformulated as
A19′ ¬∃k fst(B)(uk) ∧ fst(B)(wr)
Chomskian Binding Conditions Using gvc(k) to represent the governing cat-
egory of a node k, and cc(k, k′) to denote that a node k c-commands a node k′, the
binding principles (A), (B), and (C) can be formalized as additional constraints
within the discourse theory, as follows.
Binding Conditions in LDG
(A) ∀k[ refl(k)→ ∃k′(gvc(k)∗k′ ∧ cc(k′, k) ∧ σ(k)=σ(k′)) ]
(B) ∀k[ pron(k)→ ¬∃k′(gvc(k)∗k′ ∧ cc(k′, k) ∧ σ(k)=σ(k′)) ]
(C) ∀k[ pn(k) ∨ det(k)→ ¬∃k′(cc(k′, k) ∧ σ(k)=σ(k′)) ]
Referential and Existential Readings An alternative treatment may be
adopted in which some discourse referents declared in the universe of the global
background are referential while others are interpreted existentially. This can be
achieved by employing the existing difference between o-markers and u-markers to
distinguish between referential and existential interpretations, rather than ‘back-
ground’ and ‘new’ markers. The following semantic axiom regulates this; ‘ref ’ is
a πt-type predicate which marks a discourse referent as referential.
A22 ∀k.ref (ok) ∧ ∀k.¬ref (uk)
We no longer exclude u-markers from the universe of the global background of
the conversation. Arguably, it may also be required that o-markers, resulting in
referential interpretations, are in the universe of the global background only. Thus,
instead of A19 we would have
A19′′ proper(B) ∧ ∀k fst(B)(ok) ∧ fst(B)(wr)
In addition, the truth definition we had must be replaced with one that excludes
the set of all o-markers from interpretation as an existentially bound variable: ‘a
DRS K is said to be true in state i with respect to a set of externally anchored ref-
erents ‘ref ’ if true(〈fst(K)− ref , snd(K)〉)(i) holds.’ As before, o-markers receive
their interpretation from i0 directly.
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Content Modification Every S-node k in a discourse description comes with a
background set b(k) of type νt, a possibly empty set of nodes. The nodes function
as pointers to linguistically generated material. In principle, any lexical element or
implicit anchor with accommodation potential can provide this material, but we
focus on anaphors and presupposition triggers here. These come with a value Πk
of type τ which constitutes the background material generated by the trigger. For
every node k, a local background or background value βk of type τ is constructed
from its background set b(k) by taking the generalised merge of the background
material at the nodes in b(k):1
A23 ∀k[ βk =
⊕
{Πk′| k
′ ∈ b(k)} ]
In order to account for intermediate accommodation in conditionals and quantifier
structures, it may be assumed that S-nodes come, in addition, with a subsidiary
background set b¯(k) of type νt. Axiom A19 must then be strengthened to A23′.
A23′ ∀k[ βk =
⊕
{Πk′| k
′ ∈ b(k)} ∧ β¯k =
⊕
{Πk′| k
′ ∈ b¯(k)} ]
Local backgrounds must be composed of presuppositional material generated by
the stretch of discourse they are the local background of. The following axiom
takes care of this. It says that background sets b(k), or b¯(k), contain only terminal
nodes k′ dominated by k. The effect of this is that the background value of an
arbitrary node or discourse unit k will be constructed only from background
material introduced by elements in the lexical yield of k.
A24 ∀k, k′[k′ ∈ b(k) ∨ k′ ∈ b¯(k))→ (term(k) ∧ k ∗ k′)]
Arguably, background material, if it is accommodated, can only be consumed
once. To avoid multiple accommodation, axiom A25 may be adopted.
A25 ∀k, k′, k′′[(k′ ∈ b(k) ∧ k′ ∈ b(k′′))→ k′′ = k] and
∀k, k′, k′′[(k′ ∈ b¯(k)↔ k′ 6∈ b(k)) ∧ ((k′ ∈ b¯(k) ∧ k′ ∈ b¯(k′′))→ k′′ = k)]
For each S-node k, its information content ik is the merge of its background value
and its semantic value:
A26 k[ℓ(k) = s → ik = βk ⊕ σk]
Discourse meanings may now be described as the update of the general back-
ground B with the information content of the discourse: B ⊕ ir.
1This abbreviates the statement
∀k[∀v(fst(β(k))(v)↔ ∃k′(b(k)(k′) ∧ fst(Π(k′))(v)))∧
∀c(snd(β(k))(c)↔ ∃k′(b(k)(k′) ∧ snd(Π(k′))(c)))]
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For any given S-node k, its local context is constructed top down from the lo-
cal context of its mother node, the information content of left sister nodes when
present, and its own local background. Most of this is laid down in the lexicon
of the grammar. The following axiom, which is a revised version of A18, sets the
local context of the root node r to B ⊕ βr and the local contexts of non S-nodes
to the local context of their mother node.
A18′ Γ(r) = B ⊕ βr ∧ ∀k1k2 [[k1  k2 ∧ ℓ(k2) 6= s]→ Γ(k2) = Γ(k1)]
Economy The following preference constrains the local background values of
nodes. The effect is that readings resulting from nontrivial content modification
are predicted to be less preferred, or ‘more costly’, than those that do not require
content modification at all. The Van der Sandtian preference for ‘binding’ over
‘accommodation’ follows from this.
[Prefer smaller local backgrounds]
For all nodes k and DRSs K,K ′, prefer βk = K over βk = K
′ if K ⊑ K ′.
Justification Condition The following axiom requires that background ma-
terial is accepted in the scope of an operator only when it is informative outside
the scope of the operator. We generally refer to the combination of constraints
triggered by A27 plus the dependency constraints on background values asso-
ciated with individual operators in the lexicon as justification conditions. They
justify the insertion of background material in a certain location, when content
modification takes place.
A27 ∀k[ (k 6=r ∧ β(k) 6=[ | ]) → Γ(top(α−(k)) 6|≍ β(k) ]
We use top(k) to indicate the topnode in the elementary structure anchored by
node k:
∀k, k′[ top(k)=k′ ↔ (k=α+(k′) ∧ ¬∃k′′[k=α+(k′′) ∧ k′′ + k′]) ]
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Summary
This work presents the Logical Description Grammar framework of discourse in-
terpretation, and applies the model in the domain of anaphora resolution and
presupposition theory. The purpose of the enterprise is to provide what might be
called a common language for the specification of discourse theory. Much of cur-
rent research in linguistics and discourse semantics focuses on highly specialised
issues. Moreover, it employs a number of different formal representation systems,
so that the analyses provided are sometimes hard to compare. Although it is un-
avoidable that alternative treatments of one and the same topic arise in a field
of research where we may meet with uncertainties of various kinds, such a dis-
persion of linguistic findings need not be accepted. Even when we concentrate
on details or isolated phenomena, linguistic theory is essentially a theory of the
whole of a language user’s linguistic capabilities. Analyses of different topics must
be combined so that they may help to evaluate and strengthen each other.
The LDG framework of discourse interpretation is a flexible system which
allows much freedom in setting the parameters of discourse theory. As such it may
help to integrate and compare findings currently spread over different approaches
or spelled out in different formal theories. Thus, a shared discourse theoretical
perspective may be developed.
The LDG framework is a reasoning system, the central component of which
is a so-called Logical Description Grammar (LDG) for discourse. The grammar
represents the language user’s linguistic knowledge. To obtain the full meaning of
a discourse, however, linguistic knowledge is not enough. Language users employ
world knowledge and knowledge of what is normally the case as well. They are
able to infer a most plausible interpretation of a discourse, given their combined
linguistic and nonlinguistic knowledge. Therefore, the framework of discourse in-
terpretation also includes a reservoir of world knowledge, and a so-called default
reasoning component and preference system.
A standard (non-LDG) discourse grammar generates linguistic representations
or discourse representations for a given discourse. Usually, these are tree struc-
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tures, decorated with syntactic labels and features, lexemes, and semantic values.
If a single sentence or discourse has more than one possible analysis or interpre-
tation, the grammar generates a different representation for each of them. We
say, in that case, that the discourse is ambiguous or underspecified . An example
is given in (B.1); this is a common case of underspecification at discourse level,
where the relation of coherence linking two statements is underspecified.
(B.1) John fell. Bill pushed him.
We may fill in the implicit relation between the events described in (B.1) differ-
ently. Either John fell, and subsequently, Bill pushed him. Or we infer that John
fell because Bill pushed him, so the pushing took place before the falling.
Ambiguity and underspecification may come in various forms and guises in a
given language, and discourse abounds with it. A grammar formalism can capture
the interpretation of an ambiguous sentence or discourse by producing all possi-
ble linguistic representations and corresponding meanings. However, it can also
produce a single representation, which underspecifies the syntactic or semantic
properties that are variable and differ across the possible representations. De-
scription grammars are of the latter kind. For any given sentence or discourse
they generate a single description, which specifies all that is invariable about the
input. In (B.1), it will say that there is a relation between the events expressed
by the two sentences, but it will not specify which one.
The LDG for discourse employed here is developed in Van Leusen and Muskens
(2003) building on Vijay-Shanker (1992), Muskens (1995; 2001), and Gardent and
Webber (1998). It presupposes two levels of linguistic analysis, namely that of the
descriptions, and that of the linguistic representations they describe. Discourse
is processed incrementally. Each processing step results in an updated discourse
description. This is a set of statements in a logical language (type logic) repre-
senting the language user’s knowledge of the discourse. The grammar is a set of
statements in type logic as well. The combined theory of the grammar and a dis-
course description describes the syntax and semantics of the discourse in parallel.
Since descriptions can be partial, syntactic or semantic properties of a discourse
may remain underspecified. For any given discourse description, its linguistic rep-
resentations can be obtained by reasoning about the tree structures and semantic
values that ‘fit’ or ‘verify’ the description, given his grammar. Discourse parsing
comes down to logical deduction.
Sentence grammar is fully integrated with discourse grammar. As in Lexi-
calised Tree Adjoining Grammar (Joshi 1987; Joshi and Schabes 1991) the lexicon
is the ‘motor’ of the grammar system. All the nodes, structure, and semantic val-
ues occurring in a discourse tree are contributed by lexemes or implicit discourse
relations described in the lexicon, and occurring in the discourse. Beside a unified
treatment of sentence and discourse analysis, the LDG architecture guarantees
a smooth integration of grammatical levels. The grammar describes syntax and
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semantics in tamdem, and the preference system covers pragmatics aspects of
interpretation. The language user may access all knowledge sources in parallel.
In order to provide a full-fledged, context-sensitive compositional semantics,
discourse tree structures are decorated with various kinds of semantic information.
Each node in a discourse tree carries a semantic value, a local context composed
in the style of Karttunen (1974), and a background value. The semantic repre-
sentation language is fine-grained CDRT, a variant of compositional DRT put
forward in Van Leusen and Muskens (2003). The semantic value of the root is
constructed compositionally from the semantic values and background values of
the nodes it dominates. Furthermore, each discourse comes with a underspecified
general background value B, which represents what is implicitly taken for granted
by the participants in the conversation. Discourse meaning is defined as the up-
date of this implicit background B with the semantic value of the root node of
the discourse tree.
The framework of discourse interpretation is applied in the domain of anaphor-
icity and presupposition theory. It is shown that with a discourse semantics that
is sufficiently fine-grained and rich, approaches to presupposition projection as
different in perspective as the so-called satisfaction approach to presupposition
(Karttunen 1974; Heim 1983; Beaver 1995) and the anaphoric approach (Van der
Sandt 1992; Geurts 1999) can be integrated in a single treatment. The first treats
presuppositions as tests on the context of interpretation. For a sentence to be
felicitous or interpretable, the context of interpretation must entail its presup-
positions. Sometimes a presupposition can only be satisfied by strengthening the
context of interpretation; this is ‘accommodation’ in the sense of the satisfaction
approach. The central claim of the second approach is that presuppositional mate-
rial must be bound in the discourse context of the trigger. If it cannot be bound, it
must be inserted at some semantically accessible location in the discourse context;
this is ‘accommodation’ in the sense of the anaphoric approach.
In the LDG framework, anaphoric elements introduce underspecified discourse
markers. Through properness conditions on local contexts and the discourse mean-
ing, the grammar enforces that these discourse markers are bound. Anaphora
resolution is a reasoning process, in which a language user determines possible
binders for a given anaphoric marker and selects solutions that result in a most
preferred reading of the discourse. Presuppositional elements are anaphoric, but
they also introduce a condition that requires the entailment of the descriptive
material they carry in their local context. By letting presupposition triggers in-
troduce presuppositional conditions while at the same time analysing them as
anaphors, the gist of both of the above mentioned approaches is captured. The
relations of properness and entailment are made available at object level in fine-
grained CDRT.
The resulting fused presupposition theory is part of the discourse theory: it
is formulated exclusively in terms of the interaction of general parameters of
the discourse theory with the syntactic-semantic characterisation of presuppo-
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sition triggers in the lexicon. Discourse parameters that play a central role are
anaphoricity , and the givenness or inferrability of information in the context of
interpretation. A third factor is accommodation, that is, the specification of back-
ground information when the interpretation task calls for it. A fourth one is the
constraining effect of preferences. Main preferences in this treatment concern the
consistency and informativity of discourse units relative to their local context,
the plausibility of resulting readings, accommodation at top level in the discourse
meaning, and ‘economy’—which applies to the measure to which readings require
accommodation.
Interestingly, accommodation comes in two forms, which can co-occur. One is
‘global accommodation’, and consists in the specification of the implicit general
background of the discourse; in line with the satisfaction approach common knowl-
edge may freely be accepted in B—though subject to consistency constraints and
the like. The other is ‘content modification’, and consists in the insertion of back-
ground material in locations in the discourse meaning that are accessible from
the presupposition trigger. In line with the anaphoric approach what is accom-
modated is precisely the presuppositional material, including binders.
The predictions of the resulting presupposition theory obviously depend on
the setting of preferences, and choices in the implementation of the discourse
theory in general. When presuppositional elements are analysed as anaphors, the
predictions conform to those of the anaphoric approach, though generally speak-
ing more readings will be distinguished. This is due to the fact that the treatment
of accommodation is richer, and more of the account is handled with preferences.
What comes out as a most preferred reading is the result of the interaction of
all grammatical constraints and preferences involved. Thus, sentences that may
be said to evoke weak presuppositions can get strongly presupposing interpreta-
tions. In terms of explanatory force the satisfaction approach and the anaphoric
approach to presupposition can be seen to strengthen each other. This is partic-
ularly clear with accommodation, where ‘satisfaction type’ global accommoda-
tion may co-occur with ‘anaphoric style’ content modification. Apart from this,
the presuppositional condition functions as a suitability constraint on potential
binders of the presuppositional element.
Some spin-off of the implementation in LDG, as in other underspecification
formalisms, is that a transparant declarative treatment is provided of aspects of
presupposition projection that are often handled procedurally in the anaphoric
approach to presupposition. Furthermore, because of the flexibility and general-
ity of the analysis it can be expected to cover a wide range of presupposition
triggers, including bridging anaphors. Finally, some insight in the role of local
informativity and consistency conditions in discourse theory is gained. It is ten-
tatively concluded that these can better be handled by means of the preference
system or soft constraints, rather than hard constraints.
Descriptiegrammatica voor Teksten
Samenvatting
In dit werk wordt een model voor tekstinterpretatie ontwikkeld, en toegepast
op het gebied van de anaforenresolutie en presuppositietheorie. Het model is
gebaseerd op een zogenaamde Logische Descriptie Grammatica (LDG) voor tekst-
structuur en betekenis, waarbij ‘tekst’ zowel mono- als dialogisch kan zijn, en
zowel gesproken als geschreven.
Het achterliggende doel van het model is om te voorzien in een algemene
specificatietaal voor theoriee¨n van tekstinterpretatie. Veel van het huidige on-
derzoek in de lingu¨ıstiek en semantiek houdt zich bezig met zeer gespecialiseerde
onderwerpen. Bovendien wordt gebruik gemaakt van uiteenlopende formele repre-
sentatiesystemen, waardoor analyses soms moeilijk te vergelijken zijn. Ofschoon
het, in een onderzoeksveld waarin onzekerheden van uiteenlopende aard bestaan,
onvermijdelijk is dat alternatieve analyses van een en hetzelfde onderwerp voor-
gesteld worden, hoeft zo’n verregaande verbrokkeling van onderzoeksresultaten
niet geaccepteerd te worden. Ook wanneer we ons concentreren op details of
eigenstandige onderwerpen, is taaltheorie in essentie een theorie van het geheel
van het taalvermogen van de gebruikers van een gegeven taal. Het verdient de
voorkeur om onderzoek aan deelonderwerpen te combineren, zodat de resultaten
elkaar kunnen versterken en tot wederzijdse evaluatie kunnen leiden.
Het LDG model is theorieneutraal en laat een grote vrijheid toe bij het in-
stellen van de parameters waaruit een theorie van tekstinterpretatie bestaat. Als
zodanig kan het dienen om analyses die verspreid zijn over verschillende bena-
deringen, of die in verschillende formele theoriee¨n gevat zijn, te integreren en te
vergelijken. Op die manier kan een gezamenlijk teksttheoretisch perspectief ont-
wikkeld worden, zonder dat individuele verschillen van inzicht noodzakelijk teniet
worden gedaan.
De centrale component van het model is een Logische Descriptie Grammatica
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voor tekst. De grammatica representeert de lingu¨ıstische kennis van een taalge-
bruiker. Dat betreft zowel kennis van de vorm (syntaxis) als van de betekenisop-
bouw (semantiek) van zinnen en grotere teksteenheden. Lingu¨ıstische kennis is
echter niet genoeg om de volledige betekenis van een tekst te bepalen. Taal-
gebruikers benutten daarenboven wereldkennis, en kennis van wat gebruikelijk of
waarschijnlijk is. Op basis van de combinatie van die kennisbronnen kunnen ze een
meest plausibele interpretatie van een tekst afleiden. Het model bevat daarom ook
een reservoir van wereldkennis, en een zogenaamde default-redeneercomponent
met een preferentiesysteem. Het geheel vormt een kennis- of redeneersysteem.
Een gewone tekstgrammatica genereert lingu¨ıstische representaties voor een
gegeven tekst. Vaak zijn dat grafen of boomstructuren, die syntactische labels,
woorden, en semantische waarden op hun knopen dragen. Als een enkele zin of
tekst meer dan e´e´n mogelijke analyse of interpretatie heeft, genereert de gram-
matica meerdere representaties. We zeggen dan dat de tekst ambigu of onderge-
specificeerd is. Een typische vorm van onderspecificatie op tekstueel niveau wordt
ge¨ıllustreerd door het volgende tekstje.
(B.2) Jan viel. Piet duwde hem.
De impliciete relatie tussen de gebeurtenissen beschreven in (B.2) kan op verschil-
lende manieren ingevuld worden. Het is mogelijk dat Jan viel en dat Piet hem
daarna duwde. Het kan echter ook zo zijn dat Jan viel doordat Piet hem duwde,
met andere woorden, de tweede zin geeft de oorzaak van het feit dat Jan viel, en
Piets duw gaat vooraf aan het vallen van Jan.
Ambigu¨ıteit komt veel voor en kent talloze verschijningsvormen. Een tekst-
grammatica kan ambigue zinnen of teksten in principe analyseren door alle moge-
lijke representaties en bijbehorende interpretaties op te sommen. De karakte-
ristieke eigenschap van descriptiegrammatica’s is echter dat ze een enkele beschrij-
ving of descriptie genereren, waarin de syntactische of semantische eigenschappen
die niet gedeeld worden door de verschillende mogelijke representaties onderge-
specificeerd zijn. In het geval van (B.2) zou zo’n descriptie wel zeggen dat er
een coherentierelatie is tussen de twee zinnen, maar niet een bepaalde relatie
specificeren.
De Logische Descriptie Grammatica (LDG) in het model, ontwikkeld in Van
Leusen en Muskens (2003) op basis van Vijay-Shanker (1992), Muskens (1995;
2001), en Gardent andWebber (1998), veronderstelt twee niveaus van lingu¨ıstische
analyse, namelijk dat van de descripties, en dat van de lingu¨ıstische representaties
die ze beschrijven. Tekst wordt verwerkt per zin of bijzin, en iedere verwerkings-
stap levert een uitbreiding van de tot dan toe opgebouwde tekstdescriptie op.
Een tekstdescriptie vertegenwoordigt de kennis die de taalgebruiker van de tekst
heeft op een bepaald moment in het verwerkingsproces. Formeel is een tekstde-
scriptie niets anders dan een verzameling beweringen of vereisten in een logische
taal (in dit geval typelogica), en dit geldt ook voor de grammatica zelf. De gram-
matica en de descriptie van een gegeven tekst vormen samen een logische theorie
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die de syntaxis en de semantiek van de tekst beschrijft. Aangezien een descrip-
tie partieel kan zijn, kunnen syntactische of semantische eigenschappen van een
tekst ondergespecificeerd blijven. De mogelijke lingu¨ıstische representaties van
een tekst worden verkregen door logisch te redeneren over de boomstructuren en
semantische waardes die aan de tekstdescriptie voldoen.
Zins- en tekstgrammatica zijn volledig ge¨ıntegreerd in LDG. Zoals in gelexi-
caliseerde Tree Adjoining Grammar (Joshi 1987; Joshi and Schabes 1991) is het
lexicon de motor van de grammatica. Alle knopen, structurele verbindingen en
semantische waarden waaruit een representie is opgebouwd, worden aangeleverd
door de woorden en impliciete elementen die in de tekst voorkomen. Het lexicon
beschrijft de syntactische en semantische bijdrage van die elementen. De archi-
tectuur van het model waarborgt verder een soepele integratie van verschillende
grammaticale niveaus. De grammatica beschrijft syntaxis en semantiek parallel,
en het preferentiesysteem stelt daarbij eisen aan pragmatische aspecten van in-
terpretatie. De taalgebruiker heeft toegang tot al deze kennisbronnen tegelijk.
Het LDG model voorziet in een contextgevoelige compositionele semantiek
voor tekst. De knopen in een tekstrepresentatie dragen niet alleen een semantische
waarde, maar ook een achtergrondwaarde, en een locale context. De laatste verte-
genwoordigt de ‘op die knoop’ relevante context van interpretatie. De gebruikte
semantische representatietaal is ‘CDRT+’, een fijnmazige variant van composi-
tionele Discourse Representatie Theorie (DRT). De semantische waarde van de
topknoop representeert de betekenisinhoud van de tekst. Verder nemen we aan dat
een tekst of conversatie altijd ge¨ınterpreteerd wordt in de context van datgene wat
de participanten stilzwijgend vooronderstellen of als vanzelfsprekend aannemen.
Dit noemen we de impliciete algemene achtergrond . De betekenis van een tekst is
dynamisch gedefinieerd als de incrementatie van deze algemene achtergrond met
de betekenisinhoud.
In eerste helft van de dissertatie wordt het LDG model uiteen gezet. In de
tweede helft wordt het toegepast in het domein van de anaforenresolutie en pre-
suppositietheorie. Anaforen zijn woorden zoals bijvoorbeeld ‘zijn’, ‘hij’, en ‘dit’,
die verwijzen naar individuen, objecten of gebeurtenissen die eerder vermeld zijn
in de tekst. Presuppositionele elementen zijn woorden of constructies die iets
zeggen over wat de spreker of schrijver vooronderstelt, zonder het expliciet te be-
weren. In de volgende zin bijvoorbeeld, roepen zowel ‘het artikel’ als het gebruikte
werkwoord ‘lukken’ een presuppositie op.
(B.3) Het is Kees niet gelukt het artikel te publiceren.
Ofschoon het er niet met zoveel woorden staat, nemen we aan dat er een bepaald
artikel bestaat, en dat Kees een poging gedaan heeft het te publiceren. Tegen de
achtergrond van deze voorveronderstellingen of presupposities wordt de zin een
betekenisvolle uitspraak.
We laten zien dat met behulp van de gegeven descriptiemethode twee sterk in
karakter verschillende benaderingen van presuppositietheorie op vruchtbare wijze
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met elkaar gecombineerd kunnen worden. De ene, ontwikkeld in Karttunen (1974),
Heim (1983), en Beaver (1995), noemen we hier de contextuele support theorie
van presuppositie. Ze behandelt presupposities als tests, of eisen die in de context
van interpretatie vervulbaar moeten zijn. Soms is een presuppositie alleen vervul-
baar door de context te versterken, dat wil zeggen door aan te nemen dat daarin
bepaalde informatie aanwezig is. Dit heet ‘accommodatie’. De andere benadering,
afkomstig van Van der Sandt (1992) en Geurts (1999), wordt de anaforische the-
orie van presuppositie genoemd. Hier is het centrale idee dat presuppositioneel
materiaal gebonden moet worden in de context van de constructie die de pre-
suppositie oproept. Als het materiaal niet gebonden kan worden, moet het, met
een binder, toegevoegd worden op een ‘toegankelijke’ positie in de context. Dit is
‘accommodatie’ in de zin van de anaforische benadering.
In het LDG model introduceren anaforen ondergespecificeerde tekstreferenten.
Door middel van een algemene welgevormdheidseis (‘properness’) op locale con-
texten en de tekstbetekenis wordt afgedwongen dat die tekstreferenten gebonden
zijn in de locale context van de anafoor. Anaforenresolutie is een redeneerpro-
ces, waarbij de taalgebruiker de mogelijke binders voor een gegeven tekstreferent
bepaalt, en een binding selecteert die tot een meest plausibele lezing van de tekst
leidt. Presuppositionele elementen worden geanalyseerd als anaforen, die boven-
dien de vereiste met zich meedragen dat hun descriptieve materiaal een logisch
gevolg van de locale context is. Op deze manier wordt de kern van beide bovenge-
noemde presuppositietheoriee¨n in de analyse gevat. De semantische relaties van
‘properness’ en logisch gevolg zijn op objectniveau beschikbaar in CDRT+.
Presuppositietheorie is een integraal onderdeel van de teksttheorie. Ze is gefor-
muleerd in termen van de interactie tussen algemene parameters in de tekst-
theorie, en de karakteristieke eigenschappen van presuppositionele elementen zoals
gespecificeerd in het lexicon. De parameters die een centrale rol spelen, zijn anafo-
riciteit en infereerbaarheid van informatie in de interpretatiecontext. Een derde
factor van belang is accommodatie, dat wil zeggen de specificatie van achter-
grondinformatie als bijeffect van de interpretatietaak. Een laatste factor is het
beperkende effect van preferenties. De belangrijkste preferenties die in de analyse
een rol spelen hebben betrekking op the consistentie en informativiteit van zin-
nen of tekstdelen in hun interpretatiecontext, de plausibiliteit van de resulterende
lezingen, de positie binnen de tekstbetekenis waar geaccommodeerd wordt, en de
mate waarin materiaal geaccommodeerd wordt (‘zuinigheid’).
Er zijn twee vormen van accommodatie, die tegelijkertijd voor kunnen komen.
De een is ‘globale accommodatie’, waarbij de impliciete algemene achtergrond van
de tekst verder gespecificeerd wordt. Zoals in de contextuele support benadering
kan algemene kennis zonder meer geaccepteerd worden in de impliciete achter-
grond van de tekst, al moeten natuurlijk consistentie-eisen en dergelijke in acht
worden genomen. De ander heet ‘inhoudsmodificatie’, en bestaat uit het invoegen
van presuppositioneel materiaal plus binders op toegankelijke locaties binnen de
betekenisinhoud van de tekst, zoals in de anaforische benadering.
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De voorspellingen van de resulterende presuppositietheorie hangen uiteraard
af van de manier waarop de preferenties ingesteld zijn, en van de keuzes die bij
de implementatie van de teksttheorie gemaakt zijn. Wanneer presuppositionele
elementen als anaforen geanalyseerd worden, volgen de predicties die van de
anaforische benadering, ofschoon er in het algemeen meer toegelaten lezingen
zullen zijn. Dat laatste komt doordat accommodatie in het LDG model een rij-
kere notie is en doordat een groter deel van de analyse steunt op preferenties.
Wat uiteindelijk als meest geprefereerde lezing uit de bus komt wordt bepaald
door de interactie van alle relevante parameters en preferenties in de grammatica.
Zodoende kunnen zinnen die een logisch zwakke presuppositie oproepen toch een
sterk presupponerende interpretatie krijgen. In termen van verklarende kracht
versterken de twee benaderingen elkaar. Dit is vooral duidelijk bij accommodatie,
waarbij de kwalitatief verschillende ‘globale accommodatie’ en ‘inhoudsmodifi-
catie’ tegelijk voor kunnen komen. Verder fungeert de presuppositionele conditie
als geschiktheidseis op potentie¨le binders van het presuppositionele element.
Zoals ook in andere onderspecificatiemodellen het geval is, biedt LDG een
heldere, declaratieve analyse van aspecten van presuppositietheorie die in de
anaforische benadering meestal procedureel behandeld worden. Verder mag van-
wege de flexibiliteit van de analyse verwacht worden dat ze breed toepasbaar is,
en aan de diversiteit binnen de klasse van presuppositionele elementen recht kan
doen. Tot slot heeft het onderzoek verder inzicht in de rol van locale informati-
viteits- en consistentie-eisen op interpretatie opgeleverd. De tentatieve conclusie is
dat zulke eisen wellicht het best door middel van preferenties of ‘zachte condities’
ge¨ımplementeerd kunnen worden.
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